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Summary 
Economic Diversification and Development in Resource-dependent Economies: 
Lessons from Chile and Malaysia 
Abdelkader Amir Lebdioui 
This thesis investigates the role of the state in promoting economic diversification in 
countries that are over-reliant on the extraction of non-renewable resources. The 
objective of this thesis is particularly timely given the current context of commodity price 
bust, which has revealed the economic vulnerability of several commodity-dependent 
countries. Economic diversification has consequently been brought back as a policy 
priority in such countries. However, various resource-dependent countries have attempted 
to diversify their economies but have failed to do so throughout history. As such, this 
study addresses the question of what needs to be done to diversify such economies, by 
focusing on the role of industrial policy. The ambition is that this thesis and its theoretical 
foundations can enrich our understanding of the underlying causes of export 
diversification and structural change in resource-dependent countries. 
The first contribution of this thesis is to reframe theoretical debates related to natural 
resources and economic development by elaborating a taxonomy of diversification 
strategies and by reconceiving the way we measure extractive resource endowment 
through the elaboration of a multidimensional indicator. Three main diversification 
pathways are discussed in this thesis, namely financial diversification, vertical 
diversification, and horizontal diversification. This study also demonstrates the 
contextual determinants that influence the urgency to follow diversification strategies 
over others. 
The second part of this thesis has adopted the analytical account of specific historical 
cases as the main heuristic for disentangling dynamics of economic diversification in 
natural resource-dependent economies. It compares the experiences of Chile and 
Malaysia in diversifying their economies since the 1950s in order to contribute to existing 
discussions on viable policy interventions for economic development and diversification. 
This research also contributes to reframing existing narratives on the development of 
Chile and Malaysia by challenging several misconceptions associated with both 
countries, notably regarding the role of free market forces. 
This thesis finds that the role of industrial policy goes beyond facilitating diversification, 
as it also shapes the direction of such diversification. In both case studies, government 
interventions that successfully promoted new sectors not only fixed market failures but 
also shaped the accumulation of productive capabilities, both within and beyond 
commodity value chains. It is therefore found that neoclassical and path-dependent 
approaches to diversification are not suitable in explaining the process of structural 
change of resource-dependent economies, in contrast to more dynamic approaches to 
comparative advantage and capabilities accumulation.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine, analyze and explain the process of export 
diversification of natural resource-dependent economies. The objective of this thesis is 
particularly timely given the current context of commodity price bust since late 2014, 
which revealed the economic vulnerability of countries that over-rely on commodities for 
exports and foreign exchange generation. Many resource-dependent economies that had 
been enjoying high growth rates over the previous decade suffered shocks, became 
starved of foreign currency, which led some of them (such as Venezuela) to even 
experience a humanitarian crisis (Lahn and Stevens, 2018). Against this backdrop, export 
diversification has naturally been brought back as a policy priority in many resource rich 
countries.  
Nevertheless, a key question that remains is how to diversify resource-dependent 
economies. Throughout history, various resource-dependent countries have attempted to 
diversify their economies but have failed to do so. UNCTAD (2019) shows that over half 
of all countries, and two thirds of developing countries, are still commodity-dependent.1 
In addition, 63 out of the 72 most extractive-dependent countries have increased their 
dependence on extractives in the past 15 years (Roe and Dodd, 2018). 
 In that context, this study attempts to answer the question of what needs to be done to 
diversify resource-dependent economies by examining the role of the state in promoting 
sustainable economic diversification. However, this study aims to go beyond the 
provision of a descriptive and analytical overview of country experiences in diversifying 
their economy. Instead, the ambition is that this thesis and its theoretical foundations can 
enrich our understanding of the underlying causes of export diversification and economic 
development in natural resource rich countries more broadly. In particular, this doctoral 																																																								
1 UNCTAD considers a country to be commodity-dependent when commodities represent more 
than 60% of its total merchandise exports in value terms. 
2 The heterogeneity of results in econometric studies is partly due to the variety of methods and 
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work aims to contribute to debates surrounding the role of industrial policy and market 
forces in the promotion of structural change.  
The first part of this thesis aims to rethink and reframe the theoretical debates related to 
natural resources and economic development as well as reconceive the way we measure 
resource endowment by developing a multidimensional method to measure resource 
abundance and dependence.  
The second part of this thesis examines what type of policies are required to promote the 
accumulation of capabilities in new competitive industries, value addition along 
commodity value chains, and to maximize the developmental impact of resource 
revenues. More specifically, this thesis does so by comparing and contrasting the 
experiences of Malaysia and Chile in diversifying their economies. In presenting these 
cases, this study hopes to contribute to existing discussions on viable public policy 
interventions for economic diversification and resource-based development. 
Nevertheless, this thesis does not seek to define a single recipe for ‘success’. Instead it 
moves away from the tendency to prescribe a one-size-fits-all solution in order to offer a 
comprehensive account of the contextual determinants and mechanisms required to 
harness extractive resources for sustainable development. 
1.2 THE SUBJECT OF ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND NATURAL 
RESOURCE ABUNDANCE  
 
What do we already know about this subject and how does this research contribute to the 
existing literature?  
The literature on the relationship between natural resources and economic development 
dates back to at least the 14th century. Indeed, long before the ‘modern’ resource curse 
thesis (see seminal works such as Auty, 1994; Gelb et al.,1988; Ross, 1999; Sachs and 
Warner, 1995, 1997, 2001), cognitive explanations for the resource curse, based on the 
idea that resource booms or ‘easy wealth’ produce a type of shortsighted euphoria among 
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policymakers, were already introduced by Ibn Khaldun in the 14th century and Jean 
Bodin in 16th century (Bodin, 1576; Ibn Khaldun, 1967 [1377]).  
Theoretical debates on the role of natural resource abundance and development have been 
marked by both resource optimism and pessimism, with one or the other being in the 
ascendant at any particular time, but neither being dominant across time (Lahn and 
Stevens, 2018). In the past three decades, a plethora of econometric and statistical studies 
aimed to contribute to this debate by attempting to find a correlation between natural 
resource abundance and economic development. Some have found a positive correlation 
(e.g. Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio, 2007; Brunnschweiler, 2008; Davis, 1995; Findlay 
and Lundahl, 1999; Pineda and Rodriguez, 2010); some have found a negative one (e.g. 
Gylfason, Herbertsson, and Zoega, 1999; Neumayer, 2004; Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 
2006; Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997), while others did not find any clear-cut statistical 
correlation (e.g. Bond and Fajgenbaum, 2014; James, 2015).  
In light of the mixed evidence, and the inablity of econometric studies to determine a 
clear correlation between resource abundance and growth,2 there has been a growing 
awareness that natural resources are neither a curse nor blessing, but rather that their 
contribution to development depends on what states make of them. If there is nothing 
inherently inevitable that predetermine natural resources as a curse for development, we 
must move beyond resource determinism and instead attempt to understand the ways in 
which natural resources can be harnessed for development. While the recent literature has 
moved towards a recognition of state policy action in making the most of commodities 
(see Addison and Roe, 2018; Arezki, Sy and  Gylfason, 2012; Chang, 2007b; Collier, 
2003; Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz, 2007; Lederman and Maloney, 2007), there are still 
important disagrements regarding the optimal nature and scope of state interventions. 
This research contributes to this debate by analyzing dynamics of state intervention in the 
management of resource sectors towards achieving structural transformation. 
 
																																																								
2 The heterogeneity of results in econometric studies is partly due to the variety of methods and 
stastical misconceptions when measuring resource abundance, as further explained in chapter 3. 
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The issue of productive economic transformation has mostly been neglected by the recent 
literature on the role of natural resource in development. In other words, development has 
disappeared from the development discourse in relation to the debate on natural resources 
too (Chang, 2010). Indeed, over the past decade, a large body of literature has focused on 
showing that the effect of natural resources on economic development depends on the 
quality of governance and institutions (Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2006), degree of 
maturity of democracies (Caselli and Tesei, 2016), openness to international trade 
(Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2008), human capital (Bravo-Ortega and de Gregorio, 2007), 
or the presence of developed financial systems (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2008). 
However, one element that has not systematically been addressed is the role of different 
diversification strategies in shaping the economic growth outcomes in resource-rich 
countries. This thesis is consequently geared towards bringing back the issue of economic 
diversification at the analytical core of the resource-based development discourse.3 
Focusing on economic diversification is justified for several reasons. Diversification 
enables a country to reduce its exposure to commodity price volatility. Beyond such 
concern, diversification may have an even more important to play as a part of economic 
development. Diversification can be understood not as goal in itself, but a means to leap 
into the frontline of the development race (Benavente, 2016). Some scholars have indeed 
argued that countries get richer not by producing more of the same but by learning how to 
produce a more diverse range of technologically dynamic and sophisticated goods and 
services (Chang, 2007a, 2007b; Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2007). Chapter 4 of this 
thesis contributes to this view by showing that, beyond macroeconomic stability, export 
diversification also matters for long-term income growth and employment generation in 
medium resource rich per capita countries. Nevertheless, while this research is premised 
on the notion that export diversification is a broad objective that most resource rich 
																																																								
3 Naturally, the design and implementation of diversification policies do not take place in a 
vacuum and rely on the quality of infrascture governance and human capital available. However, 
what is the direction of the causality? For instance, “does low human capital lead to specialization 
in natural resource exports, or does specialization in natural resources lead to reduced investments 
in human capital? Causality can run both ways” (Gelb and Grasmann, 2009:94). 
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countries should pursue, it appreciates that not all resource rich economies have similar 
needs for diversification. 4  
Several empirical studies have evidenced that export diversification is an engine of 
structural change and economic growth (Agosin 2009; Cadot et al 2013; Cherif et al., 
2018; Gozgor and Can 2017; Grossman and Helpman, 1993; Hausmann et al 2007; Mau, 
2016). However, other empirical studies have also reported contradicting results 
regarding the correlation between diversification and economic development. Imbs and 
Wacziarg (2003) and Cadot et al (2011) find evidence of an ‘inverted-U’ relationship 
where trade diversification rises up to a certain level of development and then declines. 
According to Klinger and Lederman (2004), in developing countries, the removal of 
market failures that limit the ‘cost-discovery’ process leads to higher diversification, 
while in contrast, as countries develop, the removal of less profitable activities and the 
specialization in goods and services where the comparative advantage is stronger leads to 
re-specialization.  
Here, two points can be made. Firstly, the case of resource-rich countries might be 
particular and requires careful attention. Some of the econometric studies might be 
influenced by the effect of commodity prices. High commodity prices may lead to faster 
growth in resource-dependent countries, which in turn may wrongly give the impression 
that export diversification is negatively correlated with growth, if the period covered is 
that of a commodity boom (chapter 4 evidences that the effect of diversification on 
growth in resource rich countries differs according to commodity prices).  
Secondly, in contrast to the literature above, a different theory could be elaborated 
regarding the relationship between export specialization and growth as one that follows a 
“U shape”. According to my hypothesis, and as further explained in chapter 3, in order to 
grow, low-income countries that have large mineral endowment should first specialize in 
																																																								
4  The multidimensional indicator of extractives-based development developed in chapter 3 
contributes to identify which countries face the most urgency to diversify. Chapter 4 also puts 
forward the contextual determinants that influence the urgency to follow certain diversification 
pathways over others as a development strategy. 
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commodity extraction in order to appropriate resource revenues to stimulate initial capital 
accumulation, before using such revenues to invest in facilitating export diversification.5 
Economic development can thus be perceived as the process of structural transformation 
to diversify economies away from dependence on primary products. In that perspective, 
focusing on the experience of extractive-dependent economies, this thesis raises two 
essential questions: 
1) What are the different diversification routes that arise out of commodities? 
2) What is the role of the state in promoting different diversification pathways? 
My main hypothesis is that the economic development and export diversification of 
resource-dependent countries cannot be optimally managed through market forces alone. 
This thesis consequently draws on different theoretical approaches to the role of the state 
in industrial development to explain why certain resource rich countries have succeeded 
to develop whilst others have not. 
 
1.3  METHODOLOGY  
1.3.1 Comparative research method 
Comparative research methods have long been used to identify and explain similarities 
and differences across societies. Comparative research also enables the researcher to put 
a greater emphasis on contextualization of different national settings. A study is held to 
be cross-national and comparative when a particular issue is examined in two or more 
countries using the same research instruments, in order to explain similarities and 
differences (Hantrais, 1995). Such approach enables to make generalizations or to gain a 
deeper understanding of reality in different national contexts. 
There are several approaches to conduct comparative research. Broadly speaking, we can 
differentiate inductive from deductive approaches. Deductive approaches are aimed at 
																																																								
5 Whether such relationship is followed by a process of re-specialization (leading to an ‘inverted-
N’ shape) appears to be debatable. In any case, export diversification appears to be a strong 
determinant of development for resource rich developing countries. 
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testing theory and hypothesis regarding a particular subject of study by collecting and 
analyzing empirical data. This ultimately enables one to confirm (or refute) original 
theories. Inductive approaches work in reverse by moving from specific observations to 
broader generalizations and theories in order to generate new theory emerging from the 
data. This thesis can mostly be considered as grounded in deductive reasoning, as it 
attempts to test the importance of the role of industrial policy over market forces alone in 
helping the export diversification process in resource rich countries. However, the 
borders between the two approaches are porous because most social research (including 
this project) involves both inductive and deductive reasoning at different points of the 
research due the continuous cycle from theories to observations and back. 
This thesis relies on mixed methods because different parts of the thesis call for different 
methodological tools according to what is more appropriate to inform the particular 
subject of study and research sub-questions. In Part I, chapters 3 and 4 mostly relies on 
quantitative comparative methods, while Part II relies on case studies through an 
qualitative approach in order to dig deeper into the contextual determinants that inform 
our subject of study. The country-case comparative study is conducted both at the cross-
national level and through within-nation comparisons (through cross-sector 
comparisons). 
However, it is worth noting that the different methods in this thesis are intrinsically 
related. The use of quantitative data across large datasets in Part I enables us to develop 
country classifications based on observed patterns, which in turn serves as the basis for 
identifying suitable and comparable countries for further qualitative study. The use of 
case studies and longitudinal analysis enables us to further examine whether shared 
phenomena (such as export diversification) can be explained by the same causes. 
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1.3.2 Quantitative comparative analysis  
The methodologies used in chapter 3 and 4 are mostly based on the analysis of 
quantitative datasets, and fall outside the broader comparative study between the cases of 
Malaysia and Chile. 
Chapter 3 is concerned with rethinking the methodology to measure resource abundance 
and resource dependence. As a result, a new method and tool is suggested: the 
multidimensional indicator for extractives-based development (MINDEX). This method 
relies on a multidimensional measurement that includes six different indicators of 
resource abundance and dependence (resource exports, resource rents, government 
resource revenues, share of resource revenues in total government revenue, and share of 
resource exports in total exports). The methodological choices for scoring countries 
according to each of these criteria and data sources are further explained within chapter 3.  
Chapter 4 features quantitative comparative methods. In particular, cross-country and 
panel data analyses are used to compare a set of countries in order to test the correlation 
between three variables: export diversification, resource abundance per capita (measured 
in resource rents and resource export per capita) with a third variable (such as 
unemployment, poverty and inequality rates).6 
In chapter 9, a quantitative policy evaluation is conducted using a difference-in-
difference method. The use of difference-in-difference estimations has been widespread 
in the study of the impact of policies on a certain outcome in a natural experiment using 
observational and longitudinal data (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). I have looked at the 
effect of sector specific policies on different sectors by using exports value as the 
outcome variable. While several factors can impact a sector’s level of exports, including 
sector neutral policies that might have been implemented at the same time as the ones I 
am evaluating, I have reduced the level of bias by choosing control groups that are sub-
sectors within the same sector but that did not benefit from vertical interventions to the 																																																								
6 Regression techniques were used to further test the correlation but their inclusion in the current 
version of the thesis was not deemed necessary. Further methodological issues such as data 
reliability and comparability are further discussed inside chapter 4. 
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same extent as the treated group, in order to plot a trend before and after the intervention 
(t0). I did not conduct such policy evaluation method systematically across the thesis for 
one main reason that relates to the difficulty of conducting policy evaluations in contexts 
where the effect of individual programmes and policies cannot be singled out because 
different types of interventions have also been running simultaneously. In the case of 
Chile, reasonable assumptions could be made to build counterfactuals given the context 
in which different sub-sectors within the same sector were not equally targeted by 
vertical policies.  
1.3.3 Qualitative comparative analysis: Case studies  	
1.1.1.1 Why case studies? 
Part II of this thesis answers the research questions by comparing a set of two 
comparably endowed resource rich countries (Chile and Malaysia) that experienced 
similar yet somehow different outcomes in terms of export diversification.  
Methodologically sound and detailed case studies can be useful in informing the subject 
of study. However, case studies also have their limitations. Particularly, they may only 
help us compare specific policies in a specific setting, which may render generalizations 
more difficult. The use of only two country cases in my study means that this thesis is 
limited to only two developmental experiences. Case studies may also be subject to 
selection biases, as authors may select cases that confirm their priors. As a result, some 
researchers find cross-national econometric studies more relevant, but we can argue that 
the sole reliance on such methods suffer from considerable flaws. Firstly, as shown in 
chapter 2 and 3, existing econometric studies have been unable to find consistent results. 
In contrast, we can learn a lot more about the design and the implementation of policies, 
as well as their consequences and feasibility through careful case studies. Only then 
should quantitative policy evaluation methods be used to support or test qualitative 
observations. Second, quantitative datasets available across countries are not always 
comparable, and the solutions to such problems involve an understanding of different 
national contexts and circumstances. 
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The limitations of case studies can be balanced out by their benefits. While this thesis 
only addresses two case studies, it appears that giving advantage to depth is more 
sensible because it enables to do two main things: firstly, it enables us to cover a wide 
range of issues related to export diversification, resource-based development and 
resource revenue management (such as the role of the policy environment, how 
consumption and social redistribution has been sustained, the impact of diversification on 
inequality and poverty rates and vice versa, etc.). Case studies approach also enables us 
to consider differences in social and cultural settings, which may not be captured through 
quantitative data and econometric studies alone. Secondly, such approach enables within-
country comparisons to grasp a better understanding of each country’s developmental 
experience, including both its internal successes and failures. Consequently, the 
comparative study will be able to draw an accurate general picture of issues and policy-
mechanisms underlying resource-based development and economic diversification in the 
context of resource-dependent economies.  
1.1.1.2 The selection of Malaysia and Chile as case studies 
The choice and mix of countries selected in comparative studies affects the quality and 
comparability of the data. In order to avoid selection biases consisting in the selection of 
cases that confirm priors, it is important to define clear guidelines and criteria for picking 
case studies. In this thesis, the choice of Malaysia and Chile is motivated by several 
reasons, most of which related to similarities across key variables, which relate to their 
nature and degree of resource endowment, on the one hand, and their degree and type of 
export diversification, on the other hand.  
First of all, both Malaysia and Chile are endowed with extractive resources.7 Malaysia is 
a significant petroleum producer while Chile is the largest producer of copper globally. 
One methodological issue may lie in the comparability between the mining sector and the 
petroleum sector. It can be argued that mining and petroleum (particularly offshore), 																																																								
7 Interestingly, both countries also dispose of a diversified agriculture resource endowment. In 
that sense, an interesting observation (and point of comparison) is that both Malaysia’s and 
Chile’s diversified primary commodity sector is not merely ‘natural’ but was in large parts the 
result of public policies in promoting and diversifying towards primary commodities. 
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feature some differences that may impact the development of linkages for instance. The 
assumption of this thesis is that such differences do not invalidate this study because 
mining and petroleum have much more in common than what distinguishes them. Hard 
commodities (such as metals) generally involve complex technologies, large-scale and 
capital-intensive production and intensive use of infrastructure (such as road and rail 
links, which may be used by other sectors). Energy commodities have similar 
characteristics to hard commodities, apart from the fact that the infrastructure they 
involve may have fewer externalities to other sectors, especially in the context of offshore 
extraction (Morris et al. 2012).  
Second, both Chile and Malaysia are what I have termed ‘medium resource-rich per 
capita’ countries. The classification of resource abundance developed in chapter 4 is 
particularly important as it sheds light on the necessity of comparing countries with 
similar levels of resource endowment (measured in terms of mineral resource 
exports/rents/reserves per capita).8 
Third, Malaysia and Chile (albeit to a lesser extent) are amongst the few resource-rich 
countries that have experienced some degree of export diversification in the past 50 
years, as shown by the following figure. Many resource rich developing countries have 
remained vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations. In order to draw lessons from 
resource rich countries that have succeeded in diversifying, we must first ask: which 
resource rich countries have succeeded in diversifying?  
																																																								
8  In order words, from a political economy perspective, it makes little sense to draw 
generalization by comparing a country such as Chile or Malaysia with countries such as Norway 
or Qatar. As noted in Lahn and Stevens (2018:102-3), “Norway, often highlighted as the success 
story par excellence of extractives- led growth, had a developed democratic system of governance 
and a relatively small population at the outset of its discoveries […] In this diverse context, 
policies that contributed to success in Norway will not necessarily work in other countries.” 
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Figure 1. Evolution of the composition of exports of selected resource rich economies 
 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
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Figure 1 shows that countries such as Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela have 
remained extremely dependent on petroleum exports in the past 50 years and failed to 
diversify, despite a series of ambitious diversification plans in all three countries. Now-
developed countries such as Norway and Australia have respectively become even more 
dependent on petroleum and mining exports since 1970. Ecuador experienced high 
degrees of cyclical fluctuations without managing to decrease its reliance on petroleum 
on the long run. Consequently, resource-rich countries that need to diversify their export 
basket should investigate the path followed by Malaysia and Chile, as opposed to that of 
Norway or Australia. Those observations explain why Chile and Malaysia have been 
selected for further study in this thesis in order to investigate what have been the 
underlying engines of diversification in both countries and how those can be applied to 
resource-dependent developing economies. 
Malaysia has progressively diversified and expanded its export basket over 50 years of 
post-independent development. Manufacturing exports reached 80% of total exports by 
2000. The electronics sector account for the bulk of Malaysia’s manufactured exports. 
Nevertheless, as chapter 7 shows, Malaysia has also managed to leverage its rubber, palm 
oil, and petroleum industries to diversify and expand its industrial base. In addition to 
diversifying its productive structure, Malaysia has also sustained one the highest growth 
rates among middle-income countries in the period 1970-2000.9 
Chile offers a different type of resource-based development outcome. Unlike Malaysia, 
Chile has mostly diversified towards other commodities (e.g. salmon, wine, forestry and 
fruit products) and has not emerged as a major industrial exporter. Chile’s diversified 
commodity exports mostly consist in high-value primary-based products. Chile has 
indeed been one of Latin America’s fastest-growing economies in recent decades. The 
case of Chile is particularly relevant because it has long been held up as an almost 
textbook example of the success of “letting the market work”. A broad agreement exists 
among mainstream economists that Chile has largely succeeded in promoting strong and 																																																								
9 In the fifty years following independence, Malaysia multiplied its per capita income by 24 times 
and GDP grew at about 6% per annum. Despite an interruption in GDP growth by the Asian 
financial crisis in the late 1990s, Malaysia recorded a faster recovery than its neighbours.  
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stable growth because it has embraced free-market policies (See Friedman, 1982; 
Richard, 1997; amongst many others). However, the evidence presented in this study 
debunks the myths associated with Chile’s economic development.  
When making evaluations and comparative conclusions, it is useful to put 
accomplishments in a proper context and be clear about the basis of the comparison. It is 
worth noting that when Malaysia is compared with East Asian economies, it is can be 
presented as a “failure” case of an economy that fell into the middle-income trap and has 
lagged behind. However, when Malaysia is compared with other developing countries or 
resource rich countries, its developmental achievements are laudable. Indeed, as noted in 
Yusof (2007), one needs to be reminded that not much hope was showered on Malaysia 
on its survival as an independent state in 1957 because of its unstable conditions (such as 
its ethnic diversity). In that sense, a suitable comparator would be Sri Lanka (a country 
with similar ethnic divisions that is also a former British colony), but interestingly, the 
trajectories of development in the two countries have moved in the opposite direction 
(ibid.). Hence, this thesis is careful in avoiding framing the Malaysian case (or Chilean 
case for that matter) as an unequivocal success story for development and whose lessons 
can be applicable to all developing countries (this thesis will also put forward both the 
limitations of their development strategies). If that had been the objective, a case study 
such as South Korea or Singapore would have been more adequate. Instead, the main 
rationale for choosing a case such as Malaysia lies in its potential contribution to the 
literature on resource rich countries due to its considerable diversification over the past 
50 years and its use of resources rents to spur industrial growth. 
1.3.4 Data sources and analysis 
The access to comparable data is a major concern when conducting comparative research. 
The methods of data collection may vary considerably from one country to another. For 
certain topics, data might exist in one country and yet be inexistent in other countries, for 
various reasons, such as lack of interest among policy-makers, lack of capacity to gather 
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statistics nationally, lack of transparency when it comes to data sharing, etc. 10. Despite 
the considerable progress in the development of large-scale harmonized international 
databases, such as the World Development Indicators, quantitative comparisons remain 
problematic if they are not accompanied by a deeper understanding of the context in 
which phenomena are located (Hantrais, 1995). As a result, this study has also relied on 
fieldwork interviews, as detailed below, in order to better understand the strategies that 
lie behind certain policies. 
	
As a result, this study relies on both quantitative and qualitative data to identify trends 
and patterns, as well as to explain them. Indeed, quantitative data is required for 
comparing variables such as GDP growth, export diversification indices, inequality and 
unemployment rates, sector composition of employment, export and manufacturing 
outputs, etc. In contrast, qualitative data is far more informative when analyzing aspects 
such as the role of state-owned extractive companies in both countries, whether industrial 
policies have targeted sectors, the purpose of the sovereign wealth funds, reasons and 
objectives underlying the promotion of certain sectors over others, why certain policies 
were more successful than others, etc.. This thesis also relies on both economic statistics 
from secondary sources such as government reports, international institutions reports, and 
international databases (such as the World Development Indicators, the IMF export 
diversification toolkit, UNIDO statistics, amongst others), and primary qualitative data 
collected by conducting interviews with policy-makers (former and current), scholars, 
business executives, civil society representatives and other experts.  
While country comparisons can be plagued by a lack of knowledge or understanding of 
different cultures and languages, interviews also contribute to situate social, economic 
and political processes in their historical and ideological contexts. Indeed, interviews 
with different stakeholders enabled me to understand the factors underlying the 
formulation and the implementation of policies, including their context, objectives, and 
challenges. The inclusion of a variety of stakeholders also enabled me to take into 
account different angles and perspectives around the same issues. This study relies on 																																																								
10 For instance, quantitative micro-level data is accessible on local suppliers in mining sector in 
Chile but such data is not accessible for Malaysia. 
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fieldwork interviews with over 80 people, taking place over several field trips. Field trips 
were principally carried out in Malaysia and Chile between February and August 2017. I 
also carried out field trips to Algeria and Ecuador, despite their non-inclusion as main 
case studies of this thesis due to various reasons, including word limit considerations and 
data availability issues. These visits have nonetheless helped me situate Chile and 
Malaysia in the wider context of diversification efforts and practices amongst resource-
rich and resource-dependent economies. The interviews were semi-structured, with 
research questionnaires adapted to each interviewees’ background and experience, in 
order to allow for the collection of additional contextual information based on what 
interviewees deemed relevant. Information provided by interviewees has also been 
verified and cross-checked when it was publically available in order to account for 
potential biases or misinformation. 
1.4 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
Part I (chapter 2, 3 and 4) presents the conceptual framework of this thesis. Chapter 2 
lays out the conceptual framework that governs the empirical work in this thesis. Existing 
literature is reviewed in order to identify theoretical gaps. Linkages theories are also 
revisited to inform our discussion of diversification pathways in resource rich countries. 
Three major diversification pathways are identified: vertical diversification, horizontal 
diversification, and financial diversification.  
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the issue of measuring natural resource abundance and 
dependence. Current approaches and their limitations are reviewed before introducing a 
new multidimensional method to measure resource endowment. Such a method also 
serves as the basis of a diagnostic tool that helps identify what are the specific challenges 
of resource-based development faced by given countries at a given time.  
Chapter 4 addresses the political economy of resource revenue management. It provides 
evidences for variations in economic development patterns across resource-rich countries, 
by highlighting the factors that influence the outcomes of different resource revenue 
management strategies. This chapter subsequently explains why the domestic investment 
of resource revenue should be prioritized in some countries over others. 
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Part II (chapter 5,6,7,8 and 9) provides a comparative study of diversification objectives 
and outcomes in Chile and Malaysia from the early 20th century onwards.11 Chapter 5 
examines the case of fiscal management of resource revenues in both countries. Chile is 
often put forward as a success story of management of copper revenues, particularly 
thanks to its counter-cyclical fiscal policy. However, the fiscal stabilization agenda of 
copper revenues has been conducted at the expense of long-term structural 
transformation. In contrast, in Malaysia, the public investment of petroleum revenues has 
had a long-term transformative effect on the domestic economy.  
Chapters 6 and 7 examine vertical diversification strategies in Chile and Malaysia 
respectively. Chapter 6 focuses on the Chilean experience of linkage development in the 
copper sector and argues that copper extraction in Chile has been characterized by weak 
industrial linkages due to important market obstacles and timid public policies to 
incentivize value addition. Chapter 7 finds that resource-based industries have a played a 
key role in Malaysia’s diversification thanks to a pro-active role of the state in promoting 
linkage development in the face of market obstacles.  
Chapters 8 and 9 examine horizontal diversification strategies and outcomes in Chile and 
Malaysia. Chapter 8 departs from the conventional wisdom associated with Chile’s so-
called ‘free market miracle’. By analysing the dynamics underlying the emergence of the 
salmon, fruit, forestry and wine sectors in Chile’s export basket, it sheds light on the 
crucial role of industrial policy in the process of capabilities accumulation that has 
shaped the emergence of new industries. Chapter 9 examines Malaysia’s export 
diversification towards new sectors by comparing and contrasting the development of the 
electronics and electrical industry and the automotive industry. It finds a high level of 
heterogeneity in terms of performance as well as strategies underlying these two sectors.  
Chapter 10 summarizes the findings of this thesis in relation to the role of the state for 
resource based development and economic diversification. 
 																																																								
11 For more extensive historical accounts of economic development and industrial policy in both 
countries, see Jomo (1993), Lall (1995), Salleh and Meyanathan (1993) for Malaysia; and Agosin 
et al. (2010) and Bravo-Ortega and Eterovic (2015) for Chile.  
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Chapter 2: Critical Literature Review 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW 
This literature review is built around three main dimensions of the relationship between 
natural resources and economic development. The first dimension is the correlation 
between natural resource abundance and development. As such, the first section of this 
chapter examines the literature on resource determinism (featuring both resource 
optimism and pessimism). It also reviews the political and the economic factors 
underlying the resource curse thesis and reaches the conclusion that natural resource 
abundance is not inherently a curse nor a blessing and further sheds light on the need for 
alternative explanations of variations of development across resource-rich countries. 
The second dimension that this chapter delves into is how natural resources may 
contribute to economic development by outlining the different linkages between 
commodities and the rest of the economy. While resource pessimism assumes an 
‘enclave’ nature of commodity extraction, resource optimism emphasizes the synergies 
between commodities, manufacturing and service activities. This literature review aims to 
go beyond reductionist analyses of the linkages arising out of commodities and draws on 
existing linkage theories to construct a new taxonomy of diversification pathways around 
commodities. Three main diversification paths are identified: vertical diversification, 
horizontal diversification, and financial diversification.  
The last area reviewed in this literature review relates to the role of the state in shaping 
the relationship between natural resources and economic development. Specifically, the 
last section reviews the literature on what type of government involvement is necessary 
for maximizing the impact of resource extraction on diversification. Despite a growing 
recognition of the role of policy actions to harness natural resources for growth, the 
academic literature on resource-based development remains divided regarding the role of 
industrial policy in promoting different diversification pathways.  
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2.2 CORRELATION BETWEEN NATURAL RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
Over the past century, the relationship between natural resource wealth and economic 
development generated significant debates. Such debates have been characterized by both 
resource optimism and pessimism, with one or the other being dominant at any particular 
time (Addison and Roe, 2018; Lahn and Stevens, 2018; Stevens, 2015). In particular, 
those debates have focused on the effect of mineral wealth on industrial development, 
owing to the growing academic acknowledgement that industrialization is important to 
sustain economic growth (see Andreoni and Chang, 2016; Chang, 1993, 2005; Hauge, 
2017; Kaldor 1967; List, [1837] 1983; Myrdal, 1956; Palma, 2014; Prebisch, 1950; 
Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1999). Section 2.2 starts by reviewing the received wisdom 
on the negative impact of natural resources on industrial and economic development, 
before reviewing the literature exploring the positive correlation between natural 
resources and economic development.  
 
2.2.1 The ‘Resource Curse’ literature 	
Influential studies, such as Auty (1993, 1994) and Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997), found 
a negative relationship between economic growth and resource dependence and 
concluded that countries with large natural resource endowments, such as oil and gas, are 
more likely to perform worse than others in terms of economic development, because of a 
phenomenon that they call the “resource curse”. This observed negative correlation 
generated a large literature that sought to explain it. It has been argued that fiscal inflows 
from natural resources generate both market and government failures that impede 
economic growth and industrialization (Beblawi and Luciani 1987, Bhattacharyya and 
Hodler, 2010; Gylfason, 2001; Ross, 1999). We can indeed distinguish political 
explanatory factors of the resource curse (rentier state theories, rent-seeking, conflict, 
corruption, etc.) from economic factors (volatility of commodities cycles, Dutch disease, 
etc.).12 Nevertheless, as the next section shows, none of these factors are inevitable and 																																																								
12 See Ross (1999) for an extensive review of the explanatory factors of the resource curse.  
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there is nothing inherent about natural resources that make them detrimental for 
development. In addition, an increasing number of studies have questioned the theoretical 
and the statistical credibility of the resource curse hypothesis (Echavarria, Vázquez 
Moreno, and Sherdek, 2016; James, 2015; Lederman and Maloney, 2007).  
 2.2.1.1 Economic explanations of the resource curse 
There are three main economic explanations of the resource curse: the Dutch disease, 
commodity price volatility, and the enclave thesis (Ross, 1999). 
The term ‘Dutch Disease’ was initially coined to describe the observed collapse of the 
Dutch manufacturing sector following the discovery of natural gas in 1959. Corden 
(1984) modelled this effect to show how capital moves away from non-oil tradables as oil 
booms and how an influx of foreign capital to the booming resource sector causes an 
appreciation in the currency. Sachs and Warner (1997, 2001) popularized this concept 
and argued that it was the major growth-impeding factor for resource-rich countries.  
There are several interpretations of the Dutch disease phenomena, but it formally refers to 
two combined effects, which are (i) the appreciation of a state’s currency caused by the 
sharp rise in exports; and (ii) the tendency of a booming resource sector to draw capital 
and labour away from the country’s manufacturing and agricultural sectors. These two 
effects combined raise the production costs of the manufacturing and agricultural sectors 
and lead to a loss in their competitiveness (Neary and Van Wijnbergen, 1986).13  
More importantly, there are also theoretical shortcomings of the Dutch disease model. 
Ross (1999) explains that this model relies on the assumption that capital and labor 
supplies are fixed and fully employed before a boom begins. Under such conditions, a 
booming resource sector indeed draws capital and labor away from agriculture and 
manufacturing, but developing states often have labor surpluses, and most importantly, 																																																								
13 Some studies show that the Dutch disease is not a systematic phenomenon. Gelb et al. (1989) 
found that, out of seven selected oil exporters during the 1971-83 boom, only four countries 
showed a shift of labour and capital away from their agriculture and manufacturing sectors 
towards their resource sectors.  
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resource sectors often attract foreign capital and labor, offsetting any local scarcities (Tat 
Wai; 1988). Di John (2009) further notes than in addition to assuming full employment, 
the Dutch Disease model assumes static technology. This has considerable implications 
because, when a country faces a technological gap, additional foreign exchange can help 
close such gap through the increased import of advanced technology. The Dutch disease 
can thus be avoided when revenues from resource booms are used to promote the 
competitiveness of an industry through protection, subsidies, or financial incentives and 
can serve to modernize the manufacturing capital stock, which in turn can improve 
productivity (ibid.). Governments can also counteract Dutch disease effects by investing 
their resource revenues in growth-enhancing physical infrastructure or placing their 
windfalls in foreign currency (to keep their currency from appreciating). 
Cashin and McDermott (2002) found that volatility was more damaging to commodity 
producers than a predictable and stable decline in commodity prices.14 Nevertheless, 
there are many instruments that governments can use to mitigate the volatility of 
commodity revenues. These include stabilization funds and careful fiscal rules to 
smoothen government expenditure and offset the boom-and-bust cycles associated with 
commodity revenues. Those instruments are discussed in further detail in chapter 4. 
Another explanation for the resource curse is that natural resources generate poor 
economic linkages between resource and non-resource sectors, especially when foreign 
firms lead commodity extraction activities and repatriate their profits instead of investing 
them locally (Hirschman, 1958). The “enclave thesis” advocates that mineral resources 
are particular because they are capital intensive, concentrate ownership and consequently 
generate fewer production and consumption linkages in developing countries than more 
‘diffuse’ resources (Auty, 2001; Auty and Gelb 2000; Hirschman, 1981; Singer, 1950).15  
																																																								
14 Commodity price volatility has even grown more problematic since the financialisation of most 
commodity markets since the mid-1990s (Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2012). 
15  As Morris et al. (2012) explains, soft commodities are usually characterized by low 
technological content, small-scale production, high labour intensity and often have short shelf 
lives, necessitating processing soon after production. Hard commodities (e.g. metals) generally 
involve complex technologies, capital-intensive production and infrastructure that can be used by 
other sectors (such as roads and rail links). Energy commodities (e.g. oil and gas) have similar 
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However, there is in fact little evidence for the ‘enclave’ thesis. Fosu’s (1996) study of 
seventy-six developing countries finds that growth in commodity exports between 1967 
and 1986 has a negligible effect on the performance of the non-export sector, probably 
because governments took strong measures (such as nationalization) to capture the 
economic rents once repatriated by foreign multinationals in the 1970s (Ross, 1999). 
Governments thus appear to have the capacity to foster linkages, yet have commonly 
failed to do so (ibid.). Having said all this, the issue of poor economic linkages is more 
complex than simply appropriating resource rents and deserves particular attention. 
Section 2.3 of this chapter is dedicated to discuss the different types of linkages between 
natural resources and other segments of the economy. 
2.2.1.2 Political explanations of the resource curse 
While economic factors may create some obstacles for resource exporters, it appears that 
the effect of resource wealth is not pre-determined and depends on policy responses 
(Neary and van Wijnbergen 1986; Gelb and al. 1988). The real question behind the 
resource curse is consequently why governments often fail to take corrective action 
(Ross, 1999; Saad-Filho and Weeks, 2013). Three main explanations have been offered: 
(1) cognitive explanations, (2) rentier state explanations, and (3) societal explanations. 
(1) Cognitive explanations, mostly prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, but also echoing 
arguments previously made by Ibn Khaldun in the 14th century and Jean Bodin in 16th 
century, contended that resource booms or ‘easy wealth’ produce a type of paralysis or 
shortsighted euphoria among policymakers (e.g. Watkins, 1963). 
The cognitive approach has several shortcomings because state actors are often aware of 
the dangers of resource booms. Di John (2009) notably criticizes cognitive explanations 
of Venezuela’s poor economic performance in the period 1973-98, according to which 
macroeconomic instability was caused by the government’s inability to anticipate that oil 																																																																																																																																																																					
characteristics to hard commodities, apart from the infrastructure they involve, which has fewer 
externalities to other sectors. Singer (1950) thus argued that when it comes to mineral resources 
(hard and energy commodities), linkages in low-income countries would be generated abroad in 
the absence of a developed local industrial base. 
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revenues would not be permanent before investing oil revenues into large-scale industrial 
projects. While it captures part of the problem, such argument does not explain “why 
short run economic crises necessarily prevented a long run transformation of the 
economy or why other resource rich countries (such as Malaysia) that have experienced 
substantial macroeconomic crises were able to transform the structure of their economies 
in ways that contributed to rapid long-run growth” (Di John, 2009:37). Indeed, according 
to the World Bank (1989), Malaysian leaders severely overestimated the resource 
available to undertake large scale, heavy industrial investments, but this did not prevent 
them from making transformative and growth-conducive investments. 
(2) Rentier state explanations are the most common explanations for the resource curse. 
Ascher (1999) argues that the reasons underlying poor resource rent management policies 
are more complex than just ignorance of what constitutes good resource management or 
greed. Because resource rents provide an easy and low-visibility source of financing, 
governments may jeopardize efficient natural resource management to achieve other 
ends, such as the financing of controversial development programmes, redistribution and 
elite capture, or more ‘political’ objectives such as patronage, or maintenance of the 
status quo (see Lane and Tornell, 1999; Mahdavy, 1970). Anderson (1987) adds that 
rentier states favour egalitarian consumption over development policies. Karl (1997) 
finds that there are strong similarities amongst states such as those of Algeria, Venezuela, 
Nigeria, Saudi-Arabia, or even 16th century Spain. In almost all cases, the state is the 
direct recipient of the rent wealth, which reduces the need for taxation, which in turns 
erodes the nature of the social contract between the government and citizens (ibid). Other 
studies also found that natural resource endowment negatively impact democracy and 
institutions (see Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004).  
While rentier state explanations offer useful insights, they rely on unconvincing 
assumptions. First, ‘unearned’ incomes prevent the establishment of a social contract 
through taxation and accountable governments, who consequently have fewer incentives 
to formulate growth-enhancing policies. However, if governments in resource rich 
countries are less accountable, why would they still feel the need to buy social consent 
with excessive redistribution? Countries such as the United Arab Emirates show that the 
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absence of income taxes does not prevent government from formulating growth-
enhancing policies. Second, the assumption that leaders inherently have selfish 
motivations is reductionist and fails to recognize that many governments in resource-rich 
countries (e.g. Algeria and Venezuela in the 1970s) have attempted the creation of 
developmental states, and that they did not succeed not only because of ‘selfish motives’ 
but most importantly because of the poor design of their industrial strategy. Even if 
leaders have selfish aims, it is not clear why it should prevent them from maximizing 
growth. This point is captured by Olson’s (1993) concept of the stationary bandit, 
according to which a leader who has a long time horizon has the incentive to promote 
growth, since this will maximize the revenues flowing to the state in the long run. 
 (3) Lastly, the resource curse has also been explained by “societal explanations”, which 
emphasize the power of non-state actors in resource rich countries in favouring inefficient 
industrial policies (Ross, 1999). Sachs and Warner (1997, 2001) argue that resource-rich 
countries tend to feature protectionist policies that lead to economic stagnation because 
firms in lagging manufacturing sectors affected by the Dutch Disease demand 
compensation in the form of trade barriers. The argument that resource abundance leads 
to the maintaining of ISI policies long after they become counter-productive has often 
been used to explain why resource-rich Latin American countries lagged behind 
resource-poor East Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s (Ross, 1999). However, this 
argument may fail to explain why East Asian countries also maintained protectionist 
measure for several decades before infant industries finally became globally competitive. 
2.2.2 Resource optimism 
The staple theory, formulated in the 1920s and 1930s by scholars such as Innis (1930, 
1940, 1956) and Mackintosh (1923, 1939), emphasized the role of commodities as a 
motor of economic development. It stated that primary products exports stimulate growth 
in less developed areas by attracting capital and labor, and that exports of raw materials 
can trigger growth if investment is continuously made to reduce cost of production and 
transportation to export commodities. A few decades later, several development 
economists such as Viner (1952), Lewis (1955) or Spengler (1960) also suggested that 
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resource abundance would help developing countries, which were thought to suffer of 
labour surplus and capital shortages. 
In the past two decades, a plethora of studies have found a positive correlation between 
natural resource abundance, and economic and human development indicators, directly 
challenging the resource curse thesis (See Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio, 2007; 
Brunnschweiler, 2008; Davis, 1995; Findlay and Lundahl, 1999; James, 2015; Pineda and 
Rodriguez, 2010). 
A key statistical misconception behind some of the resource curse literature such as 
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) lies in the fact that they calculate resource wealth by 
looking at the share of natural resources in GDP. This is problematic because it 
misclassifies resource poor countries that do not produce anything else than primary 
commodities as resource wealthy. Lederman and Maloney (2007) provide evidence for 
the implications of this shortcoming. By adopting a different measure of resource 
abundance (net resource exports per capita rather than the share of natural resources in 
GDP), they conclude that high-income countries such as Norway, New Zealand, Canada, 
Finland and Australia rank as the most resource-intensive economies globally, rather than 
DRC and Papua New Guinea as in Sachs and Warner’s analysis. 
2.2.3 Concluding remarks 
It thus appears that natural resources are not necessarily detrimental to economic 
development and that the ‘resource curse’ thesis is a model that is essentially an 
observation rather than a systemic explanation. Morris et al. (2012) conclude that high 
resource dependence is more often the consequence of an unrelated underdevelopment of 
the industrial sector than a negative impact of the mineral resource sector. Thus, “[what is 
interpreted] as a manufacturing sector weakened by a commodities specialization, is in 
fact often a commodities specialization in an economy with no or little history of 
industrial development” (ibid.:8). If the effects of resource abundance are not 
predetermined, we need to explain how natural resources may contribute to industrial 
development and diversification more broadly. The following section examines the 
different types of linkages that can arise from commodities sectors towards other sectors.  
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2.3 LINKAGES ARISING OUT OF NATURAL RESOURCE SECTORS: 
TOWARDS A TAXONOMY OF DIVERSIFICATION PATHS 
 
This section starts by reviewing in more detail the literature on linkages arising out of 
commodities. This section then adapts, combines and completes existing linkage-based 
theories in order to build a novel framework of diversification paths. 
It his pioneering work, Hirschman (1981) suggested three major types of linkages from 
natural resources to the industrial sector: fiscal, consumption and production linkages. 
Fiscal linkages are the resource rents appropriated by the government, which can be used 
for investment in industrial sectors unrelated to commodities. Consumption linkages 
relate to the demand for domestic production arising from the incomes earned and 
expenditures in the commodities sectors. Production linkages can be both forward 
(processing and the further transformation of commodities) and backward (producing 
inputs for commodity production).  
Morris et al. (2012) further contributed to the discussion on linkages by highlighting 
‘horizontal linkages’, which are defined as “a complex set of linkages made up of 
suppliers and users in the chain, who develop capabilities to feed into other industrial and 
service chains” (2012:24). Similarly, several works have emphasized the important types 
of externalities that arise out of extractive activities and that can benefit other sectors of 
the domestic economy, such as infrastructure and knowledge. Whether those elements 
should be considered as linkages or externalities is debatable, but the literature has often 
labeled those as ‘side-stream linkages’ (see CCSI, 2016a; IRP, 2019).16 As further 
explained in section 3.2.2 of this chapter, I have adapted, grouped, and further refined 
notions of “horizontal” or “side stream linkages” under the concept of transversal 
capabilities, which include (i) technological and organizational skills; (ii) shared 
infrastructure; and (iii) ‘product linkages’ (which I have defined as goods with a wide 																																																								
16 The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI, 2016a) defines ‘side stream linkages’ 
as relating to the know-how and infrastructure necessary for the resource value chain to function, 
which can be sub-divided into ‘knowledge linkages’ and spatial (infrastructure) linkages, which 
relate to the benefits associated with the infrastructure (such as power, logistics; communications, 
water) developed for an resource extraction project. 
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applicability to different sectors and activities). The nuances between these three different 
mechanisms of transversality have not been given proper consideration under existing 
typologies, which motivates the new taxonomy of linkages developed in this study. 
The discussion on linkages around commodities can inform the debate on diversification 
strategies. While economic diversification is considered almost unanimously to be a 
fundamental policy goal for resource-dependent countries, the direction in which 
diversification ought to take place is subject to fierce debate (Coniglio et al., 2018). In 
this perspective, figure 2 identifies three main diversification pathways:   
1. Vertical diversification (both upstream and downstream) 
2. Horizontal diversification towards new sectors (with various degrees of relatedness) 
3. Financial diversification (investing resource revenues to generate rents) 
The taxonomy in figure 2 is essentially a combination and application of different linkage 
development models (e.g. Rosenberg, 1976; Hirschman, 1981; Morris et al., 2012).  
The three broad diversification routes outlined in this taxonomy entail three different 
“roles” for the commodities. The use of fiscal linkages to promote both financial 
diversification and horizontal diversification relies on commodities as a source of capital. 
Vertical diversification strategies entail a role of commodities as products in a value 
chain. Lastly, related diversification through transversal capability building relies on 
commodities as a source of production capabilities. 
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Figure 2: Mapping out diversification paths arising out of commodities 
 
2.3.1 Vertical Diversification 
Vertical diversification implies both upstream and downstream diversification. Upstream 
diversification relates to the localization of supply of goods and services required as 
inputs for commodity exploitation.17 Downstream diversification entails value addition, 
through processing (adding value before become an input to another industry) and 
beneficiation, which is understood as the process of transformation in which the 
																																																								
17 Another important distinction noted by Tordo et al. (2013) and Morris et al. (2012) and 
concerns is the issue of defining ‘local/domestic’. Indeed, local linkage does not necessarily mean 
local ownership because the company from which an input is purchased could be locally-based 
but foreign-owned. Larsen, Yankson and Fold (2009:259) illustrate this distinction with the 
example of Ghana, where “a number of basic services, such as laboratory testing, cleaning, 
security and various consultancy tasks, are still outsourced, but to foreign companies with 
subsidiaries in Ghana, not to locally owned companies”. 
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processed commodity is converted into an entirely different product, generally in an 
unrelated manufacturing activity (Morris et al. 2012).18 
Several authors (Bond and Fajgenbaum, 2014; Hirschman, 1981; Mackintosh, 1923; 
Maloney, 2002; Morris et al. 2012; Ovadia, 2016a) have suggested that vertical 
integration was the best avenue for diversification in resource rich countries.19 Within 
this view, some have emphasized the need to focus on downstream diversification (e.g. 
Goldthorpe, 2015) while others have emphasized upstream diversification (Ovadia, 
2016a, 2016b).  
Morris et al. (2012) even sustain that, while resource pessimism led to the wisdom that 
countries should diversify by expanding their industrial and knowledge-intensive sectors 
in areas unrelated to their commodities, the paths that successful late-industrializing 
economies such as East Asian countries followed are difficult to emulate by currently 
resource-rich developing countries for two reasons. The first relates to the reduced space 
available for import substituting industrialization, due to WTO agreements, FTAs and 
BITs. The second reason arises out of the blockages of opportunities in the route to 																																																								
18 An example of beneficiation is the transformation of aluminum into pots and pans. In the oil 
industry for instance, developing forward linkages mean the establishment of refineries, 
petrochemical industry, and the production of fertilizers. In addition, it is worth noting that oil can 
represent many different types of outputs. Indeed, oil could also be seen as a source of energy, 
rather than a particular chemical substance, which is why many oil rich countries use their 
“competitive advantage” to develop aluminum industries, which are very energy intensive. 
19 As early as the 1920s, advocates of the staple theory, which started out as an explanation of 
Canada’s industrial development, even argued that the reallocation of factors of production to 
non-staple production would slow economic development (Altman, 2003). Staples theory 
advocates feature divergent views on the extent to which economies can diversify through 
commodity specialization. On the one hand, Mackintosh (1923; 1939) saw an evolution of staples 
production towards a mature staple-based-industrialized economy, economic diversification and 
self-sustaining growth, rather than the risk of a ‘staples trap’. On the other hand, Innis (1930; 
1940; 1956) had a more pessimistic conception of the relationship between staple production and 
economic development. While he recognized that the commodities specialization did initially 
contribute to the development of domestic industry and infrastructure in the early years of 
exploitation, he also noted a tendency for Canada to become permanently locked into dependency 
as a ‘resource hinterland’. Indeed, Innis was not confident that a staple based-economy will be 
able to diversify and ‘develop’ rather than simply ‘grow’. North (1966) echoed this argument but 
noting that after the initial stage of synergistic linkage development between staple crops and 
local industry and services, the American south fell into a ‘staples trap’ and linkages were located 
in other regions of the US. 
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export oriented industrial development: once all economies take the same route, its 
attractiveness is diminished which is particularly the case when a very large economy – 
such as China – becomes a major actor in international trade and renders export oriented 
industrialisation more difficult to achieve for follower economies in many sectors 
(ibid.:15). As a result, they argue that resource-rich low-income economies should follow 
a diversification path that focuses on production linkages around their commodities rather 
than attempt to build a competitive advantage in unrelated industries. 
However, several counterarguments can be provided. Firstly, the argument related to 
blockages of opportunities in the route to export-oriented industrial development by 
countries such as China does not only apply to new industries but also to upstream and 
downstream industries in the commodity value chain. Chapter 6 shows that value 
addition in the copper industry is “blocked” by producer-driven constraints posed by 
China’s competitive advantage in copper smelting, coupled with Chile’s dependence on 
Chinese copper imports.  
Secondly, it is important to consider the issue of industrial dependence on commodity 
sectors and the consequent vulnerability to commodity price swings. It can be questioned 
whether diversifying along the commodity value chain is the best way to diversify, 
precisely because such diversification may perpetuate the dependence of economic 
sectors on commodity price fluctuations. Local suppliers of goods and services to 
extractive sectors may indeed suffer from the reduction in investments in exploration and 
production in extractive activities as a result of low commodity prices. In addition, the 
desirability of building linkages around a commodity depends on the exhaustibility of 
reserves. If countries run out of oil or copper, they might need to import it to keep 
operating related industries. In that sense, the argument by the staple theory advocates 
that the reallocation of factors of production to non-staple production would slow 
economic development fails to recognize the need to diversify beyond commodities and 
develop productive capabilities in other sectors, especially in countries where natural 
resources are volatile, exhaustible and not labour-intensive enough to cover national 
employment needs.  
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Thirdly, there are other concerns to consider when dealing with policies to increase 
production linkages around commodities. While these policies could generate economic 
benefits, we should question what are the costs (and particularly opportunity costs) of 
implementing these policies rather than investing in unrelated diversification. It can be 
argued that that there are considerable market barriers to commodity value addition, 
which explains why policies to increase vertical integration in extractive sectors have 
achieved mixed results (Tordo et al., 2013).20 It is thus important to consider input costs 
in vertical diversification, which can affect the commercial viability of downstream and 
upstream activities.21 For instance, the oil and gas industries are characterized by high 
capital investment, specialized input, technological complexity, and highly globalized 
supply chains, which often create barriers to local participation, especially in countries 
with little existing capacity (ibid.). As a result, the most easily accessible activities to 
local participation may not imply great degrees of capabilities, which in turn reduces 
prospects of transversal linkages to other sectors and further increase industrial 
dependence on commodities, and thus continued vulnerability to volatility. In that sense, 
the role that technological factors play in linkage development is very important. 
Hirschman (1981:167) recognized that “perhaps the principal reason why it is difficult to 
establish backward and forward linkage industries around the staples is not so much that, 
as argued originally, there are fewer linkage effects in agriculture than in industry, but 
that they largely point to industries whose technologies are alien to the grower of the 
staple. Hence, for a very long time these industries are carried on abroad.” 
Consequently, the fact that an activity is related to a country’s commodity does not 
necessarily mean that it is “easier” to enter. This may explain why Hausmann and 
Klinger’s (2007) theory of product-relatedness entailed an understanding of relatedness 
that is different from the existence of linkages: “looking downstream from existing 
production is a very poor guide to identifying high-potential export sectors. Most 																																																								
20 Governments have attempted to promote upstream diversification through so-called local 
content policies, although their application is increasingly restricted by WTO agreements. 
21 An example of costly value addition is the aluminum sector. While aluminum is mainly made 
of bauxite, the most expensive input is energy. Hence, ‘value added’ considerations should not 
lead a country to move into the aluminum industry just because it produces a lot of bauxite. 
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countries do not move down production chains over time; they are more successful at 
moving to other activities that require similar sets of productive capabilities rather than 
those that are simply related in an input-output relationship” (Klinger 2008). 22 This view 
somehow stands in contrast with the idea that countries have a natural market-driven 
‘comparative advantage’ in developing linkages around their commodities and the idea 
that ‘one thing leads to another’ through a logic of market forces alone. 
2.3.2 Horizontal Diversification 
In my framework, horizontal diversification is divided into unrelated and related 
diversification. The concept of relatedness can be interpreted in several ways and is often 
associated with vertical integration (that is, activities alongside the commodity value 
chain). However, in the framework of this thesis, the concept of related diversification is 
broader as it entails the production of goods in sectors that use similar technologies, 
infrastructure, inputs or production organisation to the already established extractive 
sectors. This is different from vertical integration, which is expanding production along 
the commodity supply chain. Although I treat “related” diversification as a process 
different from vertical integration, the processes do overlap. Vertical integration may 
entail different degrees of beneficiation that can lead to ‘related’ diversification, if the 
value-adding sectors can be categorized as non-commodity sectors (even though they 
may be part of the same value chain). For instance, the production of pharmaceutical 
goods that derive from petrochemicals could be considered as both downstream 
diversification as well as ‘related’ diversification. However, the production of offshore 
wind energy by leveraging expertise and the equipment used for offshore petroleum 
platforms would be a case of related but not vertical diversification. 
Unrelated diversification, meanwhile, is understood as the emergence of sectors that are 
unrelated to the commodity sector or situated outside a country’s current productive 
structure. It should be stressed that the concept of relatedness is not understood here in 
binary terms but instead in gradual terms. In practice, complete ‘unrelatedness’ is rare. As 
a result, I prefer to talk about degrees of relatedness. 																																																								
22 Debates on the meanings of product relatedness are further reviewed in section 4.3. 
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2.3.2.1 Unrelated horizontal diversification 
If we turn to historical experiences, it seems that several resource rich countries have 
successfully undertaken unrelated horizontal diversification.23 Unrelated diversification 
may be needed to create more employment opportunities for the segments of the 
population excluded from the natural resources sector, as well as mitigate the volatility 
caused by oil price fluctuations. As Chang (2007) explains, “in order to achieve 
sustainable long-term development, countries need to use their natural resource rents in 
order to diversify into unrelated industries that are the most technologically dynamic”. 
Unrelated diversification can indeed be promoted through fiscal linkages, which relates to 
the investment of resource rents in other sectors of the domestic economy. In addition, in 
some resource sectors that have often considered as an enclave with few dynamic 
forward or backward linkages, fiscal linkages are central to processes of economic 
diversification and particularly industrialization (Di John, 2009). A strategic use of fiscal 
linkages could consequently orient resource-based development towards industrial 
diversification rather than falling into commodity dependence. 
2.3.2.2 Related horizontal diversification through transversal capabilities  
Related diversification is different from diversification through vertical integration. In my 
framework, what I mean by ‘related’ diversification relates to the products and activities 
that arise from technological, organizational, product and spatial/infrastructure linkages 
from commodity sectors. Those types of linkages are different one from another, and 
different from related diversification through the beneficiation of commodities.24  
2.3.2.2.1 Technological Linkages 
Technological linkages were already put forward by Rosenberg (1976:30), who argued 																																																								
23 Copper-rich Chile has developed competitive salmon, fruit, forestry and wine industries. 
Malaysia has diversified towards the palm oil, rubber electronics sector. Indonesia diversified 
towards its agriculture and manufacturing sectors. Dubai, once specialized in pearls production, 
also diversified into financial services, airlines services and luxury tourism (Bauer, 2016). 
24 As noted earlier, those linkages are often grouped together under the label ‘horizontal linkages’ 
or ‘side-stream linkages’. That said, it may be worth distinguishing them from each other. 
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that producing certain things successfully (e.g. rifles) creates a capacity for producing 
other things (such as sewing machines, bicycles and automobiles). Andreoni (2018) 
further adds that technological linkages imply forms of inter-sectoral learning (with 
various degrees of ‘technological strangeness’ and complementarity). 
Most of the ‘enclave thesis’ advocates have underestimated how technological linkages 
arising out of the mineral sector can spur development. In contrast, several studies have 
argued that the high technological knowledge embedded in the mining sector generated 
spill-overs to other, thereby promoting the development of today’s industrialized 
economies, such as the USA, Australia and Scandinavian countries (Blomstrom and 
Kokko, 2007; Wright and Czelusta, 2004).  
A lot more research needs to be conducted on the technological spill-overs the 
commodities sectors. Unfortunately, such way of addressing technological linkages have 
mostly been neglected in both academic and policy circles. In this thesis, chapter 6 
provides examples of technological linkages in the Chilean copper mining supply sector, 
while chapter 7 provides examples of such linkages in the Malaysian petroleum sector. 
2.3.2.2.2 Organizational capabilities  
Organizational capabilities relate to managerial and organizational skills that can be used 
in many sectors, rather than sector-specific technologies. Such capabilities may matter 
more than technological linkages, especially for products that are not technologically 
demanding or when the technologies are easily and cheaply accessible. 
2.3.2.2.3 Product linkages 
What I call ‘product linkages’ refers to the production of goods and services that have a 
wide applicability for various markets and can be used as inputs in other industries. They 
differ from technological linkages because technological linkages focus on the similarity 
and complementarity of production processes, while ‘product linkage’ focus on the 
applicability of products themselves. Product linkages are essentially about firms 
diversifying the markets for their products. As such, industrial policy should give 
preference to products that are less specific to a particular industry but instead have 
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broader applications and consequently can reap larger benefits from economies of scale. 
Examples of such product linkages include anti-corrosive industrial paint in the 
petroleum sector, especially on offshore platforms. As a result, in Congo (Brazaville), a 
local firm became a supplier of industrial paint for offshore platforms but then scaled up 
to produce for various markets utilizing industrial paint, both domestically and 
regionally. A similar example is reflected by waters pumps production in Chile’s copper 
sector, which also targets pumping solutions sold in different industries (petroleum, 
water, ship-building). 
2.3.2.2.4 Spatial/Infrastructure linkages  
Spatial/Infrastructure linkages relate to the benefits associated with the physical 
infrastructure developed for the extraction of commodities for other actors and activities 
in the domestic economy. Utilization of resource-related infrastructure (such as power, 
water, and transport facilities needed for the extraction, processing and export of the 
commodity) could support the establishment of others sectors, if those facilities are not 
built in an enclave with restricted access.  
2.3.2.2.5 Concluding remarks 
Interestingly, there can be some overlaps between different types of linkages. For 
instance, Malaysia has developed an indigenous shipbuilding industry to meet the 
domestic demand for maritime equipment and services in the oil sector, which could be 
considered as upstream diversification. However, the Malaysian shipbuilding industry 
has also enabled the accumulation of technological capabilities that later went into the 
production of offshore platforms (technological linkages), which are mostly made of 
locally manufactured steel (product linkage). 
2.3.3 Financial Diversification 
While several works on linkages have focused on production linkages at the expense of 
fiscal linkages (e.g. Hirschman, 1981; Morris et al., 2015; Ovadia, 2016a), another view 
holds that mining and oil and gas activities make little direct contribution to the local 
economy, except for the rents they generate (e.g. Bond and Fajgenbaum, 2014). This is 
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demonstrated in the case of Ecuador, where the oil industry appears to have few direct 
spill-overs to the rest of the economy and the main transmission mechanism from the oil 
industry to the rest of the economy is through the government’s fiscal accounts. Indeed, 
Ecuador’s oil sector accounts for only about 0.25% of employment and buys few inputs 
from other sectors, although it contributes about a quarter of government revenues and 
half of total exports (World Bank, 2010). In fact, Hirschman himself, despite his initial 
scepticism of the impact of fiscal linkages, recognized that “both fiscal and consumption 
linkages are likely to appear when other types of linkages are absent” (2013:169).  
How do fiscal linkages contribute to the process of diversification? In the previous 
section, I have already mentioned the use of fiscal linkages to promote horizontal 
diversification. In addition, it is important to stress that fiscal linkages can also promote 
vertical integration. Indeed, fiscal linkages and production linkages are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, which points out another assumption in Hirschman’s 
conceptualization. It can be argued that resource rents can be impactful in developing 
countries since they relax fiscal constraints on growth and consequently provide the 
potential to support industrial diversification, not necessarily at the expense of the 
resource sector but as a complement to it (UNIDO, 2012).  
In this section, I am addressing the role of fiscal linkages in promoting a third type of 
diversification, namely financial diversification. In the context of my taxonomy, the 
financial diversification strategy (through fiscal linkages) entails the use of an extracted 
commodity as a source of capital that can be invested in financial assets across the world 
in order to diversify a country’s financial portfolio. This strategy enables a country to 
diversify the sources of foreign exchange generation and to ‘live like a pensioner’. Such 
financial diversification strategies have been pursued by countries such as Qatar (through 
the Qatar Investment Authority), Norway (through the Norwegian Pension Fund), Chile 
(through the ESSF and the Pension’s fund), and Botswana (through the Pula fund). 
As further emphasized in section 4.2 and in chapter 4 of this thesis, there are several 
limitations to this type of diversification strategy. One of them is that this strategy is 
unlikely to allow the accumulation of productive capabilities. Another equally important 
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limitation relates to employment generation. Indeed, financial diversification (to “live 
like a pensioner”) may only be suitable – or achievable – in the context of very resource 
rich per capita (VRR) countries (see definition in chapter 4). Indeed, for medium 
resource-rich per capita (MRR) countries, the lower amount of resource revenues 
generated in relation to the size of the labour force means that employment needs cannot 
simply be met by ‘artificial’ employment in the public sector or through rents 
redistribution. As a result, these countries may require productive transformation to 
generate employment opportunities and growth, especially in times of low commodity 
prices, while VRR countries are more likely to afford high growth and employment rates 
even in the absence of domestic productive transformation. 
There are thus three major pathways of diversification for resource-rich countries. The 
question that remains is: what is the role of the government in promoting each of those 
pathways? The next section reviews the literature on government intervention in the 
diversification process.  
2.4 WHAT TYPE OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IS NECESSARY 
FOR DIVERSIFICATION?  
2.4.1 Overview 
Section 2.2 has shown the recently renewed interest in the literature in moving away from 
natural resource determinism by investigating explanatory elements and policy options 
for managing resources revenues. Indeed, high resource endowment is not a pre-
determined curse nor blessing and its impact on development depends on government 
actions. The question that thus arises is: what is the role of the government in harnessing 
natural resources for development? In particular, how should we conceive the role of the 
government in the context of the three diversification routes outlined in section 2.3?  
The topic of industrial policy has been controversial within academic and policy circles, 
and mostly relates to which between the state or the market should take the lead in 
diversification. The debates have evolved around the dichotomy between state and 
market forces, with special attention to whether industrial policy should be limited to 
	 56 
correcting market failures or should govern the market by shaping the accumulation of 
productive capabilities. 
The next three subsections review the literature on state intervention for vertical 
diversification, horizontal diversification, and resource revenue management. Each of 
these three discussions can be enriched by drawing on distinct literatures. The discussion 
on industrial policy for vertical integration draws on the global commodity chains 
literature. The discussion on industrial policy for horizontal diversification mostly draws 
on theories of comparative advantage from Neoclassical, developmentalist, evolutionary 
and neo-Schumpeterian perspectives. The discussion on the role of the state in investing 
natural resources revenues mostly draws on the literature on fiscal management, various 
resource revenue models rooted in Neoclassical or Marxist traditions, as well as early 
structuralist insights, which bring useful perspective that enables to “re-link” resource 
rents investment to the developmental objectives of industrialization and diversification. 
2.4.2 Vertical Diversification 
Hirschman (1981) was sceptical of the ability of the state to promote industrial 
development through fiscal linkages because he argued that such linkages do not provide 
guidance regarding which sectors should be targeted. Regarding consumption linkages, 
Hirschman argued that, while the demand in manufactured goods generated by 
employees who spent their income earned in the natural resources sector could potentially 
spur industrialization, these needs could be fulfilled by imports instead of domestic 
production, especially in the context of poorly developed domestic manufacturing 
sectors. This is why Hirschman (1981) believed that the forward and backward linkages 
from natural resources to industry were more likely to lead to economic diversification.  
Hirschman did not explicitly address the respective roles of market and government 
forces in this process of production linkage development, but it seems that his idea that 
‘one thing leads to another’ implies that production linkages unfold somehow ‘naturally’, 
accordingly to market forces. In Morris et al.’s (2012) interpretation, the idea that ‘one 
thing leads to another’ follows a logic of efficiency and of comparative advantage, which 
would ‘run against conventional wisdom that linkages only exist as a function of 
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government interventions’. While the recognition of market forces is important, I believe 
that such an interpretation is problematic for two reasons.  
Firstly, such a view dissociates production linkages from fiscal linkages. Such mutually 
exclusive view of these two types of linkages leads to a failure to analyze the links and 
complementarities between fiscal and production linkages, which neglects the ways in 
which the investment of resource revenues by the government can target production 
linkages development (as shown in the Malaysian petroleum sector in chapter 7). Indeed, 
while several activities alongside commodity value chains have high entry barriers 
(because of their capital or technology intensive characteristics), resource rents generate 
foreign exchange that facilitates the purchase of foreign technology. 
Secondly, even though Morris et al. (2012) recognize that certain contextual 
determinants, such as the ‘policy environment’, can help speed up the unfolding of 
production linkages, it can be argued that the scope for industrial policy is much wider 
than what they imply. For instance, scholars such as Radetzki (1977), Perez (2008) and 
Perez, Marin and Aleman (2014), who have also argued that resource-based 
industrialization may be better than other industrialisation strategies (because forward 
vertical integration requires less reorientation of resources and maybe easier to carry out 
than other industrial strategies) have emphasized the role of industrial policy in the 
process of vertical integration. In a similar perspective, chapters 6 and 7, which 
respectively examine the resource-based development of Chile and Malaysia, show that 
industrial policy does not only “speed up the unfolding of production linkages” but also 
shapes the direction of production linkages. 
The literature on value chain governance within the global commodity chains (GCC) and 
global value chains (GVC) frameworks is particularly helpful in addressing issues of 
value addition in commodity sectors. The GCC research agenda emerged in the 1990s to 
examine the interactions and power relations between ‘lead’ firms and their suppliers, in 
order to understand how suppliers in poor countries can ‘upgrade” in the value chain (See 
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Bair, 2005; Brewer, 2011; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Selwyn, 2015).25 26  
The emphasis on the role that lead firms play in governing global value chains owes 
much to the work of Gereffi and his collaborators. Indeed, one of the major contributions 
of the GCC analysis relates to the governance of the global commodity chains, which 
puts forwards a range of non-market relationships that influence how material, financial 
and non-tangible resources flow and are allocated up and down the chain (Gereffi, 1994; 
Gereffi et al.; 2005).7 As a result, lead firms determine what other firms do and how they 
do it, and thereby influence the upgrading opportunities of suppliers (Selwyn, 2015). 
Indeed, the ways in which value chains are governed shape the ability of participants to 
improve their position within it to capture more value (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; 
Gereffi, 1999; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005).  
Gereffi (1994) initially identified two ways in which lead firm exerted control over a 
value chain: buyer-driven and producer-driven governance. In the buyer-driven chain, 
leads firms decide what is produced, where and at what price, while manufacturing little 
to none of the merchandise sold in their stores or under their labels (ibid.). In the 
producer-driven chains, a larger percentage of the production process is carried out 
within the organizational boundaries of the lead firm, while the manufacturing of lower 
value added components may be subcontracted to suppliers. 27 
In both instances, leads firms pursue strategies that may reproduce global poverty and 
inequality, by attempting to monopolize profits within the commodity chain, using their 																																																								
25 Upgrading is defined as ‘a move to higher value added activities in production, to improve 
technology, knowledge and skills, and to increase the benefits or profits deriving from 
participation’ in GCC (Barrientos et al., 2010, 323). Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) identified 
four types of upgrading in global value chains: 1) process upgrading (e.g. improving efficiency or 
productivity); 2) product upgrading (e.g. shifting to higher value added products); 3) functional 
upgrading (e.g. acquiring new capabilities or moving into new ‘links’ in the chain); and 4) inter-
chain upgrading (e.g. moving from a global value chain in one industry to another).  
26 The GCC framework has its foundations in the world systems theory, and later involved into 
the global value chains (GVC) and global production network (GPN) frameworks. 
27 Later on, a new model of governance was introduced (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Werner et 
al.; 2014). In contrast to the previous dichotomy, the new approach to GVC governance did not 
merely focus on who wields power in a chain, but also examined how exchanges are coordinated 
in the GVC (see Bair, 2005; Gereffi et al., 2005). 
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institutional power to lobby international institutions and national governments for 
protection, and intensifying the exploitation of labour and the natural environment across 
the chain (Selwyn 2015). The ability of lead firms to manage and restrict technology 
diffusion may allow peripheral firms to maintain a presence in industrial sectors but ‘with 
lower profit rates and lower wage rates’ (O’Hearn, 1994) 
There are two main approaches to the governance dimension of the GVC framework in 
the academic literature, which lead to different conceptions of the optimal role of the 
state (Werner et al., 2014). The first approach focuses on power asymmetry and the role 
of lead firms in reproducing the barriers that protect their positions in the chain. The 
second approach focuses on the beneficial dynamics of firm coordination, which is the 
dominant view in the development field and in line with the post-Washington Consensus 
re-framing of the role of the state as a market enabler correcting for market failures, such 
as information asymmetry and under-investment in innovation and technology (ibid.). In 
contrast, the scope for state intervention is much wider if we subscribe to the first 
approach because public policies have increasingly been acknowledged as a tool to 
rebalance asymmetric power relations and inequalities within value chains by creating 
incentives for lead firms to be more transparent, provide suppliers with longer-term 
contracts, and to participate in knowledge transfer (see Pietrobelli and Staritz, 2018). 
As a result of the constraints to upgrading in foreign-dominated GVCs, Lee et al. (2018) 
put forwards the view that low-income countries must actively participate in GVCs to 
learn from the outside at the initial stage of growth, but need to reduce their GVC 
participation or seek separation and independence from foreign-dominated GVCs, if they 
are to upgrade their economies further. 28 
We can go even deeper in our conceptualization of the role of the State in shaping 
production linkages. It is important to start with defining and distinguishing the notion of 
linkages from the notion of capabilities. Most of the literature on commodities has used 
the concept of linkages to define many different situations, but it is perhaps useful to take 																																																								
28 Only at the later stage or after building their own domestic value chains, the latecomer firms 
and economies may want to re-integrate themselves back into GVCs, but at different and better 
points in the chain (Lee et al., 2018).  
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a step back and re-orient discussions of linkage development around the notion of 
capabilities. It can be argued that linkages are given, while capabilities relate to the 
ability to exploit such linkages.29 Capabilities thus restrict the capacity to utilize linkages. 
However, we could also talk about the capability to create linkages, which is the 
capability to innovate in the ways that a particular commodity can be used in a different 
industrial sector (as shown in the case of antimicrobial uses of copper in Chile). Linkages 
and capabilities are thus endogenous in the long run because they affect each other. In 
such dynamic approach, capabilities need to be change according to existing (or expected 
future) linkages in order to localize the capacity to exploit such linkages. As a result, 
when considering which sectors and activities should be targeted as part of resource 
based development, a key consideration to take into account is which activities can leads 
to more linkages in the future and which activities enable the accumulation of capabilities 
for that purpose. 
2.4.3 Horizontal diversification 
A notable issue of academic disagreement regards the scope for state intervention in the 
horizontal diversification process.  
2.4.3.1 The argument for an ‘enabling environment’ through sector-neutral policies  
The ‘conventional’ argument upheld by neoclassical economists is that governments 
should not target sectors because they lack the capacity and knowledge to anticipate how 
these sectors will grow. Such argument leads to the policy advice that governments can 																																																								
29 As a result, when we talk about “limited linkages”, this should not be a representation of a 
country’s situation or whether such linkages are met domestically or abroad as much as it is an 
objective representation of the possible linkages that arise for a certain type of commodity (such 
as limited fiscal linkages arising out of low value minerals for instance in comparison with energy 
minerals, see Lebdioui, 2018). In contrast, when a country lacks the capabilities to exploit 
linkages domestically, it is more accurate to say that linkages are met by imports rather than to 
say that linkages are non-existent. The linkage-capabilities nexus should also be addressed 
dynamically rather than statically. Indeed, while linkages are given, they also evolve over time 
and space through technology innovation, domestic circumstances and practices, etc. For 
instance, before the technological innovation that led to the creation of lithium batteries 
throughout the 20th century, the linkage between lithium extraction and electric batteries was non-
existent. Capabilities are also not given, and require investments in education but also production 
experience to allow for learning by doing. 
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only focus on ensuring an “enabling” environment in which firms can succeed in any 
given industry, by investing in general capabilities such as health, general education, 
infrastructure, the business climate, or mechanisms to guarantee general access to credit 
and property rights for instance (Collier, 2011; Gylfason, 2011). The implicit idea behind 
this argument is to let the market decide which sectors will grow.  
While most economists would agree that policy interventions for sectors have the 
potential to solve specific bottlenecks, the neoliberal argument is that because said 
policies entail choosing favourites, they are prone to government failure. This line of 
argument consequently attributes the inefficiency of resource rents investment to overly 
interventionist states that promoted too many inefficient infant industries (see Auty, 
2004; Nabli et al. 2008). The recommendations are privatization and liberalization.30  
2.4.3.2 Active government intervention to target sectors 
The growing academic acknowledgement in the past decade of the important role of the 
state in industrialization has been the result of a better understanding and clear evidence 
that the best-performing economies featured a proactive role of the state in developing 
productive capabilities (Commission on Growth and Development, 2008). While sector-
neutral policies play an important role for diversification, sector specific policies are 
likely to be needed to bring down the costs of production, to spur efficiency and to 
encourage new entry in new sectors (Gelb, 2010; Benavente, 2016). The contribution of 
the ‘Developmental State’ literature has been of particular importance to the debates on 
industrial policy, particularly by explaining the rapid growth of a number of East Asian 
countries in the postwar period.31 In a similar perspective, several authors within the 																																																								
30 Gelb (2010:20) adds that even though resource rents provide government with increased 
resources to implement vertical policies, the risks are particularly high because having more fiscal 
resources also reduces the urgency of reversing failing policies. Tordo et al. (2013) further argue 
that in contrast to vertical policy interventions, horizontal policy interventions appear to be less 
subject to government failure. Auty (2004) and Nabli et al. (2008) also attribute the insufficient 
diversification of resource-rich countries in the Middle East and North Africa – where the 
introduction of new products is very small and what modest diversification has taken place has 
been due to diversification of existing products (Gourdon, 2010) – to the persistence of 
ineffective vertical industrial policies that favor well-entrenched groups. 
31  The concept of the developmental state has been led by several scholars, including Johnson 
(1982), Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), Chang (1994) and Evans (1995). The developmental state 
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innovation policy literature have emphasized the crucial role of the state in the 
introduction of new products and processes (both in the case of products that already 
exist in foreign markets or radical innovations), which is a crucial mechanism the 
diversification of a country’s production structure (e.g. Benavente, 2016; Lee, 2013; 
2019; Mazzucato, 2015).32 
In addition, not all public goods provisions benefit the whole economy, so governments 
are “doomed to choose” (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006).33 Chang (2009) further argued 
that the only policies that may be called truly “general” are policies regarding basic 
education and health. “There is selectivity and targeting involved in virtually every 
industrial policy measure. The only real difference is that of the degree” (ibid:14). As 
best explained by Ffrench Davis (2002), when policies that first seem “neutral” are 
applied to different segments of the economy in a context marked by inequalities and 
heterogeneity in productivity among workers and firms, they may produce asymmetrical 
effects that are evidently non-neutral, among different productive and social groups. As a 
result, policy makers should not neglect the asymmetric effects of their sector-neutral 
interventions. 
Two questions arise from the recognition of the need for vertical government intervention 
in targeting sectors. The first one relates to how the government should intervene. The 
second question relates to where the government should intervene: within or beyond 
‘comparative advantage’ areas?  																																																																																																																																																																					
literature has essentially offered a heterodox theoretical approach that emphasized the role of 
government intervention and particular social coalitions featuring some degrees of autonomy of 
the state from rent-seeking private interests (Haggard, 2018). For broader reviews of the 
developmental state approach, see Haggard (2018), Henderson (1993), Hope (2019), Leftwich 
(1995), Moon and Prasad (1997), Öniş (1991), and Routley (2012) and Woo-Cumings (1999).  
32 Mazzucato (2015) argues that without state intervention, none of today’s innovations would 
exist (or at least could have taken considerably more time to develop), by pointing out how 
government support for innovation in now industrialized countries has went far beyond sector 
neutral public goods provisions but also included aggressive sector specific policies. 
33 For example, exchange rate policies favour (or harm) tradable activities at the expense of 
nontradable ones; policies targeted at improving financial intermediation by commercial banks 
are partial to firms in the formal sector that have access to external finance and discriminate 
against small and informal firms; accelerated depreciation helps capital-intensive activities and 
discriminates against labor-intensive ones (Rodrik, 2008). 
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2.4.3.3 How should government intervene to target sectors? 
Sector-specific policies can be distinguished according to the degree to which policy 
intervention takes the form of a public input that is complementary to the market (for 
example, targeted infrastructure) or the form of a direct intervention to affect market 
incentives by influencing the behavior of agents (through subsidies for instance) (Crespi 
et al.; 2014). The first set of policies can be identified as vertical public goods provision 
(VP) and the other ones as vertical market interventions (VM). 
It can be argued that VM policies are often more effective than VP policies in solving 
market failures because they have less leakages (being more precisely targeted). In 
contrast, Tordo et al. (2013) argue that VM policies might not be the best option because 
once subsidies are provided, it is usually difficult for the government to discontinue them, 
which is why governments should target sectors mainly through VP. However, many 
more factors should be taken into account regarding the ability of governments to design 
and implement VM policies. One of them relates to whether governments have plans to 
scale down support once there are improvements in competitiveness or if the recipient 
firms become uncompetitive.34 A second key concern is whether the state combines 
support with performance requirements and monitor and sanctions firms accordingly. 
In addition, the historical evidence from several now industrialized countries shows that 
successful industrial policy went beyond VP measures and included market interventions 
such as fiscal incentives, subsidies, etc. As a result, it can be argued that what matters the 
most in terms of industrial policy design is how finely governments target promising 
sectors, as discussed in the next subsection. 
2.4.3.4 Targeting sectors beyond or limited to ‘comparative advantage’? 
How to choose sectors to diversify into? Even new approaches in the neoclassical 
tradition, such the “Growth Identification and Facilitation” (GIF) approach (see Lin and 
Treichel, 2014), recognize the potential role of the state and are concerned with 																																																								
34 In that sense, the inability of governments to pick winners needs to be weighed against the 
ability to cut losses once mistakes have been made (Rodrik, 2004). 
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identifying the sectors suitable for state intervention according to each country’s 
specificities. However, the GIF approach maintains that state intervention should not defy 
the country’s comparative advantages because government failure occurs when states try 
to reshape the production structure beyond the boundaries of comparative advantages. 
Economists such as Lin (2009, 2012), Hausmann and Klinger (2007), Hausmann et al 
(2010) and Rodrik (2004) argued that government intervention should targets industries 
that are in line with the country’s comparative advantages and follow the market rather 
than try to take the lead. 
Interestingly, we can note bifurcations within this tradition regarding what is defined as 
an area of comparative advantage and how to define relatedness. One the one hand, 
relatedness has often been associated with vertical integration (activities and sector 
alongside the commodity value chain) (See Goldthorpe, 2015, Maloney, 2002; Morris et 
al., 2012).35 On the other hand, the theory of product-relatedness by Hausmann and 
Klinger (2007) entails a notion of ‘relatedness’ that differs from the mere existence of 
production linkages.36 This theory is based on the idea that every product requires 
capabilities (knowledge, physical assets, intermediate inputs, labour-training 
requirements, infrastructure needs, property rights, regulatory requirements and so on) 
that are highly specific to that activity and sector (Hausmann and Klinger, 2007). If two 
goods need the same capabilities, a country that has a comparative advantage in one is 																																																								
35 This argument is based on the idea that governments should implement policies that build on 
the comparative advantage of abundant natural resources by creating groups of high-tech 
manufacturing industries that utilize domestically produced raw materials. For instance, Maloney 
(2002) compared the development strategy of resource-rich countries in Latin America to the 
cases of Australia, Scandinavian countries, and the United States and argued that the reason why 
Latin American countries underperformed is because they pursued an import substitution policy 
while the other countries emphasized the comparative advantage of their resource sector and 
diversified around it. 
36 The application of such theory, the Product Space (PS), was first presented in Hausmann and 
Klinger (2007) and Hidalgo et al. (2007) as a network of relatedness between 774 globally 
produced and exported products. According to the PS, some products are very near one another 
and others are far apart and countries should change their exports structure by moving to new 
export activities that are near their current activities. The PS aims to identify what new products a 
country might be expected to be able to export with relative ease. Hidalgo et al. (2007) attempted 
to map this product space empirically by measuring the distance between two products based on 
the probability that if a country exports one product, it exports the other. The PS framework 
argues that defying the comparative advantage has a high probability of failure. 
	 65 
likely to have a comparative advantage in the other. There are many issues and 
limitations to this argument, most of which cannot be addressed within the scope of this 
chapter. 37  The main point to highlight here is that Hausmann’s and Klinger’s 
understanding of relatedness is very different from the notion of relatedness through 
production linkages. Hausmann et al. (2010) even note that looking downstream from 
existing production is a very poor guide to identifying high-potential export sectors.  
Coniglio et al. (2018) investigates whether the patterns of diversification of a sample of 
177 countries over the period 1995-2015 conform to the prediction of the PS framework. 
They find that a significant number of new products that entered countries’ export 
baskets were unrelated to the initial productive specialization (suggesting path-defying 
diversification rather than path-dependent diversification), and that path-defying 
diversification is associated with higher economic growth (also see Pinheiro et al., 2018). 
Those findings support the argument in Chang (2013) that many countries have 
industrialized successfully by developing capabilities and learning-by-doing in sectors in 
which they did not have comparative advantage (such as the automobile industry in 
Japan). Pack and Saggi (2006) and Succar (1987) also argued that allocating resources 
according to comparative advantage can only ensure static efficiency and in no way 
guarantees dynamic efficiency, thereby ignoring the links between present choices and 
future production possibilities. While emphasis is placed by neoclassical economists on 
the importance of specialization based on existing comparative advantages, the 
developmentalist tradition and evolutionary economics offer a more comprehensive 
analysis of productive that take into account the role of learning, technological upgrading 
and capabilities. In contrast to static approaches to comparative advantage, dynamic 
approaches feature a wider scope for the role of the state, responsible for shaping 																																																								
37While the product space theory has attempted to link micro-learning dynamics and macro-
transformative effects, it does not disentangle the different forms of learning realized at the firm 
level and therefore cannot explain how learning dynamics trigger structural change (Andreoni, 
2014). Andreoni (2014) offers a more convincing analysis of structural learning processes that are 
embedded in productive structures; the interconnectedness among components of production 
processes; and how different organisations may exploit technological linkages with dissimilar 
activities towards the selective creation of new productive opportunities. This view is more in line 
with the concept of relatedness as defined in section 2.3, whereby related diversification consists 
in leveraging transversal capabilities that arise out of the commodity value chains. 
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productive transformation away from ‘low-quality activities’, characterized by 
diminishing returns, flat learning, low productivity and wages, towards ‘high-quality 
activities’ that are characterized by economies of scale, technological upgrading, high 
productivity and wages (Cimoli et al., 2009; Findlay, 1973; Kuan, 2016; Nurske, 1961. 
For the context of oil exporters, see Cherif and Hasanov, 2014). Thus seen, rather that 
accepting that countries have gotten where they are by exploiting their existing 
comparative advantages, the key question we should ask is how they have developed new 
capabilities and acquired new comparative advantages (Diestche, 2018).38 
2.4.4 Managing fiscal revenues from resource extraction 
This section addresses how governments should utilize fiscal linkages arising out of 
commodities. The past decade has witnessed a growing literature on the appropriation, 
management, distribution, spending and investment of natural resource revenues. Chang 
(2007) offers a useful framework of natural resources management that can help us 
structure the literature on the subject. As he explains, natural resource revenue 
management is twofold: it involves the appropriation of natural resources rents as well as 
their investment across financial assets, general capability building, related 
diversification, or unrelated diversification. The appropriation and taxation issue is not 
the key focus on this research, as it has already been investigated widely (see Conrad, 
2012; Humphreys et al., 2007; Lebdioui, 2017). The area where further research needs to 
be pursued is the last one in the natural resource revenues management policy chain 
developed by Chang (2007): investing rents for diversification. 
As previously mentioned, Hirschman (1981) argued that fiscal linkages tend to be limited 
in their impact on industrial development because they provide no guidance as to which 
sectors the rents should be invested in. In addition, while natural resource wealth 
generates opportunities to fuel economic development, resource-dependent countries face 
particular macroeconomic challenges associated with commodity price boom-and-bust 
cycles. It is often considered that resource-dependent countries overspend when 																																																								
38 Chapter 8 and 9 of this thesis examine the underlying dynamics behind the emergence of new 
products in the respective export baskets of Chile Malaysia since the 1960s. 
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commodity prices and revenues are high and cut back spending when commodity prices 
decline, which affects the quality of public spending and generates macroeconomic 
volatility (Collier et al. 2010). Governments must also manage their resource rents in 
such way as to avoid spending in excess of the economy’s absorptive capacity. 
Against this backdrop, how and where resource revenues should be invested remains the 
source of contentious academic and policy debates. Such debates have focused on 
whether resource revenues should be saved overseas or invested at home (see Bauer, 
2015; Gelb et al. 2014a; OECD, 2018a; Van der Ploeg and Venables, 2018; Witter and 
Jakobsen, 2018); invested through a wealth fund, through the general budget, or by 
increasing in reserves at the central bank (Mohaddes and Raissi, 2017; Van der Ploeg and 
Venables, 2018); consumed or invested (See Berg et al, 2012; Cherif and Hasanov, 2014; 
Hartwick, 1978; Henstridge and Roe, 2018); earmarked or not (see OECD, 2016a). 
Such debates have been dominated by neoclassical approaches to resource revenue 
management (based on the permanent income hypothesis), which are characterized by an 
emphasis on consumption and on short-term equilibrium (through the objective of fiscal 
stabilization). As a result, the mainstream view within the resource revenue management 
literature has been that government should not invest resource revenues for domestic 
diversification but instead in financial assets to allow for fiscal stabilization. This strategy 
has been labeled as ‘financial diversification’ in section 3. 
However, a few counter-arguments can be provided. Firstly, current approaches focus on 
solving symptomatic features of the resource curse (such as commodity price volatility) 
but do not address the root causes that causes vulnerability to commodity price 
fluctuations, namely the lack of a diversified productive structure. This is what Reinert 
(2007:240) refers to as ‘palliative economics’. Instead of attacking the sources of 
resource dependence from the inside through the production system – which is what 
development economics used to be about – the symptoms are addressed by throwing 
money into financial assets abroad for fiscal stabilization.  While resource revenues 
constitute a potentially productive form of capital if invested in productive capacity 
building (Stiglitz, 2003), an excessive focus on fiscal stabilization, though it helps 
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address short-term fluctuations, can be detrimental to long-term development if it delays 
the transformation of the economy. As Chang (2007) explains, financial investments are 
unlikely to enhance the productive capabilities of the national economy. The standard 
policy advice for managing resource revenues could also be a way to ‘kick away the 
ladder’, because as the rest of this thesis shows, now-diversified resource-rich economies 
such as Chile and Malaysia have not diversified by following the standard policy advice. 
How exactly can resource revenues be invested to promote diversification in developing 
countries that suffer from commodity dependence? Insights from the structuralist school 
(and in particular the works of Arthur Lewis, Michal Kalecki, and Raul Presbish amongst 
others) are very useful here. The structuralist school has emphasized the importance of 
the shift from commodity to industry. The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis suggests that the 
price of primary goods declines in proportion to manufactured goods over the long run, 
which calls for the industrialization of resource-dependent countries. This is caused by 
differences in income elasticity of demand between manufactured goods and 
commodities, and declining terms of trade (Prebisch, 1950). By focusing on the 
agricultural sector, scholars such as Bhaduri and Skarstein (1997); Kalecki (1976); Kay 
(2002), Mellor (1973) and Mundle (1985) further analyzed the re-investment of fiscal 
surplus squeezed from agriculture towards increasing agricultural productivity and 
industry.39 40 By applying those insights to the extractive sectors, we can reframe debates 
of resource revenue management within the broader context of financing development 
and initial capital accumulation in developing countries. Most of the modern literature on 
managing extractive resource revenues is not oriented towards the productive economic 
transformation of resource rich developing economies. Chapter 4 attempts to fill this gap. 
 																																																								
39 The rest of Kalecki’s arguments underlying such shift (in terms of food shortage, inflation, and 
elasticity of demand for labour in agriculture) only apply to the case of soft commodities but do 
not apply to mineral resource extraction, which are characterized by a low labour intensity and 
cannot be used to address food shortages. 
40 These scholars have emphasized the intersectoral relationship between agriculture and industry 
as a key explanation for differences in the development performance between regions, 
particularly between Latin America and East Asia. 
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2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This critical literature review has focused on several dimensions of the relationship 
between mineral resources and economic development. First, this literature review has 
shown that the literature is slowly moving away from resource determinism and towards 
acknowledging that mineral resource abundance is not inherently a curse nor a blessing. 
In the quest to shed light on the need for alternative explanations for variations of 
development across resource-rich countries, the role of industrial policy to promote 
diversification is of particular concern. 
Second, this chapter has reviewed and adapted various linkage arguments in order to 
develop a taxonomy of diversification strategies. It subsequently has turned toward the 
role of industrial policy in the context of the three diversification strategies outlined. It 
appears that the literature calling for a limited role of state intervention in the various 
diversification processes reflect the dominance of a state-market dichotomy that presents 
the state and market as being in opposition with one another, with limited attention to the 
complex interlinkages between them that shape development processes and outcomes 
(Ikpe, 2018). 
In that context, this thesis is going to explore the numerous contextual determinants that 
influence the desirability and suitability of certain diversification strategies over others, 
as well as evidence of the role of industrial policy in not only unfolding but in shaping 
the linkages around commodities.  
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Chapter 3:  
Towards a new approach to measuring resource abundance 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
The discourse around extractives-based development has tended to group various 
countries together, considering them all to be ‘resource rich’, which makes little sense. 
This chapter highlights important distinctions amongst resource-rich economies, which 
have great implications for the suitability of different resource-based development 
strategies. This chapter starts by defining resource abundance and clarifying certain 
statistical misconception when measuring natural resource abundance (and dependence). 
Most of the literature on natural resources and development has looked different 
indicators of resource abundance in isolation to each other. Such approach can be quite 
problematic and has often even led to a conflation between resource abundance and 
resource dependence and statistical misconceptions stemming from the wrong 
classification of resource poor countries as resource rich countries and vice versa. 
After examining different ways to measure natural resource abundance and their 
implications, this chapter calls for a multidimensional approach to measuring resource 
endowment because harnessing natural resources for development is multi-level process. 
A new measurement of resource abundance, the MINDEX, is introduced. It responds to 
the call by several scholars for a new measure of extractive dependence and economic 
diversification over time in order to indicate whether a country is moving in the wrong 
direction (see Lahn and Stevens 2018; Mitchell and Stevens, 2008; Stevens et al. 2015).  
3.2 DEFINING AND MEASURING RESOURCE ABUNDANCE 
 
3.2.1 Defining and classifying natural resources 
 
The first important issue to clarify concerns the differences between different types of 
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natural resources and what I will mean by ‘natural resources’ in this study.  
We tend to distinguish mineral wealth from other types of natural resources because of 
particular political economic circumstances. Indeed, mineral resources tend to generate  
‘point’ resources, which exhibit concentrated and capturable revenue patterns, rather than 
‘diffuse’ resources such as revenues from agriculture. Point rents are usually relatively 
capital intensive and tend to be associated with enclave industries since they generate 
fewer production and consumption linkages in poor economies than more ‘diffuse’ 
resources (Hirschman, 1981; Auty and Gelb, 2000:141). Hard and energy commodities 
such as oil and gas are typical examples of natural resources that are considered to 
generate ‘point’ rents. However, there are exceptions. Artisanal and small-scale mining 
tend to generate diffuse resources, while agricultural resources can be concentrated 
through state marketing board, cooperatives, large buyer-companies.41  
In terms of fiscal linkages accruing to the government, it is true that hard and energy 
minerals tend to have much higher value in international commodity markets than most 
soft commodities, but there are some exceptions such as low value minerals (e.g. 
industrial minerals such as limestone, gypsum, silica sand) or saffron (which has a higher 
commercial value than gold per kg). 
While it can perceived that commodity price volatility tends to be more accentuated for 
mineral commodities than agricultural commodities, it can be argued that soft commodity 
price volatility is further affected by climatic uncertainties, pathogens and other risks 
associated with farming, which do not necessarily affect hard and energy minerals. In 
reality, both agricultural and mineral exhibit outbreaks of volatility (OECD, 2012). As a 
result, I am not taking these points into consideration.  
There are other stronger reasons for singling out mineral resources. The most significant 
difference lies in the fact that mineral commodities are non-renewable while soft 
commodities are renewable. This difference leads to different dynamics and challenges in 
terms of managing those industries on the long run. The second most important 																																																								
41 Bernstein (2010) outlines the obstacles to capitalist farming and why large corporations have 
tended to leave farming to “family farmers” but it can be argued that this not the case anymore.  
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difference lies in the fact that soft commodities (agriculture, fisheries, etc) can be man-
induced.  In contrast, mineral commodities are by definition “indigenous” and thus 
“natural”. This is why measuring general natural resource abundance in Chile or 
Malaysia for instance would neglect the fact that the palm oil, rubber, salmon and 
forestry sectors have been the result of government-induced diversification. The focus on 
mineral resource abundance is thus justified for these two reasons.42 
3.2.2 Defining abundance and dependence 
The second issue relates to finding accurate ways of measuring ‘resource richness’ and 
distinguishing resource abundance from resource dependence. Both resource abundance 
and resource dependence are subjective concepts that are difficult to measure. As Davis 
(2010:10) puts forward, “one approach is to infer endowments from a country’s revealed 
comparative advantage […] The more direct approach is to measure physical 
endowments, i.e., mineral resource stocks, directly”.  
Several influential studies on the resource curse have been characterized by statistical 
misconceptions. For instance, the negative correlation between economic growth and 
natural resource wealth found in Sachs and Warner (1997) relies on measurements of the 
share of resources output/exports out of total output/exports. This measurement can be 
misleading because it reflects resource dependence rather than resource abundance. First, 
it misclassifies resource poor countries that export nothing else than commodities 
because they have little other products to export to foreign markets (which is a key 
characteristic of an underdeveloped economy) as ‘resource wealthy’. Indeed, some 
countries, such as Chad and Mali, may have few mineral resources but yet depend on 
those few for the bulk of their export earnings (Gylfason, 2011:10). Second, the statistical 
confusion between resource dependence and abundance leads to a selection bias that 
ignores successful resource-based development experiences. In historical terms, several 
now-industrialized resource rich countries, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Malaysia, began as resource-based economies but have 																																																								
42 The first three reasons also offer some insights on the potential differences between renewable 
and non-renewable commodities but they can be more easily dismissed given that they are based 
on generalizations (or observations) rather than clear-cut differences. 
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managed to diversify their economy and by definition do not qualify as ‘resource 
dependent’ anymore.  
A country is commonly considered as resource-dependent when natural resources 
constitute the bulk of this country’s export basket or government revenues. However, 
should we distinguish mono-resource exporters from countries that depend on several 
types of natural resources? Should multi-resource abundant countries, such Chile or 
South Africa for instance, also be classified as resource-dependent? How should resource 
abundance be measured? Gylfason (2011:10) provides an interesting way of 
distinguishing resource abundance from resource dependence. According to him, 
abundance relates to the amount of natural capital that a country has at its disposal: 
mineral deposits, oil fields, forests or farm land, while dependence relates to the extent to 
which the nation in question depends on these natural resources for its livelihood (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, the distinction between abundance and dependence should perhaps be 
subtler than the difference between resource availability and resource exploitation. 
Indeed, natural capital may be exploited through economic activities that communities 
may rely on in order to subsist, without being fully dependent on natural capital alone. 
For instance, resource activities can constitute the core of resource-based manufacturing 
activities that contribute to diversify economic output.  
 
Lederman and Maloney (2007) measured resource abundance by using net resource 
exports per capita and concluded that Norway, New Zealand, Canada, Finland and 
Australia ranked as the most resource intensive economies rather than economies such as 
the DRC and Papua New Guinea in the Sachs and Warner’s (1995) study. This 
measurement is indeed a much better reflection of resource abundance then than the share 
of natural resources in GDP/exports.  
It is also possible to look at indicators other than exports. For instance, resource 
abundance could also be measured in terms of the value of production (see Leamer, 1984; 
Moroney, 1975); the size of resource revenues (see IMF, 2012b; Matsen and Torvik, 
2005); or resource rents (see Cammett et al., 2015; Bond and Fajgenbaum, 2014; Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2009; Chauvet and Collier, 2008; IMF, 2012b). However, measurement 
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that focus on resource rents or revenues may misclassify countries with large mining 
sectors such as Madagascar (ilmenite) as resource poor because of a very low resource 
rent of the commodity (the market price of ilmenite is only marginally above its cost of 
extraction in Madagascar) (Bond and Fajgenbaum, 2014:126). In those cases, focusing on 
resource rents may misrepresent the importance of extractive sectors for the domestic 
economy.  
In contrast to studies that have focused on measured of resource exports/production/rents, 
geologists do not think of endowments as the value of current production and tend to 
focus on geological abundance as well as quality, location, and technical considerations 
such as extractability of metal from ore (Davis, 2010). The United Nations even has its 
own definitions that distinguish resource reserves from resource deposits. Reserves are 
quantities that are relatively more certain geologically and more likely to be economic to 
extract, while resources are less geologically certain and may never be economically 
extracted. 43 Some studies have measured resource abundance by using indictors of 
physical resource endowment, by comparing resource reserves or deposits per square 
kilometre across regions (See Collier 2011; Arezki et al., 2016). 
Many indicators have been used to measure resource abundance (proven reserves, size of 
production, exports, resource rents, or government resource revenues) in both absolute 
terms and relative terms (as share of GDP or total exports for instance). However, 
existing measurements have mostly relied on such indicators in isolation to one another. 
There is no objective all-encompassing single measurement for resource abundance, 
which is why it is important to look at several indicators. In addition, there are great 
implications of relying on one measurement over another. Harnessing natural resources 
for development is multi-level process and the types of variables that we choose to 
measure resource abundance reflect different aspects of the natural resource management 
chain. As shown in section 3.3, highlighting several indicators simultaneously may be a 
useful way to identify specific developmental challenges a resource-rich country faces.  																																																								
43 However, there is no standardization of these categorizations, with several mineral-producing 
nations deriving their own definitions (e.g., JORC in Australia, CIMVal in Canada, SAMVal in 
South Africa, and SME in the United States) (Davis, 2010). 
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3.3 RESOURCE ABUNDANCE COMES IN SEVERAL SHAPES: 
INTRODUCING THE MINDEX 
3.3.1 Overview  
The combination of several indicators of resource abundance (such as resource 
production, exports, rents and government revenues) can offer useful insights that single 
indicators cannot grasp on their own.  In fact, this method not only sheds light on the 
implications of choosing indicators over others when measuring resource abundance and 
dependence, but also holds potential to be used as the basis of a “diagnostic” tool, in 
order to identify the policy challenges that a given country might face.  
Figure 3: Weighting different indicators of resource abundance/dependence 
 
 
This multidimensional indicator for extractives-based development (MINDEX) consists 
in weighting six different indicators of resource abundance and resource dependence. 
These indicators represent different dimensions of extractive activities. Some indicators 
(such as government extractive revenues) relate to the fiscal linkages arising out of 
commodities, while others relate to resource reserves (and resource exhaustibility), 
resource exports and resource rents.44 Those six indicators reflect the several steps of the 
																																																								
44 Resource rents are defined as unit price minus the cost of production times the quantity 
produced (World Bank, 2019). In other words, commodity rents are the difference between the 
value of commodity production at world prices and total costs of production. 
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resource revenue management policy chain to translate extracted commodities into 
developmental assets. Such steps are common across various policy frameworks of 
natural resource management (see table 1 below). 
Table 1: Comparing frameworks of the resource revenue management policy chain  
Series	of	
steps	
Chang	(2017)	 Collier	&	
Laroche	(2015)	
EITI	 Henstridge	&	
Roe	(2018)	
NRGI	(2014)	
Discovery	
	 Discovering	 	 Discovery	
(Exploration)	
Discovery	and	
deciding	to	
extract	
Exploitation	
and	
production	
	 Exploiting	 Awards	of	
contracts	and	
licences;	
Development	
(Investment	and	
construction)	
	
	
Getting	a	good	
deal	
Regulation	and	
monitoring	of	
operations	
Production	
(Monetization)	
Resource	
rents	
appropriation	
Appropriating	
the	rents	
Taxing	 Collection	of	
taxes	and	
royalties	
Revenue	
(Transfer	rent)	
	
Getting	a	good	
deal	
	
Investment	of	
resource	
revenues	
Investing	the	
rents	across	
financial	assets,	
general	capacity	
building,	and	for	
diversification.	
Investing	in	
investing	
Resource	revenue	
management	and	
allocation	
Public	
Investment	
Managing	
revenues	
Investing	 Social	and	
economic	
spending	
Human	
Development	
Investing	for	
sustainable	
development.	
These frameworks have a common message: the conversion of extractive resources into 
developmental outcomes follows a sequence of steps, which includes the discovery of 
natural resources, their production, the appropriation of extractives revenues, and the 
investment of such revenues for developmental purposes. As such, the MINDEX can 
serve as a diagnostic tool to assess the performance of a country on each of those steps 
(whether it is limited production compared to proven reserves, poor appropriation of 
revenues, or an insufficiently diversified economy reflecting the poor investments of 
resource revenues for structural transformation). An indicator of developmental outcomes 
(such as the HDI or GDP per capita) may be added in future updates of the MINDEX in 
order to consider the last step of the resource revenue management chain, which is 
investing for human development (or economic growth). 
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3.3.2 Seven different scenarios 
 
Table 2: Seven case scenarios 
Case Scenario Explanations and policy challenges 
Case 1 All six indicators are high The country is both resource-abundant and resource-dependent.  
Case 2 Resource production is high but exports are low  
High domestic consumption of that mineral as a 
finished product (consumption of oil for electricity 
generation in Saudi Arabia) or as inputs for value 
added activities (e.g. oil used for petrochemical 
production in the United States) or illegal smuggling 
of commodities (e.g. DRC & Burkina Faso). 
Case 3 Resource reserves are high but production/rents are low 
Issue of investment attractiveness in resource 
activities (due to a poor business climate); limited 
domestic infrastructure and capabilities to extract 
minerals; political issues such as an embargo (as in 
oil-rich Iran and manganese-rich Cuba); or local 
conflict (e.g. Libya) restraining resource production 
and exports.  
Case 4 High level of resource production (or resource rents) 
but low government resource 
revenues 
The country faces issues of appropriation of resource 
revenues and possible insufficient taxation on 
mineral production/exports. 
Case 5 Resource production, exports and reserves are low but the 
share of minerals in total 
exports and government 
revenues are high. 
The country is resource poor but is highly resource 
dependent 
Case 6 In contrast to case 4, mineral production, exports and reserves 
are high but the share of 
minerals in total exports and 
government revenues are low 
The country is resource rich but has a diversified 
economy. 
Case 7 Mineral exports (in absolute terms) are very high, but 
mineral production and reserves 
are low. 
The country is resource poor but is a re-exporter of 
commodities after some degrees of processing (India 
and Israel with diamonds exports, Switzerland with 
gold exports, Belgium, Singapore and South Korea 
with fuel exports). 
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Figure 4: Seven shapes of “resource abundance” 
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3.3.3 Methodology 
 
Developing and applying this tool has proven difficult due to several methodological 
reasons. Firstly, data is not always available for each of those indicators for each country. 
In particular, sources of government revenues are not systematically revealed. Secondly, 
there is an issue of data comparability. For instance, data on the mineral deposits by 
country is often expressed in weight but rarely in value, which renders difficult the task 
of comparing countries that export different types of mineral resources. A third difficulty 
lies in the development of an appropriate scoring system for each indicator, which 
necessitates benchmarks. Table 3 below summarizes the scoring criteria for each 
indicators of the MINDEX. The value of extractives exports, rents, reserves and 
government extractives revenues are expressed in USD and in per capita terms. Per capita 
measurements are a better reflection of resource abundance than national measurements. 
The fact that two countries are sitting on/producing/exporting the same volume of 
minerals does not mean that they are equally resource ‘rich’, as their resulting wealth will 
depend on the cost of extraction but also on how many people will share the benefits of 
such wealth (Lahn and Stevens, 2018).45  
 
The methodological choices underlying this scoring system are further explained in 
subsequent paragraphs. Such methodology might be imperfect for many reasons, but it 
may be the best effort so far to capture the multidimensionality of resource abundance, 
until more data becomes accessible to improve the current methodology. 
 
  
  
																																																								
45 Indeed, it can be argued that it makes little sense to consider that a country such as Nigeria is 
more resource-rich than Norway based on the national value of resource rents generated on a 
given year, because such rents have to be shared between 190million people in Nigeria and only 
five million in Norway. By adjusting resource rents to population size, Norway’s resource rents 
per capita in 2016 are 40 times higher than Nigeria’s! 
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Table 3: Underlying scoring criteria of the MINDEX 
 
 
Score 
Share of 
extractives 
in exports/ 
government 
revenues 
Value of 
extractives 
exports 
(USD per capita) 
Value of 
extractives rents 
 
(USD per capita) 
Value of 
extractives 
reserves 
(USD per capita) 
Government 
extractives revenues 
 
(USD per capita) 
 
1 100% > 10,000 > 5000 > 100,000 > 3000 
0.9 90% Between 7,500 
and 10,000 
Between 3750 and 
5000 
Between 100,000 
and 75,000 
Between 3000 and 
2250 
0.8 80% Between 5,000 
and 7500 
Between 2500 and 
3750 
Between 75,0000 
and 50,000 
Between 2250 and 
1500 
0.7 70% Between 2,500 
and 5000 
Between 1250 and 
2500 
Between 50,000 
and 25,000 
Between 1500 and 
750 
0.6 60% Between 1000 and 
2500 
Between 500 and 
1250 
Between 25,000 
and 10,000 Between 750 and 300 
0.5 50% Between 750 and 
1000 
Between 375 and 
500 
Between 10,000 
and 5,000 Between 300 and 225 
0.4 40% Between 500 and 
750 
Between 250 and 
375 
Between 5,000 
and 2,500 Between 225 and 150 
0.3 30% Between 250 and 
500 
Between 125 and 
250 
Between 2,500 
and 1,000 Between 150 and 75 
0.2 20% Between 100 and 
250 
Between 50 and 
125 
Between 1,000 
and 500 Between 75 and 30 
0.1 10% Between 50 and 
100 
Between 25 and 
50 
Between 500 and 
100 Between 30 and 15 
0.0 0% <50 < 25 Below 100 < 15 
 
3.3.3.1 Resource reserves 
Measuring and comparing resource reserves has been a difficult task because of data 
heterogeneous availability across country across types of commodities. Indeed, 
commodity reserve data, when accessible, tends to be measured in weight (metric ton, 
ounce, barrels, or else) rather than value. However, an ounce of gold does not have the 
same value as an ounce of limestone. What is more, because the other indicators (such as 
resource exports, rents, revenues) are measured by value, it is important for commodity 
reserve to be expressed in USD to allow for comparability across indicators. Another 
important consideration lies in the difficulty of distinguishing resources deposits from 
resources reserves that are more difficult to extract. 
 
After considering several options, I have chosen to convert data on commodity reserves 
that was expressed by weight in USD, based on averaged commodity prices for a given 
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time period.46  Three further options can be pursued. One option is to recalculate 
commodity prices for every given year, but one limitations would be that fluctuations in 
the commodity reserves score may be wrongly interpreted as changes in commodity 
reserves as opposed to reflect commodity price fluctuations. Another option is to 
calculate the value of commodity reserves based on the commodity prices in a reference 
year and apply it to all years. However, given commodity price fluctuations, such method 
may not be an accurate reflection of the value of a commodity over time. A third option 
(the one I have chosen) is to calculate average commodity prices for a longer time period, 
which includes periods of both commodity booms and bust (such as 1990-2016).47  
Table 4: Selected commodity prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: EIA, 2018; IMF (2018b), IndexMundi, 2018a, 2018b; OnlyGold, 2018 
*Conversion using 1 MMBtu = 28.263682 m3 of natural gas 
3.3.3.2 Share of minerals in total exports and revenues 
Scoring the share of mineral resources in total exports and resource revenues in total 
government revenues has been relatively straightforward given that these two indicators 
are expressed as a percentage.  																																																								
46 Another option is to rank countries according to the share of global commodity reserves that 
they hold. However, such measurement does not consider the different monetary values across 
different commodities. The world’s top holder of limestone reserves is arguably not as “resource-
rich” in value terms as the 10th largest holder of oil reserves. 
47 One limitation is that this option would not accurately reflect the current value of commodities 
such as cobalt or lithium, whose price has been steadily rising and is expected to further increase 
given the rising global demand for these products. However, this method is justified by the fact 
that most other commodities have featured fluctuating prices over the last two decades. 
Commodity Average prices (1990-2016) 
Oil (brent) USD 46,70 per barrel 
Natural gas USD 3.82 per mmbtu = USD 135 per 1000 m3* 
Gold USD 641.242 per ounce 
Copper USD 4,043.03 per metric ton 
Zinc 1,548.07 per metric ton 
Cobalt 43,850 per metric ton 
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3.3.3.3 Mineral resource exports and rents  
Resource exports and rents could be scored in either absolute terms or relative terms. 
Both options offer advantages and disadvantages. Here, absolute values have been chosen 
because they are more sensitive to commodity price volatility and may be a better 
reflection of a country’s level of resource exports/rents at a given time.48 
The benchmarks should also differ between resource rents and resource exports, based on 
the average ratio between resource rents and resource exports across countries and time. 
Based on my calculations for the top 25 resource exporters, resource exports are on 
average twice (2.01) as high as resource rents over the period 1997-2010. The scoring 
criteria (see table 3) for resource rents and exports take this ratio into account. 
3.3.3.4 Government revenues  
Data availability has always been an issue when measuring government resource 
revenues (Prichard et al. 2018). However, the most recent database of the International 
Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) has now included measures of resource 
revenues specifically, which captures both taxes from resource revenues, as well as non-
tax resource revenues (such as royalties, dividends, etc). Nevertheless, data is still 
missing for several countries and time periods.  
In the ICTD database, tax revenues are expressed as a percentage of GDP. To obtain 
absolute values per capita, I have converted such values by multiplying them by the 
corresponding GDP per capita (in constant USD) for each country. Measurements of real 
GDP (in constant 2010 USD) were used over nominal GDP in order to remove the effects 
of inflation over time, and focus solely on production volume and commodity prices. The 
choice of real prices over nominal prices indeed enables better comparisons over time.  
																																																								
48 In contrast, relative values (through country rankings) enable to compare a country’s situation 
to other countries but do not take into account commodity price volatility. Indeed, a resource 
exporter might still belong to the top decile even if resource revenues drop following a 
commodity price bust. In addition, the distribution of countries according to the level or resource 
exports or rents is not necessarily homogeneous, which increases the likelihood of misclassifying 
countries. The option chosen thus relies on absolute rather than relative values.	
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One other issue is to define what counts as government revenues. Should profits that are 
retained by SOEs (such as national oil companies) be taken into account? For instance, 
many SOEs have more than purely commercial missions but also spend their revenues for 
social purposes (such as spending on fuel subsidies by Petronas, etc).49 Because of the 
lack of data on SOEs profits and spending patterns, it would be too difficult to include 
SOEs in the analysis, which consequently only focuses on government revenues. 
Another key concern is to distinguish federal revenues from subnational revenues. In 
some countries (such as the USA or Malaysia) resource revenues do not only accrue to 
the central government but also to provincial governments. As a result, it may appear that 
US government resource revenues are low, when in fact most resource revenues accrue to 
state governments. The ICTD database only includes revenues to the central government. 
Future updates of the MINDEX will attempt to include subnational revenues.  
The lack of data on government fiscal revenues for many countries renders international 
comparisons a difficult task. As a result, how can we determine whether a government’s 
resource revenues are high or low? Here, the solution found consists in using resource 
rents values as a baseline. Evidence suggests that on average, governments should 
reasonably capture two thirds of resource rents. While fiscal regimes for extractive 
industries vary greatly, the IMF (2012a) finds that government should retain around 40–
60% of rents in the mining sector and around 65–85%. Fiscal regimes that raise less than 
these benchmark averages may be cause for concern or regret (ibid.). It is consequently 
reasonable to assume that across extractive activities, government should receive about 
60% of the value of resource rents, which is why I have imposed threshold values based 
on a government resource revenues/ resource rents ratio of 0.6. While this method suffers 
from limitations due to the variety of fiscal regimes across different types of extractive 
sectors, it is useful as it enables to directly compare government resource revenues with 
resource rents for the same year. 
 																																																								
49 Interestingly, countries where private firms dominate oil production appear among the world’s 
top tax collectors, while similarly resource-rich countries that rely on national petroleum 
companies appear among the worst tax collectors (Pritchard et al, 2018). 
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3.3.4 Results 50 
3.3.4.1 Cross-country analysis 
Figure 5: Application of the MINDEX to selected countries (year 2010).51 
  
		 	
		 	
																																																								
50 See Appendix A for details on each country data and measurements. 
51 With the exception of Burkina Faso, for which data corresponds to the year 2016.  
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Several key observations can be drawn from figure 5. First, it is possible to identify each 
country with one of the seven cases identified earlier in this document. Some of the cases 
are hybrid because they simultaneously feature several case scenarios (DRC) while other 
cases are hybrids because they are in the transition between two cases (Norway). 
Burkina Faso features a case 5, due to the small size of government resource revenues 
and resource exports despite the dependence on mining exports. The case of Burkina 
Faso is confirmed by current analyses. For instance, EITI (2016) reports that:  
“The declared production from artisanal mining was 0.5 tons in 2013, but undeclared 
production was estimated as at least 8.8 tons according to a report by the Berne Declaration, 
a NGO investigating the sources of Switzerland’s gold. The study alleges that almost all of 
the gold produced by artisanal miners slips through the country’s borders undetected. In 
2013, the NGO reported that approximately seven tons of gold left the country undeclared 
and was exported to Switzerland via Togo.”  
The EITI report also revealed that only 37 of the certified 63 trading houses declared 
their revenues to the Office of Mines and Geology (EITI, 2016).  
The DRC’s MINDEX is also consistent with existing accounts of its mining sector:  
“In the DRC, the picture in mining taxation is more difficult to quantify since a large part of 
the mining is undertaken by nearly two-million informal workers, and because most of the 
mining contracts of even the large companies are secret. Moreover, World Bank audits on 
the restructuring of Gécamines, the state-owned copper- and cobalt-mining enterprise, have 
never been made public (Tax Justice Network 2010). A 2004 audit by Ernst and Young 
found that Gécamines did not receive any share of the profits made by its joint ventures 
with private mining companies due to the terms of the mining contracts it negotiated with 
private companies. Of course, the president and senior mining officials were responsible for 
drafting these contracts so the implication is obvious” (Di John, 2010:19).   
	 88 
3.3.4.2 Evolution over time: Longitudinal analysis 
Figure 6: Longitudinal analysis through the MINDEX for selected countries 
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The three dates selected for analysis reflect two shifts in commodity prices: 1997 and 
2016 were marked by low commodity prices while 2010 was a year of commodity 
boom.52 Interestingly, for most countries, the 2016 ‘shape’ seems to return to its 1997 
‘shape’. The role of commodity prices should thus be highlighted. In addition, there is a 
contrast in the evolution of the “shape of resource abundance” over time in Algeria on the 
one hand, and in Malaysia, Chile and Norway on the other hand. In times of low 
commodity prices, the striking difference between these countries is accentuated. In years 
1997 and 2016, while Malaysia, Chile and Norway shift towards case 6, Algeria shifts 
towards case 4 (dependency), which reflects its vulnerability to commodity price 
fluctuations. Norway, Malaysia and Chile have relatively managed to buffer their reliance 
on extractives for exports and revenues when commodity prices drop. 
The diagnostic tool also suggests that more resource revenues have accrued to the 
government of DRC in 2014 than in 2010. This is can be explained by the recent efforts 
from the DRC government towards appropriating more resource revenues, notably 
through a mining code revision process since 2012. This tool can thus serve to evaluate 
the impact of policies on extractives-based development and dependence over time.  
3.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES & NEXT STEPS 
This tool shows that the abundance and dependence on extractive resources are 
multifaceted. The degree to which diversification should be a priority also varies not only 
on its degree of resource dependence, but also to its degree of resource endowment. As 
shown by figure 7, for countries in case 5 (resource-dependent but resource-poor), the 
urgency to diversify away from extractives is very high. For countries in case 1 
(resource-rich and resource-dependent), the urgency to diversify is also high, but 
diversification around extractive activities remains a potentially attractive policy option. 
For countries in case 3 or 4, the key priority is not necessarily diversification as much as 
it is the development and growth of the extractive sector. In those situations, it can be 
argued that extractives-based development should precede (or at least go alongside) 
diversification. 																																																								
52 A longer time horizon for the longitudinal analysis would have been desirable, but data 
availability issues only enabled comparisons since 1997. Some observations can still be drawn. 
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Figure 7: Implications of the MINDEX for diversification strategies in selected cases 
 
This tool can also be useful in helping to manage expectations from extractive resource 
endowment and discoveries.53 For instance, recent oil discoveries have urged several 
African countries to design and implement local content policies, and led to high popular 
expectations for the future impact of petroleum on the domestic economy (Ovadia, 
2016a). However, euphoria may not be helpful, and strategies should be guided by 
realism (Addison and Roe, 2018). In that context, this tool enables to carefully examine 
the degree of resource abundance by country, and helps to show that extractive resource 
exporters such as Chad or Mali may in fact be closer to the conditions of resource-poor 
East Asian countries than resource-rich countries such as Australia, Norway or Qatar. 
Emulating the resource-based development model of the latter countries may thus be 
misleading and out of reach. In such perspective, the scaling up of this tool will enable 
the analysis of patterns over time and across countries in order to identify how the impact 
of different developmental models across the different cases outlined in section 3.2. 
Further updates of the tools will also monitor more closely the role of commodity price 
fluctuations with year-by-year animations.  
																																																								53	As phrased by Addison and Roe (2018:10): “The soaring architecture of the Gulf states, built 
on oil wealth, captivates the modern imagination. The scale of the potential rewards inspires 
explorers, miners, and investors, while politicians dream of fast-tracks to national prosperity.”	
Diversify AWAY from extractivesPossibility of diversifying both 
around and away from extractives
Extractives-based development 
as a priority before considering 
diversification
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Chapter 4: Resource revenue management in the context of 
diversification: bringing back a holistic developmental approach 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the political economy of managing resource revenues as a 
pathway to prosperity. The management of revenues from exhaustible natural resources 
involves a number of inter-related challenges, such as inter-generational equity, 
commodity price volatility, diversification away from resource dependence, and shared 
prosperity. How and where should resource revenues be invested in remains the source of 
a contentious academic and policy debate. The academic literature remains divided on 
several issues, such as whether resource revenues should be investing domestically or 
abroad (see Bauer, 2015; Gelb et al. 2014a; Van der Ploeg and Venables, 2018; Witter 
and Jakobsen, 2018), consumed or invested (See Cherif and Hasanov, 2014; Hartwick, 
1978; Henstridge and Roe, 2018), invested through a sovereign wealth fund, through the 
general budget, or by increasing in reserves at the central bank (see Mohaddes and Raissi, 
2017; Van der Ploeg and Venables, 2018); earmarked or not (see OECD, 2016a). 
A central policy question is how much of resource revenues should be invested in 
financial assets overseas for fiscal stabilization and how much should be invested 
domestically. This chapter shows that the mainstream models of resource revenue 
management, most of which are based on the permanent income hypothesis (suggesting 
that resource rich developing countries should invest all their resource revenues in 
financial assets abroad), are dominated by a short-term emphasis on consumption, fiscal 
stabilization and market equilibrium at the expense of long term structural change. As a 
result, such approaches have only addressed the symptoms of the resource curse 
(vulnerability to commodity price volatility) but not its root cause (productive 
dependence on commodities). This chapter therefore aims to reframe the resource 
revenue management agenda towards achieving export diversification. 
While it is important to consider dynamics of government failures, this chapter seeks to 
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adopt a dynamic approach (across time, space and institutional conditions) to the trade-
off underlying resource revenue management by shedding light on several factors and 
policy actions that contribute to influence the optimal allocation between domestic 
investment and saving in a stabilization fund. The alternative developmental approach 
outlined in this chapter puts forward institutional measures to reduce the risks of elite 
capture and investment inefficiency. It also features an active role of the state in 
promoting diversification through investments to relax financial and technological 
constraints in new tradable sectors. 
4.2  OPTIONS FOR MANAGING RESOURCE REVENUES 
4.2.1 Mapping out different options to managing resource revenues 
Figure 8 maps out several layers of decisions for the government to allocate resource 
revenues. First, government needs to decide whether resource revenues are to be 
consumed or invested. Domestic consumption can be fuelled through public or private 
spending (through citizen dividends, subsidies or through the tax/benefits system). If 
invested, resource revenues can be transformed into real or financial assets (which can be 
used as savings for future generations or for fiscal stabilization purposes if invested in 
low risk securities, as done by Chile’s government, Bostwana’s Pula fund or Norway’s 
pension fund). If invested in real assets, resource revenues can be invested through the 
public sector or private sector (e.g. through subsidized credits, production or export 
subsidies, or lowering public debt).  
Those differences have important implications in terms of economic development 
strategy. Collier et al (2010) rightly pointed out that these different alternatives have 
fundamental implications in terms of the actors (state, private sector, or citizens) that get 
the ultimate control of the macro level spending from these revenues and micro level 
spending detail, and the overall balance between consumption and investment.  
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Figure 8: The main options for managing resource revenues 
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Amongst the different options for managing resource revenues, the public spending of 
resource revenues for both consumption and investment in real assets has often been 
criticized due to government failures that can be classified into two broad categories. The 
first one relates to risks of public investment inefficiency due to political factors (elite 
capture, through corruption, cronyism and political motivations; reduced efforts to collect 
taxes, which may hinder accountability). The second category relates to risks of public 
investment inefficiency due to economic factors (lack of government capacity to invest, 
spending beyond the absorptive capacity and crowding out issues; fiscal instability due to 
commodity price volatility and currency appreciation). It is indeed often argued that 
resource revenues accruing to the domestic economy can exceed absorptive capacity or 
can be wasted in unproductive investments, which can also create a vicious cycle of 
under-investment, inflation and appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, which reduces 
the competitiveness of non-resource tradable sectors, further dampening incentives for 
investment in those sectors and making diversification more difficult (See Arezki, 2011; 
Gelb et al., 1988; World Bank, 2013). 54 55 
As a result, several scholars have favoured other ways to manage resource revenues. 
Some authors have emphasized that, in contrast to public expenditure, parking financial 
assets overseas is not constrained by the absorptive capacity of the economy, which is 
why financial investments should be prioritized until investments can be used efficiently 
in the domestic economy (Hentsridge and Roe, 2018; van der Ploeg and Venables, 2018). 
The more radical conventional policy advice on managing revenues from non-renewable 																																																								
54 The issue of capacity to invest is here distinct from risks of elite capture, based on the fact that 
elite capture stems from an intentional behavior that is politically or economically motivated, 
while government capacity to invest only reflect on the government’s ability to conduct 
investments despite ‘good’ intentions. 
55 Gelb et al. (1988) and Arezki and Brückner (2010) have evidenced that commodity booms are 
often followed by large public investment projects that have been characterized by inefficiencies 
and resource misallocation. It is often considered that resource rich countries overspend when 
commodity prices and revenues and high, and cut back spending when commodity prices decline. 
Such spending behaviour affects the quality of public spending and generates macroeconomic 
volatility, which is detrimental to private investment, consumption and consequently economic 
growth (Bond and Fajgenbaum, 2014). Arezki (2011) consequently points out that poor long-run 
economic performance in commodity-exporting countries may stem from inefficiencies in 
government investments rather than from underinvestment.  
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resources, based on the permanent income hypothesis (PIH), is that such revenues should 
be systematically saved overseas in order to avoid fiscal instability from overspending 
resource revenues, and that domestic spending of resource revenues on the long run 
would be financed by the returns on savings and investments overseas (e.g. Davis et al., 
2003; Barnett and Ossowski, 2003; Bems and de Carvalho Filho, 2011).56 Bauer and 
Rietveld (2014) argue that SWFs should serve macroeconomic objectives instead of 
developmental ones, and should thus not be allowed to spend domestically. As Bauer 
(2015) further notes, governments whose funds cannot invest domestically (as in Abu 
Dhabi, Botswana, Chile, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Norway) generally achieve their returns 
objectives while countries where funds can invest or spend at home (such as Angola, 
Azerbaijan, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Nigeria and Russia, often become conduits for 
corruption, patronage and financial mismanagement. Resource rich countries have often 
placed their resource revenues in SWFs that have invested in external assets, especially 
securities traded in major markets to respond to sterilization, stabilization, and risk/return 
objectives. A study conducted by Truman (2011) has shown that overseas holdings 
constitute 84% of total investments in a sample of 60 SWFs.5758 
Others scholars have argued that resource revenues should be distributed directly to 
citizens (e.g. Devarajan, 2019). The direct distribution to citizens through cash transfers, 																																																								
56 The PIH was developed by Friedman (1957) and describes how agents spread consumption by 
supposing that consumption is determined not just by the current income but also by the expected 
income in the future. The PIH can be calculated using the following formula, with M referring to 
the annual extractive income received, y as the number of years of investments, r as the real rate 
of return on investments and X as the real income received (World Bank 2013): 
 
57 More recently, several resource-rich developing countries have started to establish SWFs that 
are already mandated to invest domestically (Monk 2013; Gelb, Tordo and Halland, 2014a). 58	A further consideration where should any financial savings be placed, in the Central Bank or 
through the creation of a SWF? Henstridge and Roe (2018) argue that saving through an SWF 
requires initial and ongoing investment, (including set-up costs and the ongoing administrative 
costs) which are only justified if the revenues from natural resources themselves are both large 
and likely to be sustained over many years, as in Norway, in contrast to LICs such as Tanzania 
and Mozambique would be unlikely to build capital superior to the fixed costs of establishing and 
then operating a fund. In such situations, saving via the central bank may be preferable. 
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subsidies or tax breaks) would improve accountability (by encouraging citizens to 
monitor oil income and forcing government to rely on normal taxation for revenues) as 
well as widen the opportunity for citizens to invest in human capital to complement 
resource wealth, rather than concentrating access to capital within a small elite (Gelb and 
Grasmann, 2009; Devarajan, 2019). In the most direct cases of redistribution to citizens 
(excluding indirect transfer through social housing) the government retains neither 
macroeconomic nor microeconomic control over spending. 
Few states, such as Alaska, have implemented citizen dividend schemes, but few other 
developing exporters followed this path. Instead, many oil exporters for instance 
distribute rents to citizens indirectly through lower taxes and consumption subsidies, in 
particular fuel subsidies, or mechanisms of social housing distribution (as in Algeria), or 
even grants to newlyweds (as in several Middle Eastern countries).59 Crivelli and Gupta 
(2014) have indeed evidenced a substitution between natural resources and domestic 
(non-resource) tax revenue, with around 30 cents in non-resource tax revenue being lost 
with each additional dollar in resource revenue. 
However, public investment of resource revenues should not be dismissed so quickly. 
First of all, there are severe limitations to the ‘alternative’ ways to manage resource 
revenues mentioned above. As further explained in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.3, saving 
resource revenues in financial assets can lead to very high opportunity costs for capital 
scare developing countries that need to diversify their economies. Even in the case of 
direct redistribution to citizens, several issues should be raised.  
Secondly, there are fundamental issues related to the investment behaviour of private 
individuals. One the one hand, according to Collier et al (2010:22), citizen dividends 
enable to transfer the absorption problem and microeconomic detail of spending to 																																																								
59 Gelb and Grasmann (2009) rightly argue that the fiscal costs of holding down domestic prices 
of petroleum derivatives and natural gas to well-below world market levels can be considerable, 
and stems from policies that inefficient and difficult to reverse. According to IMF staff estimates, 
gasoline subsidies in Algeria represented 14 % of GDP in 2015, which is almost as large as the 
fiscal deficit itself and twice the combined budgets of the health and education ministries (Jewell, 
2016). Such subsidies the rich more than the poor, given that the richest 20% consume six times 
as much fuel as the poorest 20 % (ibid.) 
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private individuals, which are much better at identifying investment projects than 
government officials, and have sharper incentives to implement them well and make sure 
they succeed. Devarajan (2019) further justifies the direct distribution to citizens by 
arguing that the mismanagement of oil revenues relates to the public expenditure on 
consumption through inefficient subsidies and public-sector wages, over capital. 
On the other hand, at least four counterarguments can be provided. Firstly, there is no 
guarantee that the choices of individuals will lead to an optimal macroeconomic profile 
of consumption versus investment rates. For instance, while controversies emerged in 
Algeria regarding the alleged misuse of microcredits for consumption purposes, it is 
reasonable to be skeptical of the use of unconditional direct cash transfers for 
investment.60 As Arezki (2011) best explained, direct redistribution may fuel increased 
consumption as opposed to investment, which may infringe on the Hartwick rule.61 In 
addition, the effect of commodity price volatility would mean that if the money is used 
for consumption, the increase in consumption is unsustainable and should be reversed as 
soon as possible before it becomes entrenched into habits, especially since volatility in 
consumption is challenging to deal with (Collier et al, 2010). 
Secondly, redistribution to private citizens may also not lead to an optimal 
macroeconomic effect of investment. Dividing resource revenues through citizens would 
lead to investments that are too small in scale to have transformative effects at the 
macroeconomic level, and consequently would not contribute to export diversification.62 																																																								
60 In Algeria, the controversy regarding the claimed misuse of microcredits awarded by the 
National Agency for Youth Employment (ANSEJ) was further accentuated by a former Prime 
minister’s support of the misuse of microcredits for personal consumption and weddings. That 
said, it would seem that only few hundred cases of misuse were flagged, few thousands never 
concretized and 13.608 micro-enterprises dissolved after their creation, which combined only 
represents 5% of the total credits awarded (Hallas, 2018). 
61 “Individuals may underinvest the proceeds of resource revenues in, say, education and health, 
as they may not internalize the social benefits of those investments. One possibility would be to 
redistribute not necessarily directly, in the form of cash transfers, but rather in the form of greater 
information and enhanced transparency concerning the management of revenues and on the 
rationale behind the choice of the level and composition of spending. Citizens must take part in 
the major debates addressing public action. That will make it possible to improve the efficiency 
of government spending, which in turn will benefit the citizenry.” (Arezki, 2011). 
62 Similar criticisms can be applied to microfinance (see Bateman and Chang, 2012) 
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Indeed, in contexts of urgent diversification needs, it is not guaranteed that redistribution 
to private sector will lead to revenue mobilization in the non-resource sector, as opposed 
to the resource sector. Markets alone have often meant that investments would remain 
confined to resource sectors that are considered to be areas of comparative advantage. In 
the meantime, the process of diversification with the emergence of new industries 
involves a process of learning by doing, R&D, and risk that private individuals may not 
be able to afford alone with sole dividends from resource revenues (as shown in chapters 
8 and 9). The need for the government to retain macroeconomic control thus stems from 
the “non-automatic” nature of the process of economic diversification. 
A third issue has to do with the intergenerational distribution of the benefits, especially if 
the generation of private individuals that benefit form a resource boom use their 
dividends to boost consumption instead of investing. The consequence of such spending 
behavior would be that current generation benefit from resource revenues at the expense 
of future generations. In contrast, as argued in section 4.3.2, domestic investments can 
lead to long-term benefits that will put consumption paths on a gradual increase. 
A fourth counter-argument is that taxation has positive outcomes on state accountability 
and should not be eliminated. While Collier et al. (2010) noted that an advantage of 
redistribution to citizens is that, in countries with bad governance, it is important to get 
funds out of the reach of government as rapidly as possible, it is worth noting that the 
lack of taxation is likely to erode the basis of the social contract between people and the 
state.63 Indeed, a negative system of taxation will likely preempt greater societal demands 
for accountability and scrutiny over government spending, further allowing for bad 
governance (Cammett et. al, 2015; Eubank, 2012; Moore and Rakner, 2002). Recent 
literature has emphasized the importance of taxation for state building through its impact 
on the emergence of grassroots taxpayer associations that could monitor the efficiency of 
government spending (Brautigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore, 2008).  
Besides putting forward the limitations of the alternatives to the domestic investment of 																																																								
63 Collier et al (2010) also point out that this argument is of doubtful relevance because the 
countries with the worst governance are unlikely to implement such a scheme. 
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resource revenues, this chapter presents a holistic and dynamic approach to managing 
resource revenues. Such approach is holistic because it puts forward the interconnection 
between different resource revenue management options; and is dynamic because it puts 
forward the factors that impact resource revenue management across time, space and 
institutional conditions. 
4.2.2 Holistic approach to resource revenue management and underlying trade-offs  
This chapter suggests a different outlook of resource revenue management by drawing on 
various theoretical approaches to the interrelation between various resource revenue 
management objectives (see figure 10). Ultimately, decisions on how to spend resource 
revenues depend on which objectives are to be pursued, which are inherently political. 
However, a holistic approach to resource revenue management sheds light on the 
interrelation between different objectives of resource revenue management (such as 
intergenerational equity, fiscal stabilization, economic diversification, or private 
consumption), which are not mutually exclusive. 
For instance, the World Economic Forum (2018:20) recently identified a list of uses of 
resource revenues for maximizing welfare “in order of priority where each subsequent 
use should not be pursued until its predecessor has been successfully institutionalized”. In 
such list, economic diversification came third, preceded by the accumulation of 
precautionary buffers to protect against commodity price volatility, and the smoothening 
of consumption across generations by investing revenues in long-term assets. This thesis 
goes a step further by arguing that economic diversification is crucial for the long-term 
achievement of fiscal stabilization and smoothening consumption over time. As a result 
economic diversification should be embedded in resource revenue management strategies 
in resource-dependent economies rather than being considered as independent from - and 
subsequent to - fiscal stabilization strategies. 
Figure 9 shows that different theoretical schools feature different conceptions of the 
interconnection between different objectives of resource revenue management. 
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Figure 9: Various objectives of resource revenue management and their interconnections 
 
While neoclassical models (mostly based on the permanent income hypothesis) somehow 
question the ability of governments to conduct productive investments and is mostly 
concerned with ‘consumption’, other approaches (such as the Hartwick rule and the 
Feldman-Mahalonobis model), that are more in line with Keynesian and neo-Marxian 
perspectives, suggest that revenues generated by exhaustible resources should reinvested 
into the production of capital goods in order to reach a high standard in consumption but 
also to accumulate productive capabilities (that are capable of generating income after 
natural resources are depleted). Structuralist (and particularly Prebishian) insights also 
reveal that the diversification of a country’s productive structure is the most sustainable 
way to reduce a country’s vulnerability to commodity prices fluctuations (and thus the 
best way to achieve macroeconomic stability). For instance, Malaysia’s public 
investments led to a large short-term fiscal deficit but had long-run transformative effects 
on the domestic economy. 
Drawing on these alternative theoretical bases, the next sections further explain why, how 
and when domestic investments should be prioritized in resource-rich countries. 
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4.3 FIVE REASONS WHY THE DOMESTIC INVESTMENT OF RESOURCE 
REVENUES SHOULD BE PRIORITIZED IN SOME COUNTRIES. 
 
This section presents five strong reasons to support the prioritization of domestic 
investment of resource revenues (over their investment in financial assets overseas) in 
resource-rich capital-scarce and labour-rich developing countries. 
4.3.1 Breaking the pattern of low investment rates that characterizes developing 
economies 
First, resource revenues represent an opportunity to alleviate the low investment rates that 
characterize capital scarce developing economies, by relaxing financing and fiscal 
constraint. While high growth countries invest 5 to 7% of GDP per year (over and above 
expenditures on basic education) in incremental education and infrastructure, most 
countries with lower growth invest only around 3% (Collier et al., 2010). To date, even 
developing countries with natural resource rents have not had domestic investment rates 
commensurate with their increase of resources revenues (ibid.). The pattern of under-
investment in the tangible and intangible assets, prominently in education, infrastructure, 
often leads to a stagnation of the domestic economy’s productive structure, which further 
discourages private investments. Hence, while there is a need to cushion to impact of 
resource revenue volatility, this should not be at the expense of allowing the domestic 
economy to benefit from commodity booms (Collier et al, 2010).  
Fiscal stabilization through resource revenue investments in financial assets overseas thus 
bears a very high opportunity cost because funds would not be made available for 
domestic investment, thereby ignoring the developmental needs of certain countries. As 
pointed out by Collier et al (2010:112), “if SLFs are to be large enough to offer a 
reasonable chance of successfully smoothing, it implies that domestic spending of the 
revenue is extremely low”. Berg et al. (2012) also argue that while the conventional PIH 
advice may be attractive when resource revenues are expected to be exhausted within 10 
to 20 years, the PIH bears very high opportunity costs on the long run and does not take 
into account the developmental needs of capital scarce developing economies, which is 
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why the PIH has been increasingly criticized in recent years (e.g. Araujo et al., 2012; 
Collier et al, 2010; International Monetary Fund, 2012; Sachs, 2007; Takizawa et al., 
2004; UNCTAD 2006a; van der Ploeg and Venables, 2008, 2011; van der Ploeg, 2010; 
Venables, 2010). Indeed, while it makes sense for a country such as Norway to save and 
invest its revenues abroad since they already have considerably high levels of 
infrastructure and educated labour force, resource rich developing countries such as 
Algeria, Angola or Nigeria could generate a lot of growth by investing domestically.64  
The case of Botswana illustrates quite well the opportunity cost stemming from overseas 
investments. While the country is often praised for its strong institutions and 
macroeconomic management of resource revenues through savings of diamond revenues 
for future generation and overseas investment, the extent to which its domestic economy 
benefited from such resource is quite debatable. Diamond rents accrue to the Pula Fund, 
whose investments are all external to Botswana and thus the activities related to those 
investments do not have any significant direct domestic macroeconomic implications 
(International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 2018). Meanwhile, in terms of 
domestic economic and human development, Botswana’s HDI has not improved much 
and the economy has not managed to diversify away from diamonds. This example shows 
that an overarching focus on macroeconomic stability and strategies to invest abroad, 
though they help address short-term fluctuations, can be detrimental to long-term 
development if they delay the transformation of the domestic economy. 
																																																								
64  In Norway, all government income from the petroleum sector is channelled into the 
Government Pension Fund and the amount paid out from the fund is a yearly decision by 
Parliament (Torvik, 2011). The objective is that payments out of the fund shall equal the real 
return of the fund, which is expected to be 4% on an annual basis, although this is not a binding 
rule. Interesting, even in Norway (where the opportunity cost of investing abroad is arguably 
lower than most developing countries) some politicians still argue that there are high opportunity 
costs and that Norway should use more of the fund for domestic spending (ibid.) In Alaska, the 
payments out of the fund are decided by the constitution, according to which 21% of the net 
return for the last five years can be spent (given that this amount does not exceed the sum of net 
income of the fund the last year and what is left on the earnings Reserve account) (ibid.). Lump 
sum transfer to citizens of the State often constitute half of what is spent domestically, and still 
represented USD 1281 for each individual in 2010 for instance (ibid.) It is obvious that most 
developing resource rich countries that are less resource rich in capita terms than Canada would 
not benefit in the same extent from a similarly conservative rule. 
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In addition, it is reasonable to assume that the returns from domestic investment in capital 
scare developing countries are higher than the returns from investments in foreign 
financial assets (Collier et al., 2010). The domestic investment of resource revenues can 
holds the potential to put the economy on a growth trajectory that will in turn increase 
income rates, improve public infrastructure, reduce public debt, as well as reduce the 
interest rates that an economy faces in international capital markets, which would 
subsequently crowd in private investments (Venables, 2010; World Bank, 2013).  
As a consequence, saving in international capital markets or direct redistribution to 
citizens are only a superficially attractive option. Indeed, in the context of strong 
institutional capacities, in contrast to the redistribution to citizens, public investments for 
industrial development or government lending to the private sector offer more insurance 
that resource revenues would be used for investment rather than for consumption. It can 
be argued that some revenues should be allocated for consumption to build public-sector 
capability through financing operations and maintenance costs and public-sector wages  
(Henstridge and Roe, 2018) but such decisions can often get hijacked by political 
economy pressures (e.g. to hike public-sector wages) as in the example of Ghana (see 
Bawumia and Halland, 2018). As a result, one way to circumvent such risks would be to 
set rules according to which spending in consumption should be financed through non-
extractive revenues in the general budget (and regular taxation), while extractives 
revenues could be earmarked for investments.65 
4.3.2 Sustainable and gradual increase in private consumption  
This section explains why raising long-run consumption is more sustainable through 
immediate domestic investments, which generate growth that benefits all generations.  
																																																								65	Henstridge and Roe (2018) put forward that because LICs also suffer from a serious deficit of 
adequate operations and maintenance of their existing capital stock, some spending should be 
designated for consumption (e.g. salaries and operation and maintenance activities) rather than 
only for investment In addition, building public-sector capability is essential to increase the 
returns to public capital in the long term, which is why some spending must be used to address 
immediate short-term needs such as ongoing operations and maintenance of existing 
infrastructure and public-sector wages. 	
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Savings for future generations by accumulating revenues in a SWF pushes benefits too 
far ahead in the future (Collier et al. 2010). In contrast, direct or indirect redistribution to 
citizens may lead to immediate consumption at the expense of future generations. 
According to an analogy with a firm made in a World Bank report (2013:35) “using 
natural resource revenues to finance consumption is akin to a firm financing dividend 
payouts by liquidating its assets: both increase present income at the expense of future 
income”. In addition, using resource revenues to finance an immediate increase in 
consumption can be problematic due to the volatility of resource revenue. Cutting back 
on consumption is politically undesirable, as individuals get used to higher consumptions 
patterns, which makes it more challenging to cut back spending. 
In contrast to the PIH, the Hartwick rule and the Feldman-Mahalonobis model shed light 
on the trade-off between immediate and future consumption. Hartwick (1978) argued that 
an optimal constant level of consumption can be sustained if the value of (net) investment 
equals the value of rents from extracted resources at each point in time. Governments 
should consequently convert resource revenues towards other forms of assets that are 
capable of generating as much income as the natural capital that is being replaced (ibid). 
According to the World Bank (2011b), few resource-rich countries (such as Malaysia) 
have followed the Hartwick Rule over the last 35 years, because resource rents tend to be 
used to finance consumption rather than investment.66 In many instances, the outcomes 
that would have been achieved through the Hartwick rule are very different than actual 
outcomes. For instance, Nigeria could have had a stock of produced capital four times 
higher than the actual stock, and Gabon could have had a stock of produced capital of 
USD68,000 per person, compared to USD58,000 in oil-poor South Korea (World Bank, 
2013:36). 
  
																																																								
66 The study included net foreign assets but did not include investments in human capital given 
“the lack of an accepted production function converting education spending into human capital” 
and given that that educational expenditures have not been significant compared to physical 
capital investment (Hamilton et al., 2006; World Bank, 2013).  
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4.3.3 The importance of export diversification for growth and employment 
according to the degree of resource abundance per capita.  
4.3.3.1 The theoretical argument and hypothesis 
Although financial investments can help achieving fiscal stabilization purposes, they are 
unlikely to enhance the productive capabilities of the national economy because they will 
have no direct impact on the domestic private sector, especially if they are not linked 
towards the acquisition of strategic assets that are related to domestic capabilities (Chang, 
2007b). In contrast, diversification requires the active use of resource rents to increase the 
productivity of other exportable sectors to reduce their production costs, whether by 
funding infrastructure, subsidies or other methods (Cherif and Hasanov, 2014; Gelb and 
Grassman, 2009). In the context of resource dependency, governments should prioritize 
high long-term rate of investment that might have transformational macroeconomic 
effects, rather than aim to achieve fiscal stabilization alone. Recent macroeconomic 
studies support the argument that domestic investment of resource revenues holds the 
potential to promote economic growth and economic diversification (Berg et al. 2012; 
Collier et al. 2009; van der Ploeg and Venables 2010; Isaksson, 2009).67 
Now that we have established that domestic investments are necessary for export 
diversification, it is important to justify why should resource revenue management be 
oriented towards achieving export diversification objectives rather than focusing on fiscal 
stabilization or intergenerational equity. Why shouldn't countries follow the example of 
Norway who has successfully invested its revenues in financial assets and accumulated a 
large SWF? My main hypothesis revolves around the degree of per capita resource 
wealth: while very resource rich per capita countries (defined as the 10th decile in terms 
of extractives rents per capita, henceforth VRR) seem to be able to develop despite 
natural resource dependence, there seems to be a strong correlation between economic 
growth and export diversification for medium resource rich per capita countries (which 
rank in the 8th and 9th deciles according to extractives rents per capita – henceforth 																																																								
67 Gelb et al. (1988) found a negative correlation between domestic investment of resource 
revenues and economic growth. The difference in results can be explained by the fact that what 
matters is not just the size of public investment but also its design, scope and implementation. 
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MRR). This hypothesis implies that VRR countries can more easily sustain growth 
without necessarily undergoing a transformation of their economy while diversification is 
a key factor of economic development for MRR countries, which should consequently 
follow a pattern of resource rents management that focuses more on domestic investment 
for diversification than VRR countries.  
4.3.3.2 The evidence 
This section presents quantitative evidence on the heterogeneous impact of diversification 
on growth and employment according to the degree of resource abundance per capita. 
The first observation that can be made concerns the influence of the level of resource 
rents per capita. Figure 10 shows that VRR countries tend to have low unemployment 
rates regardless of their diversification rates, which is not the case for MRR countries.  
Figure 10: Export diversification and unemployment rates (2010) 
	
Sources: Data from IMF (2018c) and World Bank (2019) 
Panel data analysis also reveals the heterogeneous impact of export diversification on 
growth according to the level of resource abundance per capita. However, another major 
observation arises: the variation between VRR and MRR countries depends according to 
commodity price cycles. Figure 11 shows that when commodity prices are high, all 
resource rich countries achieve positive growth rates regardless of the changes in their 
export diversification. However, in times of low commodity prices (figure 12), while 
VRR countries still achieve positive growth rates regardless of changes in their 
diversification rate, diversification is strongly correlated with growth in MRR countries.  
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Figure 11: Changes in GDP per capita and diversification rates in times of high 
commodity prices (2000-2010) 
 
Sources: Data from IMF (2018c) and World Bank (2019) 
 
Figure 12: Changes in GDP per capita and diversification rates in times of low 
commodity prices (1990-2000) 
 
Sources: Data from IMF (2018c) and World Bank (2019) 
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Similar trends are observed when establishing the correlation between unemployment and 
export diversification (see figures 13 and 14). 
 
Figure 13: Changes in employment and diversification rates in times of high commodity 
prices (2000-2010) 
 
Sources: Data from IMF (2018c) and World Bank (2019)  
 
Figure 14: Changes in employment and diversification rates in times of low commodity 
prices (1990-2000) 
 
Sources: Data from IMF (2018c) and World Bank (2019) 
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The statistical analysis of this chapter reveals that while some of the most resource rich 
per capita countries (such as Norway, UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) can manage to 
grow and maintain low unemployment rates without diversifying their export basket, 
export diversification is a strong determinant of jobs creation and GDP growth in 
remaining resource rich countries, particularly in times of low commodity prices. Two 
main points can be made in light of such findings. First, because the impact of 
diversification depends on commodity price, scholars and policy makers should not be 
fooled by the influence of commodity booms. Second, scholars and policy makers in 
MRR countries should not be fooled by the experience of VRR countries. The PIH (and 
by extension the Norwegian model) might not be a ‘one size fits all’ approach. These 
countries have indeed tended to follow pattern of financial diversification that should not 
necessarily form the basis of lessons for policy making in resource rich developing 
countries because investment in financial assets are unlikely to lead to productive 
transformation. Those findings can contribute to reshape the discourse on resource-based 
development, which has in recent years emphasized the “Norwegian model” while 
neglecting the role of export diversification and production.  
4.3.3.3 How can we explain these developmental differences across categories of 
resource-rich countries?  
While it would be reductionist to attribute a nation’s development path solely to its per 
capita resource endowment, degrees of per capita resource abundance influence patterns 
of resource-based development and diversification by reframing the nature of political, 
economic and societal challenges. This section explains how the degree of resource 
wealth per capita influences both political factors (such as pressure for rents distribution, 
consent and governance) and economic factors (such as employment generation in the 
context of the low labour intensity of extractive industries). 
One of the main political economy differences between VRR and MRR countries 
concerns the compromise between social redistribution and long-term growth. 
Unsurprisingly, higher levels of resource rents per capita provide the state with enough 
financial resources for a broad social redistribution among citizens without compromising 
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or cutting back the investments needed to promote economic growth. In contrast, in 
resource rich countries with a lower per capita resource wealth, there is a clear threat of 
economic stagnation caused by excessively redistributive policies, as well as a threat of 
economic disparity amongst the population if growth is encouraged at the expense of 
social spending. Such countries need to find a compromise between their social 
commitments and their public investment budget to encourage growth, which is possible 
but requires much more efficient economic management than in VRR countries. In the 
case of Malaysia, this dilemma left effective economic management and the reinvestment 
of rents to encourage growth, especially employment-creating growth for Malays, as the 
only option (Abidin 2001; Rasiah 2006).68 
In a similar perspective, Cammett et al. (2015) noticed that in the MENA region, 
countries displaying very high oil abundance per capita tend to have higher political 
governance records than those with medium resource rich per capita countries. They 
explain this divergence in terms of the sets of incentives facing rulers in high and low 
population oil-rich countries and the ways in which resources shape or consolidate 
political settlements (Khan, 2010), which affect the way rulers distribute oil rents. 
Cammett et al. (2015) further explain that regimes featuring high oil earnings per capita 
(such as the Gulf states) tend to prefer relying more on the distribution of rents to buy 
consent and social peace in order to secure their power and prevent greater societal 
demands for accountability, which is less risky then repression. Their governance system 
is based on patronage and negative taxation system in which oil rents are distributed 
through social services, subsidies, housing, energy, water, and a private sector consisting 
of families associated with the rulers which benefit from state contracts (ibid). 69 
Meanwhile, MRR countries face a more challenging situation because even though they 
have large resource endowments, resource rents may not suffice to buy their populations’ 																																																								
68 Despite facing social stability threats and initially attempting a populist redistribution toward 
less privileged groups, Malaysia shows that “even mineral rich countries with a history of 
instability and fractious politics can experience windows of opportunity for good management 
that leads towards diversification” (Gelb, 2010:18). 
69 Nevertheless, Cammett et al (2015) also point out that buying consent is not just about a 
distribution of rents but also long term and sustainable access to economic opportunities and 
facilitation to profit making opportunities to the population and granting more political rights. 
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support. Cammett et al (2015) argue that such resource rich countries tend to employ 
more repression. This logic relates to what North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) call a 
“limited order arrangement”: when resources are plentiful, ruling coalitions can afford to 
be broader and thus more stable. 70 In contrast, when resources are more constrained, 
ruling coalitions tend to be narrower because it is fiscally impossible to buy the consent 
of a large portion of the population. Resource rich countries with large populations 
consequently tend to display a selective allocation of rents and thus of economic 
opportunities, less developed private sectors and big coercive apparatuses repression, 
which is why they are thought to suffer from the resource curse (Cammett, et al., 2015).  
This thesis contributes to this debate by providing a different argument that focuses on 
the role of diversification. We should not assume that the only policy alternative to 
buying social consent is repression.71 Another central issue for policy-makers in medium 
resource rich countries is how to maximize the socio-economic benefits of resource rents 
while dealing with high social expectations in a context where excessive social 
redistribution are likely to lead to economic collapse. Here, employment creation is of 
central importance. VRR countries can afford to transfer rents to their populations 
without the need to generate employment (through the private sector in particular). 
Instead, these countries, such as Saudi Arabia, can rely on the public sector to generate 
excess employment (thereby transferring rents).72 MRR countries usually cannot afford 
similar strategies and are more likely to need to generate employment by diversifying 
their economy, especially given the low labour intensity of extractive activities.  
																																																								
70  Such argument challenges the resource curse argument that oil wealth leads to poor 
institutional quality (see Chaudhry 1997, Karl 1997). It also echoes the observation in Addison 
(2009) that economic success reduces the need for rulers to use violence to secure their power. 
71 Cammett et al. (2015) recognize that a third strategy available to rulers would be the promotion 
of long-term economic development but they note that it is difficult to implement in most 
developing countries. However, they acknowledge that in Algeria and Iran, leaders attempted to 
construct developmental states before their ambitious development plans failed. They also 
recognize that there is no resource determinism and that high per capita resource wealth is not 
necessarily associated with inclusive distribution, as shown by the case of Equatorial Guinea. 
72 The Saudi labour market has been characterized by a dependence on the public sector (e.g. 
public administration and defense, health and education), where average wages for Saudi 
nationals is far larger than in private employment in other sectors (see McKinsey, 2016).  
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Those dynamics of rents distribution and employment generation have obvious economic 
implications.73 It can be argued that VRR countries face less pressure than MRR 
countries to industrialize through labour-intensive manufacturing activities, and instead 
are more likely to invest in financial assets and services. This argument is confirmed by 
the following two figures, which show that the highest per capita oil income countries 
feature the lowest share of manufacturing exports amongst resource rich economies.74 
Those findings echo the finding in Sachs and Warner (1995:19) that “for the most highly 
resource endowed economies […] the natural resource base is so vast that there is no 
strong pressure to develop an extensive industrial sector ”.75 
Figure 15: Manufactured exports as a share of merchandise exports in 2009 
 
Source: O'Sullivan Rey and Mendez (2011) 
																																																								
73 Economic diversification contributes to expand job opportunities for the segments of labour 
force that are not employed in extractive sectors and consequently may also bears societal effects 
in terms of inequality. Statistical analyses were conducted as part of this thesis to study the 
impact of export diversification on inequality. The preliminary results show that diversification is 
negatively correlated with inequality, but were not included in the final version of this thesis due 
to the lack of systematic data across countries. 
74 This includes countries like Qatar, Norway, Kuwait, the UAE and Australia, which are usually 
considered high-income economies. However, it can be argued that the economies of Qatar, 
Kuwait and UAE are not necessarily advanced because they have lower levels of industrial and 
agricultural development than other high-income countries (Khan, 2007). 
75 They consequently conclude that for the most extreme resource-based cases, openness to trade 
would tend to be high and the overall effect would therefore be a U–shaped relationship between 
resource intensity and trade openness. 
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Figure 16: Manufacturing exports in total exports in resource-rich countries in 2012 
	
Source: World Bank (2019) and UN Comtrade (2018) 
In conclusion, as Gelb (2010:19) writes: “although there is evidence that diversifying 
economies can expect to do better over the long run, the urgency of the issue will vary 
across countries. Contributing to this view, this chapter has shown that resource 
abundance per capita is an additional factor that influences the suitability of 
diversification strategies pursued by resource-rich countries. Indeed, it appears that MRR 
and VRR economies thus face a differentiated sense of urgency and risk-taking for 
structural transformation at the expense of financial diversification. VRR countries can 
afford growth rates, social distribution and high per capita income without a productive 
transformation of their economy. However, such circumstances are “particular” and 
cannot be replicated by most other countries. MRR countries can reap more benefits from 
diversifying their productive structures as swiftly as possible. Such differences influence 
the trade offs underlying resource revenue management decisions, especially in terms of 
the difference in opportunity costs of investing resource revenues in financial assets. 
4.3.4 Institutional measures can mitigate the political risks associated with 
domestic investments of resource revenues 
While the risks associated with public resource revenue investment are extremely 
important and sometimes cannot be eliminated, it should be stressed that they are not 
unavoidable and that several measures exist to mitigate them (see Gelb et al., 2014a; Gelb 
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et al., 2014b). A government’s ability to spend revenues and allocate resources 
effectively is affected not only by the level of institutional development prior to 
extractives production, but also by political factors that come into play once (1) public 
expectations of a new flow of extractives revenue are raised and (2) a state–business elite 
has developed on the basis of rent capture (Lahn and Stevens, 2018). However, attention 
needs to be given to the governance capabilities that states needed to have to implement 
industrial strategies effectively (Khan, 2003). The literature on managing resource 
revenues has often featured a static view of the trade off between the risks and benefits 
associated with the domestic investment of resource revenues. However, as in the context 
of growth strategies more broadly, the rent-seeking costs have to be set against the gains 
(ibid.). In addition, if it is true that governments lack the capacity to invest domestically, 
what makes them more likely to target project and invest overseas more efficiently than 
domestically? It can be argued that government can also poorly target investment 
opportunities overseas (unless they entrust the management of the funds to international 
fund managers but the country characterized by bad governance and poor institutional 
capacity might be the least likely to give up control of its resource revenues). More 
attention should thus be given to the accountability mechanisms and benchmarks that can 
help ensure that resource revenues are managed productively.  
This section discusses different institutional ways to reduce the risks of elite capture, such 
as evaluation and monitoring mechanisms, corporate governance rules, and co-
investments with a variety of actors to ensure accountability.  
4.3.4.1 Evaluation and monitoring: ex ante, ex post, vertically and horizontally. 
Social and commercial cost-benefit analyses are important to avoid while elephant 
projects. As put forward by Collier et al. (2010), avoiding elite capture requires both 
honesty and efficiency, which can be enforced in multiple ways, either ex ante (about 
how decisions get authorized) or ex post (evaluation). In addition, monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms can derive from top-down authority, bottom-up pressure from 
citizens and their representatives, civil society groups, as well as norms internalized by 
the public sector workforce (ibid.).   
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Efficient evaluation and monitoring also require transparent reporting. SWFs permitted or 
mandated to invest domestically should thus issue publicly available reports covering 
their activities, assets, and returns, as well as allow to be audited both internally and 
externally (Gelb et al, 2014a). While all funds embody “vertical accountability” 
(reporting to the government), some also mandate “horizontal accountability” to a wider 
audience, by making information on balances, earnings, deposits and withdrawals 
publically available or by sharing decision-making power among a range of interest 
groups independent of the government (Gelb and Grasmann (2009). In Norway, although 
the fund is administered by the Central Bank, decisions on transfers must be approved by 
parliament, while in Indonesia, because of the lack of ‘horizontal’ transparency, vertical 
accountability alone proved insufficient to prevent kleptocracy (Gelb and Grasmann, 
2009). In Algeria, the lack of horizontal transparency also enabled the depletion, within 
two years, of the Fond de Regulations des Recettes, which accumulated USD 32,5 
billion, to finance the government budget (Le Matin d’Algerie, 2017). Increased 
transparency reduces the risks of elite capture, increase accountability and may be 
implemented by government who may be concerned that they will be followed by 
governments that are prepared to loot accumulated funds (Collier et al., 2010).76 
4.3.4.2 Corporate governance  
The sole creation of resource funds alone is neither necessary nor suffice to sustain good 
macroeconomic management, since funds can be subverted and captured when the 
institutional environment is weak (Davis, et al., 2003; Gelb and Grasmann, 2009). Setting 
up appropriate benchmarks is thus necessary to ensure the integrity of investment 
decisions (Gelb et al., 2014a). Corporate governance is the system of rules and practices 
by which a firm is managed. It involves balancing the interests of a company's 
stakeholders, management, government and the community (Shailer, 2004). There is a 
large body of knowledge on corporate governance but in the context of this research, the 
independence of the board from political interference is particularly relevant.  
																																																								
76 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is an example of global standard for 
the good governance of oil, gas and mineral resources. The EITI Standard requires information 
along the extractive industry value chain. 
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In order to improve the efficient management of resource revenues, and similarly to the 
case of regulation of extractive sectors (see footnote 124), scholars have often 
emphasized the separation of the state (as well as national development banks and SOEs) 
from resource revenue management (e.g. Gelb et al, 2014b). On the one hand, while 
government officials often serve as board members for state-owned entities, combining 
ownership and supervisory roles presents conflicts of interest that could undermine the 
integrity investments and lead to political capture (ibid.). Nominations committees as 
well as board members should comprise individuals that meet specific skills and 
experience requirements and that are deemed to be objective, which can contribute to 
ensure a politically independent selection process, although perfect independence can 
hardly be achieved when the owner is the state (ibid.). For instance, civil society 
representatives sit on the Petroleum Oversight Committee in Sao Tome, while spending 
decisions in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are essentially those of the President (Gelb and 
Grasmann, 2009). In Alaska and Norway, the management of the resource funds has been 
delegated to bodies that to a large degree are independent from politicians (Torvik, 2011). 
On the other hand, it could be argued that the protection of resource revenue management 
from government inference is not necessarily always desirable. First, separating resource 
revenue management from the state seems unrealistic because countries with weaker 
institutions are likely to be the ones that do not set up reforms to limit the prerogatives 
and control of corrupt leaders and the state over resource revenues. Second, one could 
argue that markets alone fail to deliver diversification objectives and that resource 
revenue management should be linked to broader industrial policy objectives, as 
determined by the state, in order to foster complementarity, rather than being managed in 
isolation to policy objectives. In addition, domestic public investments are not only 
commercially minded but also carry a social mandate, with an allowance for lower 
returns as a trade-off for public utility (Ross, 1999; Cammet et Diwan; 2016; Gelb, et al. 
2014). Nevertheless, because social returns are often difficult to measure, the allowance 
for lower returns has allowed for corruption, cronyism, lobbying from special interests 
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and political agendas to distort public investments.77 As a result, strong benchmarks and 
guidelines should be put in place in order to define the allowance for investments of 
resource revenues that carry a social mandate beyond sole profits.  
4.3.4.3 Co-investments 
Gelb et al (2014a) argue that co-investing with private investors, pooling with other 
SWFs, and co-financing with international financial institutions could be used by SWFs 
to reduce risk of influence by political and lobbying pressure, bring in additional 
expertise, and enhance the credibility and integrity of the investment decision. While this 
option may be suitable in some instances, it seems unrealistic to be a systematic approach 
for all investments in capital scarce developing countries where revenues available for 
investment are mostly resource revenues that accrue to the government. In addition, 
SWFs might be willing to undertake the investments in projects with large social and 
economic externalities that private investors might not invest in. In addition, if a SWF 
were to invest according to purely commercial market principles, it could run the risk of 
simply displacing private investors, which is why SWFs should seek development 
opportunities with close-to-market financial returns in areas where it can crowd in, rather 
than displace, private investors (Gelb et al., 2014a). 
4.3.5 A Developmental Approach Towards Investing Resource Revenues 
 
4.3.5.1 Overview  
In light of the need for domestic investments in resource-dependent economies, there has 
been a revival in efforts to rethink the trade-off between resource revenue investments in 
financial assets overseas and real assets domestically. However, such efforts still feature a 
static approach to the trade-offs underlying resource revenue management. For instance, 
Berg et al. (2012) developed a useful model to analyze the macroeconomic effects of 
investing natural resource revenues and proposed an investment approach that combines 																																																								77	For instance, governments in oil rich countries have often used oil rents to buy popular support 
before elections through consumption subsidies, white elephant projects and other wasteful 
spending, rather than socially efficient projects (Robinson and Torvik, 2005).	
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raising public investment and saving some of the revenues in a fund. Nevertheless, this 
model treats public investment inefficiency, absorptive capacity constraints, weak tax 
systems and Dutch disease, as pervasive features in developing countries. The model also 
considers that investment efficiency does not improve over time, because it assumes that 
its underlying factors (such as institutional and governance quality as well as 
administration and managing capacity) can take a long time to improve.  
In contrast, this section addresses resource revenue management in the context of 
diversification objectives by offering a novel approach (or more exactly, by bringing 
back an “old” approach rooted in early structuralism) geared towards using resource 
revenues to overcome domestic structural constraints (such as low technological 
sophistication, limited areas of comparative advantage, low absorptive capacity) as well 
as mitigating economic risks associated with resource revenues (such as public 
investment inefficiency, absorptive capacity constraints, and Dutch disease). 
This approach is dynamic across time, space and institutional conditions. It is dynamic 
across time because it emphasizes the gradual shift between short-term fiscal stabilization 
and long-term progressive accumulation of productive capabilities in tradable sectors. 
The ‘space’ element relates to the consideration that resource rich countries may have 
different needs for domestic investments according to their diversification rate, level of 
resource abundance per capita, size of labour force and current gap in infrastructure and 
human capital capabilities. This approach is also dynamic across institutional conditions 
because it takes into account the state policy actions to improve the institutional capacity 
to invest over time. Indeed, this approach acknowledges the endogenous relationship 
between state capacity and growth by taking into account how certain patterns of 
resource revenue investment can contribute to building state capacity over time.  
The main features of this approach are: (i) the gradual scaling up of domestic investments 
in real assets; (ii) the focus on specific capabilities needed for targeting tradable sectors in 
order to reduce commodity dependence and macroeconomic instability on the long run.  
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4.3.5.2 A gradual scaling up of domestic investments in real assets 
There is a wide academic literature on public investment efficiency. For instance, 
Pritchett (2000) argued that public investment in many developing countries is not 
inherently productive because inefficiency, waste, or corruption, often distort the impact 
of public spending on capital accumulation. Some studies such as Petrie (2010) and 
Rajaram et al (2014) also have looked at the role of public investment in ‘transforming 
resources into assets for growth’ and focused on the role of institutional capabilities in 
ensuring efficiency of public investment management. However, these studies do not 
concretely inform us about how to design public investment and simply assume that high 
institutional capabilities will ensure the design and implementation of ‘good’ policies. 
Collier et al. (2010) and Collier and Laroche (2015) argue that countries should invest in 
their capacity to invest before domestically investing their resource revenues to ensure 
that public investment leads to high returns in terms of growth. While this is a very 
sensible argument, the question that remains is: how do government increase their 
capacity to invest? Such arguments (often used against domestic resource revenue 
spending) rely on the assumption that it takes a long time for countries to develop good 
institutions and absorptive capacity (building up government administrative capacity, 
addressing bottlenecks in the economy, investment in education and skills), which means 
that public investment is likely to be inefficient in the meanwhile and cause economic 
distortions. However, one element of great importance that might be shadowed in such 
approach is the presence of opportunities for learning by doing. 
In contrast, Gelb and Grasmann (2009) argue that the allocation for domestic 
investments, rather being fixed at a certain portfolio share, should be determined on the 
basis of competition by being weighted against the potential returns on overseas 
investments. Hence, when domestic returns are low, investment would be channeled 
abroad. This would safeguard the efficiency and high returns of investments, while 
investment with a ‘developmental’ purpose can still be benchmarked against the financial 
return on foreign assets. While this approach bears a lot of benefits and safeguards, it 
may not be suitable in terms of taking into account the ‘strategic’ and social value of 
certain investments over others, not only domestically but also abroad, and potential 
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synergies between domestic and overseas investments. Indeed, overseas investment can 
be linked to strategic domestic industries and thus should be measured not only in terms 
of their financial returns but also in terms of their economic impact and value creation 
domestically. For instance, SWFs can be a means to acquire technology that could help 
promote the industrial upgrading of domestic industries, as well as acquire distribution 
channels through strategic acquisitions. 
More importantly, it can be assumed that low-return yielding investment may be initially 
required in order to build competitiveness and increase the returns on domestic 
investments on the long run. Indeed, low domestic rates of returns can reflect the lack of 
dynamism or opportunities in a national economy but could also be the result of several 
bottlenecks that could be alleviated or because of lacking or aging infrastructure. In cases 
where domestic investments hold low returns because of bottlenecks that relate to 
infrastructure or human capital availability, determining domestic allocation of 
investment on the basis of competition with foreign assets would lead to stagnation and 
preservation of the status quo. Instead, initial transformational investments may then be 
needed to increase the marginal productivity of subsequent capital investments. 
Departing from existing suggestions, this thesis suggesting a policy alternative consisting 
in the gradual scale up in the domestic allocation of investments from resource revenues, 
which can allow for building the capacity to invest through learning-by-doing as well as 
progressively expand the absorptive capacity of the national economy. Indeed, it can be 
argued that public investment efficiency involves some degree of learning by doing in  
developing the technical expertise and institutions required for project appraisal, 
selection, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and so on. 
By capping the allowance for domestic spending in the first few years of a commodity 
boom, potentially wasted revenues or the “damage” cause by inefficient investment is 
restrained. Indeed, scaling up public investment too much and too fast could subject the 
economy to more instability, lower investment efficiency, and higher depreciation rates, 
without the guarantee that such strategy would outperform a more conservative scaling-
up path (Berg et al., 2012; Gelb and Grasmann, 2009). In contrast, gradually localizing 
the investments of resource revenues takes into account the diminishing marginal utility 
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of public spending and the issue of absorptive capacity. The progressive increase in the 
allocation of investment domestically can also allow for the domestic economy to 
gradually adjust its supply side capabilities in order to absorb larger volumes of capital, 
thereby reducing risks of crowding out, both in terms of capital and skilled labour.78 79 
In addition, this gradual approach reduces the cost of misjudging the duration of a 
commodity boom. Indeed, policy-makers have also often misjudged the nature of the 
boom, which can lead to high costs and inefficiency (Gelb and Grasmann, 2009). Policy 
makers may overspend revenues in the first years of what is perceived as a long 
commodity boom, but such commodity boom may turn out to be short. By gradually 
investing resource revenues domestically, policy makers avoid overspending in the case 
of a short boom but also ensure that investment have also accrued domestically in the 
case of a long boom. This approach consequently enables to safeguard short-term 
macroeconomic stability in the context of oil price volatility. Gelb and Grasmann (2009) 
have attempted to identify the size of fund that might be required not to fully smooth 
domestic spending, but to maximize a benefit function in which there are diminishing 
returns to spending. They find that, in the case of the short boom (which usually last less 
than five years), the optimum is to spend 20% of incremental oil revenues during the 
boom years and save the remaining 80%. For the long boom, it is optimal to spend 80% 
of incremental oil revenues and save the remaining 20% (ibid.), because over-saving 
resource revenues in low risk financial assets overseas bears a high opportunity cost in 
the long run. As a result, the savings rate should gradually decrease to around 20% over 
time, as the commodity boom prolongs, making way for other types of investments.  
The trade-off between financial investments and real investments is thus dynamic 
overtime and the policy priority should shift from fiscal stabilization towards capital 																																																								
78 Crowding-out does not only refer to the fall in private sector spending and investment caused 
by higher government spending, but also to the skilled and specialized labour or resources that 
might be monopolized by government investments (for instance, limited supply of resources and 
labour for activities such as wealth fund management or the construction sector). 
79  For instance, the gradual recruitment of skilled labour in a SWF may lead to higher 
competiveness of the labour force, in contrast to the immediate recruitment of a large number of 
employees. In contrast, the excessive delay in investing domestically would also prevent local 
professionals from acquiring experience managing resource revenues. 
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accumulation in productive sectors to stimulate diversification on the long run. Given that 
it is difficult to estimate the duration of commodity booms, the option of gradually 
allocating more resources to domestic investments reduces the risks of overspending 
resource revenues accumulated in a short commodity boom but would not delaying the 
reconfiguration of the domestic economy.80 
4.3.5.3 Emphasis on specific capabilities needed for targeting tradable sectors 
Although increased government spending can generate demand pressures on non-traded 
goods, leading to a real appreciation and a decline in traded-good production (van 
Wijnbergen, 1984), efficient public investment can also raise productivity in non-
resource tradable sectors, counteracting Dutch disease symptoms (Berg et al., 2010; 
Cherif and Hasanov, 2012, 2014). Over time, resource revenues can indeed be used to 
relax capital and technological constraints, especially in non-mineral resource sectors, in 
order to promote the diversification of productive structures. Export diversification would 
contribute to long-term macro economic stability, even more so than the prescribed short-
term fiscal stabilization through the saving of resource revenues overseas. This argument 
is in line with the idea that macroeconomic policies are not enough to solve 
macroeconomic problems. 
Several scholars have examined the desired degree of verticality in the public investment 
of resource revenues. Collier et al. (2010) argue that the dangers of crowding out and 
Dutch disease can be offset by public spending designed to increase the competitiveness 
of private sector investments and that is complementary to private sectors activities (such 
as improvement of infrastructure and human capital). Nevertheless, a sole focus on the 
‘capacity to absorb investment’ offers no guarantees that the economy will be able to 
diversify and productively "develop" rather than merely "grow’ while remaining 
resource-dependent. Indeed, relying on already existing market structures and simply 
enhancing private sector activities might be unlikely to lead to diversification.  
																																																								
80 Such rule would not necessarily oblige states to invest all their domestic allowance but would 
only constitute a cap. It is thus not systematically incompatible with the suggestion by Gelb et al. 
(2014a) to allocate domestic investments in competition with external assets. 
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The debate on absorptive capacity can be enriched by taking into account the Cherif and 
Hasanov (2012) study of the optimal consumption, saving and investment policies of oil 
exporters. This study concluded that the tradable sector plays a paramount role in 
investment-saving dynamics and that developing countries may need to pursue a purpose-
specific set of policies to develop tradable sophisticated sectors rather than rely solely on 
providing an “enabling environment” in which a sophisticated export sector would 
spontaneously emerge by itself. However, enhancing the productivity of the tradable 
sector is not just a matter of marginal returns to private capital because the mechanisms 
to enhance productivity can be interpreted more broadly. For instance, technological 
acquisition and economic diversification can be factors of enhanced productivity in the 
non-resource tradable sector of a resource rich economy. Cherif and Hasanov (2012:18) 
also argue that productivity increases as a resource abundant economy become more 
diversified, which sheds light on sequencing concerns: It is not only a matter of 
improving productivity to diversify, but also of diversifying in order to improve 
productivity and absorb investments. These concerns highlight the need for a 
transformation of productive structure and call for a broader and more complex 
consideration for the role of public investment of resource rents in orienting market 
incentives towards a diversification of the tradable sector. 
The need to focus public investment in the non-resource sectors becomes even more 
justified in the context of resource dependence. As Arezki (2011) suggests, government 
in resource-rich countries should increase their revenue mobilization in the non-resource 
sector, through taxation, for instance. He rightly points out that increasing non-resource-
sector revenue mobilization would deliver other benefits, including combating volatility 
in government revenues by diversifying the sources of government revenues. However, 
Arezki (2011) focuses on revenue mobilization from the non-resource sector, instead of 
resource mobilization towards the non-resource sector, in contrast to Cherif and Hasanov 
(2012). This distinction matters because before being able to increase revenues from 
taxation of non-resource sectors, unless there are already pre-existing sources of revenues 
from dynamic non-resource sectors (which is by definition not the case in resource-
dependent economies), governments first need to stimulate new sources of revenue 
generation in non-resource sectors. 
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has contributed to reframe the challenge of resource-based development in 
the context of productive diversification and contributes to an existing discussion that 
departs from the mainstream literature and conventional policy advice. The conventional 
wisdom is that countries should deal with fiscal volatility associated with commodity 
prices through diligent fiscal rules to offset boom-and-bust cycles and by investing 
resource revenues in financial assets abroad. However, the way resource revenues should 
be used depends on several factors that are country specific. The factors that influence to 
urgency to invest domestically include the existing gap in infrastructure and human 
capital, the current level of export concentration, as well as the level of resource 
abundance per capita, as evidenced in section 4.3.3. As a result, the standard growth 
advice that resource rich economies should pursue financial diversification by investing 
resource revenues in financial assets overseas may be suitable for some resource rich 
countries (such as Norway, the UAE or Equatorial Guinea), but may not be suitable for 
MRR countries that still require to undergo export diversification in order to develop and 
generate employment. 
Current discourses on resource wealth management indeed lack a holistic vision of 
resource revenue management in the context of productive structural transformation. 
Stabilization funds and fiscal rules can at best mitigate the symptomatic effects of 
commodity price volatility but do not address the root causes that make a country 
vulnerable to resource earnings fluctuations. The critical issue for public investment in 
resource-dependent countries is therefore the sustainable diversification of the productive 
matrix to generate new sources of foreign exchange instead of statically maximizing rents 
from existing income streams.  In this perspective, this chapter has adopted to dynamic 
approach to managing resource revenues in order to lay out several policies that can 
ensure the efficient investment of resource rents towards productive capacity building, 
including institutional measures (such as evaluation and monitoring and corporate 
governance mechanisms) and investment strategies, such as the gradually scaling up of 
domestic investments and the focus on non-resource tradable sectors. 	  
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Chapter 5:  
Resource revenue management in Chile and Malaysia 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the fiscal linkages that arise between extractive sectors and the 
rest of the economy by explaining how copper and petroleum revenues are respectively 
managed and re-invested in Chile and Malaysia. In Malaysia, petroleum accounted for 
about 30% of total exports at its peak in the 1980s (UN Comtrade, 2018). Petroleum 
revenues translated into high domestic investment levels and imports of machinery and 
equipment for industrial sectors. In Chile, copper revenues have represented around 50% 
of export revenues in the past decade (ibid.), but have mostly been managed in the 
context of a fiscal stabilization agenda. Chile is often put forward as a success story of 
fiscal management of copper revenues due its successful countercyclical fiscal policy and 
macroeconomic stability. However, this chapter argues that such fiscal stabilization 
agenda was followed at the expense of financing for structural transformation.  
 
5.2 MANAGING PETROLEUM REVENUES IN MALAYSIA 	
5.2.1 Overview 
“Most oil producing developing countries do not have the expertise nor capital to extract 
oil and have to invite international oil companies. Those countries then collect the 
royalties. But in the case of Malaysia, we decided that we cannot be satisfied with only 
collecting royalties and we must have the capacity to exploit our own resources. We have 
to acquire the technology. The first phase was the collection of royalties and the use of 
that capital to invest in our capabilities [thus maximizing fiscal linkages]” (Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad, Personal Communication, 7 April 2017). 
Malaysia's oil exports had become the nation’s top foreign exchange earner around 1980 
(Gale, 1981). Malaysia’s case features revenue management practices that are oriented 
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towards achieving structural transformation and diversification objectives.  In fact, during 
most of the period 1970-98, and in contrast to Chile, Malaysia’s overall fiscal 
management had been characterized by very high fiscal deficit as a proportion of GDP 
but most importantly for public investments that had transformative effects on the export 
basket in the long run (Di John, 2009). The World Bank (2013) also argues that 
Malaysia’s impressive economic performance is closely tied to its sound management of 
natural resource revenues and that Malaysia is one of the few countries that has followed 
the Hartwick rule, according to which the value of (net) investment needs to equal the 
value of rents on extracted resources at each point in time (Hartwick, 1978). Malaysia has 
indeed converted natural wealth into productive capital assets (namely infrastructure, 
machinery, human capital and institutions) that supported economic diversification 
towards manufacturing and services. As further shown in this section, oil and gas 
revenues in Malaysia have been mostly spent domestically, either through re-investments 
by Petronas (the national oil corporation), government expenditures or subsidies. 
 
5.2.2 Composition and fiscal importance of resource revenues 
Oil and gas revenues that accrue to the federal government consist of royalties, petroleum 
tax, export duties, and dividends from the state-owned company, Petronas.81 In the period 
1988-2012, the Malaysian government raised approximately RM615 billion (around 
USD150 billion) in petroleum revenues.82 The largest portion of these revenues goes 
directly into the federal government’s budget. A smaller share goes into the budget of 
producing provincial states, while Petronas retains a significant portion of its profits to 
undertake investments, domestically and abroad. Over the years, Petronas has grown into 
one of the largest and most profitable companies in the world, and remains the single-
largest contributor to the country’s revenue. Since its creation in 1974, Petronas has paid 
RM403 billion (around USD103 billion) to the government, comprising more than half of 
all government revenues in that period (Centre for Public Policy Studies, 2017).  																																																								
81 The Petroleum Tax Act imposed a company tax rate of 38% for the petroleum sector while 
regular company taxes are 28% in Malaysia (US Department of State, 2001). 
82 This figure includes RM231 billion in petroleum income tax, RM333 billion in dividends from 
Petronas and RM51.7 billion in royalty payments (World Bank, 2013).  
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The dependence of fiscal revenues on oil revenues had declined between 1980 and 1998, 
but the trend reversed with the commodity price boom in the 2000-2014 period. 
Petroleum revenues have indeed accounted for as much as 45% of government income in 
2012 before falling back to 22% in 2015 (CIA, 2018). Oil revenues also tripled as a 
percentage of GDP between 1995 and 2010 (see World Bank, 2019). As a result, the 
World Bank (2013) argues that since 2000, while Malaysia continues to feature among 
the few countries that follow the Hartwick rule, it is moving towards greater resource 
dependence and lower investments in excess of natural resource rents, similarly to Chile. 
However, it might be too hasty to draw conclusions on Malaysia’s increased commodity 
dependence. Despite an increase in oil revenues between 2000 and 2014, Malaysia has in 
fact managed to moderate its dependence on oil rents especially in comparison to other 
resource rich countries such as Chile. As shown by figure 17, oil rents as share of GDP in 
Malaysia have been decreasing since reaching a peak of 7% of GDP in 2008. In addition, 
this peak coincided with the global financial crisis, which probably induced a drop in 
GDP that caused a disproportionate increase in the share of oil rents in GDP.  
Figure 17: Oil and mineral rents as share of GDP in Malaysia and Chile (1993-2016) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, from the World Bank (2019) 
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5.2.3 How resource revenues are spent 
The share of the revenues allocated through the annual budget are primarily spent on 
development projects, although there is no exact way to calculate how much oil revenues 
feed into specific projects because revenues from all industries are "pooled" together, 
meaning that oil and gas revenues are not differentiated from revenues from any other 
industry (Yeoh, 2008; Centre for Public Policy Studies, 2017). The Federal government 
then decides how to manage and divide the revenues into three broad areas: expenditure 
(both recurrent and investments), subsidies, and savings.  
5.2.3.1 Expenditure 
A share of the government’s annual budget is allocated to expenditure for national 
development, whether in specific projects or general capabilities such as education 
provision. However, in the absence of exact information and broken-down data on 
sources of government revenues and government spending in different development 
projects, we can only speculate on the specific effect of resource wealth on development 
financing. Nevertheless, as detailed in figure 4 and in subsequent sections of this chapter, 
because of the high level of subsidies and tax incentives to promote manufacturing 
sectors (including resource-based industries) from the 1970s until the 2000s, one can 
deduce that one of the fiscal linkages between the Malaysian oil sector and the rest of the 
economy is through the spending and reinvestment of oil rents through subsidies towards 
prioritized sectors, especially manufacturing and resource-based industries. As further 
noted by the World Bank (2013) and the National Economic Advisory Council of 
Malaysia (2010), investments in infrastructure and human capital have been partly 
financed from natural resource revenues (export duties on tin, palm oil and rubber and 
later petroleum), which provided an important backdrop to horizontal diversification. 
This is a perhaps a case of ‘subsidizing’ industrial development through resource revenue 
management. Indeed, given the reliance of government’s annual budgets on petroleum 
revenues, it is reasonable to believe that the Malaysian government would have been in a 
much more difficult financial situation to grant generous subsidies and tax breaks to 
promote manufacturing sectors had it not benefited from petroleum rents over the last 
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forty years. Figure 18 shows that around half of expenditures (including development 
expenditures) have been financed though oil revenues in recent years. 
 
Figure 18: Share of oil revenues as a percentage of expenditures 
 
Source World Bank (2013) 
 
5.2.3.2 Savings 
 A small portion of oil and gas revenues (about USD25 million a year) also goes into the 
National Trust Fund, also called Kumpulan Wang Amanah Negara (KWAN), in which 
they are earmarked for future investments and savings. The KWAN was set up in 1988 
with the purpose of securing national wealth for future generations in the face of the 
depletion of Malaysia’s hydrocarbon reserves.83 It is under the direct control of the Prime 
Minister’s Office.84  
																																																								
83 The contributions to the KWAN consist mostly of revenues from Petronas and were initially 
allocated through Petronas’ annual budget. In 2011, the contribution modality was amended and 
Petronas consequently contributed annually based on a strata that depends on the Weighted 
Average Realized Price of oil per year (World Bank, 2013; Tordo and Anouti, 2013). 
84 In terms of oversight and control, KWAN’s is mostly governed by a panel of trustees led by the 
Minister of Finance and thus is independent from the Parliament. The World Bank (2013) argues 
that this is a weak form of governance because although submission of ex-post accounts of 
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As of 2008, the fund had about RM3.8 billion (USD1 billion). Despite its objectives and 
its thirty-years existence, the size of the KWAN appears to be rather small, especially 
compared to similarly purposed funds set up even more recently in countries with 
comparable mineral resource export intensity per capita, such as the Kazakhstan National 
Fund, the Russian National Welfare Fund, Chile’s Social and Economic Stabilization 
Fund and Pension Reserve Fund, or Algeria’s Revenue Regulation Fund. It is thus highly 
doubtful that the KWAN disposes of sufficient funds to cushion the country from 
external financial blows in the long run (World Bank, 2013; Yeoh, 2008).85 The World 
Bank (2013) consequently argues that more petroleum revenues should be invested 
through the KWAN rather than Petronas, which should restrict itself to overseeing the 
operational management of the oil and gas industry. 
Despite some remaining degree of dependence of government income on petroleum 
revenues, the Malaysian government recognized early on the need to cultivate a mixture 
of industries. The policy option chosen to deal with the dependence and depletion of 
petroleum resources seems to have been industrial diversification instead of fiscal 
stabilization alone. 
5.2.3.3 Subsidies 
A substantial amount of Petronas revenues from oil and gas also goes into subsidising 
various petroleum products (primarily petrol, diesel and gas). Fuel subsidies expanded 
from 0.1% as share of GDP in 1990-1994 to 2.1% in 2010-2012 (World Bank, 2013). 
Petronas also makes large contributions to gas subsidies. In 2007, Petronas subsidised the 
gas sector at a cost of RM19.7 billion while the government’s expenditure on petrol, 
diesel and gas subsidies that year stood at RM16.2 billion (Centre for Public Policy 
Studies, 2017). Table 5 shows that Petronas’ contribution towards gas subsidies between 
1997 and 2012 represented around RM108.5 billion (equivalent to around USD26billion).  
																																																																																																																																																																					
KWAN is provided to the legislature, this does not easily allow decisions to be reversed 
85 Although the petroleum revenue has grown significantly over the 2000s, KWAN’s assets 
accounted for only 0.6% of nominal GDP in 2012 and the percentage share of KWAN over the 
Government’s petroleum revenue remained below the 1% percent range (World Bank, 2014). 
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Table 5: Potential revenue foregone from Petronas’ contributions towards gas subsidies 
Subsidies by Petronas 2011 (in RM 
billion) 
Share in GDP Cumulative amount 
(1997-2012) 
Power sector 11.6 1.3% 108.5 
Non-Power Sector  
(including industrial, commercial, 
residential users and natural gas vehicles) 
8.5 1.0% 46.4 
Total 20.1 2.3% 154.9 
Source: World Bank (2013) 
It is doubtful whether such consumption subsidies are sustainable in the long run, or 
whether social redistribution could take place more effectively through developmental 
projects that target more specifically the poorer segments of the population. Indeed, fuel 
and gas price subsidies (although conditional on consuming fuel or gas) are mostly 
untargeted, channeling scarce public resources to both wealthy and poor individuals. 
They distort consumption incentives and lead to higher energy consumption, with 
attendant detrimental environmental implications (World Bank, 2013).86 However, it is 
generally agreed that reforming subsidies is generally politically sensitive. Consequently, 
the gradual replacement of fuel price subsidies towards more targeted transfers would 
require minding political economy considerations.87 
5.2.3.4 The role of PETRONAS in re-investing resource revenues  
After paying dividends to the government, Petronas also retains between 25% and 50% of 
its oil and gas revenues, which it reinvests in different segments of the oil and gas supply 
chain as well as in petroleum-related sectors and non-petroleum-related sectors such as 
car manufacturing and property development.88 In fact, Petronas’ assets, revenues and 																																																								
86 Retail prices of both petrol and diesel in Malaysia are among the lowest within the region. 
From 2000-2010, final consumption of petrol grew by 4.1% per annum, but imports expanded at 
a faster rate of 5.5% per annum reflecting the difficulty of domestic sources to meet higher 
demand. In 2010, approximately 45% of motor gasoline demands were met through imports. The 
trade position for motor gasoline and diesel has deteriorated over the past decade. This trend is 
expected to continue, especially if prices remain subsidized (World Bank, 2013) 
87  According to the IMF (2013:1), successful subsidy reform requires “an extensive 
communications strategy, supported by improvements in transparency, such as the dissemination 
of information on the magnitude of subsidies”. 
88 Such revenues would not be captured in the MINDEX (see chapter 3), which excludes revenues 
that is retained by SOEs. 
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capital expenditure respectively represent more than 50%, 30% and 6% of GDP, and 
accounts for a significant amount of domestic investment (IMF, 2015). 
Petronas’ responsibility of managing and reinvesting the petroleum revenues it retains 
partly explains its diversification in different activities (Nordas, Vante, and Heum 2003). 
Indeed, Petronas has re-invested its revenues in activities such as refining, processing, 
petrol distribution and sales, maritime transportation services, marine and heavy 
engineering, manufacturing of petroleum products such as chemicals and fertilizers, as 
well as real estate with the management of the Kuala Lumpur City Centre project. For 
instance, Petronas invested USD1.6 billion in building the Petronas twin towers. While 
the such project has at times been labelled a white elephant, it appears that it had 
considerable externalities since it increased the real estate value of Kuala Lumpur’s city 
centre and contributed to promote tourism, which is now one the first sources of foreign 
exchange generation in the country. Petronas’ other non-oil sector activities have also 
raised some controversy. It has bailed out firms that the government considers 
strategically important in several instances.89 Although Petronas had argued that those 
operations were commercially motivated, it appears that the company has incurred losses 
on them and the claimed synergies related to these acquisitions are not obvious (ibid.). 
Because of its mandate and significant resource-revenue investments, it can be argued 
that Petronas has in some instances played a similar role to a resource fund (World Bank 
2013).90 It has provided some insulation to the budget against volatility in oil prices, 
especially in the 1980s, because the oil prices change were only partially transmitted to 
the budget (ibid.)91 Petronas has also contributed to the management of resource 
revenues by avoiding to repatriate some of its revenue back into Malaysia when the 
country was experiencing appreciation of the real effective exchange rate (ibid.). 																																																								
89 For instance, it rescued Bank Bumiputra by taking 80% of its stakes and bailed out the national 
car manufacturer, Proton, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. 
90 According to the IMF (2012b:31), the objectives of resource funds are (i) savings: to transfer 
wealth across generations or across time; (ii) stabilization: to insulate the economy from volatile 
commodity prices; and (iii) development: to allocate resources to socioeconomic projects. 
91 The correlation between changes in oil prices and the annual variation in oil revenues was 59% 
between 1981 and 1990, which implies that only 59% of the change in oil prices was transmitted 
to the budget on average in that period (World Bank, 2013). 
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5.2.4 Impact on the local economy 
I have attempted to calculate a rough percentage of fiscal revenues accruing back to the 
local economy by calculating and adding the share of revenues re-invested domestically 
by Petronas to dividends and petroleum taxes accruing to the federal government, 
provincial states, and funds channelled to the KWAN fund. It would appear that in 2013, 
total oil and gas revenues accruing to Petronas and the government and the KWAN fund 
represented about RM73.8 billion, of which 68% were invested and spent domestically. 
In addition, while Khazanah Nasional Berhad, unlike Petronas, does not manage resource 
revenues and receives no ‘sovereign’ wealth per se, its initial capital injection (including 
the transfer of government-linked companies to its portfolio) can be understood as an 
indirect fiscal linkage from government revenues. Khazanah acts as a strategic 
investment fund that creates long-term value for the nation.92 It invests in innovation and 
technology abroad but also domestically to spur structural transformation and to create 
strategic value, understood both in terms of commercial profit, as well as potential for 
knowledge intensity, transformative effects, and spill-overs for the national economy.93 
In that regards it is very different from Chile’s sovereign wealth funds, which do not 
invest domestically.  
																																																								
92 At its creation in 1994, Khazanah’s initial objective was to manage and turn around SOEs that 
were underperforming. It transitioned from a sovereign wealth fund, towards a sovereign 
development fund, and more recently a sovereign venture fund (Speech by Khazanah’s Managing 
Director, 4 march 2016). Khazanah is now acquiring assets that can help develop Malaysia’s 
domestic capabilities. For instance, Khazanah opened offices in San Francisco and London to 
focus on IT sector acquisition and acquire microchip firms. Khazanah is also involved in two 
domestically owned E&E firms, Silterra (semiconductors) and Amulus (microchips). The 
corporate governance mechanisms in which Khazanah operates are very different from the case 
of the 1MDB fund, which has been plagued by scandals and alleged misuse of government funds. 
93 As of 2017, almost 60% its investments were in assets in Malaysia while 80% of the companies 
in which Khazanah invests in are domiciled in Malaysia (Khazanah Nasional, 2017). 
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5.3 COPPER REVENUES MANAGEMENT IN CHILE 
 
5.3.1 Overview  
 
In Chile, the impacts of the copper sector are mostly seen in terms of the revenues it 
generates, part of which are appropriated by the government. As shown in figure 19, 
copper revenues reached nearly 40% of government revenues in 2006 (AfDB, 2017). The 
fiscal linkages consist of both royalties paid by mining companies, and dividends from 
Codelco, the state-owned mining company. Codelco was founded in 1976 and is involved 
in all stages of exploration, exploitation, processing, and sales of copper. Codelco is now 
the largest copper producer in the world, with close to 20% of the world reserves and 
11% of world production (COCHILCO, 2010).  
 
Figure 19. Composition of Fiscal revenues in Chile
 
Source: African Development Bank (2017) 
How are Chile’s copper revenues used and how do they affect other sectors of the 
economy? Since the 1980s, copper windfalls have mainly been used for fiscal 
stabilization and savings for future generations. The Copper Stabilization Fund was 
created in 1985. The copper price boom in the 2000s led to an increase in state revenues 
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and allowed the creation of three funds in 2006: the Economic and Social Stability Fund 
(ESSF), the Pension Reserve Fund (PRF) and the Innovation for Competitiveness Fund.  
The PRF is essentially a savings Fund that receives between 0.2% and 0.5% of GDP, 
depending on the size of Chile's overall budget surplus each year (Ruiz-Dana, 2007). The 
Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (ESSF) replaced the original Copper 
Stabilization Fund and inherited its assets (of around USD5 billion).  Its objective is to 
finance potential fiscal deficits, therefore avoiding the negative effects on government 
income associated with copper price volatility (Varas, 2012). Indeed, it is a fiscal 
stabilization fund that is mainly used to ensure intergenerational equity and to maintain a 
countercyclical policy by financing recurrent expenditures through the central budget 
using the returns from the stabilization fund’s investments abroad (Eric Parrado, Personal 
Communication, July 2017).  
The two sovereign wealth funds (PRF and ESSF) exclusively invest abroad in low-risk 
assets. Indeed, the investment policy of the ESSF emphasises risk aversion through an 
investment portfolio with a high level of liquidity and low credit risk and volatility. 
Indeed, as shown by table 6, the ESSF predominantly invests in foreign currencies and 
sovereign bonds. Around 34% of the ESSF’s assets are allocated in money market 
instruments (15% in bank deposits and 19% in treasury bills), 55% in sovereign bonds, 
3.5% in inflation-indexed sovereign bonds and 7.5% in equity outside Chile (Ministry of 
Finance, 2018). The PRF’s portolio composition as of 2012 comprised of 15% in global 
stocks, 20% in global corporate bonds and 65% in global sovereign bonds, while the 
currency composition of the funds is broken down as follows: 50% USD, 40% Euro, and 
10% Japanese Yen (Korinek 2013; Ministry of Finance, 2018). 
Both the PRF and the ESSF’s funds are administered by the Central Bank and invested in 
international markets in low-risk instruments and consequently do not contribute to the 
local economy through domestic investments. While fiscal linkages could be an impactful 
investment mechanism between Chile’s copper sector and the rest of the domestic 
economy, the use of resource revenues to promote transformation of the domestic 
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economy has therefore been rather minimal. Meanwhile, 10% of copper sales accrue to 
the army, as decreed by the Ley Reservada during Pinochet’s military regime.  
Table 6. The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (ESSF)’s investment policy 
Benchmark Percentage of Total Portfolio 
Sovereign bonds 55.0% 
Barclays Capital Global Treasury: US 7-10 yrs. 26.5% 
Barclays Capital Global Treasury: Germany 7-10 yrs. 11.0% 
Barclays Capital Global Treasury: Japan 7-10 yrs. 10.0% 
Barclays Capital Global Treasury: Switzerland 5-10 yrs. 7.5% 
Treasury bills 19.0% 
Merrill Lynch Treasury Bills Index USD 6.0% 
Merrill Lynch Treasury Bills Index EUR 7.0% 
Merrill Lynch Treasury Bills Index JPY 6.0% 
Bank deposits 15.0% 
Merrill Lynch Libid 3 Month Average USD 5.0% 
Merrill Lynch Libid 3 Month Average EUR 6.0% 
Merrill Lynch Libid 3 Month Average JPY 4.0% 
Inflation-Indexed Sovereign Bonds 3.5% 
Barclays Capital Global Inflation-Linked: US TIPS 1-10 yrs. 2.5% 
Barclays Capital Global Inflation-Linked: Germany 1-10 yrs. 1.0% 
Total Fixed Income 92.5% 
Equity 7.5% 
MSCI All Country World Index ex Chile 7.5% 
Total portfolio 100.0% 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Chile (2018) 
Although it is often argued that copper has greatly contributed to the improvement in 
living conditions in Chile, it is difficult to quantify the impact of mineral revenues on 
human development through the increase in funding made available for social public 
expenditures (through the general government budget) and separate it from social 
development through the mining sector’s growth (AfDB, 2017). Over the past two 
decades, several programmes, such as Chile Solidario (2002), Chile Crece Contigo 
(2006), and Pension Basica Solidaria (2008),  were launched to provide social assistance, 
tackling extreme poverty, providing maternity care, and pensions for elderly and disabled 
people without social security. 
However, even if Chile’s social spending arising out of copper revenues might have had 
positive effects on vulnerable segments of the population, the country has not invested 
copper revenues to develop domestic industrial capabilities. In addition, when it comes to 
poverty rates and income distribution, Chile remains one of the most unequal high-
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income countries, while poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (as a percentage 
of the population) has peaked at 25% over the last decade (World Bank, 2018). Chile’s 
HDI loses around 20% of its value after it is adjusted to account for inequality rates, 
which would classify the country as a ‘medium human development’ following UNDP’s 
HDI classification. There are thus valid reasons to remain sceptical of the impact of 
copper revenues on social development in Chile. In that perspective, Solimano and 
Calderon Guajardo (2017) argue that the Chilean copper revenue management case 
reveals high opportunity costs of over-investing in stabilization funds at the expense of 
social spending. Indeed, there is no clarity regarding the optimal level of resource 
accumulation in various stabilization funds with a possible tendency towards over-
insurance in fiscal management (ibid). The ESSF, PRF, and copper-funded defence fund 
currently have assets of nearly 10% of GDP (which becomes 20% if we include the 
international reserves held by the Central Bank), while Chile’s levels of public spending 
in education, health, pensions, and other social sectors as a share of GDP are consistently 
below those of the OECD and other Latin American economies of middle and large size, 
in a context marked by large income and wealth inequality (ibid.)  
5.3.2 Fiscal linkages towards innovation and R&D? 
Created in 2006, the ICF is the main state financing mechanism out of copper revenues 
for innovation and competitiveness. According to the current President of Chile’s 
National Council for Innovation and Development (CNID), Gonzalo Rivas, (Personal 
Communication, July 2017), the Chilean government seeks to use copper revenues to fuel 
innovation and competitiveness, because only 0.4% of Chile’s GDP has been devoted to 
R&D activities in recent years. This figure is very low compared to the OECD average 
(2.5%) and the Latin American average (0.8%), according to World Bank data (2018). In 
2014, Chile’s share of R&D spending as a percentage of GDP was also lower than other 
resource-rich countries such as Australia (2.0%) Canada (1.7%) and Malaysia (1.3%). In 
addition, according to the President of the CNID (personal communication, July 2017), 
R&D in resource rich countries tends to be driven by public spending instead of private 
spending, which would mean that the low R&D/GDP ratio of Chile is mainly due to 
government inaction. An explanation for that observation could be linked to the fact that, 
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although resource-based sectors involve sophisticated technology, the Ricardian rent is so 
plentiful that instead of developing technological capabilities in-house, there is little 
R&D investment and the core focus of the business is to take advantage of that rent. In 
addition, R&D involves a collective action problem. Hence, the reasoning behind the 
creation of the ICF is that the public sector should have a role in coordinating and 
funding R&D in order to compensate for the low private investment in R&D.  
The ICF allocates funds to other government agencies, among which the most important 
are the National Commission for Scientific and Technological Research (CONICYT) and 
the Production Development Corporation’s (CORFO) Innova Chile programme (together 
accounting for 88% of the ICF funding in 2013). Those programmes support innovation 
activities with high technological components (Varas, 2012). Figure 20 depicts fiscal 
revenues collected from state copper companies from 1990 to 2010, as well as the total 
funds allocated to the ICF for technology and science programmes. 
Figure 20: Fiscal Revenues from State copper companies and revenue allocation to the 
science, technology and innovation programmes (1990-2010, USD million) 
 
Source: Varas (2012) 
Despite the claims that royalties from Chile’s mining sector are being used for innovation 
in mining through the ICF, the use of copper revenues for innovation remains minimal 
compared to the channelling of copper revenues for fiscal stabilization to smoothen 
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general expenditures. Indeed, the funds channelled to the ICF for innovation purposes 
merely represent a twentieth of the copper revenues allocated to the ESSF alone. The 
ESSF remains the most important recipient of the State’s copper revenues, with a market 
value of USD 14.7 billion in 2017. 
5.3.3 A case of fiscal stabilization at the expense of structural transformation 
While the fiscal stabilization objectives of the ESSF are laudable, they only offer short-
term tools to address commodity price volatility if they are not accompanied by important 
mechanisms to re-invest resource revenues for export diversification.  
Chile’s fiscal management of its copper revenues has been successful in regulating 
current expenditures since the 1990s, with an independent central bank, countercyclical 
monetary policy, flexible exchange rate, strong financial system monitoring. This has had 
an important impact on reducing medium-term volatility and financing the stimulus 
package to face the world recession in 2009, the earthquake recovery plan in 2010, and 
the medium-term financial sustainability of social policies (Korinek, 2013; Varas, 2012). 
Nevertheless, Chile’s fiscal management neglected the structural transformation agenda 
and mostly addressed symptoms of commodity price volatility rather than the root cause 
of commodity dependence. As a result, “Chile, seen as the economy that has successfully 
pursued aggressive counter cyclical fiscal policy to mitigate the effects of copper exports 
to its economy, saw a sharp rise in co-movements after 2007, in line with the huge rise in 
copper prices during the period” (World Bank, 2013:59). Four explanations can be put 
forward: 
First, it appears that Chile’s reputation for macro-stability acquired during the period of 
high growth between 1990-1999 can be directly attributed to high copper prices. Today, 
copper still represents over half of Chile’s total exports (UN Comtrade, 2018). In fact, 
Chile’s lack of economic diversification, exacerbated by falling commodity prices, along 
with bad income distribution (which is arguably another effect of Chile’s lack of 
diversified productive structures affecting employment opportunities) constitutes a threat 
to fiscal stability itself.  This issue is reflected in the recent decision by credit ratings 
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agency Standard & Poor’s to downgrade Chile’s credit score (Slattery, 2017).  Chile’s 
slow growth and fiscal deficit are a consequence of the dependence of its exports and 
fiscal revenues on copper prices. Indeed, according to the Superintendent of Banks and 
Financial Institutions of Chile, Eric Parrado, “instead of investing copper revenues 
domestically for structural transformation, successive governments in Chile have felt the 
pressure to save more than previous governments for political reasons but the other side 
of the coin is that they need to get debt to finance investments” (Parrado, Personal 
Communication, July 2017). Such trends are confirmed in figure 21, which shows that 
the government’s net debt increased after despite the boom in copper prices since 2004. 
Figure 21: General government net debt as share of GDP in Chile (1991-2018) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2019) 
Second, Chile’s lack of diversification exposed dependence not only on a single 
commodity, but also on one importing client, China. Given that China is the most 
important importer of Chilean copper, the possibility of China growing more slowly, in 
addition to the risk of copper prices going down, threaten the seeming macro-economic 
stability of Chile. This further reflects the idea that macroeconomic policies are not 
enough to solve macroeconomic problems. 
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Third, there is an asymmetry in the operation rules of Chile’s stabilization funds, as 
pointed out by Solimano and Calderon Guajardo (2017:16): 
“On the one hand, there are clear rules of accumulation; on the other hand, no rules exist for 
using the resources of these funds, say to counteract an economic downturn or recession 
[…] As of now, the decision of drawing resources from the SWFs depends on the 
discretionary judgement of the fiscal authority. In addition, it is not possible to track where 
the resources are finally spent (e.g. on consumption or investment), and therefore to 
evaluate the efficacy of countercyclical fiscal policies and some of their long-run effects.”  
 
Fourth, similarly to the previous argument on the over-insurance in fiscal management in 
the context of lagging social spending, it can be argued that the Chilean case reveals a 
high opportunity cost of over-investing in stabilization funds at the expense of domestic 
investment for diversification. Indeed, while savings of copper revenues in financial 
assets represent nearly 10% of GDP (in addition to the international reserves held by the 
Central Bank which represent another 10% of GDP), Chile remains dependent to a large 
extent on raw copper exports while its gross fixed investment as share of GDP (21.56%) 
remains below the world average (23.32%) as well as Malaysia’s rate (30.29%), 
according to IMF data (2019). In fact, Chile’s investment as share of GDP did not even 
increase with the surge in copper prices since 2004.94  	
5.4 CONCLUSION 
The Chilean and Malaysian cases reveal two very different approaches to resource 
revenue management. In contrast to Chile where fiscal stabilization was prioritized at the 
expense of domestic investment, the bulk of oil and gas revenues in Malaysia go directly 
into the federal government’s budget for investment on development projects and 
subsidies towards prioritized sectors, while Petronas also retains a large portion of its 
profits to undertake re-investments, domestically and abroad, in different segments of the 
oil and gas supply chains as well as in others sectors. Auty (1994) argued that while 
Malaysia made errors of promoting inefficient industries during the oil boom period, its 																																																								
94 Chile’s investment as share of GDP represented 23.40% for the period 1981-2003 and 23.10% 
for the period 2004-2018. 
	 144 
concern to maintain sound macroeconomic management limited the damage. 
Nevertheless, Malaysia’s development cannot be reduced to a concern for 
macroeconomic stability: Malaysia had a very high public fiscal deficit as a proportion of 
GDP during most of the period 1970-2000, which is in line with the World Bank’s 
observations that Malaysian policy-makers seriously overestimated the resource available 
to undertake large scale, heavy industrial investments. It thus seems sensible to go 
beyond sole macroeconomic stability and fiscal deficit considerations, and raise the 
question as to why and how did public investment and spending have a long-term 
transformative effect in Malaysia.  
The comparison between Chile and Malaysia shows that an overarching focus on 
macroeconomic stability and strategies to invest abroad, though they help address short-
term fluctuations, can be detrimental to long-term development, if they do not contribute 
to the transformation of the domestic economy. The fiscal stability and the structural 
transformation agenda are not mutually exclusive. Conceptually, long-term structural 
transformation should be supported by fiscal stability and vice-versa. The challenge thus 
appears not whether to compromise one for the other but how to strike a balance between 
fiscal stability and domestic investments for long-term transformation. In Chile, it 
appears that the balance has been totally tilted towards fiscal stability: “policy choices to 
promote diversification are restricted by the neoliberal ideological barriers, relying on 
Mundell–Fleming price control measures, which were successful in the 1990s but have 
stopped being successful in the last decade” (Katz, Personal Communication, July 2017). 
While Chile is often put forward as a success story of resource revenue management, it 
seems that such success is at best limited to macro-economic stability considerations. 
Meanwhile, the successive Chilean governments’ prioritization of macro-equilibrium 
may have shadowed the structural economic transformation agenda. As acknowledged by 
the Superintendent of Banks and Financial Institutions of Chile, “fiscal stability makes us 
more responsible but also leads to inertia” (Personal communication, July 2017). 
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Chapter 6: Vertical Integration in Chile’s Copper sector 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the mechanisms underlying linkage 
development around Chile’s copper resources. A report written by Ramos (1998) for the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
argued that Latin America in general and the economic development of Chile (and Latin 
America more broadly) needed a strategy that strengthens the linkages towards 
knowledge intensive activities around natural resources, supplying inputs, equipment and 
engineering services (backward linkages) and towards activities that process and use 
natural resources (forward linkages) without necessarily going against some of the 
obvious market trends. The development of suppliers of inputs, equipment and 
engineering services for mining extraction can indeed be one of the drivers to promote 
natural resource based industrialization, as witnessed in resource rich countries that are 
now highly developed and that have managed to overcome the resource curse, such as 
Canada, Australia, the United States and the Scandinavian countries, amongst others 
(Bravo Ortega and Munoz, 2015; Wright and Czelusta, 2002).  
This chapter explains why the industrial fabric around Chile’s copper is rather weak in 
comparison to those found in other resource-rich countries such as Australia and 
Malaysia, both in terms of downstream and upstream value addition. In light of this 
study, it becomes clear that the hands-off approach of the Chilean government was not 
successful in developing an ecosystem of knowledge-intensive industrial capabilities 
around Chile’s copper sector.  
The first section of this chapter discusses forward linkage development and its underlying 
political and economic challenges. The second section examines the development of local 
mining suppliers in Chile mining in order to shed light on the factors that influence 
backward linkages arising out of commodities.  
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6.2 FORWARD PRODUCTION LINKAGES IN CHILE’S COPPER SECTOR: 
TO SMELT OR NOT TO SMELT?  
6.2.1 Overview  
One hypothesis suggests that for effective copper-based development to take place, the 
copper sector must move beyond ore production by increasing the share of refined copper 
and ideally manufactured copper products (Korinek, 2013). There have indeed been 
growing concerns as to whether more value could be added to Chile’s considerable 
copper reserves, which account for over half of the country’s exports and which are the 
largest in the world (with a third of the global copper reserves).  
One of the myths is that Chile’s efforts to reduce its dependence to copper has resulted in 
its success in developing downstream linkages by refining and using copper in the 
production of wires and some other products. As Grosse (2009) writes “despite the major 
significance of copper in Chile’s exports, the country has moved far beyond dependence 
on that natural resource by entering into downstream production of refined copper 
products”. Nevertheless, it would seem that the data on which those arguments rely can in 
fact be traced back to a study conducted by ECLAC in the mid-1980s. Since then, as 
shown by figure 22, downstream production in the copper sector has considerably fallen, 
both in terms of refining and production of copper-based products. Indeed, the early 
interest for industrialization around copper in the late 1940s (championed by CORFO, 
which created MADECO, a copper manufacturing firm, and the Hernán Videla Lira 
foundry to refine copper), faded way since the 1980s (Correa, 2018). Nowadays, even 
though Chilean state-owned copper company Codelco owns three of the twenty largest 
copper refineries (Bell, 2016), refined copper represents less than half of Chile’s exported 
copper, while the rest of exported copper is exported as raw copper or copper ore (UN 
Comtrade, 2017). 95  
																																																								
95 These three facilities have a combined annual capacity of 1.5 million metric tons, which 
represents about 15% of the capacity of the largest twenty copper refineries worldwide. Four of 
the five largest refineries are located in mainland China (Bell, 2016). Out of 5.4 million tons of 
copper produced by Chilean mines in 2010, around 2 million tons were turned into copper 
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Figure 22: Evolution of the value of refined copper as a share of total copper exports in 
Chile (%)
 
Source: Correa (2018) 
Why doesn’t Chile invest in domestic smelting and processing capacity to create more 
jobs and business opportunities? In addition, a high proportion of Chile’s refined copper 
exports are already refined into high purity metal ready to be manufactured into tubes, 
wires and other components required by a range industries. Yet, most of Chile’s copper is 
exported across the Pacific without much value addition and is reimported in the form of 
manufactured goods and more sophisticated copper products (Azzopardi, 2011; OECD, 
2015). Interestingly, neighbouring Latin American countries such as Brazil seem to be 
able to export sophisticated copper products and interestingly, “most of the copper 
processed from Brazil originates from Chile” (OECD, 2015:44). 
Although some of the literature praises Chile’s downstream value addition through the 
production of goods such as copper cables, tubing and sheet (See Grosse, 2009), 
downstream value addition efforts around copper in Chile do not in fact go far beyond 
primary processing. The beneficiation of copper has been rather limited, given that the 
production of copper cables merely accounted for around USD 300 million in 2015, 																																																																																																																																																																					
cathodes, around 1.6 million tons were smelted, leaving 1.8 million tons exported in the form of 
concentrates (Azzopardi, 2011). 
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which represents less than 1% of exports of the copper sector. Although Chile’s domestic 
manufacturing industries utilize around 100,000 tons of copper each year, is it negligible 
compared to the 3.3 million tons of refined metal produced by the mining industry 
(Azzopardi, 2011). Madeco, a Chilean firm, was responsible for conducting downstream 
activities such as copper tubes manufacturing. Nevertheless, Madeco did not become 
competitive and recently announced that it will stop the production of copper cables 
(Nueva Mineria y Energia, 2013). The reasons invoked for such decision were the 
increased costs and the adoption of substitute products - mainly based on plastic resins - 
in the market (Guerra, 2013). Hence, even though Chile has a clear comparative 
advantage in copper mining, operators in the country have not effectively engaged in the 
beneficiation of its copper resources into copper-based products.  
6.2.2 Underlying factors explaining Chile’s limited smelting and value addition.  
The mainstream explanations to explain limited value addition in the copper sector focus 
on the low competitiveness of Chile’s copper manufacturers because of a strong 
currency, relatively high wages and high energy costs stemming from the energy 
intensive nature of copper smelting.  
Nevertheless, there are underlying historic and economic reasons that can help us 
understand the lack of value addition efforts around Chile’s copper resources. As further 
explained below, alternative and complementary explanations include the short-term 
profit maximisation of extractive firms in Chile, combined with a dynamic 
inconsistency.96 Such inconsistency relates to the fact that high copper prices discourage 
value addition while incentivizing copper ore exports. Other explanations could also 
include Chile’s export dependence on copper ore demand from China, where most of the 
global refining capacity has been developed, leading to a clear market obstacle.97 
 																																																								
96 A dynamic inconsistency is a situation in which the optimal plan of a decision-maker made at 
one point in time is no longer optimal later in time. 
97 In addition, copper smelting also has detrimental environmental effects, creating considerable 
emissions of pollutants, which notably forced Codeldo to suspend operations in one of its site in 
2011 after heavy contamination and leaks (AFP, 2011).  
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6.2.3 Short-term profit maximisation and ownership considerations 
At the same time, there seem to be a lack of interest from mining companies to engage in 
value addition beyond raw material extraction. According to the President of Consejo 
Minero, a trade association bringing together domestic and foreign-owned private and 
public mining companies operating in Chile, firms in Chile should not be responsible for 
value addition: “Our business is to export raw materials. If another party want to process 
and refine Chile’s copper, we would be happy to sell it to them but we do not want to be 
involved in value addition” (Carlos Urenda, Personal Communication, 19 July 2017).  
This short-term profit maximization approach at the expense of long-term investments 
can be partly explained by the historical political economy of mining in Chile. FDI in 
mining in Chile started a century ago by US companies seeking to extract the raw 
material for export to the US market and later to other world markets (Grosse, 2009). The 
mining sector was later nationalized in the 1970s but when Pinochet came to power in 
1973, the sector was reopened to foreign investors, which were again looking for raw 
materials to sell to international markets. “Even in the 21st century, the copper industry in 
Chile seems to present an enclave kind of investment, where the foreign firms invest 
huge amounts of money in production facilities, but they then export the commodity raw 
material and have little additional impact on the domestic Chilean economy” (Grosse, 
2009: 183). Even the large copper mines built in the 1990s, such as Candelaria, 
Collahuasi, Escondida and Los Pelambres, were financed by Japanese companies looking 
for a stable supply of concentrates for their smelters on the other side of the Pacific and 
thus had no interest in building new capacity in Chile (Azzopardi, 2011). There are thus 
historical reasons why Chile continues to export copper as ore without much downstream 
linkages for value addition.  
A further question could be why Chile has been constrained in the low segments of the 
global copper value chain while countries such as Australia, Canada or the United States 
did not. Part of the answer may have to do with the structure of ownership in copper 
production. The mining sectors in United States Canada and Australia appear to be 
dominated by domestically-owned firms. In contrast, in Chile, even though Codelco had 
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been nationalized in the 1970s, it only produced about one-third of total domestic output 
by the 2000s, while a dozen foreign and domestic private firms accounted for the other 
two-thirds of total production (Grosse, 2009). Most of the foreign mining companies 
operating in Chile originate from Australia (BHP), USA (Phelps Dodge), UK (Rio Tinto) 
and Canada (Falconbridge), which are mostly mining countries. Meanwhile, Chilean 
mining companies have very little outward FDI and international presence with an 
extremely limited outward FDI and overseas activities apart from copper sales and 
distribution ventures (Grosse, 2009). Given such lack of internationalization and outward 
orientation, can we really talk of a success of copper-based industrialization in Chile?  
6.2.4 The influence of global commodity prices on value addition decisions. 
The lack of interest from mining companies to engage in value addition beyond raw 
material extraction can also be explained by global copper prices fluctuations. The copper 
price boom since the early 2000s has made raw copper exports profitable while 
discouraging value addition for the production of copper-based goods, which became less 
cost competitive in the market. In fact, rather than benefiting from high copper prices, 
firms such as Madeco are witnessing reduced demand in consumer copper-based 
products as consumers switch to cheaper alternatives such as plastic and aluminium.98 
The International Copper Association, the marketing arm of the global copper industry, 
estimates that high prices have reduced demand for the metal by as much as 8% in recent 
years (Azzopardi, 2011). 
In addition, the reduced demand for the manufacturing of copper-based products has been 
accompanied by an increase in the supply of copper refining capacity globally. In 
accordance with the law of supply and demand, recent considerable investments in 
smelters in Asia have created an excess smelting capacity worldwide leading to making 
smelting a marginal business while raw copper sales have become extremely lucrative. 
During the first six months of 2011, Codelco’s Ventanas smelting and refining complex 
in central Chile barely broke even (Azzopardi, 2011). 																																																								
98 The adoption of substitute products, mainly based on plastic resins, has been invoked as a 
reason for the discontinuation of Madeco’s copper cables manufacturing production. 
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6.2.5 China’s copper ore demand restrains Chile’s leverage in terms of domestic 
value addition 
Chile’s dependence on Chinese copper imports is another important factor to take into 
account. China accounts for 40% of global copper demand but also has interests in 
refining and adding value to copper domestically. As mentioned in the above section, 
considerable investments in new smelters in Asia, and more particularly China, have 
created an excess of smelting capacity globally. Indeed, the growing competition from 
copper refineries in China, which now has the biggest copper refining capacity in the 
world, is coupled with Chile’s dependence to Chinese copper ore demand, which poses a 
barrier to increase the domestic processing of Chile’s copper exported to China. Those 
conditions render Chilean copper ore production beholden to terms dictated by smelters 
in China and may contribute to explain why Chilean actors might be reluctant to promote 
value addition to the country’s copper resources. 
6.2.6 Increasing demand by diversifying markets and applications of copper? 
In face of the main challenges that are undermining downstream copper-based 
manufacturing, some firms in Chile are pursuing opportunities related to new 
applications, using some of the copper’s lesser known properties, such as antimicrobial 
properties (Azzopardi, 2011). Coldeco, through its subsidiary INCuBA (Innovaciones en 
Cobre S.A.), aims to increase demand for copper, generate more markets and business 
opportunities for higher value-added copper-based manufacturing by targeting sectors 
such as garment, fish farming and health. It has recently partnered with Cobre Andino 
and Chile’s largest sock manufacturer, Monarch, to launch the production of clothing 
made of antibacterial copper fiber (Mineria Chilena, 2014; This Is Chile, 2011).99 100 
 
 																																																								
99 Cobre Andino is a Chilean mining company that produces Copper Sulphate Pentahydrate for 
fertilizer, algicide, fungicide, and animal nutrition.  
100 The adoption of antimicrobial copper for border control booths at Chile's Arturo Merino 
Benítez Airport can also be seen as part of governmental effort to promote different application 
and value addition of copper. 
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6.3 BACKWARD PRODUCTION LINKAGES  
6.3.1 Assessment of Chile’s mining supply industry: strengths and limitations  
Although the number of Chilean mining suppliers has recently increased from 3.443 
firms in 2007 up to 5.998 firms in 2012 (Fundación Chile, 2012; 2014), various 
assessments reveal that these firms they are stagnating when it comes to knowledge 
intensive and innovation activities (Urzúa, 2011, 2012). Around 97% of mining suppliers 
classify as average or low capacity in the use of technology while there are no local 
suppliers operating at the knowledge frontier in mining (Bravo-Ortega and Muñoz, 
2015). As Bravo-Ortega and Muñoz (2015:13) further explains, “most local suppliers 
operate in a context of production management and adaptation of available technologies, 
without achieving benefits derived from the adaptation of available technologies”. This 
may be related to the lack of conditions and incentives for local suppliers to innovate, as 
well as high level of competition from foreign suppliers, which constitutes an entry 
barrier to local suppliers. This is problematic given that greater participation of firms in 
technology and knowledge intensive activities is considered to be one of the key factors 
that will enable the growth of the Chilean mining industry as a source of technological 
development (Cochilco, 2009a; 2009b; CSiro, 2014; FCh, 2014; Urzua, 2011). 
Alongside the broader comparison with the Malaysian case, contrasting Chile’s 
experience with other extractive-led development experiences can be informative and 
puts Chile’s situation into perspective. For instance, in Finland and Australia, domestic 
mining suppliers have become internationally competitive in the exports of mining 
technology (Bravo Ortega and Munoz, 2015; Korinek, 2013; Urzua, 2011). As shown by 
table 7, firms within the Australian Mining, Equipment, Technology and Services 
(METS) sector export around twenty times more than their Chilean counterparts, despite 
Chile also being one of the world top minerals producers. Mining supplies in Chile only 
represented 0.72% of total exports and 1.3% of mining exports in 2014. 
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Table 7: Indicators comparing Mining suppliers in Chile and Australia in 2012 
 
Australia Chile 
Total sales (in USD million) 90,000 20,000 
Total exports (in USD million) 15,000 500 
Exports as share of total exports of the mining sector 13.30% 1.70% 
Share of the mining sectors in total exports 54% 60 % 
Number of suppliers in the mining sector 1,500 6,000 
Share of exporting suppliers 75% 6%101 
Number of suppliers that export more than USD 1 million (in 2014) 50% 1% 
Share of suppliers whose exports represent more than 10% of their total sales 47 28 
Sources: Compiled data from Austmine (2013), Bravo Ortega and Munoz (2015), Fundación 
Chile (2014; 2015); Meller and Gana (2015); Meller and Parodi (2017). 
While the dynamic Australian METS sector only includes less than 1500 firms, around 
75% of Australian mining suppliers are exporters. In contrast, in Chile, while the number 
of suppliers is four times higher than in Australia, only 6% of suppliers have completed 
export operations in 2012. Furthermore, only three firms (less than 1% of total suppliers) 
in Chile realized exports for a value higher than USD 1 million in 2012, far behind the 
Australian figure (50%). These three firms alone accounted for over half of Chile’s 
mining supplies exports, as shown by table 8.  
Table 8: Exports of suppliers in Chile’s copper sector by size of exports in 2014 
 Firms Exports 
 Number % Amount exported 
in USD million 
% 
Exported more than USD 50 million 3 1% 275 51% 
Exported between USD 25 mil. and 50 mil. 2 1% 53 10% 
Exported between USD 1 mil. and 25 mil. 39 12% 165 31% 
Exported less than USD 1 million 285 86% 44 8% 
Total 329 100% 537 100% 
Source: Fundación Chile (2015) 
Consequently, although the participation of Chilean mining suppliers has been increasing, 
the level of exports, technological sophistication and knowledge intensity remains quite 
far from levels reached in developed resource rich countries. 
																																																								
101 There seems to be a mismatch in the data provided by Fundación Chile (FCh). FCh (2014) 
notes that 34% of suppliers exported goods and services in 2012 while data in other reports (e.g. 
FCh, 2015) notes that 345 suppliers exported in 2012, which represents only 6% of suppliers. 
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6.3.2 Barriers to backward linkage development 
In Chile, there are no local content incentives or requirements as part of mining 
legislations or contracts regulations. One the one hand, according to the mainstream 
neoliberal view, the reason why Chile has not managed to build a competitive supplier 
industry around mining through free market conditions is simply because Chile may not 
have a comparative advantage in the supply of goods and services as inputs for mining 
production. According to a former Minister of Economy of Chile:  
“Suppliers do not need state support to scale up because Chile has a sophisticated and fluid 
capital market and low interest rates. Hence, if suppliers did not become competitive and 
scaled up without state intervention, they do not have a competitive advantage in upstream 
activities of the copper sector” (personal communication, 2017).  
On the other hand, another approach could emphasize the presence of market failures that 
prevent the localization of the supply of goods and services in the copper sector. It can be 
argued that state interventions are required to address some of the market failures 
inhibiting backward linkage development, especially given the considerable multiplier 
effect arising from the anticipated increasing global demand for copper. In addition, the 
fact that Chile holds a third of world copper reserves and the considerable internal 
demand for suppliers mean that there are enough economies of scales to seize current and 
future industrial opportunities stemming form copper exploitation through infant industry 
protection and learning by doing. Such business opportunities also arise from the 
increasing outsourcing of non-core business to suppliers, which now represent about 60% 
of the operating cost of mining companies (FCh, 2014).   
Several local suppliers have been interviewed as part of this study in order to investigate 
obstacles to backward linkage development.102 The following section summarizes various 
																																																								
102 There are few instances of successful suppliers that successfully transitioned as top tier 
supplies in knowledge intensive services, (such as Neptuno Pumps, producing water pumps; 
ENAEX, producing blasting devices; DRILCO, producing drilling tools; and AguaMarina, 
producing bio-mining equipment). These firms together account a large share of Chile mining 
suppliers exports and display high technological capabilities, international competitiveness, as 
well as the accumulation of transversal capabilities towards other sectors. 
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factors that contribute to explain the poor matching between mining firms and solutions 
developed by local suppliers.  
6.3.2.1 Poor intra-industry dialogue and risk aversion behaviour  
In a context where there are no incentives to encourage the use of local suppliers, 
multinational mining companies prefer to avoid risks and choose their established foreign 
suppliers to ensure reliability and continuity in their operations. Fieldwork interviews 
have hinted towards the spread perception of a managerial risk aversion attitude from 
mining company managers, including Codelco, the state-owned mining company. Risk-
averse project managers favour the imports of supplies from established global providers 
rather than bet on collaborations with local firms seeking to integrate the supply chain. 
An explanation for such phenomena was put forward during an interview with Gonzalo 
Rivas, then-president of the National Council for Innovation and Development of Chile 
(CNID). According to him, employees and managers in the mining sector take advantage 
of an important Ricardian rent with high salaries. Their main purpose becomes to stay in 
the mining sector to take advantage of high salaries, which leads them to avoid taking 
risks nor making mistakes that could get them fired. As a result, large mining firms are 
not incentivized to risk adopting new technology and systems when it increases their cost 
only marginally even if it can have considerable externalities on the long run. This 
situation inhibits business opportunities for local firms and reduces the scope for learning 
by doing in order to reach the required time, quality and safety standards. 
It appears that the risk-averse behaviour shaping intra-industry linkages is also the result 
of out-dated and rigid business relationships, in contrast to what is seen in countries such 
as Malaysia or Australia. According to Bravo-Ortega and Munoz, “firms with experience 
in foreign markets argue that -by contrast to Chile- abroad is easy to get engaged and 
keep in touch with customers or even related competitors through fluid relations” 
(2015:38). In a similar fashion, Patricio Meller (Personal communication, July 2017) 
emphasizes the importance of fluid government-industry linkages in Australia, in a 
context where most supplying firms are domestically-owned, enabling effectively 
communication between the state and mining suppliers in order to promote value addition 
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through backward linkage development.103 In Australia, 84% of mining suppliers are 
domestically owned while foreign suppliers only represent 16% of firms supplying the 
industry (Bravo-Ortega and Muñoz, 2015). Locally-owned firms have developed 
domestic capabilities to produce various technologically sophisticated inputs for mining 
production. Such argument hints at the possible importance of the ownership for 
capabilities accumulation in the mining supply sector. According to Bravo-Ortega and 
Muñoz (2015:12), the path of development and innovation of local mining suppliers is 
related to the evolution in mining companies’ ownership as well as the evolution of the 
demand for progressively complex services. They argue that while foreign-owned firms 
had no impact on the technological catching-up among local suppliers of services in the 
early stages of mining development in Chile, the situation changed with the 
nationalization wave in the 1970s, which led to incentives and expectations for local 
suppliers to collaborate with the state-owned firm, Codelco (ibid.). Codelco’s vertical 
disintegration during the 1980’s consequently allowed local suppliers to join the supply 
chains and increase their technological capabilities. Nevertheless, local suppliers still face 
risk aversion behaviours from even domestically-owned mining firms and have remained 
unable to compete with foreign providers from developed countries with accumulated 
knowledge and technological capabilities.  
As a result of the lack of incentives for backward linkage development and the intense 
competition with foreign suppliers, many of the existing local suppliers have managed to 
integrate the copper sector either by going into niche markets with few competitors, or by 
leveraging previously accumulated manufacturing experience in other sectors.104 Even 
then, it appears that marketing capabilities are key to earn trust from contractors. Despite 
several years of experience in the mining sector, Neptuno Pumps had been suffering from 
unstable contracts from one year to another in the absence of an established brand and 
before receiving international recognition through various awards.  																																																								
103  However, such fluid linkages have also allowed for revolving doors between mining 
companies and politics in Australia, which is argued to increase risks of conflict of interests and 
disclosure of privileged information (Waters, 2016; Transparency International, 2017). 
104 The bio-mining firm Aguamarina has even created the market for some of the applications of 
bio-mining solutions in the world, as for green tailings. 
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Local firms are not incentivized to conduct R&D activities through tax incentives or else. 
Neptuno Pumps has developed innovative solutions with little support from public 
instruments and relied on its own budget to fund their R&D. Aguamarina did not have its 
own capital to invest in research and relied on mining firms to fund their research without 
preferential terms, on the ground that such funding would reduce the costs of 
Aguamarina’s products on the long run.105 This example shows that some multinational 
firms (such as BHP) have in some instances bet on local innovators, despite the lack of 
government incentives to do so.  
6.3.2.2 Obstacles to scaling up and testing of new products.   
The scale of operations in the Chilean mining sector means there is very little time frame 
for learning by doing and for suppliers to scale up their operations. Firstly, the high cost 
of disruption of large scale and non-stop mining production constitutes an entry barrier to 
test new solutions and suppliers, who need to convince mining firms to disrupt their 
large-scale production processes to test new products.  
Secondly, even once local products and solutions are adopted, firms need to scale up their 
operations immediately to respond to the industry needs, which may be challenging for 
SMEs. This is particularly problematic in Chile where two-third of total mining suppliers 
are micro- and small entreprises (FCh, 2014). The main difficulty faced by INGMAT (a 
Chilean firm supplying engineering services to the mining sector) when selling to mining 
companies is that they have no capacity for scaling up their solutions and no access to 
mining infrastructure to develop tests, which is why they prefer to generate prototypes 
and collaborate with others who escalate solutions (Bravo-Ortega and Munoz, 2015).  
Thirdly, although Chile’s banking system is highly developed there also seems to be a 
lack of complementarity between financing systems and the needs of the suppliers in the 
mining sector. “Chile has a highly developed banking system which has limited 																																																								
105 Aguamarina is notably the first supplier with whom BHP Billiton did not sign intellectual 
property or confidentiality clauses. BHP Billiton also internationalized Aguamarina as they are 
now using the biomining firm as a supplier in their operations in Australia. (CEO of AguaMarina, 
Personal Communication, July 2017).  
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knowledge of the mining supply business. It is thus hard for mining suppliers to get 
proper funding even they find innovative solutions” (Hernan Araneda, manager at 
Fundación Chile, Personal Communication, July 2017). Several governmental 
programmes, such as Innova, implemented by CORFO (the state production development 
corporation) and Fondef, managed by CONYCIT, have been created in recent years to 
fund and invest in local suppliers. Despite the fact that Aguamarina has obtained funds 
from these two programmes, it seems that an issue was the fact that the managers of those 
programmes did not necessarily know how to enhance the scalability of start-ups in the 
mining supply industry:  
“It is not just about the financing but also about the knowledge on the process of scaling up: 
where to manufacture, how to package, in what quantities, at which prices, and where to 
outsource? This is a real issue because in the mining sector, where scaling up is not 
progressive, but goes from testing and pilot projects to large orders and immediate scaling 
up […] This is a challenge for small firms” (Pamela Chavez, CEO of Aguamarina, Personal 
communication, July 2017). 
6.3.2.3 Higher domestic sales discourage export orientation.  
The low export orientation of local suppliers may point out an indirect relationship 
between the level of internal sales and the volume of international trade. Indeed, exports 
only represent between 1% and 10% of total sales for 72% of Chilean exporting suppliers 
(Fch, 2014). Exports therefore only represented a marginal income compared to sales 
realized in the domestic market for three quarters of the supplying firms in the mining 
sector. As Bravo-Ortega and Munoz explain (2015:8), firms with a volume of domestic 
sales above their sectoral average are less eager to export than those with internal sales 
below the average. The reverse effect can also explain the internationalization of 
Malaysian suppliers in the hydrocarbons sectors, where limited domestic scales required 
internationalization to maintain productivity.  
Do large domestic scales incentivize suppliers to ignore international markets? The case 
of Australia and Norway shows that local suppliers in the extractive sectors became 
export-oriented despite the availability of large market scales and rents in the domestic 
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mineral extraction business. In addition, Chile’s mining supply sales at home are still 
considerably lower than Australia, suggesting that the domestic sales of Chilean mining 
suppliers do not suffice to compensate for their lack of export orientation in comparison 
to their Australian counterparts. 
Interestingly, when it comes to exports to other sectors, 35% of exporting suppliers 
mostly exported to other industries while 65% dedicated at least a share of their exports 
to the global mining industry (FCh, 2014). This tendency reflects the potential for 
transversal linkages in the supply of goods and services for copper mining, which can 
feed into other sectors.  
6.3.2.4 The influence of commodity prices 
Both high and low copper prices have discouraged the hiring of local suppliers, despite 
potential externalities and multiplier effects. One the one hand, when Chile’s mining 
supply sector was about to transition into knowledge intensive business services (KIBS), 
high prices of copper led to increased revenues which delayed efforts to promote local 
suppliers. Large mining firms generated large profits and could afford to prioritize 
reliability by importing inputs. At the policy level, the state captured larger copper 
revenues, which contributed to focus policy attention on fiscal linkages arising out of the 
copper, at the expense of the policy interest to pursue backward linkages and value-
addition domestically. On the other hand, in times of low commodity prices, lead mining 
firms generate smaller profits and are not incentivized to adopt new systems that would 
increase cost only marginally in the short run but could have considerable spillovers on 
the long run (some of which can benefit the lead mining firms, such as cheaper solutions 
that are adapted to the local context). In fact, lower copper prices led to lower returns 
which in turn led to the reduction of expenditure on engineering services from USD 
400million to 300million in order to bring costs down and keep value in financial markets 
(Jorge Katz, Personal Communication, July 2017). This reduction in spending on local 
services impacts the long-term productivity of engineering companies supplying the 
sector, as well as leads to a loss of human capital and increase of unemployment of 
skilled labour, which is why it is a market failure (ibid.).  
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6.3.2.5 Shortage of skilled human capital 
The shortage of skilled human capital is one of the most important factors inhibiting the 
participation and innovation potential of suppliers of goods and services in the mining 
industry. As shown by the firm surveys conducted as part of this thesis and in other 
works (e.g. Bravo-Ortega and Munoz, 2015), the suppliers who successfully developed 
capabilities and technological skills had to undertake internal measures and trainings to 
address the labour mismatches, or hire technical staff from abroad, in particular 
neighbouring countries. “Some universities in southern Chile are training fluids dynamics 
engineers but we usually would have to retrain the engineers we hire, at our own costs of 
time and capital” (Neptuno Pumps’ CEO, Skype interview, 9th march 2018). The need for 
such actions evidences poor university-industry linkages, whereby universities do not 
offer human capital formation related to the fields of development of local providers 
(Bravo-Ortega and Muñoz, 2015). Even Becas Chile, the government’s scholarship 
programme, does not discriminate in order to support specific strategic areas, which has 
resulted in the lack of human capital accumulation in engineering (OECD and World 
Bank, 2011).106 This scholarship policy stands in contrast with Malaysia’s case, where 
Petronas directly sponsors scholarships in petroleum-related programmes domestically 
and abroad.107 The recent World-Class supplier programme is an intervention attempting 
to solve this issue, as detailed in the subsequent section. 																																																								
106  The Chilean government sponsors investment in high-level human capital by funding 
scholarships to study abroad (Sinnott et al., 2010). There is no discrimination regarding the field 
of study for which the scholarships are available. While this programme aimed to promote the 
human capital accumulation required to build a knowledge economy, the ‘market allocation’ of 
scholarships resulted in a mismatch between the disciplines studied and domestic skills needs. 
Several experts and firms interviewed as part of this research complained that too little graduate 
students go into engineering fields, which is problematic because engineering capabilities are 
required to exploit and adapt modern technology in order to promote industrial upgrading 
(Former President of Fundación Chile, Personal Communication, July 2017). Technology-related 
areas have indeed received less than 10% of scholarships. In their review of Becas Chile, the 
OECD and the World Bank emphasized that the studies sponsored by the government should be 
related to the national priorities defined by the National Council for Innovation and Development 
(2011:15). The recently announced fellowship programme for foreign studies in engineering can 
be interpreted as an acknowledgement of the need for vertical approaches in education provision. 
107  In Malaysia, to counter the shortage for technical skills for science, information and 
communication technology, the government also set up TalentCorp in 2011 to attract Malaysian 
talent to return from abroad and to bring in foreign talent (Mukherjee et al. 2011).  
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6.3.3 Recent interventions 
Some of the above-mentioned obstacles can be considered as market failures around 
Chile’s copper sector and confirm the argument by Bravo-Ortega and Munoz (2015) that 
obstacles to innovation to local content in the Chilean copper sector relate to high 
transaction costs, considerable asymmetries of information, and excessive risks for local 
suppliers. In this context, the objective of promoting local suppliers in the mining sector 
has been increasingly pursued through different programmes in the past decade.  
The World Class Supplier Programme, Valor Minero and the Mineria de Alta Ley 
programme, are recent interventions relying on public-private partnership to address the 
market failures -or what is termed as bottlenecks in Chile- that the mining industry needs 
to tackle. All three programmes are public-private partnerships that involve both mining 
firms (BHP Billiton, Codelco), government agencies such as (CORFO, CNID, 
COCHILCO) and Fundación Chile, a semi-public semi-private agency. These 
programmes aim to upgrade the number, export orientation, innovation capacity and 
technological capabilities of mining suppliers in Chile by 2020 and by 2035. Those 
interventions are thus clearly export-oriented because their common objective is to reach 
USD 10 billion of exports of mining supplies by 2035.  
Interestingly, the World Class Mining Suppliers Programme (Programa de Proveedores 
de Clase Mundial) was initiated in 2008 by the foreign-owned mining firm BHP Billiton, 
whose motives can be understood by the need to have more reliable local suppliers to 
face certain local challenges. As emphasized by a manager at BHP Billiton, the increase 
of capabilities of local suppliers could help reduce costs on the long run and address 
tailored solutions to specific challenges and conditions (personal communication, July 
2017). Even though BHP Billiton played a leading role in promoting this programme, it 
soon realized that it required public goods and participation of other mining companies in 
order to scale up the programme (ibid.). The subsequent involvement of other actors 
shows that addressing those challenges goes beyond the level of economic actors but also 
requires the involvement of state actors (government, universities) to provide public 
goods in the form of capital, incentives, training, testing facilities, and intra-industry 
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coordination. For instance, one of the initiatives as part of the World Class suppliers 
programme aimed to match university training with the current and future labour needs of 
the mining industry. Large mining companies did not cooperate with each other but 
Fundación Chile, a semi-public/semi-private foundation, was granted access to different 
mining companies payroll and future investment plans in order to elaborate a skills gap 
analysis and understand the qualifications that the sector needs, before coordinating with 
education providers in the country.  
More recently, in 2017, in line with the National Commission for Mining and 
Development (COCHILCO) strategy, the programme was reformed and restructured into 
two main public-private initiatives. The programme is now known as Programa de 
Innovación Abierta en Minería, and is part of the broader Alta Ley National Mining 
Programme, led by the public agency CORFO and the Ministry of Mining (Navarro, 
2018). The public sector has a more active role under the Alta Ley programme, whose 
objective remains to foster productivity, competitiveness and innovation in the mining 
industry and its suppliers, as well as to address environmental challenges (ibid.). 
Alongside the Alta Ley Programme, a public-private alliance named the Valor Minero, 
has also been established to promote the dialogue between the different stakeholders to 
discuss the include and sustainable development of the mining sector.  
Such interventions are a clear recognition that the hands-off approach was not successful 
in developing an ecosystem of knowledge-intensive industrial capabilities around Chile’s 
copper sector. It is perhaps to soon to assess whether those programmes will fulfill their 
objectives, but several observations can be made. Firstly, the implementation of the 
World Class Supplier programme seems to show promising results. As of December 
2012, this programme was already working with 36 suppliers and was estimated to have a 
net value of USD121 million in savings on the cost of inputs, goods, and services, thanks 
to the innovations of the PPCM suppliers (Hidalgo et al., 2014; Navarro, 2018). The 
programme has been successful in achieving incremental innovations and it seems to 
have had a positive impact on exports. Between 2010 and 2012, the majority of mining 
suppliers experienced increase in their sales while new firms entered the sector (Bravo-
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Ortega and Muñoz, 2015).108 The goal of reaching 250 suppliers seems achievable, and 
the programme is almost half way towards reaching that target. However, further efforts 
are to reach the objective to export USD4 billion of mining supplies in 2035.  
It is reasonable to assume that such programmes remain too shy and limited in scope to 
effectively address some of the persistent market obstacles preventing the development of 
local mining suppliers. A more active role from the public sector is needed to improve the 
availability of facilities for piloting, testing and the development of managerial 
capabilities for scaling up and internationalization (Navarro, 2018). Much further efforts 
are thus required in this direction. In Australia for instance, where METS comprises 7% 
of GDP and 7% of employment (much more than mining itself), there is a clear emphasis 
on supporting local firms’ integration in the supply chain with a "hands-on" approach to 
increase the competitiveness of domestic suppliers, with different degrees of 
interventionism (Korinek and Ramdoo, 2017).109 Some of the more aggressive local 
content policy tools also used in Malaysia’s petroleum sector (as discussed in chapter 8) 
or in Australia’s mining sector have not been implemented in Chile because of an 
ideological barrier. While in Malaysia there was a clear objective to add industrial value 
to commodities sectors already from the 1960s onwards, the objective in Chile was 
different and the priority was to attract investment to increase the volume of mining 
output (Official from the Chilean Productivity Commission, Personal Communication, 
July 26, 2017). “It is a pity we cannot capitalize on our mining sector and make the most 
of it because a lot of developmental and industrial policy tools cannot be used and this 
has to do with our history and ideology towards interventionist policies (ibid.).  
In addition, Chile’s policy space is already restricted by the high number of FTAs signed 
since the 1990s onwards. Chile’s commitment to free trade renders it difficult for the 
government to put barriers to foreign competition and current approaches completely 
disregard balance of payment considerations. As a result, the impact of the World Class 																																																								
108 Unfortunately, I have not been able to access similar data (if such data exists) on the impact of 
the World Class Supplier Programme since 2012. 
109 Some of those policies aimed to align the education system with the demands of the industry. 
However, other more aggressive policies have been pursued to promote ‘Buy Australia’ and duty-
free imports for firms that implemented a local content plan (Korinek and Ramdoo, 2017). 
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suppliers programme may be questioned. Indeed, while it appears that this programme 
targets challenges around copper extraction that are specific and tailored to Chile (such as 
the demand for environmental friendly solutions in copper mining, the decrease in copper 
grade, as well as shortages in water provision), nothing prevents such ‘Chilean’ 
challenges to be met by foreign rather than local solutions. In the meantime, the 
Australian authorities have already identified Australian firms whose capabilities relate to 
challenges in Chile such as water scarcity and have incentivised those firms to enter the 
Chilean market (See Australian Trade and Investment Commission; 2016, 2017).  
6.4 CONCLUSION  
The idea that linkages around natural resources where countries have a comparative 
advantage is a natural and organic process aided by market forces is contradicted by the 
Chilean experience. Despite decades of copper mining, leaving it to market forces, Chile 
has witnessed neither significant downstream value addition nor upstream linkages 
oriented towards higher value-added and knowledge intensive business activities. 
Meanwhile, as noted by the CEO of a bio-mining firm in Chile: “The most important 
thing about mining is not the copper, but the knowledge and technology that can be 
associated with it. Knowledge collection is the real value of the industry”.  
Instead, long-term value added considerations in Chile have been trumped by short-term 
profit maximization behaviour. In recent years, the multiplication of interventions 
involving different types of entities demonstrate the growing recognition that the hands-
off approach was not successful in developing an ecosystem of knowledge-intensive 
industrial capabilities around Chile’s copper sector. Whether such programmes feature 
sufficient tools to effectively promote copper-based industrialization remains doubtful. 
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Chapter 7:  
Malaysia’s vertical diversification in resource sectors  
 
 
 
7.1 OVERVIEW  
 
This chapter examines how Malaysia leveraged its natural resource endowment for 
industrial development. The debates surrounding Malaysia’s development are not only 
dualistic in terms of the free market/industrial policy dichotomy, but also in terms of the 
resource/non resource-based sectors dichotomy. While the standard growth narrative 
attributes Malaysia’s economic development to ‘unrelated’ diversification towards the 
electronics and electrical (E&E) sector, it can be argued that the contribution of resource-
based industries also deserves particular attention. As noted by Professor Jomo:  
“It is important to look at resource-based development because there are indeed different 
narratives regarding Malaysia’s growth […] The official narrative is that Malaysia 
experienced a switch in the 1970s to openness and foreign direct investment. There is some 
truth to this and an example is the electronics sector. The other story, which is less known, 
involves palm oil […] and is rarely put forward because it starts with import substitution 
industrialization” (Personal communication, April 2017). 
Despite the dominance of the E&E sector in the export basket (see figure 23), figure 24 
shows that resource-based industries (which here only include palm oil, rubber-based 
manufacturing and petroleum products) have had a larger contribution to the country’s 
trade surplus than the E&E sector over the past decade.110 111 																																																								
110 In order to fully measure and weight each sectors’ contribution to domestic development, it 
would have been helpful to include indicators of value-added or employment by sector. In 
addition, if disaggregated data on employment was available on specific resource-based 
industries, it would have been interesting to compare the share of domestic versus foreign labour 
across sectors. Foreign workers account for between 20% and 30% of the workforce in E&E 
manufacturing (IMF, 2018a). However, official statistics tend to show data for the manufacturing 
sector as a whole without further levels of disaggregation. Other sources tend to single out the 
fast growing medical device sectors, which would overlap between the rubber and E&E 
industries, because it comprises of both rubber gloves and electro medical equipment. Trade data 
is consequently the most useful way here to compare the contribution of the different industries.  
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Figure 23: Composition of Malaysia’s export basket in 2017 
 
Source: Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation - MATRADE (2018) 
Figure 24: Malaysia’s trade balance by sector (1988-2017) 
 
Source: UNComtrade (2019) 
While academic research has been conducted on the petroleum (eg. Nordas et al, 2003; 
Tordo and Anouti, 2013), palm oil refining (eg. Khera, 1976; Moll, 1987; Gopal, 1999, 
2001; Rasiah and Shahrin, 2006; Fold and Whitfield, 2012) and rubber-based industries 
(eg. Goldthorpe, 2015), these industries have less often been analysed together in the 
context of Malaysia’s broader diversification.  																																																																																																																																																																					
111 In 2017, palm oil- and rubber-based industries combined remained the largest net exporter and 
with a trade balance of RM100.8 billion, compared to RM90.1 billion for the E&E sector and 
RM36bil for petroleum (The Star, 2018). 
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At independence in 1957, Malaysia was heavily dependent on tin and rubber exports.112 
Rubber and tin were marked by low-priced elasticities of supply and uncontrolled 
variability in demand and supply (Goldthorpe, 2015), which led to export instability until 
Malaysia started to diversify its resource base towards the palm oil and petroleum sectors 
from the 1970s onwards. Malaysia has now evolved into a diversified natural resource-
rich country located in the middle of a dynamic but resource-poor region in the world.113 
Nevertheless, Malaysia did not merely rely on exporting its raw commodities but 
vertically integrated around those resource sectors in order to use natural resources as a 
motor of industrialization (see figure 25). In the 2000s, value-added in commodity-based 
manufacturing accounted for 12% of GDP, compared to 18% for raw commodities, while 
about half of all commodity-related exports were processed (World Bank, 2013). 
Figure 25: Stages of value addition in three commodity sectors in Malaysia 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 																																																								
112 In 1953 the export value of tin and natural rubber represented about 85% of all Malaysian 
exports, and accounted for about a fifth of the national income (IBRD, 1955). 
113 It is worth point out that neither rubber nor palm oil are native to Malaysia, as they were 
brought by the colonial administration. 
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This chapter also informs debates on the influence of colonialism and laissez-faire 
policies on the resource-based industrialization process in Malaysia. On the one hand, 
scholars such as Jesudason (1989), Jomo and Edwards (1993) and Wheelwright, (1965) 
have argued that the laissez faire policies of the British colonial rule discouraged 
industrial development and value addition in Malaya because colonies such as Malaya 
were seen as source of raw materials to supply British Industry and provided a market for 
manufactured goods from the United Kingdom.114 
On the other hand, other scholars argue that the laissez faire policies of the colonial rule 
laid out the foundation for the establishment of production linkages around resource 
sectors (Thoburn, 1973, 1977). This line of argument puts forward the high levels of 
technology transfer from western-owned engineering firms to local Chinese enterprises, 
through the subcontracting of manufacture and construction works (Thoburn 1977:201; 
Rasiah 1995:50) as well as the role of skills embedded in plantation labour that were 
transferable to manufacturing activities (Overton, 1994).115 
This chapter contributes to these debates by focusing on the historical development of the 
petroleum, palm oil and rubber industries. In particular, this chapter evidences the key 
role of post-independence industrial policies in developing linkages despite high market 
barriers, contrarily to what had been anticipated by the neoclassical scholarship.116 117  
																																																								
114 A further argument is that the British considered that manufacturing expansion would offer 
alternative employment for estate labour, which would in turn increase pressure on plantation 
wage rates, thus reducing their profitability (Wheelwright, 1965:97; Jesudason, 1989:48; 
Edwards, 1992:157; Jomo and Edwards, 1993:18). 
115 While Thoburn (1997) sustains that rubber-tapping skills have little application outside the 
plantation sectors, Overton (1994) believes that plantation workers constituted a disciplined rural 
proletariat well suited to the demands of industrial sectors (Gopal, 2001). 
116 The wood-based industry accounted for 2.8% of total country’s exports in 2016 but it has not 
been examined in this chapter for length considerations.  
117 In contrast to Chile’s agriculture sector, most of those resources have been exported even 
before independence, which is why they are analysed in the context of vertical, rather than 
horizontal, diversification. 
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7.2 PETROLEUM SECTOR: MALAYSIANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM 
VALUE CHAIN 
Malaysia’s hydrocarbon sector first emerged in the 1910s, with Shell’s discovery of oil in 
the Sawarak region, but it was not until after independence that petroleum became a 
major sector in Malaysia. Malaysia is endowed with the world’s 16th largest natural gas 
reserves and 26th largest crude oil reserves. It is the 9th natural gas exporter and the 25th 
largest oil exporter (CIA, 2018). As this section shows, petroleum resources have played 
a key role in the country’s industrialization efforts through the establishment of upstream 
and downstream knowledge intensive activities. 
7.2.1 Overview of accumulation of upstream capabilities 118  
Considerable local capabilities have been accumulated in upstream activities of the 
petroleum sector in Malaysia. While international oil companies initially remained the 
providers of upstream technology in the early periods of resource exploitation, especially 
given the context of Malaysia’s technology-demanding offshore and deep-water fields 
(Tordo and Anouti, 2013), 74% of total value of contracts in upstream activities in the 
petroleum sector was granted to local companies by 1995 (Malaysian Plan, 1996).119 120  
Several domestic suppliers to petroleum operations in Malaysia have in fact emerged as 
globally competitive firms, operating in different regions and sectors (Klueh et al., 
2009).121 Malaysia has for instance developed an indigenous shipbuilding industry to 
																																																								
118 See Lebdioui (2019a) for a more detailed discussion of upstream linkage development in 
Malaysia’s petroleum sector. 
119 For instance, Shell and Mitsubishi were fully carried out the technical development, sales and 
marketing of the Malaysia’s first LNG plant (Nordas et. al 2003). 
120 The Malaysian Plan does not say how much of this was value was generated by locally owned 
firms or by multinationals established in Malaysia (Nordas et. al 2003). 
121 Some local suppliers have acquired transversal skills that contributed to sectors beyond the 
petroleum industry. For instance, Scomi provides oil fluids engineering and drilling waste 
management services, but that has also managed to develop globally competitive railway and 
nuclear centrifuge engineering capabilities. Such transversal skills have proved particularly useful 
after the collapse in oil prices in 2014, which incentivized Malaysian suppliers to mitigate their 
reliance on this sector.  
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meet the domestic demand for maritime equipment and services, that has also enabled the 
accumulation of capabilities that later went into the production of offshore equipment and 
platforms, which are mostly made of locally manufactured steel (Nordas et al., 2003).122  
7.2.2 Policy tools to Build Local Capabilities in the upstream Sector  
The development of backward linkages in Malaysia’s petroleum sector was the result of a 
mix of policy instruments. Some of the local-content-related policy tools in Malaysia 
derive from horizontal policies aiming to increase local participation in various 
industries, while many other instruments derived from vertical policies that have targeted 
upstream activities in the petroleum sector in particular. As summarized in table 8, the 
vertical local content policy tools have included legal and regulatory requirements, tax 
incentives, capacity-building programmes, and state-led investments through Petronas. 
The different policy tools employed for the achievement of local content objectives are 
summarized in table 9 and are further examined in the following pages. 
Table 9: Overview of some of different vertical policy tools used to promote local content 
in Malaysia’s petroleum sector 
Policy vision Key 
organizations 
Legislation Contracts 
and 
regulations 
Programmes for 
capability building 
Industrial Master 
Plans 
Malaysia Petroleum 
Resources 
Corporation 
(MPRC) 
Petroleum 
Development 
Act 
Production 
Sharing 
Contracts 
(PSCs) 
Supplier Development 
Programme 
Masters plan for 
gas & 
petrochemicals 
Specialized institutes and 
universities (e.g. UTP and 
INSTEP) 
 
Petronas 
 
 
Promotion of 
Investments 
Act, 1986 
Petronas 
procurement 
requirements 
for Oil field 
services and 
Equipment. 
Economic 
transformation 
programme 2010 
(ETP) 
Scholarships to study 
abroad 
Petronas touring ‘Clinic’ 
for local suppliers 
 
 
 																																																								
122 Considerable transversal capabilities are embedded in the shipyard industry. In Norway, the 
reversed trend took place. There were pre-existing shipyards with idle capacity in the 1970s and 
1980s, and some of these have restructured and entered the market to build offshore platforms 
and equipment for petrochemical plants (Nordas, 2003:40).  
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7.2.2.1 Institutional framework  
The establishment of Petronas through the enactment of the Petroleum Development Act 
in 1974 was part of a nationalistic drive through which government policy was clearly 
aimed at using public enterprises to achieve national economic and social goals (Gale, 
1981:1142). Amongst those national economic goals was the will to develop linkages 
around the hydrocarbon sector. 
In the absence of a dedicated ministry for oil and gas, local-content-related institutional 
responsibilities are mainly divided between Petronas and the recently created Malaysia 
Petroleum Resources Corporation (MPRC).123 Indeed, in addition to its commercial 
mission, Petronas also has regulatory functions and has been the main driver for the 
implementation of LCPs.124 It has dedicated units that are responsible for local content-
related initiatives (Pemandu, 2012; Tordo and Anouti, 2013). 
7.2.2.2 Policy vision and planning 
Local content policies to encourage the domestic procurement of goods and services in 
the petroleum sector have been set as part of the country’s broader economic 																																																								
123 As part of the governmental actions to fulfill local content objectives, the ETP further 
suggested the creation of a government body to oversee linkage development arising out of the 
petroleum industry. Initially, what the programme called “The Oil Field Services Unit” was to be 
set up with the responsibility to make recommendations on how to make the domestic industry 
more competitive, ensure coordination between all existing, planned and potential clusters of ‘Oil 
Field Services and Equipment’ activity, and the Malaysian supplying industry to investors (ETP, 
2010:184). It would appear that a year later, the government body that was effectively created 
with such mandate was the Malaysia Petroleum Resources Corporation (MPRC).  124	The role of national companies in the regulation of extractive sectors is particularly complex 
and well researched. Governments have relied on NOCs to accomplish several objectives by 
granting them public prerogatives in terms of regulations, contract negotiations and licensing (e.g. 
Petrobras in Brazil, Pemex in Mexico Petronas in Malaysia, Sonatrach in Algeria, Kuwait Oil 
Company in Kuwait, Sonangol in Angola, etc) while in other countries (e.g. Norway), such role is 
assumed by a ministry of energy (see Heller and Marcel, 2012; Marcel, 2006; Lebdioui, 2017). 
Up until the 2010s, there was a widespread consensus in favour of the separation of functions up 
due to the potential conflicts of interests, excessive power, performance and coherence issues 
(Marcel, 2006; Sarbu, 2014; World Bank, 2007). However, the separation of functions also has 
limitations and has not achieved positive outcomes in several countries, which sheds light on the 
contextual determinants that influence the desirable role of the NOCs. For instance, NOCs might 
have accumulated strong technical and managerial capabilities but that newly create state 
agencies might not have (Heller and Marcel, 2012; Lebdioui, 2017).	
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development strategy, through the various Malaysia Plans, Industrial Master Plans, 
Master Plans for Gas and Petrochemicals and the Economic transformation programme. 
Malaysia’s Industrial Master Plans (IMP) in particular have provided the framework for 
the utilization of petroleum resources in key economic sectors. The IMP2 (1996-2005) 
emphasized the strengthening of linkages and the increase of value-added activities in the 
petroleum sector. The IMP3 (2006-2020) sought to achieve long-term global 
competitiveness and the integration of Malaysian companies into regional value chains. 
Upstream linkages in the petroleum sector are also prioritized in the Economic 
Transformation Programme (2010), which aims to enhance Malaysia’s position as a 
regional hub for oil and gas services and equipment by 2017.125 
 
7.2.2.3 Legal and regulatory framework  
7.2.2.3.1 Local content requirements and incentives 
LCPs in Malaysia’s petroleum sector mostly derive from the Petroleum Development Act 
of 1974 (PDA), the Companies Act 1965, the Promotion of Investments Act of 1986 and 
terms set in Production-Sharing Contracts (PSC) and licensing requirements of suppliers. 
The PDA aimed to gain greater control over national petroleum resources, to provide 
affordable petroleum resources to the local market to form the basis for capital and 
energy-intensive industries, and to encourage local participation in both upstream and 
downstream activities (Nordas et al, 2003). The PDA also assigned the exclusive right of 
exploration and production of oil in Malaysia to Petronas. This right is mostly exercised 
through production-sharing contracts (PSCs) with international oil companies.  
The two other main effective frameworks for local content requirements are licensing 
requirements of suppliers and production-sharing contracts (PSCs). As part of Petronas’ 
procurement process, suppliers of oil field services and equipment (OFSE) must receive a 
license that can only be obtained by foreign suppliers if they partner with local firms. If 																																																								
125 The oil, gas and energy sector is the first of 12 ‘national key economic areas’ and three of the 
targets for this sector relates to the development of upstream activities. 
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incorporated locally, foreign suppliers are restricted to a 30% equity stake (US 
Department of State, 2011).  
PSCs must comply with the national objective of maximizing Malaysian participation in 
the petroleum operations, notably to minimise outflow of foreign exchange and develop 
“ancillary industries arising from petroleum operations to enhance the growth of the 
national economy.” (PSC, Art. 12.1). In that perspective, production sharing contractors 
are required to procure inputs locally if not locally available, unless approval is given by 
Petronas to source internationally (PSC, Art.12.2).126 Contractors also need to submit a 5-
year plan indicating how they will achieve the objectives of maximizing Malaysian 
participation in the use of local inputs required for petroleum operations.  
According to the Malaysian law (PSC, Art. 26.1), the contractors are also required to 
minimize the employment of foreign workforce and to fill positions with adequate 
Malaysian personnel, while expatriates can be employed upon written approval by 
Petronas.127 Petronas’ partners are also required to pay to Petronas an annual research 
contribution, the “Research Cess,” of 0,5% of the amount of cost oil plus their share of 
profit oil, in order to promote R&D (PSC, Arts 9.1 and 9.2).  
Lastly, as a result of the Promotion of Investments Act of 1986, tax incentives are also 
provided to petroleum companies and suppliers if they contribute to the local economy 
through industrial linkages and knowledge transfer (PIA, Arts.5, 26).  
7.2.2.3.2 Obstacles for local content enforcement  
Malaysia’s recent international commitments constitute an obstacle to some of the local 
content policy tools used in the country. Malaysia has been a member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) since 1995 and must consequently abide by the Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs), which can impact a country’s ability to impose certain 																																																								
126 The clauses referred to in this section belong to the 1998 model contract of PSCs. 
127 Petronas also requires its contractors to train Malay personnel for all positions, including those 
held by expatriate personnel in which local personnel is not competent as well as commit a 
minimum monetary amount to be allocated to the training of Petronas personnel (the amount 
being contract specific) (PSC, Arts. 26.1, 26.2). 
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local content requirements (CCSI, 2016b).128 A separate WTO agreement, the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) also bans several types of local content 
requirements. Nevertheless, GATS only applies to the sectors that a country chooses to 
include in its schedule of commitments. Malaysia has not included the petroleum sector 
in its schedule of commitments (ibid.). Hence, notwithstanding the limits WTO 
agreements do place on policy space, they also leave states some degree of flexibility to 
adopt local content measures.129  
As of September 2018, Malaysia had entered into 71 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
and 27 Treaties with Investment Provisions (TIPs). Such treaties can contain restrictions 
on local content requirements. However, aside from the inclusion of National Treatment 
Obligations and Most Favoured Nation clauses, which are included in most BITs, no BIT 
contained specific restrictions on performance requirements. Among the TIPs, the TPP 
signed in 2016 is particularly constraining for domestic local content policy (ibid). 
7.2.2.4 State-led investments 
One of Petronas’ responsibilities implies the reinvestment of resource revenues, which 
partly explains Petronas’ diversification, both vertically and horizontally. Petronas’ 
investments have enabled the company to develop considerable capabilities in upstream 
activities. In fact, Prime Minister Mahathir responded the following when asked about the 
role of the petroleum industry: 
“Most oil producing developing countries do not have the expertise nor capital to extract 
oil and have to invite international oil companies. Those countries then collect the 																																																								
128 TRIMS preclude requirements to purchase products of domestic origin, limitations on the 
amount of imported products that an enterprise may purchase or use; and restrictions on foreign 
exchange necessary to import goods and services. 
129 To the extent that there is no relevant GATS commitment, local content measures allowed 
under WTO agreements include: subsidies or other supports to domestic firms; requiring or 
incentivizing use of domestic service suppliers and labour; requiring joint ventures or a certain 
share of domestic equity; requiring or incentivizing transfers of technology; restricting exports in 
order to encourage development of downstream segments of the value chain; requiring or 
incentivizing R&D or other expenditures to be made in the host state; and requiring or 
incentivizing firms to locate their headquarters or particular activities in the host state, or to locate 
their investment in a particular area in the host state (CCSI, 2016b). 
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royalties. But in the case of Malaysia, we decided that we cannot be satisfied with only 
collecting royalties and we must have the capacity to exploit our own resources. We have 
to acquire the technology. The first phase was the collection of royalties and the use of that 
capital to invest in our capabilities. So unlike most other national oil companies who 
merely collect royalty, we wanted to get into the [upstream and downstream] industries 
because they have good returns. We got involved in the whole value chain, including 
exploration, production, processing, and chemical industries… from bringing up the oil and 
gas to marketing and selling it. We also needed a fleet of tankers [which is why Petronas 
entered the maritime services business]. PETRONAS is not just another royalty collector, 
but a major player in the oil and gas industry. It now gets awarded contracts in other 
countries like regular international oil companies” (Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, 
Personal Communication, 7 April 2017). 
Interestingly, unlike Chile’s state-owned copper company Codelco, Petronas has indeed 
managed to export its upstream services across the world from 1990 onwards. In the 
beginning, Petronas encountered difficulties venturing outside the Asia-Pacific region, 
but it eventually succeeded and currently operates internationally in 32 countries.130 As a 
result of this internationalization, Petronas has become the fourth largest non-financial 
TNC from a developing country in terms of size of foreign assets (UNCTAD, 2003). 
One of the reasons put forward by managers at Petronas for its internationalization was 
the relatively small size of the domestic petroleum resources, meaning that 
internationalization is the only way to maintain long run productivity and profitability 
(Abd Rahim Mahmood, Head of Strategic Research at Petronas, Personal 
Communication, April 2017). While resource exhaustibility is one of the key 
considerations and potential obstacle for linkage development, Petronas has managed to 
expand its operations overseas in the face of depleting natural resources. 
 
 
 																																																								
130 As of 2005, Petronas had 101 wholly owned subsidiaries, of which 57 operated outside 
Malaysia (Petronas 2005). Petronas ranked 68th in the Fortune’s global 500 in 2005 (Fortune, 
2018). 
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7.2.2.5 Capacity Building  
7.2.2.5.1 Technical and Managerial Skills development 
Despite its relatively good education system compared to other developing countries at 
the time, Malaysia initially faced skills shortage problems because of a lack of technical 
expertise in the petroleum sector (Lall, 2001). A major recruitment drive by Petronas in 
1975 was unable to attract highly qualified and experienced personnel, while the 
company’s staff (of about 40 full time employees at the time) was mostly made of junior 
civil servants and did not include any geologist (Gale, 1981).131 However, “Petronas 
realized its ignorance and made strenuous efforts to overcome it”, notably through 
training programmes, by seeking assistance with foreign government petroleum agencies 
(particularly from Indonesia, France, Italy and Saudi Arabia to receive strategic help and 
scholarships to study petroleum engineering), and by establishing several technical 
training institutes from 1983 onwards (ibid:1141).  
In 1983, Petronas established the Institut Teknologi Petroleum of Petronas (INSTEP), 
designed to offer programmes for petroleum engineers, technicians, and technical 
executives. In 1997, it established a specialized university, the Universiti Teknologi 
PETRONAS (UTP), which has produced over 10,000 graduates in engineering and 
technology-related academic programmes. Petronas also established its Leadership 
Centre in 1992, in order to develop the managerial skills of its employees, as well as an 
online e-learning platform, whose materials are also accessible to government agencies 
and the private sector (Tordo and Anouti, 2013).  
Petronas also sponsored Malaysian students to pursue tertiary education in the country 
and overseas. Since 1975, through the Petronas Education Sponsorship Programme, 
Petronas has invested more than USD 850million in education sponsorship, technical 
training and capability building, enabling more than 36,500 students to pursue secondary 
																																																								
131 The lack of technical expertise in Malaysia was reflected in the condescending remark by an 
international oil company executive dismissing Malaysia's oil knowledge by stating that 
“Malaysians wouldn't know an olefine from a chocolate bar." (Gale, 1981:1141) 
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education and tertiary education at home and abroad, making Petronas one of the major 
education corporate sponsors in Malaysia (Petronas, 2017a). 
7.2.2.5.2 Vendor Development Programme 
The Petronas Vendor Development Programme (VDP) was set up in 1993 with the 
objective to develop a competitive Malay industrial base and local technologies in 
petroleum-related manufacturing. The VDP has helped 99 domestic companies become 
vendors, who collectively have been awarded contracts worth more than USD2billion 
(RM8.3 billion) (Petronas, 2013, Tay 2018).132  
Through the VDP, Petronas tests local technological solutions and ensures that vendors’ 
products are used in the domestic market. Petronas invites potential vendors through 
tendering, or vendors may present their capability for consideration by Petronas, and need 
to comply with a set of minimum technical requirement.133 Every year, the vendors are 
audited by Petronas to ensure they met the company's standards. Amongst the general 
requirements to become a Petronas vendor, the company must be locally incorporated 
and meet minimum Bumiputera requirement. After being appointed as a Petronas vendor, 
firms enjoy several benefits. They would receive more stable contracts due to the fact that 
their products and services would be technically accepted by all Petronas subsidiaries 
(domestically and abroad) and by petroleum companies operating in Malaysia, such as 
Shell and ExxonMobil. Vendors also benefit from the sharing of best practices by 
Petronas. For instance, Petronas has been holding a touring “clinic” which offers a 
platform for local suppliers to interact with Petronas staff and learn about company’s 
procurement system, receive help in registering and accessing future opportunities, both 
domestically and abroad (Tordo and Anouti, 2013). 
Managers from several firms have recognized that their integration in the Petronas VDP 
enabled their firm to develop further capabilities, increase their revenues, gain exposure 																																																								
132 For instance, in 2013, three companies (Eastern Energy Services, OMNI Oil Technologies and 
Petroclamp) leveraged their engineering capabilities to get appointed as Petronas Vendors, which 
resulted in the local manufacturing of previously imported products.  
133 Companies also need to meet a Key Performance Index (KPI) set by Petronas. The KPI 
includes ISO:19001 standard, zero lost time injury and zero complaints from clients. 
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to international markets and expand internationally, as well as stabilize their contracts, 
which used to be on ad hoc basis, making it difficult to plan future expansion (The Edge, 
2013). In some instances, the VDP has acted as a stepping-stone for Malaysian 
companies to compete globally. Examples of such firms include Bumi Wangsa (a local 
manufacturer of wellhead control panels), FM Plastics Industries (which supplies tubular 
tubing rolls and polyethylene bagging rolls), Proeight (a manufacturer of wellhead seals), 
the PBJV Group (which offers hook-up, commissioning, transportation and installation 
services), amongst many others firms.134 
The VDP has also helped domestic firms develop marketing capabilities, which is crucial 
in a context where local SMEs suffer from a marketing weakness in the development of 
their own brand names, similarly to the context of local suppliers in the copper sector in 
Chile (Tan, 2008; Sani et al, 2015).  
Overall, there are thus strong reasons to argue that the VDP has been successful in 
enhancing the industrial capabilities of local suppliers in petroleum sector. 
7.2.3 Overview of the accumulation of downstream capabilities  
Malaysia pursued downstream value addition in the petroleum sector by accumulating 
capabilities related to oil refining, oil trading, lubricants production, and the production 
of petrochemicals that are used to manufacture plastic products and synthetic rubber. 
Petronas started to move towards downstream activities in 1983 when it set up its first 
small-scale refinery.135 Petronas now has a total refining capacity of 500,000 barrels per 
day enabling the production of different petroleum products such as motor gasoline, 
diesel, lubricants, jet fuel, naphtha and residual fuel oil for the world market. Petronas 
subsequently retains some of the value generated in marketing and trading of crude oil 																																																								
134 Thanks to the VDP, despite a context characterized by a lack of trust for the local production 
of quality wellhead seals in comparison with trusted foreign expertise and brands, Proeight has 
gone global and opened its first office abroad in Latin America in 2014 (Alsagoff, 2015). 
135 In the 1990s, it had established joint ventures with global players such as Conoco and Statoil 
to build more complex and larger refineries (Nordas, 2003). 
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and petroleum products through its subsidiary, Petronas Trading Corporation Sendirian 
Berhad. As figure 26 shows, the largest share of Petronas’ revenues came from 
downstream activities in 2012. 
Figure 26: Share of Petronas’ revenues by area of activity in 2012 
 
Source: World Bank (2013) 
7.2.3.1 Beneficiation towards other industries (petrochemicals, plastics and rubber) 
Policy-makers in Malaysia have viewed the oil and gas sector as a catalyst for 
industrialization in many respects, as reflected by the following statement: “Gas can be 
used as feedstock in many industries, including in petrochemicals and the plastics 
industry, which is a big industry in itself. Today, plastics are even used in building 
airplanes, so there is no end to the industries that originates from oil and gas production.” 
(Prime Minister Mahathir, Personal Communication, 7 April 2017). The domestic gas 
resources have indeed also served as feedstock for the domestic petrochemical industry 
(ammonia and ethylene based petrochemical plants), as well as for power generation in 
industries and households (through the production of methane, ethane, propane and 
butane) (Mahmood 2013).  
Malaysia went from being an importer of petrochemicals to becoming an exporter of 
major petrochemical products. Petrochemicals are the second largest contributor to 
Malaysia’s manufactured exports (MITI, 2017). The plastics industry has also become 
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one of the most dynamic industries in Malaysia's manufacturing sector and has been rated 
as one of the most competitive in Asia.136 Table 10 shows that plastic production is the 
largest subsector in terms of employment, with around 80,000 employees. In 2016, it 
generated USD3.30 billion of exports (Malaysian Petrochemicals Association, 2016). 
  
Table 10: Selected Indicators of the Malaysian Petrochemical industry in 2014.  
Subsectors of the 
Petrochemical industry 
Sales 
(USD Billion) 
Export 
(USD billion) 
Employment 
Overall 69.5 37.2 121,703 
Chemical products 12.0  26,260 
Petroleum products 51.6  13,503 
Plastic products 5.9  81,962 
Source: MITI (2017a) 
Malaysia’s growing petrochemical (and plastics) industry also supports other major 
sectors of the domestic economy by providing a steady supply of feedstock material to 
automotive, electronics and synthetic rubber production.137  
7.2.4 Policy tools to Build Local Capabilities in the Downstream Sector  
Successful downstream value addition in Malaysia’s petroleum industry relied on the 
availability of feedstock, good infrastructure and its strategic location in the ASEAN 
market, but also relied on strategic policies adopted by the government. Alongside state-
led investments, several policies, including fiscal incentives and skills development 
programs, contributed to the successful value addition of Malaysia’s petroleum resources.  
7.2.4.1 Fiscal incentives 
In order to further encourage local refining of crude oil, an export tax on crude oil of 25% 
was introduced in 1993 (before being reduced to 20%) (Malaysian Government, 1995; 																																																								
136 In 2016, the plastic sector was composed of about 1,300 plastic companies producing goods 
ranging from common household items and packaging materials to parts and components for the 
E&E and automotive industries (Malaysian Petrochemicals Association, 2016; MIDA, 2018a).  
137 The increasing need for synthetic rubber as a replacement to natural rubber required the 
development of a large-scale domestic petrochemical industry (Malaysian Petrochemicals 
Association, 2018). Petrochemical products, as well as styrenic plastics are also used in the 
manufacture of consumer products such as tyres and electronics (Ananthalakshmi, 2017). 
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Nordas et al., 2003). In addition, petrochemical production has been on the list of eligible 
activities for consideration of pioneer status and investment tax allowance under the 
Promotion of Investment Act of 1986, alongside twenty other activities.  
7.2.4.2 Skills Development  
The petrochemical industry is a highly technology- and knowledge- intensive industry, 
which requires highly trained and skilled workers (MITI, 2017). The Institut Teknologi 
Petroleum of Petronas (INSTEP) and the Universiti Teknologi Petronas (UTP) have 
offered graduate courses in refinery and petrochemical processes, as well as advanced 
chemical process design. Petronas funds this university and hires most of its graduates. 
Value addition in Malaysia’s petroleum sector has consequently leveraged the specialized 
human capital accumulated through Petronas’ investments in education and training. 
7.2.4.3 State-led investment promotion 
Petronas also played an instrumental role in developing the petrochemical industry by 
establishing the Petronas Chemicals Group Berhad (PCG) in the 1980s, after deciding to 
pursue more high value-added activities following depressed crude oil and gas prices of 
the 1980s and 1990s (World Bank, 2013). Today, PCG has become one of the leading 
petrochemicals producers in Southeast Asia. It is the largest producer of methanol in 
South East Asia, and the fourth largest in the world (Petronas Chemicals Group, 2017). 
The Malaysian Government has also encouraged the growth of downstream industries by 
successfully attracting several MNCS to develop petrochemical facilities in collaboration 
with Petronas.138 The Malaysian government and Petronas were successful in recently 
developing three major petrochemical clusters involving international and local 
companies operating throughout the entire petroleum value chain.139  
																																																								
138  The Malaysian government managed to attract major industry players such as Shell, 
ExxonMobil and Dow Chemical, amongst others (MIDA, 2016). 
139 The most diversified of the petrochemical clusters is in Kertih and hosts the Pengerang 
Integrated Petrochemical Complex (PIPC), which totaled USD27 billion in investments and 
includes two ports (Tordo and Anouti, 2013). Downstream petroleum activities have in fact 
enabled the creation of industrial clusters in previously underdeveloped regions of Malaysia, with 
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7.2.4.4 Challenges for downstream value addition 
One of the main challenges for the Malaysian petrochemical industry remains the 
volatility of crude oil prices that create uncertainty for upstream and downstream 
investments. The petrochemical industry is indeed characterized by a cyclical nature and 
needs to overcome short-term and sporadic volatilities in feedstock costs (Federation of 
Malaysian Manufacturers, 2018).  
In addition, while Malaysia continues to benefit from its strategic location in the ASEAN 
market and from China’s large imports of petrochemicals, another challenge lies in the 
‘threat’ posed by China’s rapid industrial expansion leading to tougher competition in 
global and regional markets. The Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (2018) 
anticipates that Malaysian petrochemical companies will face increasing competition in 
ASEAN markets, as these countries are also progressively developing their own 
petrochemical industries.  
Another source of potential competition could come from the shale gas revolution, which 
has resulted in a robust petrochemical capacity expansion in the United States (Thayoob, 
2018). Malaysia will thus need to further enhance the competitiveness of its 
petrochemicals production in order to face higher competition in the foreseeable future. 
 	  
																																																																																																																																																																					
considerable externalities for local populations and firms because of complementary investments 
in ‘shared’ infrastructure (e.g. roads, ports and electricity supply) (Nordas et al., 2003). 
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7.3 PALM OIL 140 
7.3.1 Overview  
The emergence of a palm oil refining industry has been a key achievement in Malaysia 
resource-based industrialization. Malaysia transitioned from being a minor crude palm oil 
producer to becoming a major exporter of processed palm oil. With annual export 
earnings from palm oil products increasing from USD15 million in 1960 to USD27 
billion in 2011, the palm oil industry has become the second largest contributor to 
external trade, and the fourth-largest contributor to gross national income (with about 8% 
of GNI per capita in 2011). The industry also generates direct employment for around 
570,000 people and an estimated total employment of 860,000 people (Azhar, 2009). 
Despite the fact that palm oil processing in Malaysia initially lacked comparative 
advantage and faced various market barriers, the policies implemented by the government 
since the 1970s have been key in developing competitive palm oil-based industries.  
 
7.3.1.1  Overview of forward linkages: success and limitations 
As shown by figure 27, the share of processed palm oil exports in total palm oil product 
exports increased rapidly from 0% in 1974 to 99% by 1994.141142 With an annual growth 
rate of 34% in the 1970s and 1980s, palm oil processing grew much faster than 
manufacturing sectors and other resource-based industries, which respectively grew at 
about 12% and 8% per annum in the same period (Gopal, 2001). For additional 
comparison, palm oil processing in Europe and the world grew at a respective 
compounded rate of only 2% and 11 % per annum in the same time period (ibid.).  
 
																																																								
140 The analysis of the development of the palm oil industry in this section extensively relies on 
the comprehensive works by Gopal (1999, 2001). 
141 Refining capacity has indeed increased from less than 40,000 tons in the early 1970s to 25 
million tons in 2012 (Fold and Whitfield, 2012; Gopal, 1999, 2001). 
142 However, such trend began to reverse after 2000. See Appendix E for the evolution of the 
share of processed palm oil in Malaysia’s palm oil exports after 1994. 
	 184 
Figure 27: Malaysia’s palm oil exports between 1960 and 1994 
 
Source: Gopal (2001) 
The establishment of refineries has relied on increased productivity (Bruno, 2017). 
Private returns on palm oil processing and export were more than 30% per annum in the 
late 1970s, enabling Malaysian palm oil refiners to compete internationally with about 
30% of the gross margins of their European counterparts and less than 75% of world 
gross margins (Gopal, 2001).  
Beyond refining, a further layer of value addition (albeit relatively modest) has taken 
place in Malaysia’s palm oil sector. As shown by figure 28, value added palm oil-based 
products represented about 25% of total palm oil exports in 2011. 
Figure 28: Breakdown of palm oil products exported in 2011
 
Source: May (2012)  
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Despite the high growth of palm-based products, it can be argued that the depth of 
forward linkages has been relatively weak, given that most of downstream value addition 
is limited to basic refining, while oleochemicals and biodiesel only respectively constitute 
9% and 0.2% of palm oil exports. In addition, Malaysia concentrates almost exclusively 
on simple oleochemicals, namely fatty acids and fatty alcohols, which accounted for 99% 
of overall oleochemical output in 2011 (World Bank, 2013). To achieve higher value-
addition, Malaysia would need to progress towards the production of more complex 
oleochemical derivatives, such as surfactants, bio lubricants and agrochemicals (ibid.)  
Malaysia can further add value to its palm oil sector through the production of biofuels, 
which could meet the renewable energy demand in the EU and US markets (Loh and 
Choo, 2013; Nambiappan et al, 2018). However, it appears that several challenges have 
hindered bio-diesel production. Firstly, the fluctuations of crude palm oil prices have led 
to a market risks and decreased competitiveness compared to conventional fuel (Loh and 
Choo, 2013; Lim and Teong, 2010). Secondly, governmental efforts in developing palm 
oil-based biodiesel have been too modest (Jomo Sundaram, personal communication, 
March 2017). Nevertheless, an alternative view sustains that the Malaysian Palm Oil 
Board has been carrying out extensive R&D in palm biodiesel since the 1980s 
(Subramaniam et al., 2010; Augustin, 2017).143  
Perhaps it is too soon to assess whether Malaysia’s efforts in R&D in palm oil are bearing 
fruits, but what can be said with certainty is that the commercial application of the 
research has not yet reached scales needed to become significant in the country’s export 
basket. In addition, a considerable degree of uncertainty stems from the recent 
proposition in January 2018 by the EU to phase out palm oil from biofuels mix by 2021 
and cap crop-based biofuels at the member states’ 2017 consumption levels and at 7% of 
all transport fuels until 2030 (European Parliament, 2018). 																																																								
143 Such view emphasizes the rising number of patents, academic publications, the establishment 
of a biodiesel pilot plant in 1985, the implementation of the B5 (95% petroleum diesel and 5% 
palm biodiesel) in 2011 and B7 (93% petroleum diesel and 7% palm biodiesel) programmes in 
2015 (Augustin, 2017). The Malaysian government also launched the National Biofuel Policy in 
March 2006 (MPOB, 2010; MPIC, 2006; Wahid, Weng and Masri, 2007) and the Malaysian 
Biofuel Industry Act in 2007 (Malaysian Biofuel Industry Act, 2007; Johari et al., 2015). 
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7.3.1.2 Overview of Backward linkages 
The demand for inputs and services required in palm oil processing (such as chemicals 
and engineering supplies) has become increasingly met by local industries. The 
progressive localization of backward linkages was the result of the accumulation of 
experience, technology, knowledge and engineering skills in palm oil processing 
techniques, as well as the high level of vertical disintegration in refining and fractionation 
technology, which enabled the local fabrication of less sophisticated equipment and 
components (Gopal, 1999:382).  
Initially, in the 1970s, refining and fractionation technologies and equipment were mostly 
imported, while local capital expenditures were mainly for civil and structural works, 
fabrication of simple vessels, tanks and piping (ibid.). Nowadays, local skills have 
reached a level where local providers of goods and services in palm oil processing have 
exported their expertise to other countries establishing local oils and fats processing 
facilities (ibid.).144 145 
7.3.2 Historical evolution: emergence, ownership and value addition 
Several phases of development can be distinguished. The first phase was the 
establishment of the palm oil industry as a way to diversify away from dependence on 
volatile rubber prices. The second phase was the development of palm oil refining 
capacity from the 1970s. The third one was the development of further downstream 
activities from the 1990s onwards.  
Palm oil was initially introduced to Malaya in 1875 by the British as an ornamental 
plant.146 The reason for the rapid development of oil palm cultivation in the 1960s was to 																																																								
144 For instance, Oiltek is a Malaysian edible oil processing and engineering firm created in 1980 
and that has undertaken several projects overseas. 
145 By the late 1980s, foreign capital expenditures were limited to sophisticated and precision 
plant equipment such as separators, high pressure presses, chillers, filters, membranes, motors, 
engines, control devices, instrumentation, laboratory equipment and analytical instruments (ibid.) 
146 Malaya was the term used to refer to territories that form modern-day Malaysia and Singapore 
under the British Colonial Rule before it gained independence within in 1957. 
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reduce the dependence on natural rubber, which was facing cyclic price declines as a 
result of technical developments in synthetic rubber. The Malaysian government 
recognized the pressing need for agricultural diversification and considered oil palm to be 
a profitable alternative crop to rubber (Gopal, 2001; Goldthorpe, 2015). Palm oil products 
have later gradually replaced rubber as the most important exported soft commodity. 
The government policy for palm oil development (as well as rubber) consisted in the 
introduction of land development schemes, which were also seen as a mean to eradicate 
poverty as they allowed plantation developed land to be distributed to the landless poor 
(NST, 2017).147 Between 1960 and 1990, FELDA alone accounted for 33% of the newly 
planted oil palm areas (Gopal, 2001:126). In 1966, five year after the beginning of 
FELDA’s palm oil programme, Malaysia overtook Nigeria as world’s largest exporter of 
palm oil. In the 1980s, government policy also included the ‘Malaysianisation’ of three 
plantation companies, namely Guthrie, Golden Hope and Sime Darby. The Malaysian 
State has also invested in the palm oil sector (and in Sime Darby in particular) through 
the Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), Malaysia's biggest fund management company 
and investment instrument of the government since 1978. By 1995, Malaysia accounted 
for 52% of the world palm oil production. In 2017, its share dropped to about 30% of 
annual world palm oil production (Ministry of Plantation Industries and Commodities-
MPIC, 2018). Sime Darby and FELDA have become the world’s largest plantation 
companies, based on planted area (Azhar, 2009). 
Interestingly, when palm oil plantations were foreign owned, there was no interest in 
value addition. As noted by Gopal (2001:239), prior to 1974, there were few attempts to 
undertake refining and fractionation of palm oil for the export market. The largely 
European-controlled plantation companies preferred to export crude palm oil while 
multinational companies did not see many gains in relocating their vegetable oil 																																																								
147 These programmes successfully combined both commercial and social objectives. After less-
successful state-level resettlement initiatives in the 1950s and 1960s that did not follow 
commercial principles, FELDA and FELCRA were created to resettle rural families in schemes in 
which smallholders contribute their land and labor and receive dividends while the management 
and marketing operations was carried out by FELDA, enabling economies of scale (World Bank, 
2013). More than 500,000 people have benefitted from the FELDA scheme (ibid.) Management 
expertise from the government was used to run the organised smallholdings (Azhar, 2009).
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processing facilities in Malaysia. As part of the NEP, which was incorporated in the 
Second Malaysia Plan (covering the years 1971-1975), the government undertook the 
nationalization (or more accurately, the hostile takeover in the London Stock Exchange) 
of foreign-owned plantations in 1981. The desire to process palm oil then increased when 
the industry became domestically owned. 
According to Gopal (1999, 2001), at a seminar organized in Kuala Lumpur in 1978 by 
the International Trade Centre (ITC), several analyses considered the processing and 
refining of crude palm oil in Malaysia as having limited potential and viability. One of 
the reasons invoked was the lack of experience of Malaysian refiners in sourcing, 
processing, blending, manufacturing and marketing process palm oil products, in 
comparison to refiners in industrialized countries. Another reason was that the 
transportation, handling and shipping facilities and procedures in Malaysia were designed 
for the bulk movement of crude palm oil instead of processed palm oil. Long 
transportation between Malaysia and consumer markets such as the European Union was 
also believed to lead to quality deterioration and reduced interaction between suppliers 
and purchasers (Gopal, 2001). Western Europe’s high import duties on processed palm 
oil products also discouraged the import of processed palm oil products. These arguments 
consequently sustained that the palm oil refining industry in Malaysia was facing too 
many major barriers to become competitive and export-oriented (ibid.). Most of these 
arguments derive from a static understanding of the process of capabilities accumulation.  
In the late 1970s, against the advice of international institutions, the Malaysian 
government began to encourage a shift from crude palm oil exports to refined products 
through taxation and incentive policies (Azhar, 2009). Similarly to the petroleum sector, 
the decline in commodity prices in the mid-1980s contribute to incentivize government-
linked companies (GLCs) in the palm oil sector to invest in building downstream 
industries in order to capture more value added opportunities (World Bank, 2013). 
7.3.3 Role of industrial policies  
Value addition activities alongside the palm oil value chain have benefited from 
considerable government interventions. Government policies involved a mix of fiscal 
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incentives, investments in R&D, skills development and trade promotion efforts. It can be 
noted that most policies were geared towards an import substitution strategy until a shift 
towards export-orientation from the late 1970s onwards. 
7.3.3.1 Overview of the industrial strategy 
The palm oil industry was identified as a priority sector in each of the three industrial 
master plans (IMPs) since 1985 as well as the Economic Transformation Programme in 
2010. The IMP1 (1985-1995) suggested addressing skills shortages through on the job 
training and outlined the role of the Palm Oil Research Institute of Malaysia (PORIM) to 
conduct R&D for palm oil processing. It also contained provisions for tax incentives, 
including a double deduction tax benefit on export sales and export tax on crude palm oil 
(CPO). By the end of the IMP1, Malaysia’s processing capacity exceeded the supply of 
CPO. The IMP2 consequently emphasized the expansion of oil palm hectarage and 
encouraged the private sector to seek raw materials from abroad (Gopal, 2001). 
The IMP2 (1996-2005), aimed to strengthen production linkages and increase value-
added activities and productivity in the palm oil sector (Rasiah and Shahrin, 2006; MITI, 
2006). The IMP2 put special emphasis on downstream processing through mechanization 
and R&D in biotechnology (such as mass tissue culture and cloning). 
The IMP3 (2006-2020) emphasized downstream manufacturing activities into a wider 
range of higher value-added products. This objective would be achieved through 
enhanced R&D and closer collaboration between government research agencies and 
operators in the oil palm sector. The creation of various institutions since the 1980s, such 
as the Malaysian Palm Oil Council, enabled a smoother dialogue and flow of information 
between the government and industrial associations in the sector, such as the Malaysia 
Palm oil association (MPOA), the Palm Oil Refiners Association Malaysia (PORAM) 
and the Malaysia Oil Scientists and Technologists Association (MOSTA) (Gopal, 2001). 
7.3.3.2 Fiscal incentives 
The government of Malaysia recognized that policy incentives were necessary to promote 
secondary processing of the country's primary resources, and consequently implemented 
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a range of fiscal incentives since 1968 to encourage value addition and the export-
orientation of the palm oil sector. In the past five decades, fiscal incentives for palm oil 
refining have included: 
§ Preferential export duties between crude palm oil and processed palm oil to encourage 
exports of processed palm oil products148  
§ Tax credits focused on stimulating further downstream processing 
§ Replanting subsidies timed with peaks in crude oil prices 
§ Pioneer Status (with income tax exemption of 70% of statutory income for five years) 
§ Investment Tax Allowance (of 60% on the additional qualifying capital expenditure 
incurred within a period of five years). 
§ Export credit-refinancing scheme for pre- and post-shipment of exports. 
§ 40% abatement of corporate income for two years 
§ Seven years tax holidays for pioneer status refineries 
§ Tax exemptions for the utilisation of oil palm biomass.149 
 
Several of those tax incentives (such as the export duty exemptions on exports of higher 
value-added processed palm oil products) were specific to the palm oil sector. Others 
were part of a broader strategy targeting resource-based industrialization more generally 
(in particular the rubber, palm oil, timber and petroleum sectors). The remaining 
incentives (such as the export credit-refinancing scheme for pre- and post-shipment of 
exports) were applied to all priority sectors. 
 
7.3.3.3 R&D and skills development 
In the late 1960s, R&D in oil palm breeding began to expand after the Malaysian 
Department of Agriculture established the Oil Palm Genetics Laboratory through an 																																																								
148 This export duty, which escalated with the degree of processing of palm oil, appears to have 
been the most important policy instrument used to promote the growth of an export-oriented palm 
oil refining industry in Malaysia. It involved “a complex system of ‘transfer pricing’ to increase 
the margins for CPO processing and PPO export, at the expense of, but without being a burden to 
CPO producers, and without any government subsidy” (Gopal, 2001:305). 
149Companies that utilise oil palm biomass to produce value-added products are eligible for 
Pioneer Status with income tax exemption and Investment Tax Allowances (MIDA, 2017). 
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exchange programme with West African economies and four private plantations 
(Donough and Chia, 2005; Rasiah and Shahrin, 2006). Later, in 1979, the Palm Oil 
Research Institute (PORIM) and the Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority 
(PORLA) were established but merged in 2000 as the Malaysian Palm Oil Board 
(MPOB). PORIM had been responsible for research on all palm oil-related activities.150 
R&D was also undertaken in collaboration with local universities through government 
grants.151 The government notably set aside RM1 billion under the Intensification of 
Research in Priority Areas (IRPA) programme, as part of the 6th and 7th Malaysia Plan, 
for R&D carried out in the Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institute 
(MARDI), PORIM and different universities, (Malaysia 1996, 2001; Rasiah and Sharin, 
2006). Overall, the palm oil-related R&D support from the government enabled firms to 
both increase value added in existing products, and introduce new products in markets, 
such as biodiesel, specialty fats and vitamin A (ibid.). The state also set up Kolej 
Serdang, an agriculture-focused institution that has trained agro-industrial engineers and 
agro-business graduate (ibid).152  
7.3.3.4 Trade promotion 
The marketing efforts overseas by the Malaysian government to promote palm oil-based 
products have been considerable. For instance, the Malaysian Palm Oil Council (MPOC) 
was established in the 1980s to counter the US soybean lobby against palm oil and to 
develop a comprehensive promotional strategy to position Malaysia as an international 
leader in the palm oil and fats market (Gopal, 2001).153 PORIM and PORLA have also 																																																								
150 It started by conducting research on chemistry, quality, analytical techniques, transportation 
and handling of palm oil products, and later expanded towards R&D in oleochemicals and 
processed palm kernel oil, following the IMPs’ recommendations (Azhar, 2009). 
151 Research calls under the three IMPs had focused on different areas according to the needs and 
stages of the industries (For instance, the research focus under the IMP2 was mass tissue culture, 
cloning and genetic engineering to improve planting material quality). 
152 Kolej Serdang became the Universiti Pertanian Malaysia (UPM) in the 1970s and was 
renamed ‘Universiti Putra Malaysia’ in 1997. 
153 “In the United States, the dominant view was that Malaysian palm oil had negative health 
effects. Now the emphasis has shifted towards the detrimental environmental consequences of 
palm oil production. There is some truth to this view but it is funded by existing vegetable oil 
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assisted the government for the market promotion of processed palm oil products.  
Malaysia’s attempts to export processed palm oil in the 1970s were blocked by the 
European common market, which practiced tariff escalation to make sure that refining 
capacity would remain in Europe. In order to counter the EU import duty structure, the 
Malaysian government had initially decided to introduce an export duty on crude palm oil 
production, as mentioned in section 7.3.3.2. Nevertheless, the EEC had subsequently 
increased its tariffs: “The effective protection in the EEC increased from about 100% in 
the 1970s to more than 200% in the 1990s” (Gopal, 2001). Such escalation in tariffs was 
the most important barrier to palm oil refining in Malaysia because the EEC was a major 
market that imported more than 30% of Malaysian crude palm oil exports and processed 
about 50% of world palm oil consumed in the early to mid-1970s (ibid.).  
As underlined by Professor Jomo Sundaram, “the Malaysian government realized they 
could not beat the Europeans at their game and had decided to overcome this problem by 
focusing on alternative markets for palm oil” (Personal Communication, March 2017). 
Since the early 1990s, most of market deals for Malaysian processed palm oil have 
consequently been signed through government-to-government partnerships under so-
called barter arrangements.154 The barter trade under Malaysia’s palm oil credit and 
payment arrangement (POCPA) involved the exchange of processed palm oil for finished 
goods, such as jet fighters, railway infrastructure, or commodities (The Star, 2009).155  
As a result of this barter trade, palm oil refining activities in Malaysia considerably 
increased and became the most competitive internationally within ten years, thanks to 
																																																																																																																																																																					
lobbies” (Jomo, personal communication, March 2017). It is worth noting that some of the 
environmental consequences of palm oil production (such as considerable river pollution) have 
been overcome with the strict implementation of the environmental protection act.  
154 System of trade in which participants in a transaction directly exchange goods or services for 
other goods and services of equivalent value without the use of money. 
155 Of the RM1.8bil allocated by the government, the credit utilised up to 2009 was about 
RM900mil (USD245mil) (The Star, 2009). Around 22 countries have received POCPA credit, 
including North Korea, Algeria, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Cuba and Bosnia-Herzegovina (ibid.) 
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both economies of scale and scope.156 As concluded by Nambiappan and Norfadilah 
(2002), merely depending on the conventional mode of doing business would not have 
been adequate to expand the export market for palm oil products. Counter-trade, or barter 
trade, thus appeared to be an innovative and mutually beneficial method of trading, 
especially when dealing with countries facing foreign exchange difficulties (ibid.).  
Interestingly, it appears that most governmental efforts in trade promotion were a 
reaction to market barriers to Malaysian palm oil-based products abroad. It thus sustains 
the idea that free markets are not free, and evidences the important role of government 
intervention to promote exports in foreign markets. 
 
7.3.4 Conclusion  
As a consequence of the carefully crafted policy incentives, palm oil processing in 
Malaysia became highly profitable and competitive since the 1970s. Although higher 
levels of value addition can still be pursued through downstream diversification, it is 
clear that the Malaysian government, through fiscal incentives, R&D and trade 
promotion, provided an environment that conditioned the development of the domestic 
palm oil refining industry. Section 7.3 thus confirms the argument that the Malaysian 
palm oil refining industry would not have been able to compete in the world markets 
without such government interventions and the outstanding growth was neither due to the 
lack of barriers to, nor any significant advantages for, the location of CPO processing in 
Malaysia (see Gopal, 2001). 
  
																																																								
156 The concept of economies of scope, developed by Chandler (1990), refers to the degree of 
specialization. In the case of Palm oil, Malaysia had specialized in one type of oil (palm oil), 
while Europeans had no scope nor scale as they were processing different types of oils, according 
to the season” (Jomo, personal communication, March 2017). 
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7.4 RUBBER-BASED MANUFACTURING 
 
7.4.1 Overview  
The Malaysia rubber industry has evolved from raw rubber exports to an –almost- fully 
integrated industry dominated by rubber-based manufacturing activities. Malaysia has 
become not only the world’s fourth largest producer of natural rubber but also the world’s 
leading exporter of rubber-based products such as latex products. The value of exports of 
rubber-based manufactured goods in downstream industries has exceeded twice the value 
of raw rubber exports since 2012. In 2017, Malaysia’s exports of rubber products reached 
RM21.6 billion (81.6% of which came from latex goods), while the total exports of the 
rubber sector (natural rubber and rubber-based products) reached RM32.3billion 
(MREPC, 2018). The rubber sector accounted for 3.5% of Malaysia total exports and 3% 
of Malaysia's manufacturing exports in 2017. 
Rubber-based manufacturing in Malaysia can be categorised into three sub-sectors: latex 
products, tyres and tyre-related products, and industrial and general rubber products.157 
The Malaysian rubber-based sector is mostly oriented towards the healthcare sector, 
through the production of rubber gloves, prophylactics, disposable hospital kits, etc. 
The World Bank (2013) argued that the success of the Malaysian rubber industry 
evidences the role that sector-blind policies play in economic diversification. 
Nevertheless, this section shows that several policies that contributed to promote rubber-
based manufacturing were sector specific. Indeed, the sustained growth of the rubber-
based industry can be attributed to role of several specialized government agencies (such 
as the Malaysian Rubber Board and the Malaysian Rubber Export Promotion Council) 
that undertook R&D, ensured quality control to promote sales in foreign markets, and 
incentivized value added through tax incentives. 
 
																																																								
157 The latex products sub-sector is the largest sub-sector both in terms of sales and employment. 
In fact, the latex products subsector constituted 80% of the total natural rubber consumption in 
Malaysia in 2015 (Malaysian Rubber Board, 2016). 
	 195 
7.4.2 Historical evolution 158  
Rubber trees were first introduced by British Colonists to the Malay peninsula in 1877. 
During the 1950s, Malaya produced half of the world’s rubber. Rubber estates occupied 
about 65% of the entire cultivated area of peninsular Malaysia and rubber provided 
around 60% of export earnings (Goldthorpe, 2015). 
During the 1960s and 1970s, policy makers and firms in Malaysia showed a lack of 
interest towards the rubber sector, following the idea that palm oil would become a more 
valuable commodity. A large number of rubber estates had been reconverted for palm oil 
plantations, because policy makers, following the World Bank’s advice, wanted to 
decrease dependence on rubber (ibid., 2015). Nevertheless, the role of the rubber sector 
for the Malaysia economy had been reassessed from the late 1980s onwards with the 
three Industrial Master Plans and the ETP, which aims to double the contribution of the 
rubber industry in gross national income. 
7.4.2.1 Forward Linkage development 
As early as the 1930s, there is evidence of exports of low value-added rubber-based 
manufactured goods (such as production rubber shoes, slippers, hoses, bicycle tyres, 
conveyor belt and inner tubes) from Malaya, which involved labour-intensive activities 
but little capital equipment (Rasiah, 1995; Goldthorpe, 2015). At the time, the World 
Bank did not consider that Malaysia could become a major producer of rubber products 
and concluded that the most economically efficient location of rubber manufacturing 
industries is in the major centres of consumption because of the low cost of shipping 
rubber relatively to its market prices (Goldthorpe, 2015:66).  
In the 1960s, the British manufacturer Dunlop established a tyre factory in Malaysia that 
was mostly oriented towards domestic sales. It benefited from tariff protection on tyres 
imports. In 1970, the government entered a joint venture with the multinational company 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company to manufacture automobile tyres, thus breaking the 
monopoly of Dunlop (Saham, 1980; Goldthorpe, 2015). The number of firms 																																																								
158 This section extensively draws on Goldthorpe’s (2015) contribution to the topic. 
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manufacturing rubber goods rose from 50 firms in 1970 and 349 firms in 2012 while the 
number of workers they employed increased from 8000 in 1970 to 60,000 people in 2012, 
accounting for 6% of employment in the national manufacturing sector (Sawal, 2001; 
Goldthorpe, 2015; MIDA, 2008).159 
Until the mid 1980s, Malaysia still exported most of the natural rubber it produced as raw 
material. Since then, the rubber industry has further become vertically integrated through 
the development of an export oriented rubber-manufacturing sector that produces a wide 
range of goods for various sectors, including the automobile industry, transport 
equipment industry, footwear producers, the construction industry, and the electrical and 
electronics sector (UNIDO, 1991:75).160 Nowadays, around 80% of the country’s rubber 
manufacturing companies are Malaysian-owned, while FDI is concentrated in the 
production of industrial components and tyres (Goldthorpe, 2015). There are several 
Malaysian firms that became world-leading companies in the rubber-based 
manufacturing sector, such as Karex Industries, the world’s largest condom manufacturer 
and Top Glove, the world’s leading producer of latex gloves. 161 
Similarly to the palm oil and petroleum sectors, lower prices of natural rubber 
incentivized the use of rubber as a cheap feedstock for industry (World Bank, 2013). 
Indeed, most Malaysian firms manufacturing rubber-based products have responded to 
price signals by moving away from scale production towards higher value-added 
products, such as nitrile gloves for the healthcare industry prophylactics (ibid.) 
7.4.2.2 Backward Linkage development 
Malaysia has also managed to localize some of the backward linkages arising out of 
rubber production (both natural and synthetic). In the late 1960s, the local expenditures 
for equipment used in rubber plantations represented 64% of total expenditure, due to the 																																																								
159 For most of the 20th century, rubber plantation was the largest employer of labour in Malaysia. 
160 Most of the domestic natural rubber production has consequently been consumed by the 
domestic rubber-manufacturing sector while rubber imports increased from 31,000 metric tons in 
1985 to more than 1 million metric ton in 2013 (Malaysian Rubber Board, 2016). 
161  TopGlove started as a family-owned rubber trading company and shifted towards 
contraceptives production to enter more lucrative activities in the rubber value chain (Liau, 2012).  
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local supply of building works, bulking and coagulating tanks, size reduction equipment, 
cast-iron rollers and minor items such as tapping knives and containers to carry liquid 
latex (Thoburn, 1973, 1977; Goldthorpe, 2015). Nowadays, several Malaysian firms are 
involved in the design, fabrication and installation of rubber plants overseas.  
Before the 2000s, Malaysia did not manufacture any synthetic rubber and most of its 
domestic industrial demand was met through consumption of natural rubber. 
Nevertheless, from the 2000s onwards, several firms have set up facilities in Malaysia to 
manufacture nitrile latex to supply the local glove and tyres producers (Goldthorpe, 
2015).162 163 Those investments are in line with the IMP3’s recommendation to establish 
facilities to manufacture ethylene propylene rubber and ethylene propyleniendiene 
rubber. Although Malaysia’s synthetic rubber exports increased by 49.7% between 2015 
and 2016, Malaysia is still a net synthetic rubber importer (MREPC, 2018). Interestingly,	
80% of Malaysian firms use locally produced synthetic rubber while 75% of 
manufacturers with foreign involvement purchase over 50% of their synthetic rubber 
from abroad. There is thus a large difference in purchasing behaviour between domestic 
and foreign firms (Goldthorpe, 2015:105). This trend is similar for forward linkages: 
Foreign firms have fewer links with other manufacturers in Malaysian economy (ibid.). 
However, it appears that the supply of factor machinery and equipment required in 
rubber-based manufacturing activities have generally not been met locally, except for the 
local manufacture of machinery to produce latex goods (UNIDO, 1991:103).164 
 
 																																																								
162 Those firms include Petronas, MNEs such as Synthomer, and the Malaysian Synthetic Rubber 
Company, established in 2013 as a joint venture between Japanese and South Korean firms. 
163 Synthetic rubber is mostly composed of polymers that derive from petroleum byproducts, 
which have been supplied by Malaysian refineries in recent years. 
164 Rubber-based manufacturing companies import over 75% of their factor machinery and 
equipment (Goldthorpe, 2015:78). For instance, tyre fabrication machinery as well as moulding 
equipment are mostly imported from Japan, the USA and the EU (Sawal, 2001) 
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7.4.3 Industrial Policies to promote rubber-based manufacturing  
The vertical promotion of rubber-based manufacturing in Malaysia included financing for 
R&D in rubber-related areas, FDI promotion to gain access to foreign technology and 
export markets (through distribution channels), quality testing for different export 
markets, and tax incentives for investment in the sector. Such policies have been fruitful: 
between 1970 and 1985, the output value of the rubber sector increasing fivefold, and 
exports grew from RM17 million to RM215 million (Goldthorpe, 2015). 
7.4.3.1 Industrial strategy and policy vision 
Similarly to the palm oil sector, rubber based manufacturing has been identified as one of 
the priority-sectors across the three Industrial Master Plans, which specified targets for 
vertical integration, identified specific industrial products as having potential for higher 
value addition, and recommended areas for R&D in the rubber sector. 
The IMP1 prioritized the expansion of the tyre industry, aiming to raise Malaysia’s share 
in world tyre production to 1.5% by 1995. The IMP1 also aimed to increase local 
industrial consumption of natural rubber from 65,000 metric tons in 1985 to 300,000 
metric tons in 1995. This target has been exceeded. In 2005, the consumption of natural 
rubber accounted for 43% of Malaysia production of raw rubber (ibid.).  
Unlike the IMP1, the IMP2 (1996-2005) prioritized rubber-based manufacturing but did 
not set any specific targets for the sector. The IMP2 notably envisioned a greater role for 
the government in boosting R&D in rubber technology. The IMP2 recommended to 
diversify the range of rubber products to reduce over-reliance on latex dipped goods. It 
identified technology-intensive rubber-based industrial products as having potential for 
higher value addition. After the IMP2, Malaysia became the world’s leading producer 
and exporter of catheters, latex thread and natural rubber gloves (MITI, 2006). The value 
of output of rubber products has almost doubled to reach around RM10 billion in 2005 
from RM5 billion in 1996. Export earnings of the rubber industry increased by an 
average annual rate of 7.4%, reaching RM8 billion in 2005 (MITI, 2006).  
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The IMP3 (2006-2020) aims to strengthen Malaysia’s position as the leading producer of 
latex products through additional quality control, FDI and market promotion. In 
continuity with previous IMPs, the IMP3 also encourages rubber product diversification 
and lays out measures to foster technology upgrading and skills development.165 Since 
2010, the government also renewed its interest in rubber-based manufacturing through 
the ETP, which aims to increase the country’s global market share in the latex sub-sector. 
7.4.3.2 Fiscal incentives for re-investments in the rubber supply chain. 
In addition to fiscal incentives that are currently available for prioritized sectors and 
activities, the government has added further tax incentives for reinvestment in resource-
based industries. Local companies in the rubber-based manufacturing sector that reinvest 
to expand their projects are thus eligible for Pioneer Status and Investment Tax 
Allowance (MIDA, 2017).  
7.4.3.3. Quality control for export promotion 
Because rubber-based manufacturing in Malaysia mostly targets the healthcare sector 
(through prophylactics such as latex gloves, condoms and disposable medical devices), 
the success of local firms relied on a strict quality management system to comply with 
international standards. Much of the growth of the rubber industry exports from the 1990s 
was related to a boom in demand for latex medical examination gloves and condoms in 
Western countries, as a the result of a worsening AIDS crisis and increased consciousness 
regarding the use of contraceptives (Jomo, Personal Communication, March 2017). In 
this period, Malaysia was the most attractive country for FDI in medical glove production 
as it was the world’s larger producer of latex concentrate, had a well-established 
industrial infrastructure and strong technical support from several government funded-																																																								
165 Six strategic thrusts have been set. Amongst those, the IMP3 aims to build and safeguard 
Malaysia’s image as a supplier of quality and reliable rubber products through increased product 
quality control. The IMP3 also encourages outward investments for low value-added rubber 
products to countries with lower costs of production and availability of natural rubber. The IMP3 
also aims to diversify the product range and emphasizes the development of support intermediary 
industries (such as rubber chemicals, tools and dies, and packaging) to enhance the linkages 
between rubber products and industries such as the plastics, metals, chemicals, packaging 
materials, machinery and equipment and automotive industries. 
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research institutes (Goldthorpe, 2015). These factors are directly related to government 
interventions in the sector.166 Malaysia has since become the largest supplier of rubber 
medical gloves to the US market, with 30% of the market share (MITI, 2006).  
However, before the increased product quality control was encouraged by the IMP3, poor 
quality control led to a tragedy of the commons amongst the large number of companies 
involved in latex gloves and condoms. “It only took one defective condom to jeopardize 
the reputation of the industry as a whole” (Jomo, Personal communication, March, 2017). 
The role of the government has thus been key in alleviating such tragedy of commons by 
setting stronger institutions to ensure quality control and setting up new product quality 
certification schemes such as the Standard Malaysian Glove (SMG).167  
In addition, the state, through the Malaysia Rubber Board (MRB), offers product quality 
testing and compliance services for local firms to maintain and improve the quality of 
their rubber products. The MRB’s physical testing laboratory notably undertakes tests to 
match domestic rubber products with International Standards (ISO) and other major 
consumer markets standards (Malaysian Rubber Board, 2011).168 Such support is key 
because Malaysian products constantly face the challenge to comply with stringent 
standards and regulations imposed by export markets.169 
The government has thus played a key role in building and safeguarding Malaysia’s 
image as a supplier of quality and reliable rubber products, enabling to maintain the 
country’s position as the world largest latex goods exporter. The government has also 
ensured that domestic latex products meet international health and safety standards 
through intensified R&D activities, as discussed below.  
 																																																								
166 Between 1996 and 2005, the exports of the rubber industry increased at an average annual rate 
of 7.4% (MITI, 2006). Latex medical devices represented the bulk of those exports (MITI, 2006).  
167 The SMG was formulated by the MRB and the Malaysian Rubber Glove Manufacturers' 
Association in consultation with regulatory bodies such as the US Food and Drugs Agency. 
168  Those include the British Standards (BS), American Society for Testing and Materials 
(ASTM), Japanese Industrial Standards (JIS) and any other standard requested.  
169 For instance, Malaysian rubber products exporters recently faced challenges to comply with 
new regulations by the European Chemical Agency (MIDA, 2008). 
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7.4.3.4 Research and Development 
Malaysia now has a competitive advantage as the foremost authority in R&D in natural 
rubber (Goldthorpe, 2015). Malaysia’s enhanced R&D capacity has been key in ensuring 
the productivity and quality of its domestic rubber-based industries, which need to remain 
competitive against low cost producers (particularly China and India) and other natural 
rubber producing countries (such as Thailand and Vietnam).  
Following the IMP2, the Malaysian Rubber Board (MRB) was established in 1998 from a 
merger of the Rubber Research and Development Board, the Rubber research institute 
(RRIM), the Rubber Exchange and Licensing Broad, the Malaysian Rubber Producers 
Research association and the UK-based Tun Abdul Razak Research Centre (TARRC).170 
The MRB became a major centre for applied research on rubber-based manufacturing. It 
has accumulated expertise across the rubber value chain (from cultivation, plantation 
management, extraction and processing of raw rubber, to rubber manufacturing 
techniques and rubber products marketing). Around 80% of Malaysian manufacturers use 
production technology developed by the Malaysian Rubber Board (Goldthorpe, 2015). 
7.4.3.5 Trade promotion and market access 
Various government agencies, such as the Malaysian Rubber Export Promotion Council 
(MREPC), the Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE) and the 
Malaysian Rubber Board (MRB), have played in key role in identifying and expanding 
new export markets for Malaysian rubber products. As recommended by the IMP2, 
MREPC was established in 2000 to promote Malaysia-made rubber products and identify 
new export opportunities. Trade promotion activities have targeted new regional markets, 
such as Latin America, Africa, West and Central Asia; as well as specific industrial 
markets, such as the automotive, petroleum, construction, and marine transportation 
industries, which offer vast end-use potential for Malaysian rubber products.  	  
																																																								
170 RRIM was created in 1925 and aimed to tackle rubber-related challenges in Malaysia. TARRC 
was founded in 1938 and became the research and promotion centre of the MRB. 
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7.5 FINDINGS 
 
The three sectors reviewed in this chapter lead to several findings on the process of 
resource-based industrialization. 
7.5.1 Scope for diversification through resource-based industries 
The vertical integration of the petroleum and rubber sectors (and palm oil sector to a 
lesser extent) has had a great impact on diversifying the Malaysian economy. Upstream 
and downstream value addition in the petroleum sector contributed to the development of 
new industries (petrochemicals, plastics, synthetic rubber) and strengthened linkages 
toward existing sectors (automotive and electrics and electronic industries). The upstream 
localization of the petroleum value chain has also enabled the accumulation of transversal 
engineering capabilities that have served other sectors (such as marine services and 
railway engineering). Rubber-based manufacturing enabled the development of a globally 
competitive latex industry as well as linkages toward other domestic industries (such as 
the automotive industry through tyre production). Value addition has also been pursued 
in the palm oil sector through palm oil refining, although further efforts are required to 
enable the emergence of a competitive complex oleo-chemicals and biodiesel industry. 
The three case studies also show that there are great spillovers from developing resource-
based sectors, both in direct terms (through value addition, export revenues, and 
employment generation) and indirect terms (through the generation of linkages, greater 
price stability, and accumulation of technological, industrial and marketing capabilities).   
 
7.5.2 Role of the State for sending market signals towards value addition 
In all three sectors, the Malaysian government has played a key role in promoting both 
domestic and foreign investments through various fiscal incentives (such as export duties 
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on crude palm oil and petroleum). By doing so, the state has successfully sent market 
signals to investors towards value-added resource-based activities. 171 
It is also interesting to note that direct state involvement in firms has varied amongst 
resource-based sectors. Government-linked companies have been actively involved in the 
petroleum value chain (through Petronas) and palm oil refining (through FELDA and 
Sime Darby), but have been much less directly involved in rubber-based industries where 
most champions are privately-owned firms. 
7.5.3 Role of the state to support learning by doing and capabilities accumulation  
In the face of major obstacles to linkage development around natural resource sectors, 
such as consolidated global supply chains and the lack of domestic expertise, the role of 
industrial policy in Malaysia has been key in providing an environment that conditioned 
the development of the domestic petroleum-, palm oil- and rubber-based industries. Such 
environment was ensured through R&D support, quality control to increase reputational 
and marketing value, and trade promotion in key export markets.  
In terms of backward linkage development, while several countries are increasingly using 
local content requirements, those requirements have often led to negative outcomes. 
Quotas have often been either too high, scaring away investors, or too broad, enabling 
investors to exploit ambiguities.172 More importantly, government have often enforced or 
incentivized local content quotas without investing in the process of capabilities 
accumulation in parallel, leading to a costly trade off between local content and 
competitiveness. The salient challenge is thus to find the balance between local content 
requirements and competitive, efficient, and quality supply chain development (Grunstein 
and Díaz-Wionczek, 2017). As evidenced by the Malaysian petroleum industry, local 																																																								
171 Ahmad (1990) argued that because the main objective was to encourage as much investments 
as possible, government officers who were responsible for approving investments, despite being 
guided by the priority lists, approved all investments and consequently did not favour in practice 
resource-based industries over other non-resource sectors. However, this does not mean that 
resource based industries did not receive preferential treatment as it could be argued that 
resource-based industries would have received less investments had they not been prioritized. 
172 Morales et al (2016) show that the degree of specificity of local content framework is 
positively correlated with higher local content outcomes in extractive sectors.  
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content objectives need to be carefully adapted to the local context through a holistic 
approach, taking into account the combination of requirements, incentives, skills transfer 
(through technical and specialized universities for instances), state-led investments and 
learning by doing. The Petronas VDP, for instance, has been successful in enhancing the 
industrial capabilities of local suppliers by allowing local firms to benefit from more 
stable intra-industry relationships and exposure to best practices and quality standards. As 
a result, even through Malaysia will eventually phase out local content requirement as 
part of its international trade commitments, it would have build an competitive supplier 
base that will no longer need infant industry protection.  
The palm oil sector has also become increasingly integrated throughout the value chain 
despite considerable artificial and natural barriers that favoured the status quo and 
discouraged domestic value addition (such as the European trade tariffs, Malaysia’s small 
domestic market, lack of marketing expertise for processed palm oil, transportation to the 
then major consumer markets during which the quality of processed palm oil 
deteriorated, making re-refining necessary) (Gopal, 2001).  
The development of the rubber-based manufacturing sector can also be attributed to role 
of comprehensive and well-crafted industrial policies, with an aggressive export 
promotion for key rubber products, strong R&D institutions that contributed to improve 
the level of competitiveness through cost reduction measures; as well as product quality 
control, which helped avoid collection action problems and negative externalities. 
7.5.4 Price incentives 
Commodity prices seem to have influenced decisions to undertake value addition in all 
three sectors. Petronas had decided to pursue more high value-added activities following 
depressed crude oil and gas prices in the 1980s and 1990s. Government-linked companies 
in the palm oil sector had also been incentivized to invest in downstream industries to 
capture more value added opportunities following the crash in commodity prices in the 
early 1980s. Similarly, in the rubber sector, lower prices of natural rubber incentivized 
domestic firms to pursue value addition towards a wide range of rubber products.  
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7.5 CONCLUSION 
Malaysia’s resource-based industrialization experience features an informative case of 
making the most of commodities beyond raw material exports. The country has been 
successful in developing and adding value to its petroleum-, rubber-, and palm oil-based 
industries. Against the conventional wisdom of laissez faire policies, the government 
played a key role in the promotion of linkages around commodities, through an 
aggressive industrial strategy guided by the country’s industrial master plans.  
The vertical policy instruments used to promote linkage development have included 
fiscal incentives to promote value addition alongside capacity development programmes 
to increase competitiveness and productivity. Targeted skills development programmes 
enabled to tackle labor mismatches and provide new skills required for value addition and 
local content processes. Government-funded R&D has enabled the accumulation sectoral 
knowledge and expertise, which contributed to avoid collective action problems. Quality 
control and product testing services by government agencies also considerably facilitated 
exports in key markets by reduce negative externalities for the sectorial ‘branding’. 
While static neo-classical comparative advantage analysis tends to condemn developing 
countries to low wage and labour intensive industries, a more dynamic analytical 
framework is needed. Dynamic approaches to comparative advantage, which devote more 
attention to technological upgrading, learning by doing and capabilities accumulation, are 
consequently more suitable in explaining Malaysia’s resource-based industrialization. 
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Chapter 8: Chile’s export diversification towards new sectors: 
A free market miracle or a free market mirage? 173 
 
 
8.1 OVERVIEW 	
Several mineral resource-rich countries have fallen into commodity dependence by 
failing to diversify. In contrast, Chile, despite the continuing significance of copper 
(accounting for over half of total exports for the past decade), has managed to diversify 
into other sectors and acquire new competitive advantages. Chile’s largest exported 
products outside copper are salmon products, forestry products (wood, pulp and paper), 
wine and fresh fruits, as shown by figure 29. These four sectors, which now constitute the 
bulk of Chile’s non-copper-related exports, have experienced tremendous annual growth 
rates of their exports, ranging from 8% to 21% per year between 1990 and 2007. 
Figure 29: Composition of Chile’s export basket in 2017
 
Source: UN Comtrade (2018) 
This chapter examines whether the emergence of new products in Chile’s export basket 
has been the result of sector-neutral horizontal policies alone or vertical policies targeting 
the accumulation of capabilities in those sectors as well. Analysing these factors greatly 
enhances our understanding of how resource-dependent developing countries can identify 
																																																								
173 A version of this chapter was published in Lebdioui (2019b).  
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emerging market niches to transform their economic structures according to both their 
static and dynamic comparative advantages. 
On the one hand, one of the most common and enduring myths associated with recent 
economic development history portrays Chile as a ‘free market miracle’, a term coined by 
American economist Milton Friedman (see Friedman, 1982). Such a dominant view 
sustains that the successful emergence of new competitive sectors in Chile’s export 
basket are the result of four decades of commitment to economic openness and free 
market policies and attributes Chile’s growth to the liberalization process during its 
military regime (1973-1990) and whose impact would have come into effect later from 
the 1990s until today. Neoliberal advocates maintain that horizontal policies suffice to 
promote productive transformation and that policies should be confined to comparative 
advantages areas: “We do not believe in the state to have a role except to be neutral [...] 
That is the policy in Chile and it has been successful” (Director of a think-tank based in 
Santiago, Chile, Personal communication, July 2017).   
On the other hand, this study shows that Chile has managed to diversify and develop new 
competitive sectors by doing much more than laissez-faire and leaving the steering wheel 
to the market's invisible hand. Indeed, little attention has been given to the proactive 
policy interventions that have taken place in Chile. However, there are alternative 
accounts putting forward the instances in which the military regime was far from 
genuinely adopting free-market economic philosophy and actually was involved heavily 
in subsidizing the structural transformation of the Chilean economy (see Agosin et al. 
2010; Bravo Ortega and Eterovic, 2015; Collins and Lear, 1996; Ffrench-Davis and Sáez, 
1995; Kurtz, 2001; and Schurman, 1996). This chapter contributes to these scholarly 
works towards building a different narrative of Chile’s economic development. 
Specifically, this chapter does so by systematic reviewing the nature and scope of 
different policy interventions across all the major sectors that have emerged in Chile’s 
export basket since 1960.174 Different policy interventions are subsequently assessed 																																																								
174 See table C1 in appendix C for a more general classification of some of those main industrial 
policies and instruments used in Chile since 1973 based on their sector-selectivity and their nature 
(public goods provision or market interventions). 
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according to their vertical nature and scope, whether they constitute the provision of 
public goods (R&D support, quality control services, export promotion assistance) or 
direct market interventions (subsidies, state-sponsored venture capitalism, etc.). Figure 30 
summarizes the different forms of industrial policies that contributed to the development 
of the forestry, salmon, fruit and wine sectors. 
Figure 30: Diagram of some of the key policy interventions behind the emergence of 
Chile’s non-mining sectors. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on in-text information 
The following section features a sector-level analysis of the salmon, fruits, wine and 
forestry sectors. Different policy interventions are subsequently assessed according to 
their vertical nature and scope, whether they constitute the provision of public goods 
(R&D support, quality control services, export promotion assistance) or direct market 
interventions (subsidies, state-sponsored venture capitalism, etc). The third section is a 
policy evaluation of targeted policies using a difference-in-difference method. The fourth 
section discusses the research findings and precedes the concluding remarks and 
theoretical implications of this study.   
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8.2 SECTOR ANALYSIS  
8.2.1 The Salmon industry 
Having started from scratch, Chile’s salmon industry is now the second largest exported 
sector by Chile (copper being the largest), and generated direct and indirect employment 
for around 550,000 people by 2004 (Katz 2006; SalmonChile, 2009). Furthermore, Chile 
has now become the second largest salmon exporter in the world, as shown by figure 31.  
Figure 31: Export volume of the salmon industries by country (in thousand tons) 
 
Source: Iizuka et al. (2016) 
 
While some accounts focus on the growth of the Chilean salmon sector from the mid-
1980s onwards when Chile adopted an open trade policy, Hosono (2016) argues that it is 
important to look at the domestic capability building that took place long before which 
enables us to understand how the industry accumulated the knowledge necessary for its 
foundation. In this regard, the role of the Chilean government was crucial in several ways 
from the late 1960s onwards, through bilateral scientific and technical cooperation 
programmes such as the Japan-Chile Salmon Project (explained below), as well as pro-
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active intervention from public and semi-public agencies such as Fundación Chile175, 
CORFO 176 , SERNAP (National Fisheries Service) IFOP (Fisheries Development 
Institute), and the Servicio Agrícola Ganadero [Agricultural and Livestock Service]. 
8.2.1.1  The Japan-Chile Salmon project 
The cooperation scheme between the Chilean and Japanese governments between 1969 
and 1989 relied on mutual interests. The government of Chile had identified the salmon 
sector as a way to alleviate the poverty faced by fishermen in southern regions of Chile, 
while the Japan Fisheries Association (JFA) was looking for an alternative source of 
salmon in the North Pacific Ocean, because of restrictions posed on fishing in the United 
States and the Soviet Union (Hosono, 2016; Mendez and Munita 1989). Because the 
Japan-Chile Salmon Project was under the responsibility of the public institutions, the 
technologies that were transferred, adapted or developed were considered as public goods 
and were made freely available (Hosono, 2016). Table 11 demonstrates how technology 
was introduced and adapted to enable Chile to attain a new comparative advantage. 
Fundación Chile and the Japan-Chile Salmon Project played a key role in addressing the 
investment gap required for knowledge accumulation (Hosono, 2016). 
																																																								
175 Fundación Chile is a semi-public/semi-private foundation created in 1976 as part of the 
settlement for the Allende government’s expropriation of the Chilean Telephone Corporation, 
owned by IT&T. While the government does not appoint FCh’s managers, it has a large influence 
in the designation of its president and board of directors.  
176 CORFO is the Production Development Corporation of Chile (Corporación de Fomento de la 
Producción). It was created following the earthquake that struck Chile in 1939, leaving the 
country’s infrastructure and industrial capacity destroyed. CORFO was responsible of 
reconstructing the country’s industrial base through inward investment focused mainly on 
industrialization, energy, mining, fishing, agriculture and infrastructure projects. In the initial 
period, it participated in the funding of over 30% of investments in equipment and machinery and 
25% of public investment in Chile (Durán and Fermandois, 2011). In the 1950s, CORFO 
represented about 70% of Chile’s GDP but in 2015, the financial support deployed by CORFO 
amounted to around USD 3billion, which represents only 1% of Chile’s GDP (Griffith-Jones, 
Martínez Sola and Petersen, 2015; Official from CORFO, Personal Communication, 2017). 
CORFO has relied on a variety of instruments ranging between horizontal and more vertical ones 
in nature, including public entrepreneurship, financial intermediation programmes, provision of 
subsidized services to SMEs, investment promotion, as well as innovation subsidies. 
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Table 11: Sources of contribution to the development of technologies for processing, fish 
disease control and feed production  
	 Contribution	by	the	
Japan-Chile	Salmon	
Project	
Contribution	by	
Salmones	Antártica	/	
Fundación	Chile	
Contribution	by	
the	private	sector	
Processing	technology	
	 Salmones	Antártica	
constructed	the	most	
advanced	processing	
plants	and	introduced	
pioneering	technology	in	
1989-90	
	
Fish	disease	control	
R&D	on	BKD	control	with	
the	most	advanced	
laboratory	equipment,	and	
pioneering	contributions	in	
the	mid	1980s.	
	 	
	
	
	
	
Food	
production	
General	
Conducted	pioneering	
research	on	feed	
production	using	fish	meal	
produced	in	Chile	
Salmones	Antártica/	
Fundación	Chile	boosted	
food	production	towards	
commercial	sea-cage	
farming	of	salmon	in	the	
mid	1980s	
	
Crumbles	
Conducted	research	on	the	
production	of	feed	suitable	
for	young	juveniles	that	
have	absorbed	their	yolk	
sacs,	built	production	
equipment	and	ensured	a	
stable	supply.	
	 	
Expansion	
pellets	
	 	 Norwegian	firms	
introduced	
expansion	pellets	
into	Chile	through	
investments	and	the	
sale	of	equipment	in	
the	1990s.	
Source: Hosono (2016) 
8.2.1.2. The role of Fundación Chile (FCh)  
Prior to 1980, foreign companies had attempted, unsuccessfully, to develop salmon 
cultivation in Chile. The American company Domsea Farms and a Japanese firm invested 
in salmon farming during the 1970s, but their production levels and return rates were low. 
In 1981, Fundación Chile stepped in to acquire Domsea Farms, transfer technology from 
Norway to Chile and experiment with the farming of various salmonid species under 
different conditions in order to identify ways to make salmon farming commercially 
viable. Salmones Antartica, the company created by Fundación Chile, reached large 
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production scales of around 1,000 tonnes by 1988 and transmitted a clear message to 
potential entrepreneurs that the salmon industry was indeed profitable (Hosono, 2016). 
The experience of that company was then ‘copied’ by a number of nascent firms, which 
increased from around four companies in the 1980 to 219 in 1997 (Iizuka and 
Gebreeyesus, 2017). Fundación Chile played a key role in the diffusion of knowledge, 
experience and technology, thereby attracting a large number of entrepreneurs. It offered 
consulting services (for instance on how to obtain a mariculture license, how to produce 
wooden fish cages, etc) to entrepreneurs, most of which originally had little knowledge 
about salmon (Hosono, 2016).  
Even though Fundación Chile sold its company Salmones Antartica in 1988, it is still 
involved today in several supporting activities around the salmon-farming ecosystem, 
such as the production of vaccines, biotesting, and quality control labs. As a result, Chile 
is not only exporting salmons but also products related to salmon health. Fundación Chile 
also set up a salmon industrial association in Chile (Mendez and Munita, 1989). 
8.2.1.3 Addressing market failures in technological diffusion 
One of the obstacles that had impeded the growth of the salmon sector before FCh 
intervened can be traced back to a collective action problem, which led to a ‘first mover 
disadvantage’. Indeed, once the first comer entered into this new activity, after investing 
in R&D in the cultivation of salmonid species, learning how to adapt salmon technology 
to Chilean conditions, identifying suitable cultivation areas and developing a business 
model, other firms could copy the business model without bearing the same cost nor 
undergo the same trial and error process. 
Meanwhile, when investments in technological development are motivated by ambitions 
to gain a competitive edge in the market, private investors are likely to seek to prevent 
imitators from entering the competition and restrict diffusion of that technology and 
knowledge. The misalignment of private interests and with the social desirability of 
technology diffusion and emulation can be treated as a market failure.  
This market failure was effectively addressed by FCh. Through its role as a venture 
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capitalist combined with its not-for-profit mandate, FCh allowed the free diffusion of 
knowledge to the wider public, which enabled entrepreneurs to copy and to emulate their 
success with Salmon Antartica without having to the bear the high costs of investments in 
R&D. Beyond solely solving a market failure, this intervention enabled the state to send 
signals to entrepreneurs. As explained by the former president of Fundación Chile: 
“Fundación Chile’s development of a firm producing salmon was not easy and it took us 
eight years. We studied why previous firms failed and solved the issue by taking all risk 
and bearing the cost of investing in R&D. The high risks of setting up new industries can 
be identified as a market failure and can be alleviated by government intervention. 
Fundación Chile proved that salmon cultivation was a profitable activity and used its firm 
as a window-case to convince Chilean entrepreneurs to get into the salmon farming 
business. Hence, it was a clear intervention in the market as well as public goods 
provision and production (Patricio Meller, personal communication, July 2017).” 
 
8.2.1.4 R&D and human capital accumulation 
The natural conditions were favourable for salmon farming in Chile but the human 
capital and technology were lacking. Addressing these gaps, along with the risk of 
investing in a new sector, would involve high costs for private entrepreneurs because 
training specialized professionals and R&D to sustain the industry takes time (Hosono, 
2016). In order to reduce the level of risk and cost to private entrepreneurs investing in 
new industries, the challenge thus lay in the reduction of entry barriers, notably by 
ensuring the availability of specialized human capital and providing incentives for 
technology development and diffusion. 
 
Salmon cultivation in Chile is a knowledge-intensive activity and founded upon extensive 
R&D in the area of aquaculture improvements, fish packing, storage, and other aspects of 
the business (Maggi, 2006).  When it comes to research and development (R&D), the role 
of government funding was also key between 1987 and 2008 and reached a cumulative 
total of the equivalent of USD70 million in the salmon sector, as shown in Table 12. Such 
government funding in aquaculture was channeled through various grants set up by 
various public agencies, some of which had a sector-focus such as the Fisheries Research 
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Fund (FIP). Other important funding sources have come from organizations with a more 
‘horizontal’ mandate such as CORFO and the National Commission for Scientific and 
Technological Research (CONICYT). 
Table 12: Research in the salmon sector that was financed by government funding 
between 1987 and 2008 
Thematic Areas 
 
 
Number of 
Projects 
 
Value 
(in thousands Chilean pesos) 
 
Share of funding 
 
Pathology and sanitary management 77 12,140,701 28.9% 
Genetics and reproduction 38 7,752,516 18.4% 
Nutrition and food 29 6,327,948 15.1% 
Environment and clean production 33 3,842,839 9.1% 
Technology centres 5 3,736,752 8.9% 
Engineering and technology 44 3,489,769 8.3% 
Cultivation and production 14 1,573,375 3.7% 
Training and transfer of technology 18 1,026,484 2.4% 
Processing and quality control 13 877,022 2.1% 
Recreational fishery 10 829,549 2.0% 
Administration and regulation 4 346,458 0.8% 
Small-scale aquaculture 1 46,874 0.1% 
Biology and ecology 1 43,043 0.1% 
Total 287 42,033,330 100.0% 
Source: Bravo (2009) 
 
When it comes to human capital development, the government has invested significant 
resources to train specialized professionals and technicians needed by the salmon farming 
industry, by establishing new university programmes and technical centres. From the 
1990s onwards, Chilean universities, such as the Universidad Los Lagos and University 
of Austral, started to provide programmes in marine sciences, biochemistry, pathology, 
and issues related to aquaculture production and aquaculture business administration. 
These two universities have supplied most of the labour market with professionals in 
aquaculture production and aquaculture business administration (UNCTAD, 2006b). 
Alongside public research institutions, the Salmon Technology Institute (INTESAL), a 
private institute that was created in 1995 by SalmonChile (the Salmon and Trout 
Producers Association) also contributed to develop the human capital and technical skills 
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needed for the salmon farming industry, and had trained 2,060 workers in 2002 alone 
(UNCTAD 2006b). INTESAL also contributed to develop and diffuse food safety and 
quality control technologies in the salmon industry, by applying for funding to the above-
mentioned public funds.  
 
8.2.1.5 Regulatory role to ensure sustainability of the ‘commons’.  
State interventions taking the shape of public goods provision were also key in 
addressing other market failures in the salmon industry and ensuring the sustainability of 
the ‘commons’ needed for production.  
Natural resource-based industries need to balance their exploitation activities with the 
environment’s pace of regeneration in order to avoid environmental catastrophe (Iizuka 
and Zanlungo, 2016). This is reflected by the Chilean salmon sector, which has been 
affected by a tragedy of the commons, which is defined as a problem in which every 
individual has an incentive to consume a resource at the expense of all other individuals. 
Indeed, overexploitation of the waters resulted in sanitary and environmental 
deterioration leading to the Infectious Salmon Anemia (ISA) virus contamination in 
2007. As a result, Chilean Atlantic salmon production decreased by 65% between 2007 
and 2010, while the number of workers decreased by 40%. This sanitary crisis reflects a 
tragedy of commons in the absence of adequate regulatory mechanism monitoring 
environmental impact (Iizuka, and Katz, 2010). Since then, policy efforts have been 
needed to intervene and create changes in existing institutions surrounding the salmon 
farming industry to ensure sustainability. Regulatory institutions have been set up, 
notably through the implementation of the Aquaculture law in 2010. In order to reduce 
the systemic risk of new diseases in the future, the National Fisheries Service 
(Sernapesca) also required salmon farming firms to group their cultivation centers into 
barrios according to geographical location, and obliged firms operating in cultivation 
centers within the same barrio to synchronize their production calendar (to provide for a 
three month resting period) to facilitate sanitary controls aimed at minimizing the transit 
of navigation, often instrumental in transmitting pathogens (Iizuka and Zanlungo, 2016). 
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The Chilean case thus demonstrates how natural resource-based activities need to be 
supported not only by advanced production technology, but also by scientific knowledge 
of the local environment to establish appropriate local regulatory institutions to manage 
the use of common resources (Iizuka and Zanlungo, 2016; Katz, 2016). Such local 
regulatory role can be seen as an input that has public goods characteristics and thus will 
be under-provided by the market.  
8.2.2. The fruit sector 
In the 1960s, Chile’s fruit exports were mostly limited to two types of products (grapes 
and apples). Today, the country exports more than 20 types of fruits and has become the 
largest fruit exporter in Latin America. One of Chile’s advantages lies in the fact that it is 
located deep in the southern hemisphere and consequently experiences seasons at 
opposite times of year from the northern hemisphere, where the largest consumer markets 
are located. However, this seemingly clear natural advantage determined by geographic 
location has not developed organically through market forces only. Indeed, the most 
important catalysts for the production of new fruits in Chile can be traced back to several 
vertical interventions. A fruit development plan was carried out in the late 1960s by 
CORFO, the national production development corporation (Bravo-Ortega and Eterovic, 
2015). As further detailed in the following section, Fundación Chile has also invested in 
R&D since 1980 to catalyse the production of berries, while the University of Chile and 
the Institute of Agricultural Research (INIA) have set up technical training in order to 
address human capital shortage inhibiting the growth of the fruit sector. 
8.2.2.1  The Chile-California Programme and its underlying governmental vision  
Given that the absence of adequate human capital was for a long time the obstacle for the 
development of the Chilean fruit sector, the promotion of targeted and specific skills was 
key to the emergence and export-orientation of the sector (Agosín and Bravo-Ortega, 
2009). The most important example of this is the Chile–California Programme, an 
exchange programme established in 1965 between Universidad de Chile and University 
of California and funded by the Ford Foundation. The Programme entailed sending more 
than 80 Chilean graduate students to study agricultural economics in California in order 
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to learn how to cultivate and export fresh fruits in Chile. The Ford Foundation spent 
USD9.75 million to fund this programme over a period of 10 years (which adjusted to 
today would be equivalent to USD 200million). This appears to have been an extremely 
successful and impactful grant considering the growth of the sector during the following 
decades (Bravo-Ortega and Eterovic, 2015)  
This successful intervention may have been financed by a private foundation but it 
remains a vertical intervention nonetheless as it contributed to providing what could be 
seen as a public good that oriented market forces towards the growth of specific industry. 
In addition, while this Chile-California programme is very often credited to the Ford 
Foundation instead of being considered as a governmental initiative, a closer examination 
of the context in which it emerged suggests that the story is far more complex and that 
the design and scope of the Chile-California programme was guided by public agencies.  
Indeed, an examination of the archives of the State of California reveals that the origins 
of this programme and its design were clearly governmental. Between 1963 and 1978, it 
is the governments of Chile and California that took the initiative to undertake three 
programmes of development assistance and cooperation, spurred by the two regions’ 
striking similarities in physical geography and natural resources (Bauer and Catalán, 
2017). In fact, the Californian task force that decided in 1963 to start a technical 
cooperation programme with Chile, following President Kennedy’s suggestion, 
“responding directly to the wishes of the Chilean Government” in the definition of core 
areas for cooperation, such as agriculture, education, water resources, highway 
transportation, planning and budgeting (California State Archives, 2000, para.3). The 
signing of the exchange programme between Chile and University of California took 
place two years after the Californian task force set up to develop a partnership with Chile 
had first met with Chilean policy-makers to identify core areas of partnership. Given the 
chronology, it is likely that the governmental cooperation programme has influenced the 
signing of the university exchange programme between Chile and California.  
It is also important to understand the context in which the Chile-California Programme 
took place as well as the context of the Ford Foundation’s involvement. In the aftermath 
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of John F. Kennedy’s election, the agenda of international cooperation through the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) increasingly emphasized the role of 
university exchanges and the development of technical skills in Latin America as a motor 
economic development (USAID, 1962). Private foundations such as the Rockefeller and 
Ford Foundations aligned their thinking with USAID and re-oriented their focus towards 
technical training and modernization of universities overseas (Fuenzalida, 1984). When 
Governor Reagan discontinued the technical cooperation programme with Chile in 1967, 
only the agricultural element of the programme was to remain active, although federal 
funding for that programme was also discontinued. Perhaps this is when the Ford 
Foundation became increasingly involved in replacing the federal funding for this part of 
the programme. Even then, the agreement between the Universidad de Chile and the 
University of California clearly stated that the two universities should be responsible for 
formulating the specific programmes and present joint proposals to foundations or 
government agencies if there is a need for external funding (Fuenzalida, 1984: 96).  
Consequently, while the Ford Foundation provided the funding for the proposal, the 
design of the intervention and the decision to target the fruit sector are to be credited to 
the Chilean policy-makers and public education institutions. 
Tinsman (2013) also analyses the even earlier historical roots of the programme and 
provides a detailed account of the emergence of the fruit sector from 19th century 
onwards, which sheds light on the important role played by the government. As Chile’s 
nitrate industry suffered from the invention of synthetic nitrate during the World War I, 
Adolfo Ibáñez, Chile’s Minister of Economic Development at the time, proposed that 
fruit exports could replace nitrate as Chile’s primary source of wealth and identified 
international demand for fruits in the United States and Europe (ibid.).177 The government 
thus played a major role in the identification of Chile’s potential competitive advantage 
in fruit production. In addition, well before the Chile-California programme, Chilean 
policy makers looked to the United States not only as a future market but also as a model 																																																								
177 In the early 20th century, nitrate was the backbone of the Chilean economy, accounting for 
about 80% of world production, 60% of its exports and 80% of government revenue, before the 
development of synthetic nitrogen in Germany ended Chile’s monopoly of world nitrates and 
crashed the Chilean nitrate industry (McConnell, 2008).  
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for building their fruit industry (ibid.). In 1922, Mr Alessandri, the President of the 
National Agricultural Society (who also was a sitting senator) led a state-financed 
commission to tour California, after which he compiled a report in which he admired and 
praised the strong government role in developing agriculture in California:  
“Alessandri identified the mysterious force at work in California not as the market’s 
invisible hand but as the enormous presence of the U.S. Ministry of Agriculture, which he 
praised as ‘one of the largest, most complete and admirable [ministries of agriculture] in 
the world’. By contrast, he bemoaned, “How enormous has been the wealth lost by Chile 
for lack of a [national] policy that should have been unceasing and tenacious in its 
promotion of production!” Alessandri reassured his audience that Chile had every 
potential to reproduce California’s success since it possessed an almost identical climate 
and fruit-growing tradition. But this would be possible only with significant state 
involvement.” (Tinsman, 2013:32) 
 
The role of state planning was particularly emphasized in Alessandri’s report: 
“All of this [California’s agricultural development] is owing to the fact that [in California] 
the orchard plantations obey a scientific agricultural plan, via which each region is planted 
only with those trees that are best adapted to the conditions of climate and soil, in other 
words, those that are capable of producing the most dollars per hectare.” (Alessandri 1923 
cited in Tinsman 2013:32). 
A critical historical perspective on the development of the fruit industry consequently 
shows that the vision underlying the Chile-California programme was clearly 
governmental.178 In addition, it is important to point out that the Chile-California was part 
of a broader set of policy intervention towards developing the Chilean fruit sector, as 
explained in the next sub-section.  
																																																								
178 Interestingly, while “Chicago and California philosophies overlapped on the imperative of 
making agriculture more efficient and promoting exports, but they had dichotomous visions of the 
state” (Tinsman, 2013:47). Indeed, while most Chileans who studied in California during the 
1960s and 1970s had prepared for careers in the public sector following the government-directed 
National Fruit Development Plan, Chileans studying in Chicago learned about the disasters of 
state-led projects and the need to minimize government involvement in economic life (ibid.) 
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8.2.2.2 Earlier state involvement and planning since the 1920s
179
 
As outlined by Tinsman (2013), the Chilean state took several immediate actions 
following the recommendations of a report by the Minister of economic development 
(Adolfo Ibáñez) in 1927 to develop the fruit sector. First, a ministry of Agriculture was 
created in 1925, including a special ‘Fruit Tree and Vineyard’ Service tasked with 
“promoting and developing fruit plantations, in technical form and the creation of 
markets” (ibid.). Three years later, the government passed the Law for Fruit Development 
(Ley de Fomento de la Fruticultura), which allocated 10 million Chilean pesos for five 
years to subsidize new vineyards and orchards as well as canning and packing facilities. 
In 1938, the University of Chile established the School of Agronomy, which included a 
special course for fruit cultivation. In 1939, CORFO began providing special credits to 
fruit growers and was also charged with drafting a national agricultural-development plan 
wherein fruit exports were central. This plan, which aimed to increase total fruit 
production fivefold within 15 years, was expected to use funding worth USD18 million 
from both public and private sources to pay for credit incentives, technical support, 
infrastructure, and commercialization of fruits abroad, but in practice the plan had its 
greatest impact using credit from CORFO and the Chilean Central Bank (ibid.). The 
National Fruit-Development Plan was accompanied by the Chile-California programme, 
but also by the Inter-American Development Bank that supplemented Ford Foundation 
funds with USD4 million to build a new agricultural and forestry campus at the 
University of Chile (ibid.)  
As a result of these public policies, the amount of land planted with orchards and table-
grape vineyards expanded almost fourfold and the size of fruit exports grew nine-fold 
between 1930 and 1975 (from 4,500 to 38,300	metric tonnes), when the military began 
dismantling agrarian-reform programmes (ECLAC, 1990; Tinsman, 2013).180 However, 																																																								
179 The role of agrarian reforms on the fruit sector development and productivity is also important 
but could not be fully discussed in this chapter due to length considerations. For a detailed 
account of state-led agrarian reforms and how they boosted fruit cultivation and productivity 
throughout successive political regimes since the 1960s, see Tinsman (2013).  
180 Meanwhile, between 1974 and 1986, during the military regime, the state spent more than 
USD27 million on expanding fruit-irrigation systems (Tinsman, 2013:49) 
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fruit exports grew almost tenfold (in metric tonnes) after a decade of military regime, ‘but 
the exponential growth in the 1980s was partly afforded by fruit trees and vineyards that 
were planted in the late 1960s and early 1970s but took three to seven years to mature’ 
(Tinsman, 2013:39). 
 
8.2.2.3 The role of Fundación Chile (FCh) in the 1980s 
The cultivation of berries in the South of Chile was another a successful area of 
innovation pioneered by FCh, with a similar approach to what was used to catalyse the 
salmon sector. FCh identified which fruits are produced in similar climatic conditions as 
Chile and subsequently created a firm in 1980 called Berries la Union, which became the 
largest exporter of blueberries in Chile (FCh manager, Personal Communication, 2017). 
Even though this firm later went bankrupt (after FCh exited the business), its 
demonstration effect was very important and sufficed to show entrepreneurs that the 
cultivation of berries in Chile was possible. Chile’s blueberries exports reached USD 380 
million in 2011 (Retamales et al. 2014). This investment, through what could be 
considered as public entrepreneurship, resulted in the introduction and development of a 
new product as well as new transversal technologies and capabilities, including cold 
storage systems, which are required to ensure product quality.  
8.2.2.4 Quality control and export promotion 
A government agency called Servicio Agrícola Ganadero (SAG) was set up to control the 
export quality of fruits produced in Chile. The role of SAG was a key factor influencing 
the performance of the entire fruit sector. SAG was responsible for disseminating 
information on phytosanitary standards in importing countries so that individual 
producers could comply with them and request technical assistance. 
In addition to quality control to facilitate exports, the government's promotion of Chilean 
exports was also supported by ProChile, the government’s export promotion agency, as 
well as the diplomatic action in the negotiation of free trade agreements. Such FTAs can 
be considered as a provision of a public good (albeit only for some of the existing 
sectors), and have been considered by most executives of Chilean exporting companies as 
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an important factor in stimulating the export of Chilean fruits (Agosín Agosín and Bravo-
Ortega, 2009; Meller and Zenteno, 2013). 
8.2.2.5 Technology transfer and Research Institutes  
In addition to Fundación Chile’s mandate, the Chilean government also set up institutions 
to promote technological upgrading in the fruit and agriculture sector more broadly. It 
created the Institute of Agricultural Research (INIA) as well as a technology transfer 
programme (GTT), with the purpose of creating synergies between agricultural producers 
and research institutes to facilitate the adoption and dissemination of foreign knowledge 
and technologies by local farmers (Grosse, 2009:180). CORFO has also financed cold-
storage and fumigation facilities required for fruit exports.181 
8.2.3 Wine sector  
8.2.3.1 Technological upgrading in an existing industry 
Before its emergence in the Chile’s export basket, wine was already produced in Chile 
for two centuries. Between 1938 and 1973, wine production was restricted by the 
government, heavily taxed and mostly aimed for domestic consumption (Grosse, 2009). 
However, in 2016, wine exports reached almost USD 2 billion (UN Comtrade, 2018). 
In the late 1970s, growing investments from foreign firms, particularly the Spanish firm 
Miguel Torres, looking for ideal climatic conditions, played a key role in the introduction 
of new methods of production that were inexistent in Chile such as the use of stainless 
steel containers imported from the United States, as well as modern grinding and pressing 
machinery (Meller and Zenteno, 2013). The success of Miguel Torres was followed by 
increasing foreign investments as well as joint ventures from the 1980s onwards, 
enabling Chilean producers to access foreign markets and international distributions 
channels while further learning how to adapt their production to the demand of foreign 
consumer markets (ibid.: 150). The import of foreign technology was thus a crucial factor 																																																								
181 Beginning in 1967, it built five refrigerators, which accounted for 70% of all cold-storage 
capacity in the country by 1972 (Tinsman, 2013) 
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in the development of wine exports (Agosín and Bravo-Ortega (2012). According to data 
provided by UN Comtrade (2018), this process enabled Chile to go from being a minor 
participant in the international wine business to becoming the fourth largest exporter of 
wine in the world today. 
While the climatic conditions for cultivating grapes and producing wine had existed for 
centuries, the export orientation and upgrading came from the introduction of new skills, 
technology, support from public agencies (such as CORFO, ProChile and SAG), and 
government policy (Grosse, 2009:180). In fact, it is interesting to note that the foreign 
investments in the wine sector came after the interventions to develop Chile’s fruit sector, 
including grapes, which represented an major part of the fruit industry at the time. 
Perhaps the foreign investment inflow that contributed to developing Chile’s wine sector 
was also partly motivated by the existing quality and supply of grapes, and could 
consequently be related to the successful interventions leading the development of the 
fruit industry from the 1970s onwards. I have not been able to find data confirming the 
Chile California Programme’s effect on both wine grapes and table grapes cultivation, 
but it can be presumed that in theory the cultivation and agro-science skills developed 
through the Chile California programme could have been equally applied to the 
cultivation of wine grapes and table grapes.  
8.2.3.2 Role of government programmes 
More importantly, even through the export-orientation of the wine sector was FDI-led, 
the government played a key role from the 1980s onwards in intensifying the sector’s 
export performance. Indeed, the government has set up several programmes to subsidize 
export-oriented production across sectors, notably through its Production Development 
Corporation (Corfo), which set up a supplier development programme that helped small 
producers adapt the quality of their products to international standards. ProChile, the 
government’s export promotion agency, financed nearly half of total costs related to 
promotional activities of the Chilean wine sector abroad, including trade fairs, travel 
costs and marketing brochures and equipment.  
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Nevertheless, it is worth noting that most of these interventions were horizontal. Indeed, 
neither ProChile nor Corfo singled out the wine industry and the support they offered was 
available to all industries wishing to receive it (Grosse, 2009:180). Meller and Zenteno 
(2013) further put forward that Chilean wine producers acknowledged the existence of 
certain ‘public goods’ as essential for increasing their exportations, such as the 
negotiation of phytosanitary agreements, the protection of the environment carried out by 
the SAG, the promotion of business associations, and the establishment of FTAs.  
8.2.3.3 Quality control and export promotion 
Similarly to the government’s response to the tragedy of the commons leading to the 
salmon diseases, the wine sector has also witnessed greater role of the state to avoid 
negative externalities when some producers were using chemicals which could hurt the 
image and branding of the Chilean wine industry as a whole (Former President of 
Fundación Chile, personal communication, July 2017). This view of the role of the 
Chilean state role in preserving the value of the national brand through regulation is in 
line with Iizuka and Katz (2010) analysis of the regulatory role of the State. 
 
8.2.4 The Forestry industry  
One of the areas that the Chilean government has targeted most explicitly is the forestry 
sector, through a mix of policy interventions including laws, incentives, subsidized credit 
lines and other tools to attract private investments in the sector. As shown by Agosin et 
al. (2010:7), “the military government made a strategic bet on a non-existent but 
potentially profitable sector. It had long been known that radiata pine grew faster in 
certain parts of Chile than practically anywhere else in the world. The authorities in effect 
solved a coordination problem that made this sector take off.” Today, exports of wood 
and paper products represent about USD5 billion, which accounts for about 9% of 
Chilean exports (UN Comtrade, 2018). 
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8.2.4.1 Subsidized credits and incentives for reforestation 
The Chilean authorities have successfully targeted the forestry sector through several 
tools and legal interventions. One of them was Decreto Ley 701, a law passed in 1974 
recognizing the importance and necessity of developing the forestry sector for the 
domestic economy. The law also granted cash subsidies of 75% of the costs of planting 
and the initial management of forests (Decreto Ley 701, 1974). The Central Bank also 
provided incentives and subsidized credits for investments in the forestry sector 
(managed through public and private banks) between 1974 and 1979. Such subsidized 
credits were effectively used by specialist professionals, most of whom recently 
graduated from two Chilean universities that offered forestry engineering programmes, 
for the planting and replanting trees for commercial exploitation, including wood and 
pulp exports (Rossi, 1995). 
It is interesting to note that measures were also taken to ban the exploitation of forest 
trees younger than 18 years old as well as the exports of raw wood and debarked logs. 
Rossi (1995:117) highlights that the Central Bank additionally required quality certificate 
rendering wood export a very difficult task. As a result, the market for raw wood became 
less export oriented and turned towards the internal market. This measure benefited the 
domestic cellulose and paper industries, which took advantage of low raw material prices. 
According to Rossi (1995), this measure discouraged investments in plantation or 
forestation. Nevertheless, it would seem that those impediments were effectively 
counterbalanced by financial incentives offered by the Decreto Ley 701 and the Central 
Bank for further plantations. It is thus clear that the Central Bank of Chile played a key 
role in artificially controlling market prices in a way that benefited domestic value 
addition and the growth of industries around the forestry sector.  
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8.2.4.2 Debt-Equity Swaps Programme 182 
Another intervention, which is less vertical in its design but that ended up benefiting the 
forestry sector in particular, was a programme of debt equity swaps in 1985.183 This 
programme acted as an important subsidy for investing by buying debt as it involved the 
sale of a bank's loan at a discount rate. While the programme did not explicitly target any 
specific sector, it appears that the Central Bank’s approval of all debt-equity swap 
arrangements also stipulated and ensured that proposed investments would generate 
foreign exchange and create wealth (Bridges, 1987). The biggest debt-equity swap by far 
was carried out by the New Zealand company Carter Holt Harvey, who in 1986 bought 
$160 million of Chilean debt which it then converted into pesos and invested in the 
forestry industry (ibid.). The programme also attracted investments from other New 
Zealand leading producers of wood fibre and forestry-based products such as New 
Fletcher Challenge (Shirley, 1988). The programme thus benefited the forestry sector in 
particular. Given that the Central Bank’s had to oversee and approve proposed 
investments involving debt-equity swaps, it is reasonable to suspect that the forestry 
sector was seen as a priority area with potential to generate foreign exchange. In addition, 
given that the Central Bank had already been giving incentives and subsidized credits for 
forestry plantations before 1985, the fact that the largest investors selected and approved 
for the debt-equity swap programme by the same Central Bank were in the same forestry 
sector is perhaps not a coincidence. In addition, the sequencing of those policies and 
investments appears to be very timely. While the Central Bank’s subsidies targeted the 
radiate pine plantation development, enabling availability of raw material, the later 
investments as part of the debt-equity swap stimulated the industrial process to transform 
the developing forestry sector into value-added wood products such as fibreboard.  																																																								
182 The impact of the Debt-Equity Swaps Programme for the forestry sector was pointed out to me 
by Manuel Agosin during a fieldwork interview.  
183 The debt-equity swap programme was introduced by Central Bank of Chile in 1985 as a way 
to reduce external debt while attracting investments. The buyer of the loan converts the earnings 
into the debtor's currency and invests it in that country. In other words, the debt holder gets 
an equity position in exchange for cancellation of the debt. Thanks to the debt-equity swap 
programme, Chile's total external debt declined by about USD740 million between 1985 and 
1988, while its GNP grew by 43% in that period (Cole 1992:69). 
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8.2.4.3 R&D  
The Forestry Institute, or Instituto Forestal (INFOR) was officially created by the 
Government of Chile in 1965. It is a technological research institute attached to the 
Ministry of Agriculture of Chile and has been the first institution responsible for 
conducting research and development in the forestry sector, in areas of forestry 
economics and wood-related technologies. 
8.2.4.4 Impact of policy interventions 
The different policy tools reviewed above that were used to promote the forestry sector 
were extremely successful. Public expenditures through subsidies and grants in the 20 
years of application of the law Decreto Ley 701 amounted to USD 135 million. 
Meanwhile, the total private investments in the forestry sector in the same period reached 
USD4 billion and total forestry exports rose from USD 127 million in 1974 (year of 
enactment of the Decreto Ley 701) to USD 1.5 billion in 1994, when the terms of the law 
ended (Rossi 1995). While it appears that the main motivation behind its promotion was 
the exploitation of the country’s natural resource endowment, it is important to note that 
Chile’s considerable forestry endowment, with over 1.5million of hectares of plantations, 
and more especially its radiata pine abundance, was man-made.  
It is interesting to note that, as the state gradually abandoned wood production and the 
management of forestry plantations, more sophisticated and value added products have 
been developing slowly (Agosin et al., 2010:7). For instance, wood furniture exports, 
which increased fiftyfold from USD 500,000 in 1985 to USD 23.3 million in 1994 
(Rossi, 1995), have since been stagnating. 
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8.3 POLICY EVALUATION USING A DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE 
METHOD 
One of the counter-arguments to the argument of this article emphasizes that Chile’s 
seemingly successful interventions targeted sectors in line with Chile’s comparative 
advantages, and which were already bound to emerge as successful exports. Preliminary 
assessments considering state interventions as successful would then be based on a 
selection bias. The question should thus not be whether successful sectors today have 
benefited from government interventions, but instead whether they would have been 
successful without government interventions (Bravo-Ortega and Eterovic, 2015).  
Firstly, the fact that only few sectors (such as the wine sector) have emerged as major 
exports without benefiting from vertical interventions is a first indicator that there is also 
little evidence to support the counter-argument that free market forces are behind Chile’s 
diversification outcomes. Second, because it is difficult to build an exact counterfactual, 
it would be useful to conduct an impact evaluation of Chile’s vertical interventions by 
using a difference-in-difference estimation (DiD). The use of this method has been 
widespread in the study of the impact of policies on a certain outcome in a natural 
experiment using observational and longitudinal data (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
I have looked at the effect of vertical policies on different sectors by using the value of 
exports as the outcome variable. While several factors can impact a sector’s level of 
exports, including other policies that might have been implemented at the same time as 
the ones I am evaluating, I have reduced the level of bias by choosing control groups that 
are sub-sectors within the same sector but that did not benefit from vertical interventions 
to the same extent as the treated group, in order to plot a trend before and after the 
intervention (t0). I have conducted two comparisons.184 The first one of the fruit sector 
with vegetable exports as the control group because the fruit and vegetable sectors benefit 
from similar conditions and are affected by similar natural factors. Hence, they would be 
no reason to believe that one sector would perform better than the other without 
differences in accumulation of capital investments, human capital and technological 																																																								
184 See appendix D for the compiled data used to undertake the DiD policy evaluation.  
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upgrading. The selection of the wine sector as control group would have perhaps 
provided different results but because the wine sector directly relates to grape cultivation, 
the externalities from the interventions in the fruit sector towards the wine sector might 
be high. The use of the vegetable exports thus constitutes a more adequate control group. 
The second comparison is that of the salmon industry with other fish exports. 
8.3.1 Fruits and vegetables 
Figure 32: Evolution of Chilean exports of fruits and vegetables between 1964 and 1999 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Center for International Data (2018)  
8.3.1.1 Methodology and Interpretations 
Using Standard International Trade Classification (SITC4) data, I have singled out fruit 
products (code 057 and 058) and vegetable products (code 054, 056 and 292). The fruit 
sector has received several interventions, from the late 1920s to the 1980s but the major 
interventions started in 1965 with the Chile-California programme and subsequently 
FCh’s intervention in 1980. The earliest data point that is available is 1964, not allowing 
proper comparison before treatment in figure 32. Nevertheless, the dashed line in the 
graph between t0 and t1 represents the year 1974 which could be used as an alternative 
t0. There is indeed a solid basis for assuming that the interventions would not yet have 
had any effect on the treated group (fruit sector) by 1974 due to the lag after which the 
intervention would come into effect (time of implementation of the cooperation 
programme, followed by the duration of full academic courses and exchange 
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programmes, the lag to translate the newly acquired capabilities into practice, as well as 
the years that it took from fruit trees and vineyards planted in the late 1960s to mature. 
Interestingly, both the treated and non-treated group had very similar growth rates 
between 1964 and 1974. The fruit sector experienced an annual growth rate of 11% while 
the rate was 10% for vegetable exports. Consequently, it is highly plausible that fruit 
exports would have experienced a similar growth trend as vegetable exports if there was 
no intervention during the period 1965-1980. Between 1974 and 2000, the vegetable 
sector continued to grew steadily at a 10.6% annual growth rate. If the fruit sector had 
grown at the same rate as pre-1974, it would have reached an export level of around USD 
480 million in 1999 while fruits exports actually exceeded USD2 billion. According to 
this DiD estimation, today’s fruit exports represent more than four times what they would 
have been without the vertical intervention. In order words, 80% of current fruit exports 
can be attributed to the clearly successful interventions in the fruit sector. 
8.3.2 Salmonids and other fish exports (anchovy, hake, shellfish, etc.) 
Figure 33: Evolution of Chile’s exports of Salmon products and other fishery exports 
using the DiD method (in USD million)
 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data provided by SalmonChile’s database (2009, 
2018), UNCTAD (2006b), Achurra (1995), Feenstra (2018) and UN Comtrade (2018). 
 
8.3.2.1 Methodology and Interpretations 
One of the issues faced in this DiD estimation was the lack of disaggregation of the 
product classifications for specific fish species in both SITC (Standard International 
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Trade Classification) and HS (Harmonized System). I thus relied on different sources, 
such as SalmonChile, the Chilean Customs Authorities and UNCTAD, to gather and 
cross-check data on Chile’s salmon exports.  
The cooperation scheme between the Chilean and Japanese government started in 1969 
while FCh’s entry into the salmon industry took place in 1981. Consequently, the year 
1969 is used as t0. I cannot estimate the similarity of growth trends before t0 until 1986 
because salmon exports were non-existent before the intervention. Nevertheless, just as in 
the case of fruits, the selection of other fish species within the same sector as a control 
group is motivated by the reduction of bias, caused by natural factors and industry trends.  
According to my calculations, the growth rate of non-salmonids exports reached about 
7% in the period 1969-2016 and 4% in the period 1986-2016. Meanwhile, the annual 
growth rate of salmonid products from their emergence in the export basket in 1986 until 
2016 was about 25%. If salmonid exports had grown at the same pace as non-salmonid 
exports for the entire period (1969-2016), they would have reached USD50.35 million in 
2016. Instead, salmonid exports accounted for USD3.844 billion in 2016. There are thus 
solid reasons to believe that the interventions in the salmon industry were very impactful 
and enabled it to grow above the fish sector’s average.  
 
8.4 FINDINGS  
Several lessons on the role of policy interventions for export diversification can be drawn 
from this chapter’s analysis of Chile’s diversification since the 1960s. A number of 
elements, such as adequate human capital availability, research and development, and 
environmental sustainability, that are crucial for a sector’s development, are difficult to 
manage without policy interventions.  
8.4.1 Role of the state as catalyst of human capital accumulation 
This study has shed light on the role of investments in human capital to address shortages 
in the skills required for the development of new industries. Specialized human capital 
accumulation in Chile was promoted through technical training programmes and 
university programmes in fields related to the now-export oriented sectors, such as 
	 232 
marine sciences, fruit and agricultural science, forestry engineering, etc. As shown in the 
copper sector in chapter 6, when institutions for training specialized personnel are 
lacking, or when particular skills are not provided by the public sector, private firms 
either cannot grow due to the absence of skilled human capital or have to train the 
necessary personnel in-house, which leads to high non-recoverable costs, if trained 
employees leave the company. This is why governments have a role to play in the 
creation of training programmes in anticipation of future and current skills needs. 
8.4.2 Role of the state as venture capitalist  
 
Indeed, even though pioneers can gain significant sales advantages, head start in learning, 
and reputational advantage, as argued by Schumpeter (1942), Boulding and Christen 
(2001) have found that they can in some circumstances incur even larger cost 
disadvantages, while firms that follow pioneers can have some cost advantages as they 
can learn from the mistakes and successes of their predecessors, reducing their own 
investment requirements as well as their risks, potentially leading to a free rider 
problem185. As a result, while technology diffusion and the presence of ‘followers’ can 
bear high social and economic returns for the sector as a whole, private investors are less 
likely to invest in a new industry if technologies that have been developed over much 
time and expenses are likely to be copied or are not sufficiently protected by intellectual 
property control, because it would weaken confidence that sufficient profit will be 
generated in compensation for the high risks and costs of R&D (Hosono, 2016; Rodrik, 
2007). Private investors are thus likely to seek to prevent imitators from entering the 
competition and restrict diffusion of that technology and knowledge (through patents and 
other means). In such situations, the private interests of innovators do not match the 
socially desirable outcome of technology diffusion and emulation.  
 
In that context, the role of the semi-public agency Fundación Chile, through what could 																																																								
185 Perhaps it is easier for other firms to free ride when first movers adapt imported technology 
instead of developing their own technology: Emulating first-movers thus might not have as much 
knowledge advantages as the first movers that are genuine innovators. A discussion of the 
determinants that renders industries prone to a first mover advantage or disadvantage is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
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be considered as semi-public not-for-profit venture capitalism, sheds light on the scope 
for vertical interventions to promote the diffusion of knowledge acquired through R&D 
and industrial trials not as a public good. FCh’s role has thus consisted in sending market 
signals in promising industries that would not develop through market forces alone. This 
type of intervention can be considered as a mechanism to explore new products and 
promote nascent infant industries. FCh consequently faces a tradeoff between profitable 
investments and risky ones that would be less profitable but that could have a higher 
social returns (Agosin et al., 2010). In total, Fch has created around 70 firms.186 
8.4.3 Role of the state for Trade promotion  
Another aspect relevant to the development of Chilean exports lies in the government’s 
role in the opening up to foreign markets for Chilean products. Such interventions 
involve diplomatic action in the negotiation of free trade agreements (FTAs), sanitary 
agreements for food exports, as well as the creation of export promotion agencies such as 
ProChile, which has been assisting Chilean companies in their participation in trade fairs, 
etc. Those efforts of trade promotion started in the 1980s because few countries were 
willing to trade with Pinochet’s military government. At first, one could consider the 
state’s trade promotion as a provision of a ‘public good’ of a horizontal nature. That said, 
such trade promotion appears to be very targeted as it focused on foodstuff and benefited 
existing sectors, at the expense of infant industries and manufacturing. Indeed, Meller 
and Zenteno (2013) also note that the negotiations of sanitary agreements with importing 
countries also was a key element for the growth of certain exports, especially food-related 
products, which are particularly impacted by sanitary and phytosanitary standards.  
8.4.4 The quality control role of the state to ensure ‘national’ reputation 
The government’s role is also crucial in reducing negative externalities that can impact a 
whole industry’s reputation and exports. The Chilean state had to ensure quality control 
of salmon, fruits and wine producers. In the case of the wine sector, for example, Bordeu 																																																								
186 Some of the commercial projects pioneered by FCh had no followers (such as in furniture 
production), while others (such as berries cultivation) were not commercially successful but had 
several followers and thus high returns for the Chilean economy (Agosin et al., 2010). 
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(1995) shows that wine consumers tend to associate product quality with the country of 
origins. Poor quality from a single wine exporter, or the use of chemicals, could hurt the 
branding of the Chilean wine industry as a whole. There also seems to be an asymmetry 
because while it is very easy for a few wine exporters to damage the sector’s reputation, 
it is difficult for few firms to enhance the sector’s branding on their own. Indeed, if some 
firms investing in quality improvement end up increasing reputation for all Chilean 
wines, other producers that have not raised quality might attempt to charge higher prices, 
which would in turn damage the sector’s reputation. In contrast, if all producers improve 
their quality, there are large reputational increases for the country’s branding that few 
firms on their own might be able to achieve. Hence, enhanced product quality control can 
have a considerable impact in increasing the value of a product, such as Chilean wine, by 
allowing the sector to target niche markets with higher prices (Meller and Zenteno, 
2013). In Chile, the role of public agencies such as SAG or the Chinquihue Foundation 
was key to uphold export quality standards in the fruits, wine and salmon sectors.  
8.4.5 Correlation between export diversification and industrial policy 
In 1973, the Pinochet regime sought to implement a free-market economy by privatizing 
SOEs and banks, removing all restrictions on FDI and adopted unilaterally an open trade 
regime characterized by low and uniform import tariffs. However, Chile’s so-called 
uniform tariff has not been so uniform: special protection, inspired by the European 
Union’s Common Agricultural Policy, was offered to some agricultural goods through 
tariffs that were higher than Chile’s so-called uniform tariff since the mid-1980s (Agosin 
et al., 2010). The government also used the reintegro simplificado (abandoned with the 
Uruguay Round in 2003), which subsidized up to 10% of the value of new exports 
(Ffrench-Davis and Sáez, 1994). In light of this chapter, it appears that such departures 
from the free-market agenda were not isolated nor an exception. Indeed, while the 
Pinochet’s government was explicit in stating that the government avoided picking 
winners by ‘letting the market choose’ (thereby invoking the logic of the Chicago 
School), this chapter has outlined the vertical policies towards the forestry, salmon and 
fruit sectors, that significantly went against sector neutrality. The military regime has 
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indeed provided plenty of government subsidies for credits in various sectors through 
organizations such as the Central Bank and CORFO.  
Nevertheless, despite the ‘disguised’ use of industrial policy during Pinochet’s military 
regime, it would be misleading to think that such policy has been a consistent feature of 
that regime’s economic policy. As argued by Kurtz (2001), Chile can be seen as a case of 
‘state developmentalism without a developmental state’. The military regime’s shock 
therapy in the mid-1970s sent the country spiralling into a financial crisis within few 
years of its implementation. The regime eliminated price controls, unified the exchange 
rate, cut public expenditures by half, sold off several hundred state-owned firms, and 
dramatically reduced import tariffs from 90% to 10% within four years. There was little 
room for the market to adjust gradually to the strong impact of this rapid liberalization, 
which led to a rapid increase in non-traditional imports, particularly non-food consumer 
goods. As a result, per capita imports other than equipment and machinery grew by 115% 
even though per capita GDP barely increased by 10% in 1970-81. In that period, imports 
of equipment and machinery as a share of GDP were significantly below the 1970 level, 
which was insufficient to raise productive investment and recover the 1960s growth rates 
(French-Davis, 2002). Ffrench Davis (ibid.) thus concludes that the expansion of imports 
(or import de-substitution) was much larger and stronger than export dynamism and 
specialization, with non resource-based exports ceasing to grow in 1980 generating a 
growing trade deficit. Pinochet’s neoliberal policies were also followed by very volatile 
growth and Chile experienced two big recessions, in 1975 and 1982–83, with GDP 
declining by 13% in 1975 and more than 16% in 1982–83 (Solimano, 2012).187 
As a result, it is doubtful whether industrial policy was part of Pinochet’s economic 
project from the start. However, based on the chronology and sequencing of liberal and 
industrial policies during the military regime, we can reasonably assume that some of the 
industrial policies emerged as a consequence of the realities of the crisis that were created 
by the abrupt liberalization of the economy. It can thus be suspected that some of the 																																																								
187 Ffrench-Davis (2002) argues that even through trade liberalization was required after the 
excessive effective protection in 1973, the way in which trade liberalization was conducted was 
excessive, ill-timed, and uncoordinated with exchange rate and capital account policies.  
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push towards more interventionism might have been driven by the limitations of 
neoliberal policies in promoting export diversification right after 1973.  
Interestingly, the progressive abandonment of those vertical policy tools from the 1990s 
onwards is correlated to the country’s decreasing degree of export diversification (see 
figure 34). Following the return to democracy in 1990, the new political economy has 
been much more based on neoliberal fundamentals with a policy consensus that economic 
growth is based on ensuring macroeconomic stability (low inflation, low fiscal deficits, 
and moderate current account deficits) and an underlying view that industrial policy was 
unnecessary or unproductive (Solimano, 2012). 
Figure 34: Evolution of Export Diversification in Chile and Malaysia (1964-2010) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2018c) 
While long term diversification in Chile shows positive trends with the emergence of 
niche industries such as salmon, forestry, fruits and wine, the shorter time horizon since 
2004 reveals that Chile’s export basket has become less and less diversified from 2004 
onwards. Varas (2012:16) notes that while policies implemented in the 1990s aimed at 
correcting market failures by fostering entrepreneurship and innovation, facilitating 
access to capital, and lowering barriers to export markets, it appears that out of a total of 
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7,520 exporting companies in 2009, the ten largest exporters accounted nearly half of all 
export values, with eight of these those firms operating in the mining sector while the 
other two operated in the forestry sector. Since both of those sectors had strongly 
benefited from clear state support and vertical policies since the 1970s, it is appropriate to 
ask whether the neoliberal policies implemented since the 1990s contributed to achieve 
the goal of diversifying the Chilean economy. This trend could be explained by the 
fivefold increase in copper prices between 2003 and 2011 as well as China’s economic 
boom, leading to a surge in commodity demand. While Chile’s slower diversification is 
sometimes attributed to a Dutch disease affecting the export capacity of the country, it 
cannot be attributed to such phenomenon in its strict sense, as there were no exchange 
rate depreciation between 2004 and the 2009 financial crisis. Perhaps Chile’s case 
supports rentier state theories, according to which high copper prices have hindered 
incentives to move towards more sophisticated sectors. The lack of diversification could 
also be attributed to the decades of neoliberal policy with shy sector specific incentives 
(Official from the superintendence of banks and financial institutions of Chile, personal 
communication, 2017). 
The recognition that sector neutrality has not been enough to achieve economic 
diversification has led the first Bachelet government (2006-2010) to target specific 
sectors through a clusters strategy.188 In fact, the first Bachelet administration, attempted 
to use vertical policy tools to effectively govern the market in what could be identified as 
industrial policy ‘in disguise’: “We don’t use the name industrial policy, but what we do 
is close to that. We just call it ‘facilitation’ or “networking” (Chilean government official, 
																																																								
188 The National Council on Innovation for Competitiveness, set up by President Bachelet at the 
beginning of her mandate in 2006, had first embraced selectivity when it released two “White 
Papers” in 2007 and 2008, using a study awarded to Boston Consulting Group identifying clusters 
that productive development policies should target. CORFO also set up High Technology 
investment promotion programme. According to Agosin et al. (2010), this programme was 
developed as a direct consequence of Chile’s failure to land the Intel semiconductor plant. This 
programme involves explicit up-front subsidies for FDI in high technology sectors. It thus has a 
clear vertical orientation (Nelson, 2007). The results so far have been quite promising, with 
recorded exports of the promoted firms increasing to over USD168 million, while resources 
allocated to the programme remain modest, especially in comparison with other countries such as 
Ireland (Agosin et al. 2010; Belmar et al., 2004). 
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personal communication, July 2017).189 However, the first Piñera government (2010-
2014) embraced sector neutrality and scaled down the clusters programme. According to 
Juan-Andres Fontaine, the Minister of Economy who was serving in Piñera’s government 
at that time, the decision to scale down the clusters programme was justified by principles 
of letting the market choose which sectors are strategic and which sectors require public 
inputs (Personal communication, July 2017).190 
8.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The findings of this research show that, in contrast to the laissez-faire narrative, the role 
of the Chilean state has been crucial in catalysing human capital accumulation, ensuring 
sustainability, and diffusing expertise and technology in non-copper related sectors, 
through different types of vertical policies and through various public institutions 
(government agencies, the Central Bank, Fundación Chile, universities, etc.).  
The opening up of the economy in the 1980s subsequently took advantage of the 
specialized human capital, knowledge and technological capabilities accumulated 
through vertical interventions prior to liberalization. This finding also confirms the 
argument in Kurtz (2001) that much of the gain in output recorded in the mid-1970s 
reflects the public investments made before the coup. While it can be argued that some 
sectors such as the wine industry could have developed through market forces only, it is 
undeniable that other sectors would not have developed to the same extent without 
vertical interventions (in fact, some would not have developed at all given that the policy-																																																								
189 The Chilean government has been recently re-attempting to send market signals to promote 
new exports: “Is the government trying to send market signals towards certain sectors? Yes, we 
try to send market signals that we see potential in a sector and that we will support investments in 
that sector, but we also send market signals through public goods provision. For example, in 
agriculture, we seen potential and market opportunity for the farming of ‘Chilean sea bass’ but 
there is no technology for harvesting it as it appears to be too risky for private investors, so the 
government sees funding for R&D as public goods provision” (Official from the Ministry of 
Economy, Personal Communication, July 2017). 
190 This decision also affected FCh, whose budget was cut in half because public funding for 
innovation was scaled down based on the view that those programmes were the responsibility of 
private actors (Patricio Meller, president of FCh, Personal communication, July 2017). As a 
result, FCh’s mandate has evolved towards solving market bottlenecks and coordinating 
prospective studies rather than creating firms. 
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induced forestry and salmon endowment). The comparative advantage Chile developed in 
salmon, forestry and fruit production did not only rely on natural factors alone but has 
instead mostly been acquired through technology upgrading, human capital 
accumulation, export quality control, and financial incentives, through state interventions. 
For instance, while Chile had had a fishing industry for a century, and while salmon 
cultivation relies on several natural comparative advantages (such as the availability of 
adequate protected freshwater and seawater sites far from population centres, adequate 
temperature, location in the southern hemisphere achieving greater production in the 
summer than the northern hemisphere), the salmon industry only took off and was scaled 
up after considerable policy interventions to develop the conditions allowing for its 
emergence (such as sanitary control of the import of eggs, investments in R&D, 
technology transfer, training programmes, etc).  
 In addition, while the wine sector’s technological upgrading is mostly the result of 
foreign investments and horizontal policies (unlike the other sectors analysed in this 
chapter) it is worth noting that those foreign investments have targeted an industry in 
which Chile was already a producer, and consequently did not promote a new product 
beyond Chile’s existing productive structures at the time. Hence, while it is a successful 
instance of ‘export discovery’, it is not a case of ‘product discovery’, as in the cases of 
the salmon or fruit sectors.  
The Chilean government has thus relied on several policy tools to effectively govern the 
market in what could be identified as industrial policy ‘in disguise’, especially during the 
seemingly economically liberal military regime (1973-90). However, even though Chile 
has diversified into different sectors, its productive structures remained confined to 
commodity sectors. Since the return to democracy in particular, economic policy has 
focused on natural comparative advantages (at the expense of acquired comparative 
advantages), which attribute more importance to natural resource endowment than the 
potential for capabilities accumulation, learning by doing and incremental innovation in 
new industrial sectors. Such focus is based on the idea by orthodox economists that 
export orientation is more beneficial than import substitution, because exporting respects 
the law of comparative advantage. Static approaches to comparative advantage have often 
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considered agriculture and raw material processing as the developing world’s 
comparative advantage, as almost 90% of third world exports derived from primary 
products in the 1960s (Amsden, 2008). Chile’s focus on natural resource-based sectors is 
justified by arguments such as the following: “With a relatively small population of just 
16 million, Chile’s market is certainly limited in its ability to offers firms scale 
economies in serving domestic demand. With no regional market of the significance of 
NAFTA or the EU, Chile is clearly too small to attract industries such as auto-assembly, 
computer manufacturing or biotech research.” (Grosse, 2009:171). Such line of argument 
also emphasizes the failed import substituting manufacturing sectors in Chile in 1960s, 
such as the automobile sector (Amsden, 2008).191 
However, such arguments rely on several assumptions that can be debunked, especially 
given the fact that Chile had in fact been targeted by Intel to host its Latin American 
computer and electronics manufacturing operations. The Latin American market also 
remains an important consumer market. Furthermore, the geographic distance to 
consumer markets does not seem to have discouraged fresh fruits and fresh salmon 
exports to East Asia. In fact, if anything, distance to consumer markets is more a reason 
to promote exports of manufactured goods rather than perishable foodstuffs. In addition, 
as opposed to the conventional thinking, many of the state-owned and import substitution 
industries in the 1960s proved profitable (Agosin et al. 2010). Lastly, and most 
importantly, it can be argued that even Chile’s comparative advantages in new primary 
sectors were dynamically acquired, as opposed to ‘revealed’ through free market forces 
thanks to natural endowment factors solely.   
																																																								
191 Thanks to government incentives, Chile, a country with less than ten million people in the 
1960s, attracted around 20 automobile assemblers, each operating on a very small scale. Even 
though the government considered restricting entry to only a few firms, it did not know what 
criterion to use and there was no weeding out process by the market, leaving one or two players 
to compete. As a result, Chile’s automobile industry collapsed very quickly (Amsden, 2008:105). 
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Chapter 9 
Malaysia’s horizontal diversification: a tale of two sectors 
 
 
 
9.1 OVERVIEW  
While chapter 7 has highlighted the role of the Malaysian state in promoting vertical 
diversification around natural resources as part of the country’s development, the purpose 
of this chapter is to examine the role played by industrial policy in stimulating horizontal 
diversification towards new “unrelated” industries. 
Since gaining independence in 1957, the economic structure of Malaysia has changed 
significantly. At independence, Malaysia’s economic activity was dominated by 
unprocessed primary commodities, which accounted for nearly half of GDP and 80% of 
exports, while the manufacturing sector represented less 10% of GDP and 5% of exports. 
Forty years later, the share of manufacturing rose to 30% of GDP and 80% of total 
exports (see Figure 1 in chapter 1). Malaysia became the developing world's sixth largest 
exporter of manufactures by the early 1990s (Lall, 1995).192 Malaysia’s manufacturing 
value added (MVA) as a share of GDP increased also from 13% in 1969 to 31% in 2000, 
before dropping to 22% in 2017 (see figure 35). The key questions that remain are: What 
have been the sources of manufacturing growth in Malaysia? Were they caused by 
market forces in which the government played no particular role? Could they have been 
even better without intervention? Was there an element of luck? 
 
 
																																																								
192 Meanwhile the contribution of agriculture to GDP dropped from 40% in 1960 to 8 % in 2017 
and from over 50% to 2% of exports in the same time period. A similar pattern is witnessed in 
terms of composition of employment. The share of agricultural employment in total employment 
continuously declined since independence, and stood at 11% in 2012 while the share of 
manufacturing employment in total employment reached 29% in 2012 (Siew Yean, 2015). 
Malaysia’s services sector is the largest contributor to GDP and employment.  
	 242 
Figure 35: Evolution of manufacturing value added as share of GDP in selected 
developing countries. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2018. 
This chapter aims to assess the role of government initiatives in the promotion of the 
electrical-electronics (E&E) and the automotive industries. The E&E industry was 
selected because it has been the most important contributor to Malaysia’s export basket 
since the late 1980s. A common argument is that Malaysia’s diversification towards the 
electronics sectors was the fruit of free market policies.193 In contrast, this chapter will 
show that several policies towards the E&E sector have departed from sector neutrality. 
The automobile sector features a different story because it has failed to take off despite 
being a key area for government support over the past four decades. Using these two 
sectors as case studies, this chapter examines the formulation and the implementation of 
key industrial policies and assesses their successes and failures. Such exercise is 
important, as it informs debates on the scope of state intervention to promote horizontal 
diversification towards sectors that are unrelated to commodities.194 
 																																																								
193 For instance, Nordas et al. (2003) argue that Malaysia’s rapid industrialization during the 
period 1960-99 was the result of low-cost, reasonably productive labor, competitive exchange 
rates and an open and export-oriented trade and industrial policies, and skills improvement. 
194 See appendix B for a historical review of different phases of industrial policy in Malaysia 
since independence.  
0	
5	
10	
15	
20	
25	
30	
35	
1968	 1970	 1972	 1974	 1976	 1978	 1980	 1982	 1984	 1986	 1988	 1990	 1992	 1994	 1996	 1998	 2000	 2002	 2004	 2006	 2008	 2010	 2012	 2014	 2016	
Percentage  
Algeria Brazil Chile Malaysia Mexico 
	 243 
9.2 THE ELECTRONICS AND ELECTRICAL SECTOR 
 
9.2.1 Overview and performance of the sector 
 
In 2017, the E&E exports exceeded half of Malaysia’s total exports with about USD133 
billion. However, the electronics sector still relies on labour-intensive specialization 
rather than technological sophistication. E&E activities in Malaysia have mostly 
consisted of assembling activities for large MNEs, which is reflected by the sector’s 
stagnant trade balance, despite a large increase in exports (see figure 36 below). 
Figure 36: Export, Imports and Trade balance of Malaysia’s E&E sector  
 
Source: UN Comtrade (2018) 
Despite a fall since 2006, foreign value-added continues to represent over half of 
Malaysia’s E&E exports, as shown by figure 37. This is considerably higher than most 
other East Asian countries and the world average.  
Figure 38 further shows that after reaching a peak in 1999, the E&E sector’s shares in 
manufactured exports and in MVA have been dramatically decreasing. Between 2007 and 
2013, Malaysia’s share of global high-tech exports (goods and services) have also 
decreased from 4.6% to 3.5% (Rasiah and Chandran, 2015). 
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Figure 37: Share of foreign value-added in E&E exports across selected countries  
 
Source: OECD Trade in Value-Added database (2018b) 
Figure 38: Contribution of the E&E sector to Manufacturing exports and manufacturing 
value added in Malaysia 
 
Source: Rasiah (2017) 
 
The contraction of the E&E sector in Malaysia during the 2000s can be partly explained 
by the relocation of labour-intensive assembling activities from Malaysia to China, 
Indonesia, Philippines, and Viet Nam, where labour costs are lower. As a result, 
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employment in the sector, which had steadily increased from the 1970s, has also fallen 
since 2000 (Rasiah, 2017). In 2016, the sector was employing 322,308 workers (MITI, 
2018a). There were around 1,900 firms operating in the E&E sector in Malaysia (IPSOS, 
2012), most of which were operating in the segments of the value chains where there is 
little manufacturing value added. Policy efforts to encourage industrial upgrading may 
not have sufficed in enabling Malaysia to compete globally at the technological frontier. 
 
9.2.2 How did the E&E sector emerge in Malaysia? Market or state promotion?  
Because of the emergence of the E&E sector in Malaysia has been FDI-led, it is often 
attributed to exogenous factors (such as the appreciation of East Asian currencies in the 
1980s following the Plaza Accord and the withdrawal of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore from the Generalized System of Preferences). Following the appreciation of 
the yen (due to the Plaza Accord), Japanese firms relocated some of their operations in 
South East Asian countries with lower labour costs. Malaysia, because of its relatively 
educated and English-speaking population, was considered as a prime destination.  
However, this story is incomplete. A more complete story, which starts as early as the 
late 1960s, emphasizes the promotional roles of the provincial state of Penang and the 
federal government, enabling Malaysia to build a decade of production experience in 
electronics, which further rendered Malaysia as an attractive FDI destination following 
the devaluation of east Asian currencies. 
Three waves of investments in E&E activities can be identified in Malaysia (Rasiah, 
2010). The first wave took place in the early 1970s followed the opening of FTZs in 
Penang. The second wave took place in the late 1980s, with investments from Japanese 
firms following the Plaza Accord and a strong appreciation of the yen. While the first two 
waves targeted labour-intensive assembly operations, the third wave, taking place since 
2005, has targeted investments in higher value-added activities such as chip design, wafer 
fabrication, and supportive R&D activities (Rasiah, 2017). 
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9.2.2.1 FDI promotion at the provincial level 
According to some of the experts interviewed as part of this research, it is the provincial 
state of Penang that took the initial initiative to promote the E&E industry. According to 
Wong (2013), because the unemployment rate was much higher in Penang (around 15%) 
than the national average (of 9%) in the 1960s, the Chief Minister at that time, Dr Lim 
Cheong Eu was faced with the challenge to create more job opportunities and set up the 
Penang Development Corporation in 1969 to establish FTZs and attract FDI. 
Subsequently, Penang’s Chief Minister and his team made numerous trips overseas 
especially to the USA, Europe and Japan to attract MNEs (ibid.). Wong (2013) further 
provides a detailed account of the leap of faith that Intel’s CEO, Andy Grove at the time, 
took during his visit to Penang, at the invitation of the local government, to set up a 
factory in the FTZ, which was at the time still a coconut plantation in the process of being 
readied to be used for factories.195 This decision marked the start of the E&E industry in 
in Malaysia, and seven other companies (including Hewlett Packard and Hitachi) quickly 
followed in setting up factories in the Penang (ibid.). Naturally, some of the reasons for 
the initial FDI inflows relate to low labour costs, availability of good engineers and 
technicians, and business-friendly policies, but it is clear that the local government also 
played a role in convincing major MNEs to set up operations in Malaysia.   
It is interesting to note that the Penang Master Plan study was commissioned by the 
federal government in 1970 to provide an alternative development strategy for the region, 
following the end of Penang‘s free-port status a year earlier. This report, drafted by an 
American consulting company, Nathan Associates, became known as the Nathan report, 
recommended that the state of Penang shifts to an export-oriented strategy focusing on 
the electronics sector, in light of Penang‘s limited natural resource endowment and 
potential (Athukorala, 2014). The Nathan report became the basis of Penang’s 
																																																								
195 The role of the local government in directly approaching Intel stands in stark contrast with the 
Chilean case. In Chile, it is Intel that approached the government after identifying the country as a 
potential host for their regional operations. However, the Chilean government refused to pick 
winners and consequently refused the conditions and incentives requested by Intel.  
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development throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Goh, 2002).196  
9.2.2.2 FDI promotion at the Federal level 
Only few years after independence, the Malaysia government started to promote domestic 
manufacturing through the Pioneer Industry Ordinance of 1958, based on import 
substitution considerations. It was during this time that the first E&E firms (such as the 
Japanese firm Matsushita Electric, now known as Panasonic) started to relocate some of 
their manufacturing operations to Malaysia (Rasiah, 2017). Following the Investment 
Incentives Act of 1968 and the Industrial Relations Act in 1967, labour laws were 
amended and the role of trade unions was weakened to attract MNEs that were seeking to 
relocate their labour intensive assembly operations to countries endowed with cheaper 
and skilled labour (ibid.). The Second Malaysia plan (1971-1975) and the creation of free 
trade zones in 1972, further promoted export-oriented manufacturing, which resulted in 
an expansion of electronics production in Malaysia (ibid.).197 
The major objective of the government’s FDI promotion strategy, through the second 
Malaysia plan, the NEP and FTZs, was to create jobs. Such objective was confirmed 
during an interview with Prime Minister Mahathir: 
“…From these two sources [tin mining and rubber plantations], we earned our foreign 
exchange, which was not much. But the problem faced upon independence was creation of 
jobs. To do that, we opened up land for settlements, but very soon we outgrew our need for 
land. The next step was to industrialize because industry employs more people than 
agriculture, but we had no expertise, capital, knowledge of the market and big companies to 
start these industries. So we invited foreign industrialists to come to invest and create jobs. 																																																								
196 In 1962, eight years before the Nathan report, the Penang state government had already 
engaged a Colombo Plan Advisor to prepare a Master plan for the state. However, the plan was 
not implemented because it did not have the federal government’s support (Goh, 2002). This plan 
(commonly referred to as the Munro report) was already suggesting that Penang had been granted 
little priority at the national level, with a threatened free port status, and called for a structural 
transformation of Penang’s economy through import substitution industrialization (Beng and Lee, 
2010). Both the Nathan and Munro report were influential in Penang’s industrialization, although 
more emphasis has been placed on the E&E sector in the Nathan report. 
197 As early as the 1970s, the major MNCs (such as Intel, Texas Instruments, Motorola, HP and 
Siemens) had relocated massive electronics assembly operations in Malaysia (Rasiah, 2017). 
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We just wanted jobs. We were not interested in taxing them. They had tax holidays for 10 
years, to use our labour. That solved most of the unemployment problem […]. Primarily it 
[diversification towards new sectors] was about creating jobs for the people. We 
encouraged whatever industry could employ more people. So initially it was mostly about 
assembling things [...] but later, we eventually went into the assembly of electronics that 
were more sophisticated, and we acquired knowledge in that because not really would those 
industries employs people but need for sophistication and higher technology but better need 
for trading who will get better wages. If you get better wages better income per capita and 
GDP will increase. Later, we began […] to have our own industries for higher and more 
sophisticated jobs” (Prime Minister Mahathir, Personal Communication, 6th April 2017). 
The major role the state played in the emergence of the E&E sector was to develop basic 
infrastructure, to directly approach potential investors among MNCs from the United 
States, Japan, and Europe to relocate in Malaysia, as well as to further incentivize them 
through tax breaks and/or subsidies. As a result, even though external events such as the 
Plaza Accord of 1985 played a key role in increasing FDI from Japan to Malaysia, 
Malaysia at that point already had production experience of more than a decade, which 
was very useful in attracting FDI in the electronics industry (Rasiah, 1988; 2017). By the 
late 1980s, the government objectives had been achieved, as the electronics industry had 
become the largest source of manufacturing employment and exports. In Penang, as a 
result of FDI inflows, the unemployment rate fell from 8.1% in 1971 to 4.0% in 1980 to 
2.5% in 1998 (Rasiah, 2017). 
9.2.3 Industrial strategy for the E&E sector after 1986 
9.2.3.1 Overview  
It is also possible to find important interventions by the federal government for the 
promotion of the E&E sector. A shift of industrial strategy can be noted from the late 
1980s, from a relatively horizontal approach (targeting the manufacturing sector, but no 
particular sector within manufacturing) towards targeted interventions towards the E&E 
sector, alongside a gradual focus away from the promotion of labour intensive and low 
value-added assembly activities towards higher value-added activities.  
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While Malaysia successfully managed to attract MNEs to invest in E&E assembly 
operations, Rasiah (2017) argues that such policies did not meet the key objective of 
industrial policy, which is to stimulate structural transformation from low to high value-
added activities. In contrast, Singapore had managed to get Hewlett Packard to relocate 
some aspects of wafer fabrication in the late 1980s, mostly because Malaysia refused to 
provide capitalization grants upfront (Rasiah 1987; 2017). 
However, from the late 1980s onwards, as confirmed during the fieldwork interview with 
the former and current Prime Minister Mahathir quoted above, the government’s 
objectives for the E&E sector shifted away from the initial emphasis on FDI to create 
jobs towards higher value addition. Such shift was accompanied by an increased use of 
targeted policies. Since 1986, in additional to the five-year Malaysia Plans, the Malaysian 
government launched three Industrial Master Plans and an Economic Transformation 
Programme that systematically targeted and promoted the E&E sector.  
A number of targeted initiatives were launched under the IMP2 in particular.198 For 
instance, a special E&E unit within MIDA was created that focused on supporting 
information dissemination, rapid project approval, advice on factory locations, and 
liaison with respective state governments for investors (Rasiah, 2017). The government 
(and more particularly Prime minister Mahathir, under the advice of McKinsey & 
Company) also launched the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) in 1996 in order to 
provide sophisticated infrastructure in a strategic location to further attract major 
electronics and multimedia firms. The MSC contributed a cumulative total of RM34.5 
billion (around USD10.2 billion) in value added to the country’s GDP from 2004 to 2009, 
generated by around 2520 MSC status companies (64% of which are Malaysian owned) 
employing 99590 skilled workers (Bin Injau, 2011).199 200 Following the launch of the 
																																																								
198 As noted by Rasiah (2017), despite new government objectives for technological upgrading of 
the E&E sector, the first Industrial Master Plan (IMP) in 1986 relaxed all pressures on upgrades 
to avoid scaring away existing firms, following the 1984–5 downturn. 
199 The MSC aimed to develop high technology activities by replicating the Silicon Valley model, 
attracting FDI from high tech MNCs through tax incentives, infrastructure investment (such as a 
fiber-optic network), and importing skilled foreign knowledge and ICT workers (Okamoto 2004).  
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Action Plan for Industrial Technology Development (APITD) in 1991, the government 
began promoting functional upgrading to stimulate the transformation of the industry to 
high value-added operations, such as wafer fabrication, chip design, and R&D (ibid.). 
Several organizations were also created to solve collective action problems in the E&E 
sector, including the Malaysian Institute of Microelectronics Systems (MIMOS) in 1985 
to support the development of national firms. MIMOS incubated several Malaysian E&E 
firms, such as Silterra, which produces wafers (ibid.). 
The initial policy focus on developing domestic capabilities in higher value-added 
activities led to the emergence of several indigenous E&E firms, such as Carsem, 
Unisem, and Globetronics (Rasiah, 2017). Some local suppliers have even gone global to 
supply MNC factories located in other parts of the world such as the Philippines, China 
and Central America, and many engineers have left MNCs to become entrepreneurs to set 
up system design companies (Wong, 2013). 
However, the objective of technological deepening set from the late 1980s onwards was 
not fully achieved. The following sections examine more closely the role of fiscal 
incentives, state venture capitalism, R&D and human capital accumulation in the 
development of the E&E sector. 
9.2.3.2 Targeted Fiscal Incentives 
Since the late 1980s, with the launch of the IMP1 (1986-1995), the government 
promotion of the E&E sector gradually emphasised sophisticated and high-tech activities 
rather than merely promote the volume of investment and jobs created, as previously 
done (Best and Rasiah, 2003). The IMP2 called for targeting financial incentives to 
capital-intensive and strategic industries. However, due to the Asian financial crisis 
struck in 1997, such policy was not implemented until much later when MIDA 
established a list of promoted activities products for high technology and strategic 
																																																																																																																																																																					
200 Industrial parks, such as the Kulim High Tech Park, were also created in the 1990s to host 
high technology enterprises. 
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investments.201 Nowadays, several products and activities within the E&E sector remain 
eligible for fiscal incentives.202  
  
9.2.3.3  State venture capitalism 
The Malaysian government has also invested directly in E&E firms, notably by launching 
a venture capital firm, the Malaysian Technology Development Corporation (MTDC), in 
1992, and by corporatizing MIMOS in 1993. Malaysia’s sovereign development fund, 
Khazanah, has also been increasingly acquiring assets to develop Malaysia’s domestic 
E&E capabilities. For instance, Khazanah opened offices in San Francisco and London to 
focus on IT sector acquisition and acquire microchip firms. Khazanah has also invested in 
two domestically owned E&E firms, Silterra (semiconductors) and Amulus (microchips). 
Silterra, 1st Silicon, Amulus and VLSI are examples of government-owned wafer 
fabrication firms. Rasiah (2017) argues these state venture capitalism efforts did not yield 
significant results in the semiconductor industry because Silterra and VLSI are still far 
from the technology frontier, while 1st Silicon has been since acquired by a foreign firm.  
  
9.2.3.4 R&D and technology transfer 
Over the past decades, the Malaysian government has set up different types of financial 
support schemes for R&D through various organizations such as MITI, MIDA and the 
Small and Medium Scale Industry Development Corporation.  
																																																								
201 The most recent list of promoted activities and products for high technology firms can be 
found on MIDA’s website. Those include design, development and manufacturing of advanced 
electronics and computing, biotechnology, and the manufacturing of super fine wires, medial and 
laboratory equipment, amongst other products and activities. High-tech companies must meet 
several conditions to quality for the above-mentioned fiscal incentives. Local R&D expenditure 
should be higher than 1% of gross sales on an annual basis, and the percentage of science and 
technical graduates should represent at least 7% of the workforce. Investments in the high tech 
sector deemed of national importance, (defined as investment of more than RM100 million; 
having backward and forward linkages; and approved R&D facilities) also qualify for full tax 
exemptions under the Pioneer Status and Investment Tax Allowance (Best and Rasiah, 2003). 
202 Those incentives offered by the Malaysian government include Pioneer Status (which involves 
a tax exemption on 70% of statutory income for five years) and the Investment Tax Allowance. 
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Most of the government programmes that offer fiscal incentives for R&D have a 
horizontal scope and do not specifically target the E&E sector.203  One programme that 
has a more vertical scope is the Intensification of Research in Priority Areas (IRPA) 
Fund, created in 1987 under the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment. 
IRPA supports the financing of research and development through grants to Malaysian 
universities and other research organizations. IRPA targets various prioritized and 
strategic areas, such as design and software technology, nanotechnology and precision 
engineering. Thematic areas and research directions are defined under the supervision of 
the National Council for Scientific Research and Development, with consultations with 
representatives of academia, industry and public authorities (OECD, 2016b).  
However, despite the availability of considerable government research grants, the 
commercialization rate of government-funded research grants remains low, at around 5% 
of the research output of Malaysian universities (OECD 2011). Academic and public 
research organizations appear to have a limited ability to translate research into 
intellectual property rights (Rasiah and Chandran, 2015). This might be due to the weak 
industry-university linkages (Siew Yean, 2015). According to some account, the lack of 
industry-relevant research may also be the result of a lack of dedicated intermediary 
organizations that can match university research with the needs of firms (OECD, 2011; 
Siew Yean, 2015). However, intermediary organizations do not appear to be lacking in 
Malaysia given that a wide range of institutions have been created by the government 
since the 1970s to coordinate technology accumulation and transfer. Those include: 
• The Technology Transfer Unit, started in 1975 within MITI. 
• The Technology Councils, on which both the public and private sector are represented. 
Those councils assist firms in moving towards the technological frontier. The leading 
example is the Penang Industrial Co-ordinating Council. Other councils have suffered 
from a lack of participation from industrial partners.  																																																								
203  Those programmes include the Industrial Technical Assistance Fund; the Technology 
Acquisition Fund, which helps Malaysian industries obtain strategic technology from foreign 
sources; the Industry R&D Grant Scheme, which encourages technology adaption and diffusion 
amongst Malaysian companies; the Commercialisation of R&D Fund, created in 1992 to enhance 
the commercialization of domestic technology. 
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• The Malaysian Industry-Government High Technology (MIGHT) 
• The recently privatized (in 1992) Malaysian Institute of Microelectronics System 
(MIMOS). It supports start-ups in the E&E sector, with the assistance of the Malaysian 
Technology Development Corporation (MTDC), whose task is to identify and financially 
support promising high-tech firms.204 
In 2012, a group of 10 MNEs decided to establish a platform to promote collaborative 
research among industry, academia and the government to satisfy the research needs of 
the electrical and electronics industries (Rasiah and Chandran, 2015).205 While foreign 
firms were already engaged in early stages of R&D since the 1990s, the government was 
initially favouring national capital over foreign capital in the provision of incentives and 
grants for R&D following the introduction of the heavy industrialization programme in 
1981 and the APITD in 1991.206 The extension of the provision of R&D grants to foreign 
firms and the approval of permits to import foreign R&D personnel in 2005 has 
considerably stimulated the undertaking of further R&D activities. 207 As a result, the 
R&D pursed by several MNES (such as Intel, Hitachi, Motorola, Alterra, Infineon, Onn 
Semiconductor, etc) has increasingly stimulated upgrading towards higher value-added 
stages such as chip design, wafer fabrication and R&D (Rasiah, 2017). In fact, foreign 
multinational firms have been engaging in more sophisticated R&D and product 
innovation than domestic firms, which have remained limited to basic research (Best and 																																																								
204 MIMOS contributed 45–50% of Malaysia’s patents filed in 2010 but the low citations that 
have emerged from those patents suggest that the commercialization rate is low (Rasiah and 
Chandran, 2015). The experience of low commercialization of government-funded R&D in the 
electronics sector stands in contrast with the high impact and commercialization rates of 
government funded R&D in the palm oil and rubber sectors for instance. 
205 Those MNEs spend nearly RM1.4 billion on R&D annually thanks to government research 
grants that have been extended beyond domestic firms in 2005 (Rasiah and Chandran, 2015). 
206 While studies such as Hobday (1999), and Ariffin and Bell (1999) had found that there has 
been technological progress within the E&E industry in Malaysia, Pek Chen (1999) found that the 
technological progress in the semiconductor industry was still structurally weak due to foreign 
domination, weak linkages between foreign and local firms, low relative technology content in 
both foreign and local firms, and weak production linkages between suppliers and firms, 
207 Nowadays, the government is also encouraging more companies to set up D&D (Design & 
Development) centres and to set up global procurement centres, regional logistics centres, 
operational headquarters and other high value operations (Wong, 2013). D&D expenditure has 
doubled from RM1 billion in 2007 to RM2 billion in 2012 and the number of D&D engineers has 
almost tripled from about 2,000 in 2007 to 5,500 in 2012 (ibid.). 
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Rasiah, 2003; Rasiah and Chandran, 2015).208 However, even the R&D conducted by 
foreign firms tends to be limited to process and product improvements, rather than 
reaching the technology frontier (Rasiah and Chandran, 2015; Rasiah, 2017). Cherif and 
Hasanov (2019) also suggest that MNEs have not seriously engaged in technology 
transfer which is why Malaysia might need to further stimulate the creation of 
technologies by domestic firms in order to reach the technological frontier and attain the 
levels of local research and design of South Korea, Singapore or Taiwan. 
Wong (2013) suggests that there is a need for supplier development programmes to assist 
local SMEs to upgrade, grow and compete globally. Such programmes could offer 
assistance in areas such as technology acquisition, product commercialization, funding, 
branding and setting up global networks and business connections (ibid.). Marketing and 
branding are indeed another weakness of local firms (Siew Yean, 2015). 
9.2.3.5 Human Capital 
Skilled human capital accumulation has remained a major challenge preventing 
technological upgrading in Malaysia’s electronics sector. Both the IMP1 and IMP2 failed 
to put in place effective human capital development policies to step up the supply of 
quality engineers and scientists (Cheong, 2011; Rasiah, 2017). Indeed, despite the 
availability of grants for R&D, several studies have shown that one of the main reasons 
for the lack of upgrading towards R&D operations in the E&E sector relates to the 
shortage of specialized human capital (such as quality engineers and scientists) (World 
Bank, 2009; Wong, 2013; Siew Yean 2015; Rasiah, 2017).209  
In addition, most of the labour-intensive operations employ foreign unskilled workers, 
mostly from neighboring countries. Meanwhile, Malaysia also suffers from a brain drain, 
which lures skilled workers abroad, especially to neighbouring Singapore (Samel, 2012; 
																																																								
208 In the semiconductor subsector, while 20 of the 21 foreign firms were engaged in at least early 
stages of R&D, only one of four national firms reported undertaking basic R&D (Rasiah, 2017). 
209 Around 40% of Malaysia’s firms have identified skill shortages as a top constraint (World 
Bank 2009; Siew Yean 2015). 
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Siew Yean 2015).210 Because the supply of skilled labour became scarce in Malaysia, the 
rising demand for statistical and cognitive skills by firms in the E&E sector has led to 
high degrees of poaching since 1988 (Rasiah, 2017). The lack of human capital and the 
wage spiral generated as companies headhunted for technicians and engineers (Wong, 
2013), is a type of collective action problem. 
To solve this collective action problem, the Penang provincial government has initially 
responded to firms’ requests by offering a large building for their use in order to 
stimulate training for the industry (Rasiah, 2017). However, the most important initiative 
that has been set up to increase the supply of skilled workers and effectively address the 
human capital shortage was the non-profit Penang Skill Development Centre (PSDC), 
created in 1989 through a partnership between the Penang provincial government, the 
Penang Development Corporation, and several multinational corporations. Sub-
committees (which include representatives from MNCs) are responsible for analysing and 
overseeing training needs; defining the annual programme; and evaluating the 
effectiveness of courses. By 1998, PSDC had 81 member companies employing 75,000 
workers, 40,000 of which had followed courses in PSDC (Best and Rasiah, 2003). 
However, despite some positive results, the Penang Skill Development Centre has not 
been able to gain the committed involvement of local universities for long-term solutions 
to upgrade local capabilities (Piyanit 2010; Siew Yean 2015).  
The efforts of the provincial government of Penang to start the PSDC influenced the 
creation of similar institutions at the national level.211 The PSDC also influenced the 
enactment of the HR Development Act in 1992, which aimed to establish a more 
institutionalized framework to support training at the national level by requiring 
manufacturing firms employed more than fifty workers to contribute up to 1% of their 
payroll to the Human Resource Development Fund (HRDF), coordinated by the Human 
Resource Development Council (Rasiah, 2017). Firms can then claim from their 																																																								
210 The share of migrant workers in the Malaysian E&E sector increased from 1.0% in 1980 to 
28.0% in 2007 (Siew Yean, 2015). Meanwhile, roughly 350,000 Malaysians were working 
abroad in 2008, with over half of them having tertiary education (Fong, 2010; Siew Yean, 2015). 
211 The PSDC was indeed followed by the SHRDC (Selangor Human Resource Development 
Centre) in 1992 (Wong, 2013).   
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contributions approved training expenses, which incentivizes them to increase training 
(Best and Rasiah, 2003; Rasiah, 2017). The HRDF has been instrumental in pushing 
MNCs such as Intel and Motorola to start their own training centres (Best and Rasiah, 
2003). However, indigenous electronics firms are lagging in this respect (ibid.) 
The Malaysian government has also responded to the industry’s needs by encouraging the 
creation of more postgraduate programmes in electronics engineering in Malaysian 
universities (such as Universiti Sains Malaysia). The Northern Corridor Implementation 
Authority has also set up the Centre of Excellence for Microelectronics, operated by 
USAINS Infotech, where engineers are trained in microelectronic design (Wong, 2013).  
9.2.4 Conclusion 
The development of Malaysia’s E&E industry features a mixed experience. Only 
assessing this sector by the size of its exports is somewhat misleading. There is a 
consensus that most local firms are engaged in the least knowledge-intensive segments of 
the E&E value chain (Best and Rasiah, 2003; Cherif and Hasanov, 2019; PEMANDU 
2010; Rasiah 2012; Siew Yean, 2015; Yusuf and Nabeshima 2009). Despite recent 
attempts to increase local value-added, the results, although tangible, remained limited.  
Initially, the government interventions towards the E&E sector mostly consisted of 
financial incentives subsidizing infrastructure at FTZs and directly approaching MNCs to 
attract them to relocate assembling operations in Malaysia. Such interventions were in 
line with the initial governmental objective for the E&E sector, namely to generate 
employment and exports. However, the bulk of FDI did not involve high value-added 
activities. Rasiah (2017) explains, “markets were left to shape firm-level technologies” 
because of the lack of policy interests for industrial upgrading in between 1970 and the 
1990s, and the late introduction of R&D grants.212 Because government support was 
mostly limited to fiscal incentives and basic infrastructure provision at that time, most 																																																								
212 Neither of the IMP1 or the IMP2 included grants or policies to promote R&D not human 
capital development to increase the supply of quality engineers and scientists, while R&D grants 
(as part of the APITD in 1991) were delayed to the early 2000s (Rasiah, 2017). MNCs (such as 
HP and Intel) that considered upgrading into wafer fabrication and chip design in the late 1980s 
did not do so because of lack of capital grants upfront from the government (Rasiah 1996; 2017). 
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investments in the E&E targeted labour-intensive activities. Such specialization in 
labour-intensive activities has been problematic in the long run. Indeed, Malaysia is no 
longer considered as a low-cost country, leading to a loss in competitiveness in labour 
intensive assembly, packaging, and testing operations (Best and Rasiah, 2003; Wong, 
2013). As a result, several MNCs have already relocated their operations to neighbouring 
countries with lower labour costs such as Vietnam, Indonesia, China and the Philippines.  
From the 1990s onwards, industrial policy objectives for the E&E sector shifted towards 
industrial upgrading from low value-added to high value-added activities. Fiscal 
incentives, R&D support and publicly funded human capital accumulation has some 
positive results. However, despite the availability of R&D grants and notwithstanding the 
success of the Penang Development Centre and the Penang Skill Development Centre, 
the lack of a critical mass of human capital and frontier R&D institutions have inhibited 
industrial upgrading, innovation and the transformation of such firms into global players 
(Rasiah, 2017). “While ‘carrots’ were given to national firms during the Dr Mahathir 
regime, the ‘stick’ was never applied. The government’s largely facilitative rather than 
developmental role has restricted technological upgrading in the industry” (ibid.).  
9.3 THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR  
9.3.1 Overview  
Several countries have attempted to develop an automotive industry as part of their 
industrialization strategies. However, in contrast to countries such as Japan, Thailand or 
South Korea, Malaysia has not managed to develop a competitive and export-oriented 
industry.213 How can we explain this divergence of experiences? What have been the 
strengths and limitations of the Malaysian automotive strategy?  
In line with previous assessments on the Malaysian automotive industry (such as Ariffin 
and Sahid, 2017; Rosli and Kari, 2008; Siew Yean, 2015; Wad and Govindaraju, 2011), 																																																								
213 In fact, the Japanese firm Toyota has run losses for the first 40 years of its existence, and 
survived thanks to infant industry protection and subsidies, but subsequently gradually increased 
its world market shares until becoming a global champion in 2008 (Chang, 2007a). 
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this section shows that the Malaysian automotive sector expanded in terms of 
employment, production, sales and local content, but has not managed to become export-
oriented due to a lack of competitiveness and industrial upgrading.214 
By the end of the 2010s, the automobile industry in Malaysia consisted of 27 
manufacturing and assembly plants and 600 automotive component manufacturers (MITI, 
2018b). Amongst those components manufacturers, the majority of the firms are still 
lagging behind in terms of technological capacity and only around 45 firms are exporters, 
mostly of low-tech components and parts (such as steering wheels, rims, brake pads, 
wheels, bumpers, radiators and shock absorbers) (Wad and Govindaraju, 2011).  
Vehicles sale and production in Malaysia both increased almost fivefold since 1980.215 
Malaysia’s automotive exports even grew more than tenfold between 1990 and 2016 
(from USD121 million to USD1.6 billion, as shown in Figure 39). However, the growth 
of automotive production has stagnated since 2009. More worryingly, Malaysia’s 
automotive exports still only represented around 1.5% of the country’s total exports in 
2017 (Malaysia Automotive Robotics and IoT Institute, 2019). In addition, figure 39 
shows that Malaysian automotive imports have also dramatically increased since the 
early 2000s, leading to an increasing trade deficit for automotive products. Malaysia’s 
trade deficit for automotive products reached a peak of USD5.6 billion in 2012. Figure 40 
furthers shows that Malaysia’s automotive production is also far from covering the 
increasing domestic demand, which explains the reliance on car imports.   
 
																																																								
214 In terms of employment, automotive manufacturing (including assembly activities) generated 
nearly 60,000 jobs in 2017 (MITI, 2018b). The industry recorded a 3% annual average growth 
rate of employment since 2000. The two ‘national’ car-makers Proton and Perodua have the 
largest share of workforce with nearly 70% of the total employment of motor vehicle 
manufacturers (Wad and Govindaraju, 2011).  
215 Vehicle sales went up from around 97,000 in 1980 to 578,000 in 2017, while production of 
vehicles increased fivefold from around 104,000 in 1980 to about 500,000 in 2017 (MAA, 2018a, 
2018b; Wad and Govindaraju, 2011). In 2017, Proton and Perodua, captured 47,8% of the total 
vehicle market (MAA, 2018b). 
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Figure 39: Exports and imports of automotive products in Malaysia 1990-2016.216 
 
Source: WTO (2018) 
 
Figure 40: Sales, Imports and Exports of Malaysian Vehicle Components and Parts 
 
Source: MIDA (2018b) 
Despite the reliance on domestically owned car makers, figure 41 shows the share of 
foreign value-added (FVA) in Malaysia’s automotive exports is quite high in comparison 
to other countries, including Thailand, where the automotive industry is FDI-led.  
 																																																								
216 Automotive products used for this figure include SITC groups 7132, 7783, 781, 782, 783 and 
784 while railway equipment, aircrafts and ships are excluded.  
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Figure 41: Share of foreign value-added in automotive exports in selected countries 
 
Source: OECD TiVA database (OECD, 2018b) 
The next section discusses the role of the state in stimulating the development of the 
automotive industry in Malaysia before discussing the limitations of Malaysia’s 
automotive strategy. 
9.3.2 Role of the State 
9.3.2.1 Objectives and motivations  
Malaysia’s first national car project, PROTON, was approved in 1983 as part of the 
country’s heavy industries programme to deepen industrialization and create Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs. The government saw the importance to have its own automotive 
manufacturing industry since the automotive industry was considered (particularly in the 
pre-globalization era) as the “industry of the industries”, due to its potential to drive 
industrialisation through linkages and spill-over effects on other manufacturing industries 
(Ariffin and Sahid, 2017; Dicken, 2007; Wad and Govindaraju, 2011).  
A fieldwork interview with Prime Minister Mahathir, who initiated the PROTON project, 
confirms that the motivations behind the promotion of the automotive industry were quite 
different than the objectives for the electronics industry:  
“We promoted the electronics industry because it creates more jobs and better qualified 
people. In the case of the automobile industry, the aim was to upgrade the national 
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engineering capacity. As a developing country and former colony, we did not have 
engineering know-how, so we had to develop engineering capabilities in order to progress. 
One of the best catalysts for developing engineering capabilities is the automotive industry, 
because to build a car you need various types of component and parts. If local firms build 
the components and parts, we will become very skilful in producing engineering products, 
not only for the automotive but other industries as well. [...] Developed countries have had 
engineering capabilities that contributed to their growth. We used the car sector in order to 
accumulate engineering capabilities” (Personal Communication, 7th April 2017). 
This emphasis on the transversal linkages arising out of the engineering capabilities that 
are embedded in the automotive sector contributes to explain why Malaysia chose to 
build its own automotive manufacturing industry rather than rely on foreign direct 
investment, in contrast with the E&E sector.  
9.3.2.2  State investments to build a ‘national car industry’ 
The first national automotive project came through with the establishment of the Heavy 
Industry Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) in 1981. HICOM is a state-owned enterprise 
tasked with the development of heavy industries, both on its own and in joint ventures 
with foreign companies (Siew Yean, 2015). In 1983, HICOM entered a joint venture with 
the Japanese Mitsubishi Motor Corporation to create Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional 
(PROTON). After the government invested RM480 million to establish the PROTON 
automobile factory the first Proton cars rolled out in 1985 (Mahathir, 2011).217 In 1993, 
ten years after the creation of PROTON, the second national car company, PERODUA, 
was founded. Other national projects followed in the automotive sector. A heavy vehicle 
company was created in 1994, followed by a motorcycle manufacturer (MODENAS) in 
1995, a light vehicle commercial manufacturer (INOKOM) in 1997, and Malaysian 
Truck and Bus (now Isuzu HICOM after Isuzu took over the majority of shares in 2006) 
(Wad and Govindaraju, 2011). There are also around ten foreign car assemblers and three 
composite body sports car manufacturers in the country (Siew Yean, 2015). 																																																								
217 Siew Yean (2015) notes that the total amount spent by the government to set up Proton was 
much higher as it also included grants to support the development of Bumiputera vendors. 
Malaysia could afford such expenses to build a national car because of its oil rents.  
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Proton was originally owned in majority by HICOM, with minority stakes being held by 
Mitsubishi Group members. By 2005, Mitsubishi had divested their stake in Proton to 
Khazanah Nasional. By 2007, the largest shareholders in Proton were still government-
controlled agencies, namely HICOM, Khazanah Nasional Berhad (42.7%), the 
Employees Provident Fund (12.6%), and Petronas (9.8%). In 2012, Proton was fully 
acquired by DRB-HICOM. In 2017, DRB-HICOM sold 49.9% stake in Proton to the 
Chinese car manufacturer Geely Automobile Holdings. While Malaysian capital has 
retained the majority ownership of Proton, Perodua is no longer a national car company 
since its equity was restructured in 2001.218 
Most of the major domestic auto-manufacturers have thus relied on state investments, 
notably through the state-owned HICOM and later on through state investment funds, 
such as Khazanah and PNB. However, some policy changes came about with the 
National Automotive Policy (NAP), launched in 2006 and reviewed in 2009 and 2014. 
Through the NAP, the Malaysian government confirmed the previous objective of 
developing a national automotive industry of original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
parts for automotive assembly as envisioned in the early 1980s, but scaled down its 
ambitions (Wad and Govindaraju, 2011). The Malaysian government has indeed 
withdrawn from national projects it could not handle by selling its stakes in automotive 
firms. The overall aim of the NAP is to improve the competitiveness of the automotive 
industry in Malaysia through technology upgrading and market expansion, notably into 
the energy-efficient vehicle segment.219 However, since the implementation of NAP in 
2006, the sales of vehicles in Malaysia have not recorded a significant increase, 
especially compared to Thailand (Ariffin and Sahid, 2017).220 
																																																								
218 Local investors dominated Perodua’s equity until 2001, when Daihatsu, a Toyota subsidiary, 
and Mitsui, respectively acquired 41% and 10% of Perodua Auto Corporation (Perodua’s 
manufacturing unit) (Siew Yean, 2015). Japanese firms thus effectively control the company. 
219  Some of the measures outlined in the revision of the NAP in 2014 include the provision of 
customized incentives to attract strategic investments in the EEV category (MITI, 2018b).  
220 Following the financial crisis in 2009, as part of the 2nd Stimulus Package that totaled RM60 
billion, the Automotive Development Fund benefited from a RM200 million grant (equivalent to 
USD60 million) to develop local vendors and establish the Automotive Institute of Malaysia 
(Wad and Govindaraju, 2011). While the government’s assistance provided cushioning effects to 
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9.3.2.3 Trade Protection 
Several trade protection measures, such as tariffs, imports quotas and restrictions on 
approved permits for car imports, have been implemented over the past decades to protect 
the domestic automotive industry.  
High tariffs were used to protect Proton from the 1980s until the revisions on import 
duties as part implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 2004.221
 
The 
first national car, the Proton Saga, launched in 1985, was indeed protected by tariffs 
ranging from 140% to 300% (Siew Yean, 2015). 
Non-tariff barriers, such as import quotas have also been applied on the automotive 
industry since 1966 (Rosli and Kari, 2008; Siew Yean, 2015).222 Those measures caused 
a price difference of 20–30% in favor of the national car over imported cars (Siew Yean, 
2015).223 Import permits have been increasingly restricted and restrictive. Since 2011, as 
part of the NAP, approved permits are given only to assemblers whose production of 
certain models is significant for the export market (ibid.).  
The Malaysian government had also temporarily adopted protective measures (such as 
auto-scrapping schemes) during the global financial crisis by giving rebates of RM5000 
for consumers replacing a car more than ten years old with a national brand vehicle 
(Bursa, 2009, Siew Yean, 2015).  In addition, Proton still receives preferential treatment 
in public procurement and is the official car for civil servants (Siew Yean, 2015).  
																																																																																																																																																																					
the auto industry, it did not completely restore the sales level of the pre-2009 period (ibid.). 
221 Since 2004, there has been a significant reduction in import duties on all types and variants of 
CBU and CKD vehicles across regions. However, import duties on ASEAN CKD (0%) and non-
ASEAN CKD (10%) have remained. 
222 Import quotas imposed on passenger cars and commercial vehicles have fluctuated between 
10% and 1% since 1989 (Rosli and Kari, 2008). Import and excise duties have also been imposed 
by the government on ‘completely knocked down’ units (CKD) assembled locally. 
223 For example, Siew Yean (2015) reports that the price of a 1.3 cc PROTON Saga in 1987 was 
RM21 000, lower than the RM28 000–29 000 of similar imported cars, which allowed PROTON 
to capture a 65% market share in 1987 and 73% in 1988. This share eventually fell to 25% during 
2006–10 due to competition from Perodua, the second national car project, and an increase in 
imported cars as a result of a proliferation in approved permits (ibid.). 
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Rosli and Kari (2008) and Rasiah (2005) note that the inclusion of automotives under the 
common effective preferential tariffs under the AFTA has increased pressure for the 
removal of localization-based tariff protection for automotive manufacturing. As a result, 
a key concern should be whether local suppliers are on the path to become competitive 
once trade protection measures are removed. By comparing the performance levels of 
local and foreign supplier firms in Malaysia, Rosli and Kari (2008) have shown that local 
suppliers still lacked technological and managerial capabilities.  
9.3.2.4 Tax incentives  
Generous tax incentives have been provided to promote investments in automotive 
manufacturing under the 1986 Promotion of Investment Act (Rosli and Kari, 2008). 
Amongst those incentives, the Pioneer Status and Investment Tax Allowance are the two 
most generous tax incentives. They are granted to firms involved in promoted activities 
or products that are determined by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI). The automotive sector has been systematically identified in the list of promoted 
activities by the Malaysian government.  
9.3.2.5 Local content policy  
In order to localize backward linkages, the government directly intervened in the 
automotive industry by protecting local suppliers from too much exposure to external 
competition through local content requirements and fiscal incentives. 
In 1979, the Mandatory Deletion Programme banned local car producers from importing 
30 automotive parts and components (Alavi and Hasan 2001; Rosli and Kari, 2008; Siew 
Yean, 2015).224 In 1992, local automotive manufacturers were required to meet new 																																																								
224 The mandatory deleted components comprised 13 items for motorcycles and 30 items for 
passenger and commercial vehicles (including air filters, batteries, carpets and underlay, coil 
springs, exhaust systems, fuel tanks, radiators, seats, spark plugs, tyres, wiper motors, and wire 
harnesses). In 2002, the local items constituted 50% to 80% in the Proton cars, and 35% to 65% 
in the Perodua cars and other vehicles (MIDA, 2004). The calculation of the reported local 
content is based on gross value – the percentage would be much lower if the calculation is based 
on net value due to the fact that most semi-processed materials (such as steel and plastic) to make 
parts are imported (Rosli and Kari, 2008:107). 
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minimum local content targets ranging between 45% to 60% of by 1996 (Abdulsomad, 
2003). 225 In 2002, following the AFTA, the government had begun phasing out local 
content requirements with the initial removal of 11 items from the Mandatory Deleted 
Items List (MDIL). By the end of December 2003, the remaining 19 items contained in 
the MDIL were removed (Rosli and Kari, 2008).  
In the late 1980s, the government also introduced a vendor development programme 
(VDP). The first VDP was implemented by Proton, and granted financial assistance to 
Bumiputera vendors (for purchasing capital goods, intermediate inputs, and technology) 
and enabled them to participate in the Quality Improvement Programme organized by the 
Standards and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia. 226 227 
The local content in Proton cars has reportedly increased since the launch of the VDP, 
from 18% in 1985 to 80% in 1992 (Abdul Rahman, 1994; Meyanathan and Ismail, 
1994).228 However, Rosli and Kari (2008) found that foreign suppliers still performed 
better than local suppliers due to their access to superior technology from abroad. In 
addition, the negative trade balance of automotive part and components also indicates 
that local suppliers have been unable to meet volume and quality standards, which has 
encouraged imports (Wad and Govindaraju, 2011). Local suppliers have remained highly 
dependent on the domestic market and failed to become internationally competitive. The 
efficiency of local suppliers needs to be raised through appropriate economies of scale by 
establishing strategic alliances to gain larger market shares (Rosli and Kari, 2008).   
One of the reasons for the low competitiveness of Malaysia’s auto-parts and components 																																																								
225 The variation in local content target was subject to the engine capacity of automobiles. 
226 Perodua undertook a similar vendor development programme since the early 1990s. 
227 Grants could be provided by the Industrial Technical Assistance Fund (ITAF) and through the 
Proton Technical Assistance Programme, which secured over RM20 million in government grants 
under the 5th and 6th Malaysia Plans (1986–90 and 1991-85) to help SMEs venture into 
automotive parts manufacturing (Rali 1999; Rosli and Kari, 2008). 
228 Total vendors of Proton increased from merely 17 in 1985 to 284 in 2005, of which about half 
are members of the Proton Vendor Association (Rosli and Kari, 2008). About 50% of the 
suppliers were SMEs and 50% of these SMEs were Bumiputera-owned (Mohd Shah, 1995). In 
2004, the total value of components and parts manufactured in Malaysia reached RM5.19 billion, 
but the import of automotive parts amounted to about RM7.2 billion during the same year (ibid).  
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industry may also have to do with Malaysia affirmative action agenda. The creation of 
Proton was a result of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which aimed to create a 
Bumiputera business community, at the expense of already existing (and dominant) 
Chinese Malaysian businesses in automotive assembling and distribution (Jomo, 2007; 
Wad and Govindaraju, 2011). The Malaysian government has therefore bypassed 
competitive Malaysian Chinese firms in the components and parts industry, which 
resulted in the neglect of existing production, sales and management experiences (Wad 
and Govindaraju, 2011; Siew Yean, 2015). 
In addition, as pointed out by Wad and Govindaraju (2011), Proton’s weak technological, 
marketing and management capabilities affected the upgrading of its domestic supplier 
base, because upgrading requires the lead OEM producer to transfer technology, train 
vendors, and form collaborative production and innovation networks. As a result, Proton 
partly switched to global first-tier suppliers in the 2000s.  
9.3.2.6 Skills development 
Unskilled workers represent more than 80% of the workforce in the Malaysian 
automotive industry (Wad and Govindaraju, 2011).229 Industrial upgrading requires skills 
development of the Malaysian workforce. Although domestic automotive manufacturers 
such as Proton and Perodua undertake skills development programmes and trainings in 
areas such as production control, welding, painting, trim and final maintenance, tooling, 
stamping and quality control (Rasiah, 2001; Mahidin and Kanageswary, 2004, Wad and 
Govindaraju, 2011), the industry still lacks the investment in training and skills 
development. The training expenditure as a share of sales for manufacturers of motor 
vehicles and other transport equipment is below 0.10% (Wad and Govindaraju, 2011).230 
 
 																																																								
229 Wad and Govindaraju (2011) respectively define skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers as 
degree holders, diploma holders and non-degree and diploma holders out of total workforce. 
230 In comparison, organizations, in the United States spend on average 11% of their budget on 
training and learning (TrainingMag, 2018). 
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9.3.2.7 R&D and Technological capabilities 
The national auto-manufacturers upgraded technologically to original design 
manufacturing (ODM) in 2000 and to engine manufacturing in 2002, following Proton’s 
collaboration with and acquisition of the British sports car maker, Lotus.231 However, 
investments in technology and R&D are still too low with an average of 2% during the 
2000-2005 period for OEMs, while other equipment manufacturers only spend around 
0.14% (Wad and Govindaraju, 2011).232 In addition, indigenous technology development 
in the sector has been inhibited by weak linkages with research organisations, including 
universities (Rasiah and Chandran, 2015). Such low R&D capacity has hindered local 
firms’ ability to compete internationally, especially given existing high entry barriers and 
demanding economies of scale in the automotive industry (Siew Yean, 2015; Wad, 2011; 
Wad and Govindaraju, 2011).233 
Recent initiatives have been undertaken to stimulate industrial upgrading. In 2006, the 
IMP3 recommended the creation of a platform for automotive industrialists to come 
together to formulate strategies in facing the challenges ahead. Four years later, the 
Malaysian Automotive Institute (MAI) was created under the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI). It functions as a coordination centre and a think tank for the 
nation's automotive industry and aims to enhance the technology, human capital, supply 
chain, and marketing capabilities of all automotive stakeholders. 
The government has been searching for a partner for PROTON since the Asian financial 
crisis. In 2017, Proton partnered with the Chinese automaker Geely, who bought almost 
half of its equity stakes. It is too soon to assess whether this recent partnership will offer 
more avenues for Proton to upgrade in global value chains. 
																																																								
231  Recent Proton models use Malaysian developed engines through collaboration with its 
subsidiary, Lotus (Siew Yean, 2015). Proton acquired Lotus in 1996 and sold 51% of its stakes in 
Lotus to the Chinese car manufacturer Geely Automobile Holdings in 2017. 
232 Such figures fall short of the average R&D spending as share of sales in the auto-industry 
(3.9%) (Jusko, 2008). 
233 In contrast, Thailand is one of six countries housing Toyota’s global R&D operations and one 
of the eight hosting Bridgestone’s tire test track (Cheong 2011; Siew Yean, 2015). 
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9.3.3 Assessment: why Malaysia did not do better in the automotive sector?  
Since 1980, the Malaysian automotive industry has considerably expanded its production 
and evolved from assembly activities towards the production of higher value added 
manufacturing through the local production and design of cars and components.234 
However, beyond the pride of a national car manufacturer ownership and the fact that 
Proton has managed to stay profitable most of the time (in a protected environment), the 
industry still lacks competitiveness in international markets. The country remains a net 
importer of automobiles and automotive components. In addition, PROTON’s future 
looks bleak for two reasons. Firstly, Proton cannot survive without becoming export-
oriented due to Malaysia’s small domestic market, especially since automobile 
companies need to sell at least 1 million cars a year to remain profitable (Cheong, 2011; 
Siew Yean, 2015).235  Secondly, even if Proton manages to export, there is global excess 
manufacturing capacity of 20 million units in conventional cars (Fong 2011).  
Malaysian automotive makers and suppliers can also expect to face greater competition 
following pressures for trade liberalization at the bilateral and regional level through 
FTAs under the AFTA, WTO and with the European Union.236 Trade liberalization under 
AFTA represents a challenge for domestic firms (if foreign suppliers become the prime 
beneficiaries of this expansion) but it can also be an opportunity, if they manage to gain 
access to this large regional market for car parts (Rosli and Kari, 2008). However, the 
domestic automotive industry still lacks competitiveness to penetrate international 
markets due to its low levels of skills, marketing and technological capabilities. 																																																								
234 Torri (1991) argued that country typically develop a local automotive industry through the 
following sequencing: import of CBU units; assembly of imported CKD parts and local 
manufacturing of automotive components; and local production and design of cars and 
components. Malaysia has already entered the last stages (Wad and Govindaraju, 2011). 
However, those categorizations do not suffice to assess the performance of Malaysia’s 
automotive industry, which still suffers from limitations that prevent its export orientation. 
235 Kuchiki (2007) argues that domestic demand in Malaysia does not satisfy the minimum 
average cost of production essential for cost competitiveness in the global automobile industry. 
236 ASEAN and the Japan–Malaysia agreements have left government procurement untouched. 
However, it is unlikely to be the case for the potential Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and a 
FTA with the European Union, which are also are bound to affect tariffs in the automotive sector 
given the interests of the parties involved in the Malaysian market (Siew Yean, 2015).  
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Could Malaysia’s automotive industry have done better by adopting an FDI-led strategy 
from the start? Ariffin and Sahid (2017) compared the Malaysian “independent” (albeit 
not so independent as argued in the previous paragraph) automotive policy focus on 
national firms with Thailand’s “dependent” automotive strategy that relied on FDI. 
Thailand’s annual car production represents four times Malaysia’s production. 237 
However, it would be wrong to attribute Malaysia’s limitations simply to the ownership 
base of its industry. Thailand’s FDI-led strategy also features weaknesses, such as 
increased dependence and exposure to global markets fluctuations (Abdulsomad, 1999). 
During the 2008/9 financial crisis, motor vehicle exporters in Thailand were hit more 
than domestic market-oriented automakers in Malaysia (Wad, 2010).  
In addition, we could also compare Malaysia’s experience with that of South Korea, 
where a successful indigenous automotive industry was also developed through domestic 
firms as opposed to FDI. In Korea, car manufacturers became highly competitive partly 
because government support was granted upon performance requirements. In contrast, in 
Malaysia, export conditions were not imposed and there was no sunset clause for phasing 
out protection. Indeed, despite the fact the Malaysian government did several things right 
(such as investing in state-owned automotive firms, imposing trade protection measures, 
local content requirements, and vendor development programmes) Malaysia’s automotive 
strategy failed to emphasize skills development, R&D and performance requirements.238 
Another reason for the low competitiveness of Malaysia’s automotive sector may have to 
do with the affirmative action agenda. The NEP aimed at improving the economic 
situation of the bumiputeras (indigenous Malays), notably by imposing equity ownership 
requirements and employment quotas for Bumiputeras.239  The Malaysian government 																																																								
237 During the early development of Thailand’s automotive industry, similarly to Malaysia, high 
tariffs were used to protect the domestic industry. However, the government opened the 
automotive market and attracted MNEs after realizing that high car prices caused by protectionist 
measures would limit the domestic demand for cars (Tai and Ku, 2013; Ariffin and Sahid, 2017). 
238 Proton did try to export, but with a flawed strategy that consisted in selling vehicles in the 
British market under the production cost. However, Proton vehicles were of low quality and lost 
reputation incurring additional costs in servicing (Siew Yean, 2015).  
239 The economic system inherited from colonial times had been responsible for the failure to 
produce a racially equitable distribution of the nation's wealth (Gale, 1981). The NEP aimed to 
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has consequently bypassed competitive Malaysian Chinese firms in the components and 
parts industry, which resulted in the neglect of existing production, sales and 
management experiences (Wad and Govindaraju, 2011; Siew Yean, 2015). Mahathir 
(2007) argues that affirmative action is still necessary because the NEP did not attain its 
redistribution target given that the Chinese community still hold more than 40% of the 
country’s economic wealth. He furthers argues that the affirmative action agenda did not 
hold back growth given that Malaysia has grown much faster than practically all other 
developing countries despite going through forty years of the NEP. Nevertheless, even if 
Bumiputera equity participation requirements were relaxed over time, the perception of 
several experts interviewed as part of this study is that the affirmative action agenda has 
made Chinese entrepreneurs feel alienated and incentivized to migrate, in particular to 
neighbouring Singapore (Cheong Kee Cheok, personal communication, march 2017; 
Dato’ Dr Thillainathan, personal communication, March 2017). The redistribution agenda 
might thus have had an impact on the development of the domestic automotive industry. 
In addition, the Malaysian government embarked on nationally controlled joint ventures 
but it faced a capabilities gap in technology and marketing, which led to the continuing 
reliance of local firms on foreign technology suppliers (Leutert and Sudhoff, 1999). The 
domestic automotive industry had indeed been dominated by Japanese car-makers 
following the disintegration of Proton into production (PROTON) and sales companies 
(EON) in 1984 (later reintegrated in 2009) and the disintegration of Perodua into a 
production organisation under Japanese control and a sales organisation under Malaysian 
control in 2000 (Wad and Govindaraju, 2011).240 The Malaysian-Japanese automobile 
alliance allowed for the transfer of standard product and process technologies and created 
production capabilities among workers and administrative employees, but it did not 
support the creation of international sales, managerial, and organizational capabilities, 																																																																																																																																																																					
eliminate the identification of race with economic functions. Lall (1995) notes that the objectives 
of Malaysia’s industrial policy towards heavy industries was different from Korea because the 
NEP aimed to address social imbalance rather than gain world market competitiveness. 
Nevertheless, the economic recessions of the mid-1980s led the Malaysian government to relax 
some of the ethnic requirements of the NEP (ibid.). While absolute poverty declined from 50% in 
1970 to 7.1% in 1990, inter-ethnic income disparity ratios remained sizable (Yusof, 2007). 
240 This strategy went against the international norm of the automobile industry, classified as a 
producer-driven GVC, where lead firms govern the whole chain  (Wad and Govindaraju, 2011). 
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given that Proton was predominantly managed by Japanese managers and technicians 
(ibid).241 It remains too early to say whether Proton’s recent partnership with the Chinese 
automaker Geely will allow for more technology and knowledge transfer than previously.  
9.4  CONCLUSION: A TALE OF TWO SECTORS 
Malaysia’s experience can inform the theoretical debate about the role of industrial policy 
in pursuing horizontal diversification. In particular, the domestic E&E and automotive 
sector can inform discussions on the role of infant industry protection and FDI-led export 
promotion in the larger perspective of global value chains. 
The Malaysian experience with the E&E industry reveals a rather ‘minimalist’ role of the 
state that initially mostly provided basic infrastructure, an effective bureaucracy, and FDI 
promotion, thereby following the market lead towards low-wage labour-intensive 
activities. While Malaysia successfully developed low value-added labour-intensive FDI-
led manufacturing activities, such strategy has not sufficed to stimulate upgrading into 
higher value-added activities to support rising wages, and technology absorption through 
the emergence of a critical mass of local suppliers and skilled human capital, in contrast 
to the experience of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in the same industry. While policy 
initiatives have been adopted since the late 1990s to stimulate upgrading to higher value-
added activities, the lack of a critical mass of human capital and frontier R&D institutions 
continue to inhibit value addition and the innovation potential of local firms. 
In contrast to the E&E sector, Malaysia’s experience in the automotive sector was based 
on a more aggressive role of the state. One the one hand, since 1980, the Malaysian 
automotive industry has considerably expanded its production and evolved from 
assembly activities towards higher value-added manufacturing while generating large 
employment. The government’s objective for automotive production to drive 
industrialization through linkages towards other industries has also been achieved to 
																																																								
241 An experienced Malay took control of Proton in 1994, but he shortly passed away, throwing 
Proton into a corporate governance mess, ending with its re-nationalisation in 2000. Proton was 
thus never under private local ownership as in Japan or Korea (Wad and Govindaraju, 2011). 
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some extent.242.243On the other hand, the industrial policy towards the automotive sector 
failed to stimulate regional competitiveness and export orientation, in contrast to the E&E 
sector, which had evolved from ISI orientation towards export-orientation.  
It would be misleading to attribute this failure to the objective and nature of infant 
industry protection, as the neoclassical scholarship would. Instead we can trace the 
weaknesses of the Malaysian automotive sector to several misguided features of the 
implementation of infant industry protection. First, Malaysia’s automotive strategy failed 
to incentivize (or require) performance and competitiveness. Unconditional protection is 
unlikely to stimulate competitiveness. Second, domestic firms enjoyed trade protection 
and subsidies while there was no sunset clause for phasing out protection. This is not to 
say that prolonged protection was a wrong policy, because it has handsomely paid off in 
the long run for Japan and Korea, but it is also true that tariff protection and local content 
requirements are increasingly difficult to implement under international, regional and 
bilateral trade agreements. Third, the affirmative action agenda within the automotive 
local content policy has undermined (or at least, slowed down) competitiveness amongst 
local suppliers, by neglecting the role and production experience of Chinese 
entrepreneurs in the capacity building process.  
All things considered, if we consider that the main objective of industrial policy is to 
stimulate domestic industrial and technological upgrading from low to high value-added 
stages in order to eventually to catch up with global competitors, we can conclude that 
Malaysia’s industrial strategy towards both the E&E and automotive sector has not been 
fully successful. In such regards, it would appear that Malaysian industrial policy has 
been much more successful in resource-based industries where it successfully met the 
objectives of industrial upgrading and international competitiveness. 
  
																																																								
242 As noted in chapter 7, the automotive sector features backward linkages to a number of 
resource-based industries (such as rubber-based manufacturing and petrochemical-based plastics). 
243  Interestingly, similarly to the Chilean case, it appears that linkages have been more 
successfully localized in industries dominated by domestically owned firms (such as the 
automotive, petroleum, palm oil and rubber industries), in contrast with the FDI-led E&E sector. 
Such relationship is further discussed in the findings of this thesis. 
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Chapter 10:  Findings  
 
 
10.1 OVERVIEW 
This thesis has examined two specific historical cases to provide a clearer picture of the 
dynamics that influence economic diversification in natural resource-dependent 
economies. We can identify a number of important findings, hereby reviewed in this 
chapter. The broader contribution of this thesis is threefold: 
The first important contribution of this thesis is its new ways of conceptualizing and 
classifying resource-based economies. The MINDEX reveals the multidimensionality of 
resource abundance and dependence and enables a better identification of the specific 
developmental extractives-related challenges a country might face at a given time. 
Second, this thesis finds that the role of industrial policy goes beyond ‘facilitating’ 
diversification, as it also shapes the direction of diversification. In both country cases, 
government interventions that successfully promoted new sectors and activities went far 
beyond simply fixing market failure and instead shaped the productive development and 
capabilities accumulation processes.  
Third, this thesis has enabled to reframe the narrative on the development of Chile and 
Malaysia by debunking several misconceptions associated with the role of free market 
forces and the contribution of certain sectors over others. In that perspective, this thesis 
enabled to identify the ‘good, the bad and the ugly’ in order to explain the strengths and 
limitations of Chile’s and Malaysia’s growth performance.  
More particularly, we can identify the ten main messages that arise from this research: 
1. Harnessing natural resources for development is multi-level process and the types of 
variables that we choose to measure resource abundance reflect different aspects of the 
natural resource management chain. The MINDEX indicates whether a country is 
moving in the right or wrong direction extractive dependence and economic 
diversification over time. 
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2. Resource-rich countries face various degrees of urgency to diversify. For some countries, 
financial diversification might be suitable, while others should prioritize domestic 
investments to stimulate export diversification. 
3. Different diversification pathways are not mutually exclusive. Instead structural 
economic diversification should rely on combining these different pathways in order to 
increase their cumulative effects.  
4. The role of the state goes beyond ‘facilitating’ diversification, as it also shapes the 
direction of diversification and linkage development. 
5. Linkages do not unfold naturally around commodity sectors due to the existence of 
considerable market obstacles.  
6. As a result, industrial policy should defy- rather than conform to- comparative 
advantage, in order to stimulate economic diversification in resource-dependent 
economies.  
7. Historical and institutional factors such as policy planning, regional and ideological 
influence, and the nature of electoral systems contribute to influence both the intention 
and the ability of governments in promoting policies that foster or inhibit diversification. 
8. Decisions to undertake value addition in commodity sectors are also influenced by 
ownership structures and commodity price fluctuations. 
9. Both Chile and Malaysia have diversified their economy by doing a lot more than laissez 
faire. In both countries, industrial policies played a key role in linkage development 
through R&D support, targeted human capital accumulation, price control mechanisms 
to manipulate market signals, and in providing opportunities for learning-by-doing. 
10. In both Chile and Malaysia, resource-based industries have acted as a motor of 
economic development.  
 
10.2 CONTRIBUTION TO THEORETICAL DEBATES ON THE ROLE OF 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE DIVERSIFICATION PROCESS 
The evidence reviewed in the comparative study of this thesis confirms the existence of 
considerable market obstacles in both horizontal and vertical diversification processes. 
The role of industrial policy is therefore crucial for the dynamic accumulation of 
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capabilities (such as technology, human capital, and infrastructure) that enables 
economies to overcome market obstacles in the emergence of new sectors and activities, 
both within and outside of commodity value chains.  
10.2.1 One thing does not lead to another 
In terms of horizontal diversification, there is weak evidence to suggest that market 
forces alone have been the main engine for guiding investments towards the successful 
new sectors that have emerged in Chile’s and Malaysia’s respective export baskets since 
the 1960s. In contrast, as shown in chapters 9 and 10, and as summarize later in this 
chapter, in both Malaysia and Chile, the state played a key role in promoting successful 
‘unrelated’ activities by guiding investments and effectively ‘governing’ the market. 
When it comes to vertical diversification, the evidence also contradicts the argument that 
linkages unfold “naturally” around commodity extraction through market forces alone. 
Chapters 6 and 7 find that there are considerable market obstacles to linkage development 
in developing countries, which consequently do not necessarily have competitive 
advantages in upstream and downstream activities alongside commodity value chains. In 
addition to the existence of high entry barriers (due to capital- or technology-intensive 
characteristics of value added activities, and internationally consolidated supply chains, 
developing countries aiming to develop linkages around their commodities also have to 
face counter-attacks from incumbent firms. In that sense, the literature on global 
commodity chains is helpful in explaining the consumer- and producer-driven constraints 
that limit upgrading efforts within commodity value chains.  
For instance, in Chile’s copper sector, one of the several barriers to value addition lies in 
the dependence on Chinese imports through a production-driven governance structure. 
By pursing value addition, Chilean firms would jeopardize their access to the Chinese 
market as a major copper ore importer. Such market obstacle, coupled with a short-term 
profit maximization behaviour from copper exporters, contributes explain why Chile has 
not pursued downstream value addition in the copper sector. Such findings stand in 
contrast with the mainstream explanations that sustain that Chile (despite being a country 
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with an enormous renewable energy potential) has no comparative advantage in energy-
intensive activities, such as copper smelting.  
In the palm oil sector in Malaysia, efforts to promote value addition through palm oil 
refining were met with considerable market barriers that favoured the status quo and 
discouraged domestic value addition. Some of these barriers were ‘given’, such as 
Malaysia’s small domestic market, lack of marketing expertise for processed palm oil, 
long transportation time to the major consumer markets during which the quality of 
processed palm oil deteriorated, making re-refining necessary (Gopal, 2001). However, 
some of these barriers were also artificially induced (and constituted counter-attacks from 
the incumbents), such as the European trade tariff escalation to make sure that refining 
capacity would remain in the European Economic Community (EEC) and funding by 
vegetable oil lobbies for environmental campaigns targeting consumers against palm oil. 
As a result, most neoclassical analyses in the 1970s concluded that palm oil refining was 
beyond Malaysia’s comparative advantage. However, such static approaches to 
comparative advantage and the argument that linkages ‘unfold’ through market forces 
alone do not explain how Malaysian palm oil refiners became able to successfully 
compete internationally. Instead, we need to turn to this study’s findings on the role of 
state in stimulating linkage development and export diversification more broadly. 
10.2.2 Diversification policy implications: The role of the state beyond fixing market 
failures 
This section summarizes the findings of this thesis regarding the role of industrial policy 
in shaping the process of productive capabilities accumulation and export diversification 
more broadly. In particular, it is found that the state has a key role to play: 
a. To catalyse targeted human capital accumulation 
b. To solve collective action problems in knowledge creation through R&D support 
c. To facilitate access of domestic firms to foreign markets  
d. To send market signals through price control mechanisms and venture capitalism 
e. To orient resource revenue management towards achieving export diversification 
f. To stimulate the dynamic acquisition of new comparative advantages 
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10.2.2.1 Role of the state as a catalyst of human capital accumulation 
Gerschenkron (1962:9) argued that, while ‘backward’ countries were often judged based 
on cheap labour, the most important factor to consider was the presence of industrial 
labour that could be utilized in factories rather than on land.244 Five decades later, 
scholars continue to analyse the link between human capital accumulation and export 
diversification. Using data on a large panel of countries in the period 1962-2000, Agosin 
et al (2012) find evidence of a positive effect of human capital accumulation on export 
diversification. Jetter and Ramirez-Hassan (2015) finds that one of the important positive 
predictors of export diversification (among 36 possible determinants) are net enrolment 
in primary education, while secondary and tertiary education are found to be less relevant 
compared to primary education, suggesting that a larger base of the educational pyramid 
matters the most for promoting diversification.   
In light of these quantitative studies, this study contributes to the discussion on the role of 
human capital with two main important points regarding the link between human capital 
and economic diversification, by putting forward evidence from the cases of Chile and 
Malaysia. This thesis demonstrates that not only the accumulation of skilled human 
capital is crucial in the emergence of new industrial activities as well as resource-based 
activities, but that the state also has a key role to play in such process by shaping and 
aligning human capital accumulation towards supporting industrial diversification 
objectives. The Jetter and Ramirez-Hassan (2015) study may thus lead to inadequate 
policy recommendations of neglecting specialized human capital accumulation, which 
has been crucial in the development of competitive sectors in both Malaysia and Chile.  
The importance of the orientation rather than the size of human capital is well reflected 
by the case of the Chilean copper sector. In the upstream industry, a mismatch between 
the supply and demand for skills has inhibited the participation and innovation potential 
of suppliers of goods and services. The skills mismatch can be partly explained by the 																																																								
244 Such industrial labour was considered to be extremely scarce in developing countries and he 
regarded its creation as the “most difficult and protracted process” in the process of economic 
development (Gerschenkron, 1962:9). 
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lack of strategic orientation in the government scholarship programme BecasChile. As 
rightly phrased by a government official, “in Chile, we have human capital, but not in the 
right places” (personal communication, July 2017). 
The need for discipline-based discrimination in tertiary education provision can be 
explained by Hausmann’s and Rodrik (2006)’s ‘doomed to choose’ argument. The 
production of a particular good or service requires a set of specific inputs, which in turn 
requires labour with corresponding particular skills (amongst other things). As a result, 
there is a strong case for government intervention to prioritize the accumulation of human 
capital in certain areas according to existing and future needs. 
Public interventions have indeed played a key role over the past 60 years in providing 
technical training and university programmes in fields related to the sectors that have 
successfully emerged in Chile’s export basket. Technical training and programmes were 
publicly funded and provided in marine sciences, biochemistry, pathology, and issues 
related to aquaculture production and aquaculture business administration, in fruit and 
agricultural science; and in forestry engineering. 
In Malaysia, public institutions have also played a key role in shaping human capital 
accumulation processes through the creation of technical institutes and university 
programmes in disciplines related to value addition in the petroleum, palm oil and rubber 
sectors. Quite tellingly, the sectors that face considerable shortcomings in both Chile 
(such as the upstream copper sector) and Malaysia (such as the E&E and automotive 
sectors) are the ones that were characterized by insufficient public initiatives and funding 
to promote specialized human capital accumulation. 
It thus seems that economic diversification requires a collaborative framework between 
private and public actors, such as governments, public research units and universities. 
Such collaboration is necessary to tackle skills mismatches and provide new skills 
required to shape the dynamic innovation-driven processes taking place around and 
outside the commodity sectors. When institutions for training specialized personnel are 
lacking, or when particular skills (or at least the bases for acquiring such skills) are not 
provided by the public sector, private firms either cannot grow due to the absence of 
	 279 
skilled workers or have to train the necessary personnel in-house, which leads to high 
non-recoverable costs, if trained employees leave the company.  
10.2.2.2 Role of the state for R&D support to stimulate industrial upgrading  
As emphasized by a rapidly growing body of literature on national innovation systems 
(see Andreoni and Chang, 2014; Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2009; Lee, 2013; Lee and 
Malerba, 2017; Lundvall, 2010; Malerba, 2002; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Petrobelli and 
Staritz, 2017), industrial development and upgrading also requires public institutions that 
provide R&D support, quality certification, standards setting, incubation, technology 
transfer and technology diffusion. The need for public interventions in providing those 
services as public goods is justified given the collective action problem involved in their 
provisions (Andreoni and Chang, 2014).  
In Chile and Malaysia, several institutions have played such a role, both at the sector 
level and at the nationwide level. Fundación Chile has successfully promoted the salmon 
and the blueberries sectors through the identification, adaptation and development of 
technologies and the diffusion and transfer of these technologies through the creation of 
innovative companies. These companies were subsequently used to generate a 
demonstration effect. Salmon cultivation in Chile also benefited from extensive 
government-funded R&D. In the fruit and the forestry sectors (and agriculture sector 
more broadly), the Chilean government also set up institutions such as the Institute of 
Agricultural Research (INIA), the Forestry Institute (INFOR), and the technology transfer 
programme (GTT) to facilitate the adoption and dissemination of local and foreign 
knowledge and technologies by local producers.  
Nevertheless, Chile’s record of innovation capability building varies greatly between 
different sectors. While local firms in the salmon sector have gradually closed the 
technological gap with frontier capabilities, not a single mining supplier is operating at 
the knowledge frontier in mining, while the overwhelming majority of mining suppliers 
still classify as displaying average or low capacity in the use of technology. Chapter 6 
notably identified insufficient public resources for R&D as one of the main obstacles 
inhibiting their growth these local suppliers. While the recently created ICF has become 
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the main financing mechanism out of copper revenues through which the state funds 
initiatives for innovation and competitiveness through other government agencies, it can 
be argued that Chile requires a greater focus on innovation to sustain its economic 
development. Current resources devoted to innovation programmes and institutions (such 
as the ICF, Fundación Chile, or the World Class supplier programme) are too modest to 
achieve the objective of transformation towards knowledge intensive activities.  
In Malaysia, several intermediate institutions have played a key role in technological 
diversification and upgrading in resource based industries. 245 The Malaysian Palm Oil 
Board and the Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institute have played a 
key role to promote technology upgrading in the palm oil sector. The Malaysia Rubber 
Board (MRB) has fostered product and process innovations in the rubber sector. R&D 
support by the MRB has also enabled to help domestic firms adapt to changing quality 
standards in foreign markets. In contrast, the E&E and the automotive sectors have 
suffered from a lack of investments in R&D. Weak industry-university linkages have 
hindered the Malaysian E&E sector’s transition towards higher value R&D, design and 
testing activities, while the automotive sector remains characterized by very low 
investments in R&D as share of total sales. It can be argued that Malaysia’s objective to 
reach a high-income status will depend on the ability of domestic firms to integrate and 
move up the E&E value chain, and on the productivity of suppliers in the automotive 
sectors. Despite the availability of R&D grants for firms in the electronics sector, it can 
be argued that the resources devoted to these efforts may remain insufficient and need to 
be anchored in a national innovation system aiming to build a critical mass of human 
capital and R&D institutions, in order to leapfrog to the technological frontier. 246 
																																																								
245 The role of intermediate institutions to promote R&D at the sector level has been supported by 
the Intensification of Research in Priority Areas (IRPA) programme, under the Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Innovation. IRPA has first been introduced in the fifth Malaysian plan 
(1986-1990), and is one of the main mechanisms put in place to facilitate funding for R&D in 
priority areas (as defined by successive Malaysia plans). While the data gathered as part of this 
thesis suggests that IRPA funding has been helpful in promoting R&D in the palm oil sector, a 
further study and impact evaluation would be needed to comprehensively assess the efficiency of 
IRPA funding across sectors and across time.  
246 It is worth adding that the limited upgrading in these sectors may be due to the slow learning 
possibilities that are associated with long-cycle technologies or high entry barriers (Lee, 2013). It 
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10.2.2.3 Role of the state for trade promotion, quality control & national branding. 
Access to foreign markets is essential for gaining competitiveness in new products. 
International trade costs are not only determined by natural or exogenous factors (such as 
geography or technological advancements in the transport sector) but also by policies to 
overcome trade barriers (Coniglio et al, 2018). This thesis finds that the role of the state 
can go beyond “facilitating” trade and can proactively shape access to foreign markets. 
Several studies (e.g. Mau, 2016; Sheperd, 2011; Feenstra and Ma, 2014) find a positive 
correlation between export diversification and trade facilitation (namely the reduction of 
exports costs).247 Such findings would support the view that free trade agreements have 
been a driving force in the promotion of export diversification (see Cook and Jones, 
2015; Dutt et al, 2013; Parteka and Tamberi, 2013). Other quantitative studies refute such 
view (e.g. Buono and Lalanne, 2011; Dingemans and Ross, 2012). For instance, 
Dingemans and Ross (2012) find no evidence on the role of FTAs in promoting export 
diversification in Latin America and cite the case of Chile where most diversification 
occurred in the 1970s-80s, before the surge of FTAs signed by this country. This 
dissertation supports the latter argument.248 The opening of the economy after the 1980s 
took advantage of the specialized human capital, knowledge and technological 
capabilities previously accumulated through vertical interventions prior to liberalization. 
In that sense, it is important to consider the sequencing of trade liberalization. Across 
both country case studies, trade liberalization has been able to benefit diversification 
mostly following (rather than preceding) the acquisition of productive capabilities 
through vertical industrial policies, confirming the logic of the infant industry argument. 																																																																																																																																																																					
is thus important to acknowledge that not all sectors offer similar opportunities for learning and 
catching up. Lee (2019) notably points out that the issue of choice and specialization is less 
important at low or lower middle income stage but become becomes critical at upper middle 
stages where the latecomers are getting close to frontier and increasingly competing with 
incumbent firms and countries in world markets. 
247 Export costs are understood as the costs associated to the shipping of a standardized container 
and administrative procedures, transportation of goods to relevant seaports, and custom clearance. 
248 In Chile, the diversification rate actually reduced after the surge of FTAs signed by the country 
(not necessarily as consequence of those but rather as the outcome of the scaling down of 
industrial policy and a surge in copper prices). 
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When it comes to the opening up to foreign markets for Chilean products, the 
government has played a key role through diplomatic action in the negotiation of FTAs, 
sanitary agreements for food exports, as well as the creation of export promotion agencies 
such as ProChile. The negotiations of sanitary agreements with importing countries were 
also a key element for the growth of certain Chilean exports, especially food-related 
products, which are particularly impacted by sanitary and phytosanitary standards. At 
first, one could consider the state’s trade promotion as a provision of a ‘public good’ of a 
horizontal nature. However, such trade promotion appears to be very targeted as it 
focused on foodstuff and benefited existing sectors, at the expense of manufacturing. 
The role of the Chilean state in marketing domestic products abroad is similar to the 
Malaysian case where considerable government efforts were deployed to commercialize 
processed palm oil (PPO) abroad, in the face of EU tariffs and environmental campaigns 
against palm oil products. Government-to-government partnerships under so-called barter 
trade enabled to open up export markets for Malaysian PPO leading to economies of 
scale stemming from a larger customer base. This case sustains the idea that free markets 
are not ‘free’, because they are shaped by government actions (Chang, 2012). 
In the rubber sector, various government agencies, such as the Malaysian Rubber Export 
Promotion Council (MREPC), the Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation 
(MATRADE) and the Malaysian Rubber Board (MRB), have played in key role in 
identifying and expanding new export markets for local rubber products. 
The role of the Chilean and Malaysian governments in promoting access to foreign 
markets has also included strong quality control to ensure ‘national’ reputation.249 The 
government (through public agencies such as Servicio Agrícola Ganadero, the National 
Fisheries Service, CORFO, and the Chinquihue Foundation) therefore had a key role to 
play in increasing the value of wine, fruit and salmon products by tackling such collective 
																																																								
249 In some industries, sectoral reputation appears to be characterized by a collective action 
problem, because while it is very easy for a few firms to hurt the sector’s reputation, it is difficult 
for few firms to enhance the sector’s branding on their own. 
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action problem through enhanced product quality control.250 Similarly, in Malaysia, the 
government had to ensure and enforce quality control of health-related latex producers in 
order to mitigate incidents that could hamper the industry’s reputation in foreign markets.  
10.2.2.4 Role of the state in modifying market signals through price control 
mechanisms and state venture capitalism  
Some of the most successful industries that have emerged in the export baskets of Chile 
(such as the forestry and salmon sectors) and Malaysia (such as the refined palm oil, 
refined petroleum, rubber-based manufacturing, and the E&E sector) have benefited to a 
large extent from market signals manipulated by the government.  
In Malaysia, the government has identified in its successive five-year Malaysia plans 
priority sectors in which investments are eligible for tax incentives. In some instances, 
such as the palm oil and petroleum sectors, the government has even gone further in 
modifying market signals towards value addition by introducing export taxes on crude 
palm oil and crude petroleum. 
In Chile, the central bank artificially controlled market prices in a way that would benefit 
the development of an industrial ecosystem around the forestry sector. The Central Bank 
offered subsidized credits for forestry plantations before taking measures to ban the 
exploitation of forest younger than 18 years old as well as render exports of raw wood 
and debarked logs a difficult task through regulatory measures. As a result, the supply of 
raw wood became less export oriented and turned towards the internal market. This 
measure benefited the domestic cellulose and paper industries, which benefited from 
lower raw material prices.  
The Chilean government has also modified market signals in promising industries that 
would not develop through market forces alone through FCh, which effectively behaved 
as a semi-public not-for-profit venture capitalist. This type of interventions can be 																																																								
250 The diffusion of food safety and quality control technologies in the salmon industry was also 
promoted by INTESAL, a private institute (created by the Salmon and Trout Producers 
Association) that applied for funding from public funds. 
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considered as a mechanism to explore new products and promote nascent infant 
industries.251  
10.2.2.5 Findings on the fiscal management of resource revenues for diversification 
The academic debate on the management of resource revenues in resource rich countries 
has been concerned with how much of resource revenues should be invested in financial 
assets overseas for fiscal stabilization and how much should be invested domestically.  
Chapter 4 reframed the resource revenue management debates away from a consumption-
centred fiscal stabilization agenda and towards achieving the long-term diversification of 
productive structures. This thesis consequently contributes to an existing discussion that 
departs from the conventional policy advice that resource-rich developing countries 
should save all their resource revenues in financial assets overseas in order to deal with 
the fiscal instability associated with commodity price fluctuations. The conventional 
models of resource revenue management, most of which are based on the permanent 
income hypothesis, are dominated by a short-term emphasis on consumption, fiscal 
stabilization and market equilibrium at the expense of long term structural change. As a 
result, such approaches have only addressed the symptoms of the resource curse 
(vulnerability to commodity price volatility) but not its root cause (productive 
dependence on commodities). Instead, this thesis suggests a dynamic approach to the 
trade-offs underlying resource revenue management decisions by showing that how 
resource revenues need to be managed depends on several factors that are country-
specific. The factors that influence the urgency to invest domestically include the existing 
gap in infrastructure and human capital, the current level of export concentration, as well 
as the level of resource abundance per capita. The critical issue for public investment in 
many resource-dependent countries is to sustainably diversify the productive matrix to 
																																																								
251  FCh’s role can be interpreted as alleviating what could be considered as first mover 
disadvantages. Even though pioneers can gain significant sales advantages, head start in learning, 
and reputational advantage, as argued by Schumpeter (1942), they can in some circumstances 
incur even larger cost disadvantages because firms that follow pioneers can learn from the 
mistakes and successes of their predecessors, reducing their own investment requirements as well 
as their risks, potentially leading to a free rider problem (Boulding and Christen, 2001). 
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generate new sources of foreign exchange instead of statically maximizing rents from 
existing income streams.  
In that perspective, Malaysia is one of a handful of developing countries that got closer to 
an optimal utilization of resource revenues for investments that had a long-term 
transformative effect on economic diversification, inter-generational equity, and 
macroeconomic stability. In Chile, while copper revenues have been successfully used to 
address short-term fiscal stabilization, such strategy has a high opportunity cost for the 
accumulation of productive capabilities. These findings contribute to reshape the 
discourse on resource-based development, which has in recent years emphasized the 
Norwegian model while neglecting the role of production and export diversification. 
10.2.2.6 Conforming to- or defying- comparative advantage?   
The findings of this dissertation hold important theoretical implications for comparative 
advantage and industrial policy. A key debate in development economics has been 
whether countries should be complying with or defying their comparative advantages (see 
Lin and Chang, 2009). This question holds important implications for the extractives-led 
development agenda because the argument of conforming to comparative advantages 
suggests that low-income countries endowed with extractive resources should continue to 
focus on- and encourage investment in- this sector (Dietsche, 2018).  
However, three points can be made. First, as shown in chapters 3 and 4, some resource-
dependent countries need to urgently diversify their productive structure away from 
commodities. As a result, conforming to their comparative advantage is a misleading 
approach for those countries that need to diversify their economies away from volatile 
commodities and generate employment outside non-labour intensive extractive sectors. 
Second, in line with what has been defined as ‘related diversification’ in chapter 2 and as 
evidenced in the case of Chile and Malaysia in chapters 6 and 7, rather than simply 
conforming to comparative advantage, countries can benefit a lot from acquiring 
transversal productive capabilities that are transferable across sectors, in order to 
promote economic diversification (Dietsche, 2018; Morris et al., 2012). 
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Third, chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 of this thesis have proved that the acquisition of new 
comparative advantages in both Chile and Malaysia has benefited to a large extent from 
government interventions. As a result, this thesis confirms the view that some of the key 
drivers for current comparative advantage, such as human, institutional and technological 
capabilities, are policy-induced, even in natural resource-based sectors. Comparative 
advantages thus reflect policies that underpin factor productivity and institutional 
arrangements relative to those of other countries (Diestsche, 2018). 
The evidence here consequently contradicts neoclassical approaches to comparative 
advantage, and supports the argument that the emergence of new competitive activities in 
the context of a diversification strategy should be achieved through comparative 
advantage-defying behaviour. Even new and revisionist approaches that are rooted in the 
neoclassical paradigm (such as the “Growth Identification and Facilitation” approach by 
Lin and Treichel, 2014; the product space by Hausmann et al., 2010; and the model of 
trade and industrialization in Porter, 1990), which sustain that state intervention should 
target industries within the country’s comparative advantages, remain too narrow to fully 
explain and predict the export diversification of both Chile and Malaysia.252 
In contrast to static views of comparative advantage, which are path-dependent upon 
established capabilities, approaches that take into account the dynamic acquisition of 
comparative advantage through path-defying behaviour can greatly enhance our 
understanding of the key factors behind capabilities accumulation, industrial development 
and structural productive transformation in resource rich countries.  
10.2.3 The influence of domestic ownership on linkage development 
The findings on the Malaysian experience appear to confirm the hypothesis by Lee et al. 
(2018) regarding the importance of separating from foreign-dominated GVCs at middle-
income stages. While participation in GVCs has been increasingly prescribed for 
developing countries to achieve economic growth (Baldwin, 2016), many of these 																																																								
252 For instance, some of the most successful industries that emerged in Chile’s and Malaysia’s 
respective export baskets would not have been found in these countries’ “open forest” in 1980, a 
model developed by Hausmann et al. (2007) (see Agosin et al. 2010). 
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countries remain stuck in low-value-added activities, which raises doubts on the 
effectiveness of GVCs as vehicles for upgrading.  
In Malaysia, domestic ownership has been a key determinant of industrial upgrading 
across various sectors. When rubber and palm oil plantations were foreign-owned, there 
was no interest in value addition. The largely European-controlled plantation companies 
preferred to export crude palm oil and did not see many gains in relocating their 
vegetable oil processing facilities in Malaysia. The desire to process palm oil and natural 
rubber increased when the industry became domestically owned, notably following a 
hostile takeover of three British palm oil and rubber plantation conglomerates by 
Malaysian public capital on the London stock exchange in 1981. In addition, in the 
rubber sector, a large difference in purchasing behaviour can be noted between domestic 
and foreign firms. Foreign-owned firms have fewer forward and backward linkages to 
other manufacturers in the Malaysian economy than domestically-owned firms. 
In the petroleum sector, the national oil company Petronas has played a key role in 
promoting production linkages through several initiatives. It is doubtful whether similar 
value addition results would have been achieved if international oil corporations 
controlled the sector.253 
In contrast, the E&E sector has been mostly FDI-dominated. Most MNCs targeted 
assembling and packaging activities rather than value-added activities. The FDI-led 
strategy (in stark contrast with South Korea where E&E firms were mostly indigenous) 
and the specialization in low-skilled activities have made Malaysia vulnerable to the 
process of re-localization towards neighbouring countries with cheaper labour costs. 
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that ownership was not the only determinant of value 
addition, because some MNCs did consider upgrading into wafer fabrication and chip 
design in the late 1980s, although they did not do so because of lack of capital grants 
upfront from the government.  
																																																								
253 However, it should be acknowledged that the Malaysian case should not be overgeneralized 
because even though Petronas has been more successful than other NOCs, there are still many 
NOCs that are plagued by inefficiencies.  
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The picture is more complex and nuanced in the automotive sector. The sector has been 
mostly domestically owned (Malaysian capital has retained the majority ownership of 
Proton, although Perodua is no longer a national car since its equity was restructured in 
2001) and it has developed some backward linkages to local suppliers. However, the 
automotive industry failed to become competitive and has been plagued by inefficiencies. 
In addition, the Malaysian automobile industry ended up dominated by the regionalized 
Japanese keiretsu system as a result of the separation between foreign-owned production 
units and domestically-owned marketing functions (Wad and Govindaraju, 2011). 
In Chile, the effect of ownership on value addition is less clear. Initial value addition 
efforts in the forestry and wine sector have been mostly FDI-led. In the salmon sector, 
FCh’s efforts have been the most successful, but it should be acknowledged that previous 
efforts to develop salmon farming had already been attempted (less successfully) by an 
American and a Japanese firm. In the copper sector, the development of local suppliers 
was initially clearly related to the ownership of mining companies. In the early stages of 
mining development, foreign-owned firms had no impact on the technological catching-
up among local suppliers. The situation changed with the nationalization wave in the 
1970s, which led to incentives and expectations for local suppliers to collaborate with the 
state-owned firm, Codelco. However, the situation has now been reversed and foreign 
firms produce two thirds of Chile’s overall mining output. Surprisingly, while the two 
major domestic mining firms feature a managerial risk aversion attitude towards local 
contractors, the programmes to promote the skills upgrading of local suppliers have been 
initiated by a foreign firm, BHP Billiton. 
10.2.4 Policy environment, historical legacies and institutional norms.  
The historical and institutional contexts within which economic development proceeded 
have differed considerably between Malaysia and Chile. This section highlights some of 
the key institutional differences in the policy environment of both countries.  
Dietsche (2018) identifies four levels of institutions that shape the outcomes of 
extractive-based development: (1) social embeddedness (tradition, norms, customs); (2) 
the institutional environment (constitutional rules regarding the management of extractive 
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resources); (3) governance (how specific rules are set up between companies and 
governments); and (4) resource allocation. She argues that the impact of policies to 
enhance the contribution of extractive industries to development is limited when social 
networks (level 1) are resistant. This thesis would go even further by drawing attention to 
the interrelatedness of these different dimensions. In addition, external factors appeared 
to have play an important role in influencing diversification policy design and 
implementation in Chile and Malaysia. This section devotes particular attention to the 
role of intellectual influences stemming from colonial legacies and regional trends, and 
the different approaches to policy planning.  
10.2.4.1 Industrial policy planning, implementation and adaptability 
In Malaysia, there is a clear diversification policy guided by government plans, such as 
the five-year Malaysia plans (there are now 11 of them), three industrial master plans 
(IMPs) since 1985, and the economic transformation plan since 2010, which are set and 
overseen by state organizations such as the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) and the 
Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU). 254  The importance of 
development planning is justified by Prime Minister Mahathir in the following way: 
“Being methodical is the way to achieve success. That is one of the most important 
lessons we learnt from the Europeans, particularly the British. Method involves a series of 
pre-determined orderly steps and procedures, planned and laid out so as to achieve a 
certain objective. The country’s development was being based on five-year plans, which 
enabled us to link the yearly budgets and give us a definite programme for five years. In 
addition, we had the long-term perspective of 10 years. The plans could not be segregated 
or kept apart from each other, but had to be continuous so that each could coincide with 
the previous one” (Mahathir Mohamad, 2009:4). 
																																																								
254 EPU is responsible for overseeing the progress and delivery of the industrial masters plans and 
five-year Malaysia Plans. The more recently established PEMANDU under the prime minister’s 
office in 2009, is tasked with overseeing the delivery of the Government Transformation 
Programme and the ETP. All government agencies must meet key performance indicators and 
targets to meet. In the absence of discipline and checks and balances, Malaysia’s and Petronas’ 
ambitious investment projects (such as the twin towers, and the property developments related to 
the new administrative capital) could have easily turned into white elephants (Gopal, 2002). 
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IMPs allow for a continuous review of promoted sectors and activities. Both IMPs and 
Malaysian plans have indeed enabled some degrees of adaptability of industrial policy 
and their focus has evolved over time. 
In Chile, long-term state planning has not been adopted in a comprehensive manner 
throughout modern history due to both electoral and ideological reasons (that are further 
explained in the next section). Some of the obstacles to long-term planning may indeed 
have to do with the nature of the electoral system in Chile. In Chile, presidents are not 
allowed to seek consecutive re-election. This rule has important implications for 
industrial policy (which requires long-term vision) and led to the discontinuation of the 
industrial policy formulated by the first Bachelet administration (2006-2010) by the first 
Piñera government (2010-2014). The fear of ‘renewed discontinuation’ led to policy 
stagnation during the second Bachelet government (2014-2018), as confirmed during 
interviews with government officials.255  
In contrast, in Malaysia, a constitutional monarchy with a democratically elected 
parliament, there are no limits to the number of mandates that can be held by the prime 
minister.  As a result, Tun Dr Mahathir, who served as Malaysia’s 4th and now 7th prime 
minister, has governed Malaysia for 23 years (between 1981 and 2003 and since 2018). 
What is more, up until the general elections that took place in May 2018, the economic 
regime in Malaysia was complemented by a political system grounded on coalition-
building and “consociationalism”, beginning with the Alliance and then the Barisan 
Nasional, which succeeded in containing overt inter-ethnic strife and therefore 
maintaining stability (Awang, 1983). There were consequently no radical changes to the 
development-planning and -implementation institutions.256 
																																																								
255 CNID officials were discussing their current programmes with the opposition parties in to 
ensure policy continuity in the next presidential term. After facing difficulties finding consensus 
across the political spectrum, a consensus was reached to target “challenges” instead of sectors. 
256 As further noted by Prime Minister Mahathir, it is difficult to conduct industrial policy within 
the scope of a four-year mandate: “The first year you learn ho to do the job, the second year your 
start planning, but the third year you already have to start campaigning for reelection in the fourth 
year, so you have no time to implement your policies. In that sense, I am grateful to have had 22 
consecutive years as prime minister.” (Personal communication, April 7th 2017). 
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10.2.4.2   Ideological climate: the Chicago school versus the ‘East Asian school’. 
Chile is often taken by admirers and critics alike to be the quintessential neoliberal model 
of development as it was the first country in Latin America to embrace neoliberalism 
after the 1973 coup against Allende’s socialist government. Such policy shift may be 
explained by the influence of the Chicago Boys, who brought Milton Friedman’s free-
market economic philosophy to Chile. The country’s economic policies in the late 1970s 
and 1980s are often considered to have been influenced to a large extent by their agenda 
to avoid picking winners and to scale down the use of vertical industrial policies in order 
to ‘let the market choose’. There is no doubt that the Chicago Boys influenced the 
trajectory of Chile’s diversification policy, up until today. After the return to democracy, 
the new political economy was still fundamentally based on a neoliberal framework. 
Indeed, during the past twenty-eight years, the policy consensus in Chile has been that 
economic growth is based on ensuring macroeconomic stability (low inflation, low fiscal 
deficits, and moderate current account deficits), with the underlying view that industrial 
policy was unnecessary or unproductive (Solimano, 2012).257 
Nevertheless, their influence should not be overstated. Indeed, there are instances of 
vertical policies that significantly went against sector neutrality, especially during the 
seemingly neoliberal military regime. Some degree of manoeuvre was thus possible 
despite the ideological dominance of the free-market philosophy. In addition, the 
economic development of Chile was also influenced by the ‘California School’ (see 
chapter 9). While Chicago and California philosophies overlapped on the imperative of 
promoting exports, they had dichotomous visions of the state (Tinsman, 2013: 47).258 259 
																																																								
257 Even the more progressive presidents had maintained the orthodoxy and for instance refrained 
from stimulating the economy through fiscal injections, preferring to save copper-price windfalls 
despite sluggish growth and accumulated social needs. 
258 While most Chileans who studied in California during the 1960s and 1970s had prepared for 
careers in the public sector following the government-directed National Fruit Development Plan, 
Chileans studying in Chicago learned about the disasters of state-led projects and the need to 
minimize government involvement in economic life (Tinsman, 2013). 
259 Another important factor that appears to have shaped the intellectual climate under which 
economic policies have been conducted in Chile is the Latin American experience of failed 
import substitution industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s. A large fragment of Chilean 
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In contrast, in Malaysia, the ‘Look East’ policy implemented by the Mahathir 
administration from 1981 onwards implied taking Japan and South Korea as economic 
developmental models (Wad, 1988; Jomo, 1994). Such model involved what can be 
considered heterodox policies at a time where the ‘Washington Consensus’ prevailed. 
Goldthorpe (2015) argues that the political economy of Malaysia since independence 
demonstrates the pragmatism of decision-makers, notably in light of the government’s 
stance towards the conventional economic wisdom from international institutions, at 
times accepting their advice and at times rejecting it.  
The Asian financial crisis of 1997/8 is a key instance when the Malaysian government 
did not accept the recommendations from the IMF to devaluate the ringgit and implement 
economic austerity. Instead the government imposed stringent currency controls and 
pegged the ringgit at a fixed rate against the US dollar:  
“The World Bank and IMF gave us advice but we found that not all the advice was good 
for us. Some we accepted, some we didn’t. We conduct our own policies. For instance, 
[we received] the advice that currency must be freely marketed. People […] abused that 
by manipulating currency sales to make profit for themselves, and we lost money so […] 
we do not allow it anymore as we fixed the exchange rate.” (Prime Minister Mahathir, 
Personal Communication, April 7th 2017) 
Malaysia was able to recover from the crisis more rapidly than Indonesia and Thailand, 
which had followed the IMF prescription (Goldthorpe, 2015). In fact, the IMF later 
recognized that capital controls are necessary at times. “We survived the currency crisis 
of 1997/8 because we were unorthodox […] When people were looking at the West, we 
decided to look at the East. Now, the great minds of the World Bank and IMF say that 
Malaysia was right in doing that, but now it is too late for many countries” (Speech by 
Prime Minister Mahathir, July 16th 2019). 																																																																																																																																																																					
economists seem to oppose state interventions because of the track record of state failures in 
neighbouring Latin American countries, who fell into debt crises by the late 1980s, and their 
interpretation of how interventionist industrial policy was a major cause of the crisis. However, 
attributing Chile’s growth to free market policies relies on a partial interpretation of Chile’s 
development because Chile’s growth has owed much to high copper prices at that time. 
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There were other instances of defiance of the conventional wisdom. In the late 1970s, 
against the advice of international institutions, the Malaysian government began to 
encourage a shift from crude to refined palm oil exports. In the 1980s, the World Bank 
(1989) argued that Malaysian leaders were severely overestimating the resources 
available to undertake large-scale, heavy industrial investments but it did not prevent the 
Malaysian government from pursuing transformative investments. Meanwhile, Malaysian 
authorities had also at times closely followed the recommendation from UNIDO to 
diversify out of natural rubber into palm oil and to diversify the range of rubber-based 
goods products in Malaysia (Goldthorpe, 2015). The Malaysian government even 
commissioned UNIDO to prepare the first industrial master plan in 1986, in order to 
rectify some of the failures in the heavy industry development strategy.  
It can be argued that such pragmatism towards the policy advice from international 
institutions is owed to a large extent to the exposure to the East Asian development 
model. The geographic proximity the developmental success of NICs such as Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, has also helped Malaysian policy makers (and 
citizens) to relativize their performance and remain mindful of the limitations of their 
growth model. In contrast, it can be argued that Chile, having grown faster than its 
neighbours from the 1960s to the late 1990s (but having achieved comparable growth 
rates to Malaysia), fell into a sort of ‘self satisfaction’, which prevented further efforts 
towards the accumulation of productive capabilities. Such perception was confirmed in 
some of the fieldwork interviews conducted as part of this study: “Chile has grown faster 
than the rest of the Latin American region over the past 50 years, so where is the 
problem?” (Director of a think tank in Chile, Personal Communication, July 2017). This 
echoes a point made by Palma (2010) but also nearly a century ago by Ortega y Gasset 
(1918: 15), who found in Latin America a “… tendency to use reality as a mirror for self-
contemplation, rather than as a subject for critical analysis and progress”. He argued that 
the phenomenon of “self-satisfied individuals” that he witnessed in Latin America was a 
major obstacle for progress, since “human history is the product of discontent” (ibid.). 
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10.3 REFRAMING THE NARRATIVE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF 
CHILE AND MALAYSIA 
10.3.1 Malaysia: industrial policy and resource-based industries as engines of growth 
The complexity of the Malaysian case lies in its dualism and the heterogeneity of its 
industrial policy design, implementation and outcomes across sectors and over time. 
Some sectors have relied on FDI while others have relied on local ownership; some were 
domestic market-oriented while other were export-oriented; and some are resource-based 
while others are unrelated to the country’s commodity base. The Malaysian case 
consequently calls for nuanced analyses. In that regards, this study has contributed to two 
main debates surrounding Malaysia’s development. 
The first debate relates to the role of state versus market forces in Malaysia’s 
diversification. On the one hand, one explanation for Malaysia’s economic success 
emphasises the country’s liberal economic policy, trade openness and FDI inflows, stable 
macroeconomic setting and improvement in the business environment (e.g. Ang, 2008; 
Case, 2005); and horizontal interventions undertaken by Malaysia’s government, such as 
free trade zones and improvements in the business environment (OECD 2011). Tordo and 
Anouti (2013) notably note that Malaysia ranks well on “global competitiveness” indices 
due to its “efficient and sound financial sector, highly efficient goods market, and a 
transparent and relatively well-developed tax system”. This supposedly market-friendly 
approach is believed to have enabled the emergence of the E&E sector, while the sectors 
that relied on state interventions (such as the heavy industries) failed to take off and 
become competitive (see World Bank, 1993). 
On the other hand, several scholars have attributed Malaysia’s diversification to 
deliberate and active industrial policy (e.g. Edwards, 1995; Jomo, 2007; Lall, 1995; 
Rasiah and Shari, 2001; Siew Yean, 2015; Yusof, 2007; amongst others). According to 
this view, the government has given the broad direction for development, including 
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socioeconomic goals, while the private sector has been given a relatively free rein.260 
This thesis confirms the latter view in two ways: 
First, the evidence suggests that the argument that selective interventions were irrelevant 
or harmful in Malaysia is unwarranted because, while some of Malaysia's growth has 
been driven by FDI and market-friendly policies, sector-specific industrial policy have 
also played in key role in promoting Malaysia’s diversification towards globally 
competitive sectors since the 1970s.  
Secondly, this thesis shows that the shortcomings of certain sectors could not have been 
solved with a more market-oriented approach. Rather than being inherently caused by the 
principles of government interventions, issues of low value-added in the E&E sector and 
low competitiveness in heavy industries could in fact have been addressed and solved 
through better industrial policies. While the E&E sector has lacked strategic government 
interventions to stimulate industrial upgrading, the automotive industry was plagued by 
poorly designed and implemented interventions that ignored the role of performance 
requirement and R&D support. The heavy industry drive should have been designed and 
implemented differently, but this does not imply the failure of industrial policy per se 
(Lall, 1995). While this thesis generally puts forward the Malaysian experience as a 
developmental success, it also concludes that improvements in industrial policy design 
and implementation, rather than a more neoliberal approach, is what would have enabled 
Malaysia to grow as fast as the East Asian tigers. 
This thesis also contributes to the debate concerning the developmental contribution of 
resource-based sectors versus non-resource sectors. In contrast to reductionist analyses 
that portray Malaysia as a sole case of unrelated diversification into the E&E sector, this 
thesis finds that Malaysia’s vertical integration in natural resource sectors has been a key 
																																																								
260 As noted by Prime Minister Mahathir himself (2007:5-6): “We used a lot of government 
authority to regulate the market […] People talk about liberalization as a means of increasing FDI 
but […] it’s not because you are liberal, it is because you are efficient. […] If it were just a matter 
of lower costs, foreign investors would go to Indonesia and China but they come here because we 
have shown that we are more efficient, business-friendly and able to provide the services they 
need. That is more important than being liberal”. 
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engine of growth. Those findings are in line with Perez’s (2008) insights on the 
perspectives of technological development through resource-based development. 
10.3.2 Chile: the free market myth  
Assessing industrial policies in Chile remains a rather contentious and divisive topic. 
Chile has had a long and inconsistent historical approach to industrial policy, from heavy 
reliance on the state to guide industrialization to a free-market approach. One of the most 
common and enduring myths associated with recent economic development history 
portrays Chile as a ‘free market miracle’, a term coined by Milton Friedman. Such 
dominant view sustains that the successful emergence of new competitive sectors in 
Chile’s export basket are the result of four decades of commitment to economic openness 
and free market policies, and attributes Chile’s growth to the liberalization process during 
military regime (1973-1990), whose impacts would have come into effect later from the 
1990s until today.261 Chile is indeed often taken by admirers and critics alike to be the 
quintessential neoliberal model of development in Latin America, as it was the first 
country in the region to embrace neoliberalism after the 1973 coup against Allende’s 
socialist government. While “neoclassical” narratives have dominated most accounts of 
Chile’s economic development, several “dissenting” economists and economic historians 
(such as Manuel Agosin, José Miguel Ahumada, Claudio Bravo-Ortega, Ricardo Ffrench-
Davis, Marcus Kurtz, Gabriel Palma, Andres Solimano, amongst others) have produced 
seminal works that critically analyzed the limits of the neoliberal model in Chile.  
Three main findings contribute to debunk the myth of Chile’s free market ‘miracle’: 
Firstly, the supposedly free-market oriented military regime was far from genuinely 
adopting free-market economic philosophy and actually was involved heavily in 
subsidizing the structural transformation of the Chilean economy. By analysing the 
dynamics underlying the emergence of new sectors in Chile’s export basket, this study 																																																								
261 The Financial Times (2014) saw Chile “as having been a laboratory for free market economics 
for 30 years”. Richard (1997:139) even claims that  “Chile's adherence to the classical economic 
development doctrine based on liberalization and free trade has been […] so successful in 
generating high rates of export-led growth that the country's recent economic record has been 
favourably compared by some to the performance of the four 'Asian tigers’".   
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has shown that Chile has managed to diversify by doing much more than laissez-faire and 
leaving the steering wheel to the market's invisible hand. This study thus supports and 
strengthens the argument made in Agosin et al. (2010), Bravo Ortega and Eterovic 
(2015), Colfins and Lear (1996), Ffrench-Davis and Sáez (1995), Kurtz (2001) and 
Schurman (1996).  
Secondly, it can be argued that free-market policies have had a detrimental effect on 
Chile’s growth and resulted in the limitations of Chile’s development rather than its 
successes. Several scholars have shown that free-market policies resulted in the financial 
and balance of payment crisis before the 1982 debt crisis (see Ahumada, 2019; Ffrench-
Davis, 1986, 2002; Solimano, 2012), which may explain why the military regime 
increasingly relied on industrial policies thereafter. In addition, in contrast to the sectors 
that relied on state interventions, linkage development has been relatively weak in the 
sectors where the state has adopted a more laissez faire approach, such as the copper 
sector. This thesis finds that the industrial fabric around Chile’s copper is rather weak in 
comparison to those found in other resource-rich countries such as Australia and 
Malaysia, both in terms of downstream and upstream value addition.  
Lastly, while some of the most successful vertical policy instruments were used during 
the seemingly economically liberal military regime (1973-1990), it appears that the 
progressive abandonment of those vertical policy tools from the 1990s onwards (by 
democratic governments) is correlated to country’s decreasing degree of export 
diversification. In fact, Chile’s export basket has experienced increasing concentration 
from 2004 onwards. As a result, much of Chile’s growth since 1990 has owed much to 
higher copper prices. When copper prices declined between 2014 and 2017, Chile’s 
growth also slowed down, which negatively affected private investment and exports.262 
The fact that Chile’s recent export concentration has eventually translated into slower 
economic growth shows that “adhering strictly to macroeconomic fundamentals is not 
																																																								
262 While Chile has been one of Latin America’s fastest-growing economies in recent decades, 
Chile’s GDP growth in 2017 dropped to 1.50%, ranking the country only 24th out of 34 Latin 
American and Caribbean economies.  
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enough to ensure steady high-end economic growth when sector-specific weaknesses are 
not addressed” (Solimano, 2012:51).  
10.3.3 Comparing the performance of both countries 
One of the policy dilemmas in resource-dependent countries is whether to diversify 
around or away from domestic resource sectors. In this regard, the two country cases 
studies offer an interesting comparison. While Malaysia appears to have performed better 
than Chile in terms of vertical diversification in existing resource sectors (i.e. linkage 
development around petroleum, palm oil and rubber in Malaysia in comparison to copper 
in Chile), it appears that Chile has performed better than Malaysia in terms of horizontal 
diversification towards new globally competitive activities (i.e. salmon, wine, forestry 
and fruit sectors in Chile in comparison to the E&E and automotive sectors in Malaysia). 
However, it should also be noted that Chile’s horizontal diversification has remained 
confined to commodity sectors (relying on a competitive advantage stemming from 
natural factors). Chile has not ventured into new industrial sectors that go beyond natural 
resource-based comparative advantage since the 1960s, unlike Malaysia. 
It is important to stress that there is no universal diversification strategy that is suitable 
across all countries. Whether to follow a diversification pathway over another are highly 
contextual and depend on several factors (such as nature of the resource base, prospects 
for linkage development, resource abundance per capita, amongst other elements). For 
countries deciding to turn their resource base into manufactured goods, the experience of 
Malaysia over the past 50 years may point out at lessons to be learnt. For the one 
attempting to acquire new comparative advantages in resource sectors, the experience of 
Chile offers valuable lessons. 
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10.4 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE AREAS OF RESEARCH 
There are important issues that have not been investigated further as part of this research 
due to theoretical scope and word length limitations. Although they are not the central 
topic of this thesis, problems such as environmental concerns of resource-based 
development and the redistributional effects of different diversification strategies should 
be addressed in future research.  
10.4.1 Environmental concerns 
Environmental sustainability is certainly an important consideration when it comes to 
resource-based development, especially if ‘development’ is understood holistically as a 
process that cuts across political, social, economic and ecological boundaries. This thesis 
has mentioned environmental sustainability issues in the context of salmon farming in 
Chile (especially the tragedy of commons that led to the ISA virus). Nevertheless, other 
relevant environmental issues that could not be further addressed include the increase of 
deforestation in Malaysia over the past decades partly due to the expansion of palm oil 
plantations, and the environmental impact of petroleum and copper extraction in 
Malaysia and Chile, respectively. Those considerations will gain importance in the future, 
as it can be anticipated that the countries that minimize the environmental costs of their 
extractive sectors will be those that retain access to the best markets. 
The issue of climate change in the context of resource-based development is an 
interesting area for future investigation. Climate change and resource-based development 
are bound together in a two-way relationship. On the one hand, resource-based 
development bears implications for climate change, both in terms of speeding it through 
CO2 emissions and mitigating it through the production of raw minerals (such as lithium) 
that are required for the production of green technologies.263 On the other hand, climate 
change also bears important implications for the vulnerability of agricultural commodity-
																																																								
263 Minerals and metals are seen as critical for a low-carbon future (World Bank 2017). 
	 300 
dependent countries, and by extension many developing countries.264  
By deepening the topic of linkages arising out of commodities, this thesis has also opened 
new questions for research that relate to renewable energies. In particular, a question that 
can be raised and further investigated relates to the nature of linkages between extractive 
sectors and renewable energy sectors. Understanding the transversal linkages between 
renewable and non-renewable production processes will be central to understanding how 
hydrocarbon-rich economies can transition towards green energy. 
10.4.2 Redistributional effects of different diversification pathways 
The distributional consequences of different export diversification strategies are 
important issues to consider. Chapter 4 examined the distributional consequences of 
export diversification across a large set of countries. However, it should be acknowledged 
that this thesis did not examine the reverse causality, which is the impact of inequality on 
the feasibility and outcomes of different diversification strategies. It can also be 
anticipated that different sectors feature different outcomes in terms of distributional 
effects. Manufacturing was at the heart of modern economic growth because it was 
considered as having the power to create new skills and pay higher wages. Following this 
premise, it can be argued that Chile, despite its relative export diversification (which 
would be expected to reduce income inequalities by expanding employment opportunities 
for different segments of the population), has maintained a highly unequal income 
distribution due to its economic concentration on raw materials (Amsden, 2008; Kay 
2002). In order to fully investigate the main beneficiaries of each diversification pathway, 
we would need to analyse distributional effects not only at the macro level but also at the 
sector and firm level (by looking at degree of firm concentration, their ownership 
structure, labour intensity, workers conditions, land concentration, etc.). Such analysis 
may require going deeper into each country’s history to explain the reproduction of class-
based inequalities in industrial and agricultural contexts, notably through systems of 
																																																								
264 See Kahn et al. (2019) for a discussion on the macroeconomic consequences of climate change 
across countries and sectors. 
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hacienda and latifundio in Chile for instance (See Kay, 1997, 2002; Tinsman, 2013).265 
While these topics are not investigated within the scope of this thesis, chapter 9 
acknowledges some of the interesting distributional dynamics in the forestry and fruit 
sector in Chile (particularly in terms of the limited number of firms and their ownership 
structures). Additionally, this thesis provides an examination of Malaysia’s redistribution 
agenda and its impact on industrial development, given that the NEP was a key feature of 
the country industrial policy since 1970. 
10.4.3 The multidimensional indicator of extractives-based development (MINDEX) 
Most of the economic literature on natural resources has used different indicators of 
resource abundance and resource dependence in isolation from one another. Such 
approach has often resulted in a conflation between resource abundance and resource 
dependence, which has led several studies to be misguided by statistical flaws. The 
diagnostic tool developed in chapter 3 is an effort to go beyond common conceptual 
flaws and reveal the multidimensionality of resource abundance. Developing and 
applying this tool faced some challenges of methodological character, including issues of 
data availability and comparability. Such issues have been addressed through a scoring 
system and appropriate benchmarks for each indicator. The MINDEX may be the most 
comprehensive effort so far to capture the multidimensionality of resource abundance in 
comparison with existing indicators such the Resource Governance Indictor (RGI), the 
Mining Contribution Index (MCI) or the World Bank’s Mining Sector Diagnostic (MSD). 
Future research will aim to scale up this indicator by expanding the database in 
collaboration with civil society organizations and international bodies in order to identify 
patterns across time and across countries.  
  
																																																								
265 Haciendas are large estates or plantations with a dwelling house in the colonies of the Spanish 
Empire. Latifundios are extensive parcels of privately owned land that usually involve the 
exploitation of peasants or slaves. 
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10.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This thesis contributes to the scholarly effort to move away from natural resource 
determinism towards acknowledging that natural resources are neither inherently a curse 
or blessing for development but are instead influenced by state policy actions. More 
particularly, the ambition of this thesis has been to provide a thorough analysis of the role 
of industrial policy for export diversification in economies that are dependent on non-
renewable resources. This objective has been pursued through both conceptual, statistic 
and historical analysis of diversification in Chile and Malaysia over the course of the past 
seventy years. This has been achieved through extensive archival research, and the 
interviewing of close to one hundred people within the government, civil society, 
academia and the business sector.  
A critical reflection can be drawn on the case studies of this thesis. The cases of Chile 
and Malaysia are analyzed to disentangle dynamics of economic diversification in natural 
resource-dependent economies. However, it is worth ending this study by stressing that 
while many lessons can be learned from these two cases, there is no 'one size fits all’ 
approach when is comes to diversification strategies, which are highly context dependent. 
Diversification strategies that can be effectively implemented in one context may be 
much more difficult to implement somewhere else because the political economy of a 
country plays a crucial role the developmental process. A country’s social, cultural, 
political factors contribute to influence both the intention and ability of governments in 
promoting policies that foster or inhibit diversification. This thesis has notably shown 
that the intellectual climate within which economic development took place differed 
considerably between Malaysia and Chile due to ideological and historical differences.  
Nevertheless, one commonality across countries appears to lie in the fact that economic 
diversification policy requires pragmatism, boldness and creativity. As observed by 
Albert Hirschman (1967:13), “Creativity always comes a surprise to us; therefore we can 
never count on it and we dare not believe in it until it has happened. In other words, we 
would not consciously engage upon tasks whose success clearly requires that creativity 
be forthcoming”. However, the failure to engage in creative imagination of alternative 
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realities might inevitably lead to maintaining the status quo. As shown by this thesis, 
economic diversification precisely comes about through the implementation of the 
creative vision of what a country ought to be producing and that is does not already 
produce.  
It has indeed become clearer throughout this thesis that neoclassical approaches and static 
views of comparative advantage, which are path dependent upon established capabilities, 
are unsuitable in explaining the process of structural change of resource-dependent 
economies. Indeed, most of the mainstream policy advice to economic diversification in 
resource rich countries has been dominated by a short-term emphasis on consumption, 
fiscal stabilization and market equilibrium at the expense of long term structural change. 
As a result, such approaches have only addressed the symptoms of the resource curse 
(vulnerability to commodity price volatility) but not its root cause (productive 
dependence on commodities).  
In contrast, approaches that take into account the dynamic acquisition of comparative 
advantage can greatly enhance our understanding of the key factors behind capabilities 
accumulation, industrial development and structural productive transformation in 
resource-dependent countries. This thesis found that government interventions that 
successfully promoted new sectors and activities in previously resource-dependent 
economies went far beyond simply fixing market failure and instead shaped the 
productive accumulation of capabilities to promote new activities and sectors, both within 
and beyond commodity value chains. The role of industrial policy in guiding the export 
diversification process consequently also stems from the non-market directed nature of 
the diversification process, and the recognition that the accumulation of capabilities is 
complex and affected by a country’s institutional and structural characteristics. 
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APPENDIX A:  
 
Scoring Criteria Underlying the MINDEX 
 
 
Table A1: Overall selected country data. 
 
Country	
	
	
	
Year	
	
	
	
Extractives	
exports	
	
	
	
Government	
extractives	
revenues	
	
	
Extractives	
in	
government	
revenues	
	
Extractives	
rents	
	
	
Extractive	
reserves	
	
	
Extractives	
in	total	
exports	
	
Chile	
	
2010	 0.7	 0.6	 0.2	 0.7	 0.7	 0.5	
1997	 0.4	 0.3	 0	 0.4	 0.7	 0.5	
2016	 0.6	 0.4	 0	 0.7	 0.7	 0.5	
Malaysia	
	
1997	 0.3	 0.4	 0.1	 0.3	 0.6	 0.1	
2010	 0.6	 0.6	 0.5	 0.5	 0.6	 0.2	
2016	 0.6	 0.6	 0.2	 0.3	 0.6	 0.2	
Algeria	
	
1997	 0.3	 0.6	 0.6	 0.3	 0.7	 1	
2010	 0.6	 0.7	 0.6	 0.6	 0.7	 1	
2016	 0.4	 0.6	 0.6	 0.6	 0.7	 1	
Iran	
	
2010	 0.6	 0.7	 0.5	 0.7	 1	 0.9	
2016	 0.3	 0.6	 0.3	 0.6	 1	 0.8	
Singapore	 2010	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0.3	
Norway	
	
1997	 0.9	 1	 0.2	 0.7	 1	 0.6	
2010	 1	 1	 0.3	 1	 1	 0.7	
2016	 1	 1	 0.2	 0.9	 1	 0.6	
DRC	
	
2010	 0.1	 0	 0.1	 0.1	 0.8	 0.9	
2014	 0.1	 0.1	 0.3	 0.2	 0.8	 1	
Burkina	
Faso	
	
2010	 0.1	 0.1	 0.1	 0.1	 0.3	 0.6	
2016	 0.1	 0.1	 0.2	 0.2	 0.3	 0.8	
Chad	 2010	 0.3	 0.3	 0.8	 0.3	 0.5	 0.9	
Mali	 2010	 0.2	 0.1	 0.2	 0.2	 0.3	 0.8	
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Table A2: Country Measurements for the MINDEX (Chapter 3). 
 
Table A2a: Chile 
Indicators  1990  1997 2010 2016 
Data Score Data Score Data Score Data Score 
Mineral reserves (USD)* 687 bil. 0.8 687 
bil. 
0.8 687 bil. 0.8 687 bil. 0.8 
Mineral reserves  
(USD per capita) 
51880 
 
0.8 46751 
 
0.7 40428 
 
0.7 38359 
 
0.7 
Mineral rents  
(USD per capita) 
250 0.4 353 0.4 2248  0.7 1375 0.7 
Mineral exports  
(USD per capita) 
n/a n/a 557  0.4 2745 0.7 1768 0.6 
Share of minerals in 
exports 
51% 0.5 52% 0.5 50% 0.5 53,2 0.5 
Government resource 
revenues (USD per capita) 
n/a n/a 113 0.3 563 0.6 178 0.4 
Resource revenues in 
government revenues(%)** 
Around 
20% 
0.2 >5% 0.0 20% 0.2 1.7% 0.0 
*Chile holds 170 million metric tons of copper reserves and 8.4 million tons of lithium reserves. Source: 
U.S. Geological Survey (2019) 
** Source: AfDB (2017); Fuentes (2010) and Gallagher and Porzecanski (2010). 
 
Table A2b: Norway  
Indicators 1997 2010 2016 
Data Score Data Score Data Score 
Mineral reserves in USD* 559 bil .  0.8 559 bil .  0.8 559 bil .  0.8 
Mineral reserves in USD per capita 126897 1 114332 1. 106791 1. 
Mineral rents (USD per capita) 2221 0.7 6971 1. 4088 0.9 
Mineral exports (USD per capita) 6,662 0.9 18,665 1 10,080 1 
Share of minerals in exports 64% 0.6 70% 0.7 61.6% 0.6 
Government resource revenues 
(constant USD per capita) 
5391 
 
1 9,887 
 
1 3770 
 
1 
Resource revenues in government 
revenues (%) ** 
18% 0.2 27% 0.3 11% 0.2 
*Norway holds crude oil reserves of 6,611,000,000 barrels (USD 308 billion) and natural gas reserves of 
1,856 billion m3 (USD251 billion). Source: CIA (2018) 
**Source: Norsk Petroleum (2018), Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2010). 
 
Table A2c: Algeria  
Indicators 1997 2010 2016 
Data Score Data Score Data Score 
Mineral reserves*  1.2 trillion 1  1.2 trillion 1  1.2 trillion 1 
Mineral reserves in USD per capita 40151 0.7 33225 0.7 29552 0.7 
Mineral rents (USD per capita) 179 0.3 886 0.6 527 0.6 
Mineral exports (USD per capita) 453 0.3 1556 0.6 704 0.4 
Share of minerals in exports 96% 1 97% 1. 95% 1. 
Government resource revenues 
(constant USD per capita) 
394 0.6 1081 0.7 493 0.6 
Share of resource revenues in total 
government revenues. ** 
62% (1999) 0.6 
 
60% 0.6 60-66% 0.6 
*Algeria holds natural gas reserves of 4,504 billion m3 (USD608 billion) and crude oil reserves of 12,200 
billion barrels (USD570 billion). Source: CIA (2018) 
**Source: IMF (2000)   
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Table A2d: Malaysia  
Indicators 1990 1997 2010 2016	
Data Score Data Score Data Score Data	 Score	
Mineral reserves (USD)* 328 bil. 0.7 328 bil. 0.7 328 bil. 0.7 328 bil. 0.7 
Mineral reserves in USD 
per capita 
18184 
 
0.6 15210 
 
0.6 11667 
 
0.6 10517 
 
0.6 
Mineral rents 
(USD per capita) 
257  0.4 224 0.3 485 0.5 223  0.3 
Mineral exports 
(USD per capita) 
n/a n/a 348.75 0.3 1267 0.6     1097 0.6 
Share of minerals in 
exports 
17% 0.2 13% 0.1 24% 0.2 19% 0.2 
Government resource 
revenues (USD per 
capita) 
283 
(1992) 
0.5 208 0.4 625 0.6 429 0.6 
Resource revenues in 
government revenues ** 
9.4% 0.1 9.4% 0.1 45% 
(2012) 
0.5 22% 0.2 
*1183 billion m3 of natural gas reserves (valued at USD160 billion) and 3,6 billion barrels of crude oil 
reserves (valued at USD168 billion). Source: CIA (2018) 
** Data for 1980, 1990 and 1997 are based on averaged data for the time periods 1980-85 and 1991-95 
(see Wee Chong Hui, 2008) 
 
Table A2e: Singapore  
Indicators  Data (2010) Score (2010) 
Mineral reserves 0 0 
Mineral reserves in USD per capita 0 0 
Mineral rents (USD per capita) 0 0 
Mineral exports (USD per capita) 12,827 (5th) 1.0 
Share of minerals in exports 28% 0.3 
Government resource revenues (USD per capita) 5.69 0 
Share of government revenues in total revenues 0 0 
 
Table A2f: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
Indicators 2010 2014 
Data Score Data Score 
Mineral reserves (in USD)* >3,4 trillion  1 >3,4 trillion 1. 
Mineral reserves in USD per capita 52694 0.8 46119* 0.8 
Mineral rents (in USD per capita) 49 0.1 95 0.2 
Mineral exports (in USD per capita) 72 0.1 55 (2016) 0.1 
Share of minerals in exports 91% 0.9 97% 1.0 
Government resource revenues (USD per capita): 
source EITI (2019) 
USD13 0.0 USD25 0.1 
Government resource revenues (USD per capita): 
source: ICTD 
7 
 
0.0 5 0.0 
Share of government revenues in total revenues** 12% 0.1 25% 0.3 
*We have reasons to believe that the value of DRC’s mineral reserves is much higher, because of limited 
exploration to date. The most important minerals for the DRC are cobalt, copper, and diamonds, but the 
country also produces some gold, tin, iron, nickel, and tantalum, amongst others, which I have not 
included in the measurement. According to some sources, the DRC has over USD24 trillion in mineral 
deposits (Migiro, 2018; Mining in Africa, 2018; Morgan, 2009). However, this number may be 
exaggerated. According to my own calculations and methodology (averaging prices for the period 1990-
2016), DRC’s diamond reserves (around 150 million carats) represent a value of USD 3.165 trillion. 
DRC’s cobalt reserves are valued at USD153 billion, while its copper reserves (of around 20 million 
metric tons) are valued at around USD80 billion. DRC’s lithium reserves (1 million tons according to 
estimates from the United States Geological Survey) are valued at around USD5 billion.  
** Sources: Anyanzwa (2017) 
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Table A2g: Burkina Faso 
Indicators 2010 2016 
Data Score Data Score 
Mineral reserves* (in USD) 29 billion 0.4 29 billion 0.4 
Mineral reserves in USD per capita 1858 0.3 1555 0.3 
Mineral rents (USD per capita) 42 0.1 55 (2015) 0.2 
Mineral exports (USD per capita) 57 0.1 89 0.1 
Share of minerals in exports 61.5% 0.6 76,6% 0.8 
Government resource revenues (USD per capita) USD21 (2012) 0.1 USD 14 0.1 
Share of resource revenues in total government 
revenues. ** 
Between 5% and 
16% 
0.1 15.9% 
(2015) 
0.2 
* Only gold reserves have been measured and valued in this table. Burkina Faso holds around 1,23% of world gold 
reserves, equivalent to around 45,746,412 ounce of gold (author’s calculations using data from Natural Resource 
Holdings, 2013) 
** See EITI (2013, 2016, 2018)  
 
Table A2h: Chad  
Indicators Data (2010) Score (2010) 
Mineral reserves* USD 70 billion 0.5 
Mineral reserves in USD per capita 5889 0.5 
Mineral rents (USD per capita) 186 0.3 
Mineral exports (USD per capita) USD 315 0.3 
Share of minerals in exports 93% 0.9 
Government resource revenues (USD per capita) 114.5 0.3 
Share of resource revenues in total gov revenues.** 75% (IMF) 0.75 
*Source: CIA (2018) 
** Source (IMF, 2016) 
 
Table A2i: Mali  
Indicators Data (2010) Score (2010) 
Mineral reserves* 19 billion 0.3 
Mineral reserves in USD per capita 1260 0.3 
Mineral rents (in USD per capita) 68 0.2 
Mineral exports (in USD per capita) 107 0.2 
Share of minerals in exports 77% 0.8 
Government resource revenues (USD per capita) 15 (2013) 0.1 
Share of resource revenues in total gov revenues** 17.6 (2007)  0.2 
* Only comprised of gold and zinc. Mali holds around 800 metric tons of gold reserves equivalent to 25,720,597 
ounces and 1,7 million metric tons of zinc reserves. Source: EITI (2018b) 
** EITI (2018b) 
 
Table A2j: Iran 
Indicators 2010 2016 
Data Score Data Score 
Mineral reserves* 11 trillion 1 11 trillion 1 
Mineral reserves in USD per capita 147517 1 137025 1 
Mineral rents (USD per capita) 1416 0.7 832 0.6 
Mineral exports (USD per capita) 1011 0.6 404 0.3 
Share of minerals in exports 87% 0.9 79,3% 0.8 
Government resource revenues (constant USD per capita) 831 0.7 391 0.6 
Share of resource revenues in total government revenues** 50-60%  0.5 34% 0.3 
*Iran holds 33,500 billion m3 of natural gas reserves (valued at USD 4,523 billion) and 158,4 billion barrels of 
crude oil reserves (valued at 7,080 billion USD). Source: CIA (2018) 
**See Farzanegan (2011) and Financial Tribune (2018). 
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APPENDIX B:  
 
Historical Phases of Industrial Policy in Malaysia 
 
It is difficult to distinguish clear phases of industrialization in Malaysia due to the 
heterogeneous industrial strategy and policy across sectors (some sectors were guided by 
an ISI strategy while others were guided by an EOI strategy). However, four broad 
phases of industrialization can be reasonably distinguished, as done in Alavi (1996), 
Gopal (2001), and Lall (1995), and as summarized in the following table. 
Table B1: Industrial strategy and policy tools employed in Malaysia  
 
Source: Lall, 1995, Alavi (1996) and Gopal (2001) 
  
Period Industrial 
strategy 
Some industrial policy tools Emphasis 
1957 - 1970 FDI-led ISI Tariffs and fiscal incentives Simple consumer 
goods 
1970 - 1980 Export oriented 
industrialization 
(EOI) 
Free trade zones 
Fiscal incentives and FDI 
promotion 
Investment Incentives Act (1968) 
Industrial Coordination Act 
(1975) 
Manufacturing 
(electronics) 
Textile 
Bumiputra equity 
ownership and 
employment 
1980 - 1985 ISI in heavy 
industries 
Investments by SOEs 
Fiscal incentives and FDI 
promotion 
National Heavy Industry Policy 
National Industrialization policy 
Malaysia Incorporated Policy 
Heavy industries 
Bumiputra equity 
ownership and 
employment 
1985 - 2005 Export 
Promotion 
Fiscal incentives and FDI 
promotion 
Industrial Master Plans 1 and 2 
Promotion of investment Act 
(1986) 
Bumiputra equity 
ownership and 
employment 
Resource-Based 
industries and 
manufacturing 
2006 - 2020 Export 
Promotion 
Fiscal incentives and FDI 
promotion 
Economic transformation 
Programme 
Industrial Master Plan 3 
Resource-Based 
industries and High 
Tech activities 
Bumiputra 
employment 
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APPENDIX C:  
 
Categorization of some of Chile’s Policy Interventions since 1973 
Table C1: Categorization of some of Chile’s Policy Interventions since 1973 266 
 Horizontal Vertical  
 
Public goods 
provision  
 Regulatory and 
Quality control 
bodies for 
foodstuff 
Servicio Agrícola Ganadero 
(SAG), Subpesca, Sernapesca, 
Chinquihue Foundation267; 
‘Mesa del Salmon ’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market 
intervention 
SME credit 
& financing:  
 
CORFO GIF windows, 
FOGAPE, SERCOTEC 
loan preparation 
programme, credit lines 
from BancoEstado 
Public venture 
capitalism and 
entrepreneurship:  
Fundación Chile, Codelco. 
Targeted 
subsidies 
 
 
 
Decreto Ley 701, reimbursing 
75% of the cost of reforestation 
and Decreto Ley 2565 
increasing the subsidy to 90% 
(1979). 
Central Bank’s subsidized 
credits for forestry sector. 
CORFO FDI subsidies for ICT 
sectors. 
Economies 
of scale & 
SME 
upgrading:  
 
CORFO’s programmes 
such as the supplier 
development 
programme (PDP), 
entrepreneurial 
management 
programme, FONTEC, 
PROFO, FAT, FOCAL. Sector-specific 
education:  
Chile-California programme 
 
Technology 
transfer and 
sectoral research 
on investment 
opportunities 
 
The Salmon Technology 
Institute, SERNAP, IFOP 
(Fisheries Development 
Institute), Institute of 
Agricultural Research 
(INIA),the Forestry Institute; 
the Fishing Development Plan; 
the Institute for Geological 
Research; National Mining and 
Geological Service; and the 
Natural Resources Research 
Institute (IREN), Cochilco, 
Programme of Science and 
Technology (PCT) 
Export 
subsidies:  
Reintegro simplificado 
(discontinued 2003)  
Training & 
technical 
assistance:  
National Training and 
Employment Service 
(SENCE, 1976), 
National Training Fund 
(1998), CONICYT 
Generic 
export 
promotion:  
ProChile (1975), 
SERCOTEC (1982) and 
negotiation of FTAs 
R&D 
subsidies:  
CORFO Innova 
Agricultural 
protection:  
Higher tariffs for four groups 
of products with price bands Investment 
subsidies 
Central Bank’s Debt 
Equity Swaps 
programme 
Source: Author’s update of an existing table in Agosin, Larrain and Grau (2010), using data provided by 
Bravo-Ortega and Eterovic (2015), Meller and Zenteno (2013), and information contained in chapter 8.  
 
  
																																																								
266 The policy instruments examined here mostly relate to market interventions, while horizontal 
public goods provision have not been the core focus of this thesis. 
267 Chinquihue Foundation set up by the regional government of Los Lagos, aims to improve the 
capacity of artisanal fishing communities within the Los Lagos Region. 
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APPENDIX D:  
 
Data used for the difference-in-difference policy evaluation method in chapter 9 
 
 
 
Table D1: Data on the fruit and vegetable exports of Chile (1964-2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Vegetable products were identified and grouped using the STIC codes 54, 56 and 292. 
** Fruit products were identified and grouped using the STIC codes 57 and 58. 
Sources: Center for International Data (2018) and UN Comtrade (2018) 
 
 
Table D2: Data on fish exports of Chile (1963-2016) 	
Export 
Value  
 
(in USD 
million) 
 
 
Products 1963 1969 1986 1989 1993 1998 2003 2007 2013 2016 
Salmonids 0 0 5 50 291 714 1147 2243 3517 3844 
Non 
salmonids  15 33.1 385 693 698 856 1013 1697 1473 1246 
Total fishery 
exports 15 33.1 390 743 989 1570 2160 3940 4990 5090 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 
(%) 
 
Products 1969-2016 
 
1969-1986 
 
1986-2016 
 
Non 
salmonids 7.1% 15.5% 4.0% 
Salmonids N/A N/A 24.8% 	
Sources: Author’s calculations based on compiled data from SalmonChile’s databases (2009, 2018), 
UNCTAD (2006b), Achurra (1995), Center for International Data (2018), UN Comtrade (2018).		
 
  
Export 
Value 
 
(in 
USD 
1000) 
 
Products 1964 1969 1974 1979 1994 1999 2009 2017 
Vegetable 
Products* 
 
12503 
 
8118 
 
32099 
 
83053 
 
321629 
 
397961 
 
608720 
 
762989 
 
Fruits** 
 
13254 
 
15159 
 
36953 
 
210445 
 
1519098 
 
2086220 
 
3686767 
 
5747827 
 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 
(%) 
 
 
Products 1964-1974 1974-1999 1974-2017 
Vegetable 
Products 
 
10.0% 
 
10.6% 
 
7.6% 
 
Fruits 
 
10.8% 
 
17.5% 
 
12.5% 
 
	 361 
APPENDIX E 	
Palm oil exports in Malaysia after 1994 
 
 
Table E1: Malaysia’s palm oil exports between 1994 and 2012 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data in UN Comtrade (2018) 
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